Authority and democracy in industry: the relevance of theories of industrial democracy to contemporary industrial organizations by Calvert, John Robert
AUTHORITY Aim DEMOCRACY III INDUSTRY : THE
RELEVANCE OP THEORIES OP INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY TO CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS
By
John Robert Calvert
A Thesis submitted to the University of London in partial
«
fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy.
London School of Economic
September, 1976
ABSTRACT
It is commonly assumed that contemporary industrial organizations 
are structured according to the dictates of technology, size, expertize 
and administrative needs and hence that property no longer plays a major 
role in determining either the priorities of industry or the way in 
which industrial undertakings are organized. The purpose of this thesis 
is to challenge this assumption and to argue that despite the numerous 
technical advances of the past century, workers’ control remains a viable 
and desirable alternative to the present system.
The first part of the thesis analyzes the development of management 
in the West from F.W. Taylor to the present and concludes, first, that 
managers are agents of shareholders, not independent professionals and, 
second, that the subordination of industry to property has led to a 
systematic exclusion of workers from the decision making process.to ensure 
that they do not obstruct the pursuit of shareholders’ objectives. Thus 
the circumscribed role that workers now play in industry is primarily a 
result of the constraints of ownership, not industrialization.
In the second part of the thesis the consequences of excluding workers 
from industrial decision making are examined. Contrary to the fashionable 
assumption that the consumer benefits arising from industry’s present 
emphasis on efficiency and productivity outweigh any losses incurred by 
workers as a result of their subordination to property, it is argued that 
such costs are exceedingly high. Methods of production which maximize 
output frequently involve major risks to the physical health and safety 
of workers and pose a threat to their psychological well-being. But, 
more significantly, the possibility of utilizing work as an avenue for 
creativity and self-development is effectively stifled because the owners 
who control industry have no interest in such objectives.
-3, -
The third, part of the thesis looks at the effectiveness of the 
collective bargaining approach to industrial democracy, as outlined 
by the Webbs and Hugh Clegg, in redressing the abuses of private 
ownership. It concludes that because collective bargaining accepts 
the subordination of workers to property, it fails to protect their 
rights and interests adequately. Consequently, a more radical approach 
is called for.
Thus, in the final part of the thesis, we turn to examine 
R.H. Tawney’s proposals for the démocratisation of industry. Tawney’s 
arguments that industry could be founded upon the principles of 
co-operation and fellowship rather than hierarchy and subordination, 
vie maintain, are no less relevant today than when he first advanced them 
half a century ago. As the Yugoslav experiment in workers’ management 
demonstrates, the idea of workers' control constitutes a perfectly 
feasible - and desirable - basis upon which to manage a modem economy.
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PART I
PROPERTY. SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I
"Lack of efficient management will spell lack of b r e a d . S u o h
was Joseph Schumpeter's assessment of the probable outcome of workers1 2
management, for he believed that the management function required a
degree of expertise, specialization and training beyond the reach of
ordinary workers* hence it was impossible for them to exercise control
over management decision-making without undermining economio efficiency.
Even under socialism, which Schumpeter regarded as a likely development
in the West, there would be little room for workers to participate in
management. Like its capitalist predecessor, the socialist society
would still require the services of a specialized, highly-trained group
2of executives to run its industries efficiently.
For many, the argument that the complexity of the management function 
precludes workers' control has proved convincing. Clarke Kerr, for 
example, maintains that the roles of managers and managed are defined by 
a "logic of industrialization." The management function, he contends, is 
not greatly influenced by considerations of power or class interest.
■ 7 -
1. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, 1966) 
(orig. pub. 1943) p. 299»
2. Ibid., pp. 201-218, 284-302. However, as Robert Weinberg points out, 
Schumpeter altered his position slightly in the period just before 
his death. He came to believe that industry might gain certain 
important benefits by encouraging a greater degree of participation 
among workers. Nevertheless, he still adhered to the view that higher 
level decision-making must remain in the hands of those qualified for 
it. See* Joseph Schumpeter "The March into Socialism" in Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, op. cit., pp. 416-425 as cited by*
Robert Weinberg, Workers' Control* A Study in Contemporary Socialist 
Thought (University of London Ph.D., I960) p. 26.
*• 8 *•
Rather, it is determined by the technical and administrative needs of 
modem industrial societies. The size and complexity of industry 
within such societies necessitates a high level of co-ordination and 
planning. Consequently, those who perform these functions - the managers - 
must possess a correspondingly high level of skill and expertise. And they 
must be allowed the authority to carry out the policies which they see as 
necessary to ensure the satisfactory functioning of industry. The resulting 
subordination of workers is an unfortunate, but necessary, aspect of modem 
industry.'*
In a similar vein, Alan Flanders, one of Britain's leading industrial
relations theorists, maintains that "The source of the power of management
is not ownership as such, but organization."^ And he goes on to note that,
inevitably, "a combination of large-scale organization and centralization
5of decision-making will result in massive power at the top." For this 
reason he doubts that the question of ownership has much impact on the way 
modem industry is organized. Flanders does not deny that, in theory, 
property rights give owners exclusive control over decision-making. But he 
believes that this theory now "has no relevance to the facts of modem 
industry."^ *46
3» Clarke Kerr, John T. Dunlop et. al., Industrialism and Industrial Man 
(London, 1973)» (orig. pub. 1959) Ch, 1. and pp. 300, J01. Their 
position is re-affirmed in a more recent publication. Seet Clarke Kerr, 
John T. Dunlop et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man Reconsidered 
(Princeton, 1975)*
4. Alan Flanders, "The Internal Social Responsibilities of Industry" in 
Alan Flanders (ed.) Management and Unions (London, 1970)» (the essay 
is dated 1966), p. 135.
5« Ibid.. p. 1J6.
6. Ibid.. p. 139.
Another analyst of contemporary industrial organizations, Robert Blauner,
attributes a key role in determining authority relationships between workers
and managers to technology. Blauner argues that the amount of control
exercised by workers over their jobs is largely a reflection of the level
n
of technological development in each industry. Thus in traditional craft 
industries, where products are not standardized and where a high level of 
skill is required, they have considerable say in the organization of their 
work. However, in industries characterized by mechanized technology, workers 
perform routine, closely-supervised tasks: hence their discretion is 
sharply reduced. Finally, in industries using automated technology, they 
regain much of their control because their tasks now involve monitoring
8complex machinery which demands a high level of responsibility and skill. 
Although Blauner does not emphasize the impact of size and administrative 
complexity to the same degree as the preceding writers, he shares their 
belief that the question of property ownership is of little relevance in 
determining how modem industry is organized. 7
The belief that the management function is primarily a technical and 
administrative one has been reinforced by the argument that ownership is 
nov/ divorced from control. Although Marx noted that the early joint stook 
company gave rise to a potential separation between the functions of 
ownership and management, it was not until A.A. Berle and Gardiner Means 
published their pioneering study, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, *8
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7. Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago, 1964),esp. Ch. 1,
2 and 8.
8* Ibid.. Ch. 3, 4 and 5«
9» Indeed, Blauner explicitly rejects the view that ownership is a
significant constraint on contemporary industrial organization. See« 
Ibid.. p. 3.
— 10 —
that the full implications of this development emerged.^ Berle and 
Means examined the largest two hundred American companies in 193P to 
find out if shareholders maintained effective control. They concluded 
that in 44$ of the firms» representing 58$ of the total assets» management 
had usurped the traditional prerogatives of owners. And the trend towards 
management control appeared irreversible. Moreover, in 44$ of the 
remaining companies, control was exercised by a legal device such as 
pyramiding or by minority ownership. In either case»the effect was the 10
10, Karl Marx, Capital. Vol. Ill as cited by:Half Dahrendorf, Class and 
Class Conflict in Industrial Society. (Stanford, 1959) (orig. pub.-in 
German in 1$87), pp. 41-43. The early Fabians also noted the separation 
of ownership from management. See* W. Clarke, "The Industrial Basis of 
Socialism" in George Bernard Shaw et al., Fabian Essays (Jubilee, ed. 
1948) pp, 78-80 as cited by Robert Weinberg, op, cit., p. 11,
Dahrendorf suggests that Marx's analysis points to the conclusion that: 
"...joint stock companies involve a complete break with earlier 
capitalist traditions,” And, he argues that contemporary Marxists 
have failed to see the significance of Marx's views on this question. 
Consequently, they have opposed the separation of ownership from 
control thesis even though Marx himself accepted this view. However, 
Dahrendorf's interpretation of Marx has been criticized recently by 
Maurice Zeitlin who contends that Dahrendorf has misinterpreted the 
Hegelian meaning which Marx gave to the German word Aufgehoben. This 
word usually means abolition. But, argues Zeitlin, Marx followed 
Hegel in giving it the meaning of rebirth through destruction. Thus 
the passage in Marx to which Dahrendorf refers - "the abolition of 
capital as private property within the framework of capitalist 
production itself” - ought to be interpreted as "recreating while 
abolishing," Zeitlin goes on to point out several other passages 
where Mhrx clearly indicated that he did not see the separation of 
ownership from management leading to the peaceful abolition of the 
capitalist mode of production. See: Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate 
Ownership and Control* The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class" 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79» No. 5, pp. 1113-1115, See 
also* Michel De Vroey, "The Corporation and the Labour Process* The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations" Review 
of Radical Political Economics. Vol. 7» No. 2, Summer 1975» PP* 1-9.
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same* the ordinary shareholder was effectively disenfranchised.
Berle and Means identified several factors which they thought were
responsible for undermining the position of ordinary stockholders. First,
shares were becoming increasingly dispersed among a larger number of 
12owners. Whereas a century earlier public companies had had only a
handful of subscribers, the modem corporation frequently had tens of
thousands. This dispersion of ownership made co-ordinated action by
13shareholders to protect their interests almost impossible. Secondly,
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (New York, 1948) (orig. pub. 1932), p. 94. Their
classification of enterprises according to type of control was as
follows»
Type of Control By Number By Wealth
Management Control 44$ 58$
Legal device 21$ 22$
Minority control 23$ 14$
Majority ownership 5$ 2$
Private ownership 6$ 4$
in hands of receiver 1$ Negligible
ÎÔÔ$ 100%
Several recent studies using the Berle and Means method of categorizing 
firms have pointed even more strongly towards the conclusion that 
management has usurped control. The most notable of these, by 
Robert J. Lamer, found that of the top 200 U.S. non-financial companies, 
84$ were under management control. Moreover, 70$ of the next largest 
300 companies were controlled by management. However, as we shall see 
later in this chapter, the methods used by both Berle and Means and 
Lamer to establish who is in control are open to criticism. See»
Robert J. Lamer, Management Control and the Large Corporation 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1970) p. 21. In Great Britain, qualified support 
for the Berle and Means view is to be found in the extensive survey of 
industry by P, Sargant Florence, Ownership, Control and Success of 
Large Companies (London, 1961)} P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of 
British and American Industry (London, 1955) (revised 19^1 and again 
in 1972) pp. 211-240 of 1972 ed.
12. Ibid., pp. 47-68. Berle and Means did note some exceptions to this trend, 
but felt that it was becoming more and more difficult for any small group 
of shareholders to own a sufficient portion of shares to maintain control.
13« Ibid., p. 66. According to Michel de Vroey, the German Marxist,
R. Helferding noted the dispersal of share ownership as early as 1910 in 
his study Das Finanz Kapital. Anticipating the views of subsequent 
Marxists, Helferding believed that this dispersal of ownership was 
accompanied by a concentration of power in the hands of the largest 
owners. See* Michel De Vroey, "The Corporation and the Labour Process»
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations", op. cit.
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economic power was becoming more concentrated as enterprises grew ever 
larger in size.^ This meant that effective control of economic decision­
making was passing into the hands of a diminishing number of individuals
who were becoming less and less accountable to the owners they ostensibly 
15represented. These developments - the dispersal of ownership and the
concentration of control - were revolutionizing the business enterprise.
The traditional rights of property were being split into two components!
passive ownership and active management.^ ''The dissolution of the atom
of property", Berle and Means argued, "destroys the very foundation on
17which the economic order of the past three centuries has rested."
But the rise of the modem corporation not only separated ownership
from control of industry! It also gave rise to a situation "...where
18the interests of owner and manager may and often do diverge." As a
14. Ibid.. pp. 18-46. For a more recent statement of their position see«
A.A. Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York,
1954) PP. 25-60} A.A. Berle. Power Without Property (New York, 1959) 
pp. 69-76.
15. A.A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private 
Property, op. cit.. pp. 44-46.
16. Ibid.. p. 66} A.A. Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution, 
0£. cit., pp. 29-51.
17» Ibid.. p. 8. See, as well« A.A. Berle, Power (New York, 1967) pp. 191“ 
227 and passim.
18. Ibid.. p. 6. Berle and Means devoted several chapters to the various 
methods available to managers for enriching themselves at the expense 
of shareholders. They concluded that some practices could be corrected 
by changes in the law. However, most abuses arose from the fact that 
it was necessary to delegate to management wide responsibilities in 
order to allow it to perform its job properly. As long as such 
discretionary powers were available to managers, it was impossible 
to prevent them from using them for their own interests. A.A. Berle 
and Gardiner Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, op. 
cit.. pp. 153-219. See, as well« A.A. Berle, The Twentieth Century 
Capitalist Revolution, op. cit.. Ch. Ill} A.A. Berle, Power Without 
Property (New York, 1959). In this latter publication Berle gives a 
rather different outline of the motivations of top executives«
"...(T)he corporation manager of today is essentially a civil servant 
seeking reputation, power and a pension; in most cases he has long 
ceased to be a tycoon seeking billions." Ibid., p. 145. This change 
from the earlier position reflected his growing interest in the idea 
that managers were becoming socially responsible - a point which we 
shall discuss later in the chapter. For a good critique of Berle*s 
recent position, See* K.W. Wedderbum, "Certified Publio Accountant"
The New York Review of Books. June 18, 1970, pp. 25, 26-32} and,
Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology (London, 1969) Ch. 1.
consequence, the dominant role of property ownership in guiding economic
activity had been undermined. Managers were now free to determine the
activities of their corporations largely according to their own priorities
and often against the interests of the shareholders they represented.
A decade later, James Burnham took the Berle and Means argument a
step further. He contended that managers were not simply becoming a
separate administrative group, but, more ominously, that they were emerging
as a new and distinot class. The days of capitalist owners were numbered,
for the managers who were gradually usurping control of industry were
19coming to recognize that shareholders were dispensable. Burnham felt
that most of the owners cited in Ferdinand Lundberg's America's Study
Families had already "...withdrawn from any serious direct active contact
with the economic process," He did not deny that capitalist control of
the financial institutions was still an important factor ensuring that
industry was run in the interests of shareholders. However, he felt that
the withdrawal of owners from the actual management of production would
gradually erode their ability to maintain this overarching financial 
21control.
Although post-war social scientists have usually eschewed Burnham*a 
pessimism, they have been greatly influenced by the separation of ownership
- 13-
19, James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (London, 1942), pp. 94-99« 
However, as G.D.H. Cole notes, Burnham's thesis is plagued by, 
ambiguities arising from his inconsistent and confusing use of terms 
such as elite and olass. See: G.D.H. Cole, Studies in Class Structure 
(London, 1955) PP. 98, 99, 104, 105«
20, Ibid., p, 96. In the United States several years later, R.A. Gordon 
published an equally influential book on this theme. Gordon, however, 
emphasized the 'professionalization* of management. See< Robert Aaron 
Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (Washington, 1945)«
21, James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution, op. cit., pp, 96-99 and nasaim. 
For a critique of Burnham's argument see, Theo Niohols, Ownership.
Control and Ideology, op. cit,, Ch. II, t
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from control thesis. As Maurice Zeitlin notes, there is now an
'•astonishing consensus" among economists, sociologists and political
22scientists alike that the Berle and Means argument is true. For 
example, C.A.R. Crosland, in his well known book, The Future of 
Socialism, contends that:
The owner, far from being an active 
entrepreneur, has become the familiar 
passive shareholder, neither in fact 
controlling his firm, nor capable of 
doing so even if he wished, since 
effective government by shareholders 
is now a physical impossibility. They 
are both too numerous - some industrial 
enterprises have over 100,000 on their 
register, and most public companies have 
over 2,000 - and too geographically
scattered.25
Crosland concedes that there are instances where shareholders still
exercise control over managers« but he argues that these are "exceptional
cases"," remnants of an earlier stage of industrialism when owner-
24
managers were the norm. In contemporary industrial societies, the 
management function is now one of applying administrative expertise and 
technical competence to the problems of industrial production. Because 
managers, not owners, possess these skills, shareholders' control is 
rapidly coming to an end. Consequently, while the owners still have a
22. Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large
Corporation and the Capitalist Class" American Journal of Sociology, 
op. cit.. pp. 1073, 1074* Zeitlin is repeating a phrase used by 
Dahrendorf in Class and Class Confllot, op. cit., to underline the 
extent of agreement among contemporary scholars on this issue.
23» C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, 1964) (orig.
pub. 1956) p. 267» Crosland has re-affirmed his position on this 
issue in his most recent publication. See: C.A.R. Crosland, "Social 
Democracy in Europe", Fabian Traot No. 438 (London, 1975)»
24. Ibid.T p. 267. See also: C.A.R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy 
(London, 1962)} C.A.R. Crosland, Socialism Now (London, 1974) esp. 
pp. 26-44*
legal claim to the profits of industry, they are no longer in a position 
to dictate how it shall be run*^
The noted economist, J«K. Galbraith, adds his support to the views
just outlined. Galbraith argues that, historically, control of production
has been exercised by those who possess the‘factor of production which is
most difficult to obtain. In feudal society, those who owned land were 
26dominant. In the period of capitalist expansion, the demand for capital
was greater than that for labour or land; hence the owners of capital were
able to assert their control over production. ' However, with the rise of
the modem corporation, the situation has again changed. Because the
corporation normally retains sufficient earnings for its investment needs,
it is no longer dependent upon the capital market. Indeed, it frequently
has an embarrassing surplus of capital. As capital is no longer scarce,
the power of its owners is greatly diminished. Who, then, has replaced
them? Galbraith answers in the following way»
Power has,in fact, passed to what anyone in 
search of novelty might be justified in calling 
a new factor of production. This is the 
association of men of diverse technical knowledge, 
experience or other talent which modem industrial 
technology and planning require. Ijr extends from 
the leadership of modem industrial enterprise 
down to just short of the labour force and embraces
- 15 -
25» C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op* cit.. This argument 
also had considerable impact on Labour Party policy during the 
1950*3 and early 1960*s. See« Industry and Society (Labour Party, 
1957) and Robert Weinberg, Workers' Control; A Study in Contemporary 
British Socialist Thought, op. cit., p, 11., Footnote No. 10.
26. J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (London, 1970) (orig. pub. 
1967) pp, 55-67. See also; J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society
Second ed. revised (Harmondsworth, 1971) Second ed. orig. pub. 
1969' (First ed. pub. 1958) pp. 98-100. For a Marxist critique of 
Galbraith*s New Industrial State, see» Jim Mason, "A New Ruling 
Class?'* Monthly Review, Vol. 20, No. 1., May, I960, pp. 47-56; and» 
Paul M. Sweezy, "Galbraith*s New Utopia" New York Review of Books, 
Nov. 15, 1973, PP. 3-6.
27. J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, op. cit.. p. 65.
28. Ibid., pp, 66, 67«
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a large number of people and a large 
variety of talent. It is on the 
effectiveness of their organization, as 
most business doctrine now implicitly 
agrees, that the success of the modem 
business enterprise now depends.^9
Like Burnham, Galbraith suggests that the managers who now control 
production have interests which diverge from the owners they represent. 
This is most apparent in two areas of business strategy'* risk-taking 
and growth. In relation to the former, managers tend to eschew policies 
which involve significant risks even when they offer the prospeot of 
exceptional profits. Their conservatism arises from the fact that the 
high profits which accrue from successful risk-taking go to shareholders 
while any losses immediately call into question management's competence* 
Low profitability invites interference by outside bankers and business 
consultants who may demand policy changes or, perhaps, resignations. Thus 
managers have a vested interest in pursuing policies which do not involve 
risks, even though this means foregoing opportunities to make high profits 
for shareholders.^
Once a secure rate of return, sufficient to appease shareholders is 
attained, management's next priority is growth. This is bo because the 
status, power and income of senior executives are largely dependent upon 
the size of the enterprises they manage. Yet corporate expansion is 
not synonomous with profitability* "Price, sales, cost and other policies 
to maximise growth", Galbraith maintains, "will differ within any given 
time horizon from those to maximise profits."^ Senior executives may 
pursue other objectives as well. For example, they may attempt to enhanoe 
their corporation's reputation through leadership in high technology, or
29* Ibid.. pp. 67, 60.
50. Ibid., pp. 69-IO5 and passim. 
31* Ibid.. p. 178, footnote No. 7»
prestigious projects. Donations of shareholders* money to charities,
political parties or other worthy causes may also be thought worthwhile.
In these and numerous other ways, Galbraith argues, the desire of the
owners to maximize the return on their investment is now being frustrated
33by the actions of the managers who ostensibly represent them.
Ralf Dahrendorf, one of the most influential contemporary proponents
of the separation of ownership from control thesis, also believes that
there is a growing divergence of interest between shareholders and managers#
Echoing Berle and Means, he argues that industrial development "...produces
two sets of roles, the incumbents of which increasingly move apart in their
outlook and attitudes towards society in general and the enterprise in
particular." And he goes on to suggest, perhaps rashly, that "Never has
imputation of a profit motive been further from the real motives of men
34than it is for modem bureaucratic managers."'^ The source of the manager's 
authority has also changed, according to Dahrendorf. Consent of workers
- 17 -
32
32. Ibid., pp. 180-182.
33, Ibid.. pp. 182, 183 and passim. Another noted economist, John Maynard 
Keynes, foreshadowed Galbraith's argument that managers are concerned 
with objectives other than maximizing profits. In a passage written 
almost forty years earlier, he outlined what he saw as the emerging 
objectives of senior executives in large firmsi
"A point arrives in the growth of a big institution - particularly a 
big railway or a big public utility enterprise, but also a big bank 
or big insurance company - at which the owners of the capital, i.e. 
the shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the management, 
with the result that the direot personal interest of the latter in the 
making of great profit becomes quite secondary. When this stage is 
reached, the general stability and reputation of the institution are 
more considered by the management than the maximum of profit for the 
shareholders. The shareholders must be satisfied by conventionally 
adequate dividends, but once this is secured, the direot interest of 
the management often consists of avoiding criticism from the publio. 
and from the customers of the concern."
John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez Faire (London, 1926) as cited 
by P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry,
0£. _cit^ », p. 257*
34* Ralf • Dahrendorf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society, op. cit. 
p. 46.
18
has replaced property ownership as the basis for management *s leadership
of the enterprise.^ Thus the old class of capitalist entrepreneurs has
been replaced by a new group of professional managers who exercise
authority on the basis of their acknowledged expertise.
Similarly, in The End of Ideology, Daniel Bell argues that "...technical
skill rather than property...” is now the crucial factor determining who will
control industry.^ In fact Bell claims that the emergence of managerial
control has precipitated the "...break up of the 'ruling class"' in the
37capitalist societies of the West. Unlike Burnham, however, he does not
foresee the development of a new class society based on managerial control*
gather, he feels that this change ha3 reinforced the trend towards a more
pluralist society. In this respect, Bell typifies liberal and social
democratic thinkers who have come to believe that the managerial revolution #
has been a progressive force because it has reduced the significance of 
property ownership and hence has eroded the principal support of the class
TQ
structure of the West.
Not only has the power of property receded with the rise of professional 
management} according to many theorists, the executives who now control 
industry are conscious of their obligations to the larger community. The 
notion of social responsibility has gradually supplanted unrestrained 
commitment to profit. According to A.A. Berle, in a more recent publication, 
the managers of business enterprises "...have been compelled to assume in
35. Ibid.. pp. 44, 45.
36. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, I960) p. 45*
37* Ibid., p. 45, For a more recent statement of his position see:
Daniel Bell, "The Corporate Society in the 1970's" The Publio Interest 
No. 24, Summer, 1971»
38. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, op. cit., pp. 39-45« See, for example: 
J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, op. cit.; William F. Whyte,
The Organization Man (Harmondsworth. 1961Vlorig. pub. 1956) esp. • 
pp. 225-258} Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (London, 1961) pp. 85, 86 and 
passim. The pluralist argument is also outlined in the concluding 
chapter of A.A. Berle's Power Without Property (New York, 1959). The 
chapter is titled, appropriately, "people's oapitalism and Soviet 
Communism."
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appreciable part of the role of conscience-carrier of twentieth century
39American s o c i e t y . A n o t h e r  commentator, Erich Rhenmann,views the
modem manager as a skillful arbitrator who juggles the claims of
workers, owners, consumers, government and other groups in such a way as
to maximize the benefits to all concerned. Although he cannot satisfy
each claimant's demands fully, he can strike the most sbcially acceptable
40balance among them. Thus despite the foiimal basis of modem industry in 
property ownership, the actual management is carried out in the interests 
of the larger society.
II
» As the preceding writers indicate, the major justification for the 
present role of management among contemporary social scientists rests upon 
the key function it performs within a modem industrial society. Management 
authority, it is asserted, derives not from property ownership, but rather 
from the expertise required to co-ordinate production. Because of its 
central role, management has been able to assert its independence, And 
it has done so despite attempts by shareholders to maintain their control 
over its activities. But what is of greater significance, according to 
the preceding writers, is that managerial autonomy has been accompanied 
by a fundamental change in the objectives and responsibilities of the men
39» A.A. Berle, jr. The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York, 
1954)» P» 182 as cited by Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America 
(New York, 1962) p. 56. For a more detailed examination of Berle*s 
ideas on the social responsibility of business seej Theo Nichols, 
Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. d t ., Ch. 1.
40. Erich Rhenmann, Industrial Democracy and Industrial Management (London, 
I960) pp, 24-29 and passim. This view is frequently stated in a 
slightly different way. When conflicts between unions and management 
arise, the position of management in resisting the demands of wage 
earners is normally claimed to be one of defending consumers and the 
larger society from the sectional greed of workers. Thus it is 
implied that management is not simply representing its shareholders 
but is defending the, interests of the community as well.
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who now govern industry. They are no longer simply the paid agents of 
shareholders* whose job it is to extract the maximum in profits from the 
enterprises they control. Instead, they are independent, socially 
conscious professionals, anxious to see that their decisions benefit 
the public. True, they are still concerned with problems of efficiency 
and cost accounting. But their concern with these matters is society*s 
guarantee that industry will not suffer from that '‘lack of efficiency" 
which, Schumpeter predicted, would lead to a'lack of bread."
Acceptance of the argument that managers are now disinterested 
"professionals" or "technocrats" has important ideological implications.
For it suggests that the question of who owns and controls industry is 
no longer of great significance. This is so because the roles of managers 
and workers are defined by the functional imperatives of modem production 
and not by considerations of power or class interest. And, by the same 
line of reasoning, it indicates that effective control of industry by 
workers is no more feasible than control by owners - a point expressed 
clearly by Galbraith«
The misfortune of democratic socialism has 
been the misfortune of the capitalist. When 
the latter could no longer control, democratic 
socialism was no longer an alternative. The 
technical complexity and planning and associated 
scale of operations, that took power from the 
capitalist entrepreneur and lodged it with the 
technostructure, removed it also from the reach 
of social control.
This is certainly a plausible view of contemporary society. But 
plausibility is not synonomous with accuracy. Consequently, it is necessary 
to examine the claims of the "managerialists" more olosely. In particular, 
it is important to find out to what extent managers have become independent 
of the shareholders they ostensibly represent. It is also necessary to
41. J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, op. cit,, p. 111.
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see how different the behaviour of "autonomous” managers is when compared 
with their owner-dominated counterparts. In short, it is essential to 
discover if property ownership is still the guiding principle underlying 
the organization of industry. For if it can be demonstrated that ownership, 
not expertise,remains the basis of managerial authority, then Schumpeter's 
confident assertion that workers' control is impossible will itself be 
called into question.-
Ill
Despite assertions that the managerial function now derives its 
authority from technical and administrative expertise, authority 
relationships within the business enterprise still rest formally on the 
laws associated with property. And these laws are supported in the final 
instance by the power of the state. Because an enterprise is considered, 
in law, to be a form of property, the owners of that property are free 
to dispose of it as they see fit. As Neil W. Chamberlain points out 
"...the corporation has been held in law to be the stockholders."^ 
Significantly, employees are excluded from the legal definition of the 
company. This is important because it establishes quite dearly that 
workers have no legal right to participate in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, despite recent interest in the idea of employee participation 
in management the legal basis of the employer's authority has not been 
altered in any fundamental way over the past century. Thus 
George F. Thomason, in his recent survey of employee participation in
42. Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control (New 
York, 1948) P» 11 and passim. See also» C.W. Mills, White Collar. 
(New York, 1951) PP* 101-102. For a good discussion of the 
historical development of the modern corporation seet A.A. Berle 
and Gardiner Means, The Modem Corporation and private Property. 
op. cit., pp. 127-152 and passim.
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British industry, concluded that "...the outstanding characteristic
of the private enterprise system is the persistence of not only the
primacy but also the sanctity of the ownership principle as a
43foundation for the exercise of ultimate authority."
Of course, contemporary business corporations are not usually
managed by their owners. Instead, the shareholders elect from among
their members a board of directors. It is the task of this board to
oversee the operation of the enterprise and to appoint full-time
executives to carry out the day-to-day tasks of management. The board
of directors normally delegates authority to the top executives On the
condition that they carry out their jobs solely in the interests of
shareholders. Although there has been some debate concerning whether
managers are agents or trustees of the owners, the practical implications,
according to Chamberlain, are the same in either case»
...(R)egardless of whether the authority of corporate 
management is derived by direct delegation of the 
stockholders or by legislative fiat, the legal basis 
of that authority rests ultimately upon an accompanying 
obligation to serve the interests of the corporators 
(i.e. shareholders). Without acceptance of that 
obligation, there is no legal fbundation for management's 
assumption of authority. The powers of management are 
conferred as a result of a legal relationship with the 
stockholders. If management is considered as an agent 
for the stockholders, its authority is limited to 
actions on behalf of the principals. If management is 
considered the trustee its authority is confined to 
actions in the interests of the cestui que trust, that 
is to say, of the stockholders again.44
43» George P. Thomason, "Workers' Participation in Private Enterprise 
Organizations" in Campbell Balfour (ed.) Participation in Industry, 
(London, 1973) P» 178«
44« Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control, op. 
cit., p. 16. See also: Donald E. Cullen and Marcia L. Greenbaum, 
"Management Rights and Collective Bargaining» Can Both Survive?"
New York State School of Industrial and Labour Relations Bulletin 58 
(Ithaca, N.Y., August, 1966) pp. 7-10. For a good discussion of the 
obligations of British Managers, see» Theo Nichols, Ownership, 
Control and Ideology, op. cit.» P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of 
British and American Industry (London, 1972) pp. 203-llj And, also* 
George F. Thomason "Workers* Participation in Private Enterprise 
Organizations" 0£. cit., p. l6l.
Because management is legally an agent or trustee of the shareholders!
it follows that the power it exercises is derived entirely from the owners
it represents. Moreverf the exercise of that power is conditional upon
the fulfilment of its obligations to shareholders and "...not by virtue
45of anything inhering ; in its management function." Thus we see that from
a legal point of view management*s authority over its employees stems not
from any demonstrated expertise or competence - although these attributes
may indeed be necessary to fulfilling its function. Rather, it rests
entirely upon its legal relationship with the shareholders.
What the law does, then, is to define the role of managers such that
their sphere of action is constrained within areas which coincide with
the interests of the owners they represent. In relation to subordinates,
46they have at their disposal all the powers associated with property.
They can determine who can enter the premises of the enterprise, who will 
work for it, who will be promoted and many other related matters. But in 
relation to the shareholders, their position is one of subordination.
They cannot, for example, decide that the purpose of the enterprise will 
no longer be to maximise profits. Nor are they legally free to pursue
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45* Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control, op, 
cit., p. 16; See, as well* Alan Flanders, "The Internal Social 
Responsibilities of Industry" in Alan Flanders, Management and 
Unions (London, 1970) p, 139» (The essay was written in 1966).
46, On this point see« Donald E. Cullen and Marcia L. Greenbaum,
"Management Rights and Collective Bargaining: Can Both Survive?", 
op. cit.,pp. 8, 9* Of. course, this does not mean that the rights 
of property over the enterprise have remained absolute. Management 
decisions are constrained by government legislation, the presence 
of trade unions and other limitations. Yet because managers are 
subject to numerous pressures which limit their ability to pursue 
the goals of owners does not change the fact that they axe legally 
accountable solely to the owners for their actions.
policies which harm the interests of the stockholders in any other way. 
Indeed, if managers attempt to use the property they oversee for their 
own purposes they are open to legal aotion, as C.W. Mills succinctly 
points out: "Any owner who can prove any case of ’expropriation* of
48property by any manager can have the manager prosecuted and put in jail."
IV
The issue of management’s legal obligation to its shareholders 
might, of course, be of little significance if shareholders were unable 
to enforce their rights and if managers themselves believed that their 
interests conflicted with those in whose name they manage. As we have 
seen, many writers feel that this is now the case. However, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that neither condition holds true.
With regard to the first issue, we agree with Berle and Means that the
47« This point is illustrated by Theo Nichols who notes that the courts 
have supported the claims of British shareholders in a number of 
cases where managers have pursued policies beneficial to groups 
other than the owners:
"In 1962, as a consequence of a shareholder’s objection, the direotors 
of the Daily News were ruled ultra vires for making an ex gratia payment 
to employees made redundant by the sale of the News Chronicle and Star 
newspapers on the grounds that this was not in the interests of the 
company. In the judgement of Plowman, K. "The view that directors in 
having regard to the question »that is in the best interests of their 
company are entitled to take into account the interests of the 
employees, irrespective of any consequential benefits to the company, 
is one that may be widely held...But no authority to support that 
proposition of law was cited by me. I know of none, and in my 
judgement such is not the law." Parke v. The Daily News Ltd., and 
Others (1962), 2 All E.R. 929 at 9.48 (in Greenhal^hv. Ardeme 
Cinemas Ltd., (1950) 2 All E.R.1120, Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R., held 
that the benefit of the company meant the benefit of the shareholders 
as a general body)." Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, 
iOj5. _ci_t., pp. 22, 25.
It is useful to contrast such a clear legal position with the arguments 
of industrial relations theorists such as Erich Rhenmann mentioned 
earlier. As the above quotation shows, management is legally bound 
to pursue the interests of shareholders only. It cannot attempt to 
be a neutral arbitrator, for to do so would mean contravening its 
legal responsibilities.
48. C.W. Mills, White Collar (New York, 1956) p. 102
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average shareholder is effectively disenfranchised. But we do not agree 
with their claim that the dispersal of ownership has meant that management 
is no longer accountable to any shareholders. Rather, we believe that in
most companies, effective control remains in the hands of large shareholders.
Although there is a veil of secrecy surrounding the affairs of most
large firms which makes the task of uncovering who is actually in control
exceedingly difficult, there have been a number of studies during the past
50decade which cast doubt on the validity of the Berle and Means thesis.
Maurice Zeitlin carefully re-examined the original Berle and Means research
and found that "...they had information which permitted them to classify
as definitely under management control only 22$ of the 200 largest
corporations and of the 106 industrials only 3.8$1" These lower figures
are explained by the fact that half the companies which Berle and Means
designated under management control were qualified by the adjective
"presumably." In these cases, they were making a qualified guess as to
whom was in control} adequate information was simply unavailable. Yet as
Zeitlin points out, many writers have accepted the much higher claims by
51Berle and Means without realizing the qualifications involved. Hence 
they have complacently assumed that management control within the largest 
corporations was an established fact, even though the evidence did not 
warrant such a claim.
49
49» For an enlightening account of how a small group of large shareholders 
can retain effective control of an enterprise without a majority 
shareholding, see: C.S. Bede, "The Separation of Ownership from 
Control" in M. Gilbert (ed.) The Modern Business Enterprise 
(Harmondsworth, 1972) pp. 133-144» Orig. pub. in the Journal of 
Economic Studies Vol. 1, 1966, pp. 29-46.
50. This is particularly true of the U.S. where, unlike Britain, no 
official, publicly accessible register of shareholders is maintained.
51. Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control» The Large 
Corporation and the Capitalist Class", 0£. oit., pp. 1081, 1082.
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Other studies have taken issue with the statistics on management
control put forward by Berle and Means. For example, a U.S. Government
investigation less than a decade later came to the opposite conclusion.
The temporary National Economic Committee found that 140 of the top
52200 companies were controlled by large stockholders. More recently,
Don Villarejo was able to gather sufficient data on 232 of the top 250
U.S.companies of i960 to ascertain whether they were shareholder;' or
manager controlled. He found that in 141, or over 60 per cent, the
board of directors itself owned a sufficient number of shares to exercise
53effective control.
The validity of the Berle and Means study can also be questioned on
methodological grounds. The rather mechanistic assumption that who
controls an enterprise can be uncovered by knowing what percentage of
shares are held by the leading stockholders is highly dubious. For
54example, it ignores the history of control within each enterprise. 
Families which in the past controlled management decision-making through 
majority shareholding may still be able to exeroise oontrol even with 
relatively small current holdings because the board of directors has
52. Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph 29 as cited by
G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1967) p. 47» The T.N.E.C's findings are reported in greater 
detail in P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American 
Industry, op. cit., pp. 221-241. Lundberg traced the history of 
each of these companies since the T.N.E.C. Monograph was published 
and came to the conclusion that ,rWith the exception of a few 
newcomers, the same groups owned the companies as owned them in 
1937" Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Richt op. cit. 
p. 238. See also» Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America 
(New York, 1962) pp. 55-69.
53» Don Villarejo, Stock Ownership and the Control of Corporations
(Anne Arbor, Michigan, 1962) p. 59» ’orig, printed in New University 
Thought (Autumn, Winter I96I-I962) as cited by G. William Domhoff, 
Who Rules America? op. cit., pp. 49» 50.
54» C.S. Bede, "The Separation of Ownership from Control" in M. Gilbert 
(ed.) The Modem Business Enterprise (Harmondsworth, 1972) pp. 138, 
139» orig, pub. Journal of Economic Studies Vol. 1,1966, pp. 29-46} 
Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. cit,, pp. 19-21; 
Michel De Vroey, "The Corporation and the Labour Process» The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations" on. oit.
pp. 6-8. ---
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always been selected, by them or their appointees» Directors may also 
be connected with, or indebted to, the controlling interests in ways 
which are not obvious to the outside observer. They may be distant 
relations or partners in other ventures# Alternatively,they may be 
employees or proteges of certain members of the controlling group#
The methodological weakness of the Berle and Means approach is
revealed when we turn to examine specific firms. To attempt to evaluate
who controls General Motors, Exxon or Gulf Oil without knowing the
history of control exercised by the Du Ponts, Rockefeller and Mellons,
respectively, would be to ignore what is clearly one of the most
important factors determining in whose interests these firms are now 
55run. Yet this is precisely what the Berle and Means approach involves. 
Por this reason, their findings cannot be accepted as a reliable answer 
to the question of whether stockholders or managers now oontrol most 
large corporations.
Contrary to Berle and Means optimistic predictions about the trend 
towards dispersal of stock ownership and the emergence of "peopled 
capitalism", what is most notable about stock ownership is that it has 
remained highly concentrated. True, the number of individuals owning 
stock in the U.S., where ownership is most widely dispersed, rose from 
6.3 million in 1952 to 30.8 million in 1970 - still less than one fifth 
of American families, however. But in the last five years this figure
55» On the question of the continuing influence of certain wealthy
families on the management of enterprises in which they have stock 
see« Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich, op. cit..
Ch. IV-VII} Maurice Zeitlin, "The Large Corporation and the 
Capitalist Class", op. cit., pp. 1073-1119} 0. William Domhoff,
Who Rules America? op. cit.p.43.To give a concrete example of how 
misleading such figures may be, Ferdinand Lundberg notes that no less 
than six of the companies listed by Bsrle and Means were "authoritatively 
regarded in Wall Street as actually under the rule of J.P, Morgan and 
Company« United States Steel Corporation, General Eleotric Company, 
Electric Bond and Share Company, Consolidated Gas Company (now 
Consolidated Edison Company), A.T. and T. and New York Central 
Railroad." Ferdinand Lundberg, America*a .Sixty Families (New York, 
p. 5Q7 as cited by G. William DcEhoi'i’, Who Rules America? o p. oit. 
p# 48» -----------------  ---
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has dropped by over 20$ to 25»2 million and will probably decline
further because hard-pressed brokerage firms are now less willing to
56deal with the largely unprofitable small investor. More significantly,
these figures conceal the fact that share ownership remains highly
concentrated. According to a Department of Commerce Study, "Stock-
ownership in the U.S." 51$ of stocks were owned by 1$ of the population
in 1971.*^ Again, this figure represents a slight improvement on the
1953 statistics which, according to the Lampraan study, indicated that
the top 1$ owned 76.0$ of corporate stock. However, if we go back further
in U.S. history, we find that in 1922 the richest 1$ owned 61.5$ of 
58company shares. Thus in half a century the amount of 'levelling' that
59has taken place i3 hardly dramatio.
56* Robert Samuelson, "End of the American Dream" Sunday Times, Dec. 14» 
1975» P» 46. Samuelson's figures are based upon the latest census 
of the New York Stock Exchange. Ironically, one of the anomalies in 
the position of those who adhere to the separation of ownership from 
control thesis is that they readily acknowledge that share ownership 
is confined to a small minority of the population. Dahrendorf, for 
example, noted in his 1959 study that only 5$ of the population of 
Germany and 8$ of the U.S. at that time owned even a single share.
Yet he went on to argue that share ownership was widespread. It is a 
strange definition of 'dispersal' which excludes such a large segment 
of the population! See* Ralph Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society, op. cit., p, 42.
57» United States Department of Commerce, "Stockomership in the U.Si
Characteristics and Trends" as cited by Arnold Cantor, "The Widening 
Gap in Incomes" The American Federationist, March, 1975» P» 13? See 
also» J.D. Smith and S.D. Franklin, "The Concentration of Personal 
Wealth 1922-1969" American Economic Review, May 1974» pp« 162-167.
58. Robert J. Larapman, The Share of Top Wealth Holders in National Wealth 
1922-1956 (Princeton, N.J. 1962) pp. 208, 209.
59» The widely accepted view that income inequality is diminishing is 
also questionable. A review of income distribution, published in 
the U.S. government's Monthly Labour Review concluded that "Analysis 
of census data...shows a slight but persistent trend towards inequality 
in the 1958-1970 period..." Sees Peter Henley, "Exploring the 
Distribution of Earned Income" Monthly Labour Review, Dec. 1972, Vol. 
95» No. 12, pp. 16-27. A more recent article in the A.F.L.-C.I.O's 
monthly journal, The American Federationist.noted that the trend 
towards greater inequality accelerated in the period from 1968 to 
1973» Seej Arnold Canton, "The Widening'Gap in Incomes'! op. cit., • ,
pp. 11-15. -1 .
In Great Britain, the situation is broadly similar.^ According 
to the 1975 interim report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution 
of Income and Wealth the top 1 per cent of the population owned 28.1 
per cent of all property in 1972, while the top 5 per cent owned 55*9 
per cent.^^ As in the United States, however, the concentration of 
share ownership is much more unequal. In 1973» the wealthiest 0.8 per 
cent of the population owned 71*6 per cent of ordinary shares and 69*4 
per cent of company securities. The top 3.5 per cent owned 90*1 per 
cent of shares and 87.8 per cent of securities.^ Yet these figures 
still under-estimate the extent of inequality.
Although it is now slightly dated, an early post-war study of the 
concentration of share ownership among thirty of Britain's largest firms 
revealed some interesting facts about the distribution of ownership among 
shareholders. While the average value of the shareholdings of 96.4 per 
cent of stock owners was only £118, the value of the shares owned by the 
wealthiest 132 in each company averaged £52,000.^ When this is considered 
in the light of the fact that only 7$ of the U.K. population owns even a
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60. The most valuable discussion on this matter is still to be found in 
Richard Titmus, Income Distribution and Social Change (London, 1962)» 
Statistics on other European Countries are roughly the same. Seei 
Michel de Vroey, "The Corporation and the Labour Process« The 
Separation of. Ownership and Control in Large Corporations", op. cit., 
P. 5.
61. Royal Commission on the Distribution of Inoome and Wealth, Report 
No. 1. Initial Report of the Standing Reference Committee Cmnd. ¿171. 
(July, 1975) Table 34» Series C, p. 81 as cited by Labour Research 
Vol. 64, No. 10, Oot., 1975, p. 203.
62. Ibid., Table 31» P* 82, as oited by Labour Research, Vol. 64, No. 10., 
Oct., 1975, p. 203.
63« H. Parkinson, The Ownership of Industry (London, 1951)» PP. 43-46, as 
cited by P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American 
Industry, op. cit., pp. 215-219» For other discussions of inequality 
in Britain see the collection of articles edited by A.B. Atkinson in 
Wealth, Income and Inequality (Harmondswerth, 1973) and A.B. Atkinson, 
Unequal Shares (London. 1972).
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single share| the concentration of ownership is striking indeed.
Moreoever, when we look to see who has gained the shares lost by the
richest ifo of the population, we find that they have gone to the next
654i<> rather than the remaining 95$» J The reason for this is clear* by
spreading wealth as evenly as possible among family members, the very
rich are able to minimize their taxes. The heavy rates of taxation imposed
in the past 30 years have also given the rich a major incentive to conceal
the extent of their earnings. This is exacerbated by the fact that,
increasingly, the very rich choose to •live1, for tax purposes, in various
havens which enable them to avoid taxation altogether. Thus official
figures notably underestimate the concentration of ownership because they
refleot •declared* as opposed to •actual* ownership.
These statistics provide an effective answer to the misleading claim
that stock ownership is spreading within the population. For while it
may be true that the tiny number of people who own shares has grown
slightly, it is not true that the concentration of shares owned by large
shareholders has diminished significantly. And it is hardly plausible to
claim that people who now own two or three shares in General Motors have
the same interests of the Du Ponts, or the former president, Alfred P,
Sloan, jr., who, according to Lundberg, was worth between two hundred and
66four hundred million dollars in 1968. 645
64
64. British Market Research Ltd., "How Does Britain Save? A Summary of 
the Results of a Survey Conducted for the London Stock Exchange by 
the British Market Research Limited" (London, May, 1966) pp, 5» 9» as 
cited by Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. cit., p,78. 
See also* John Westergaard and Henrietta Reisler, Class in a Capitalist 
Society (London, 1975) P* 117 and passim.
65. John Westergaard and Henrietta Reisler, Class in a Capitalist Society, 
op. cit.. pp. 38-44» H O  and passim; Richard M. Titmuss, Income 
Distribution and Social Change (London, 1962); Ferdinand Lundberg,
The Rich and the Super-Rich, op. cit.. Ch. IX; Gabriel Kolko, Wealth 
and Power in America, op. cit., pp. 50-54.
66. Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich, op. cit., p. 40. By
calculating the value of shares in various companies known to be held 
by the extended family of Du Ponts (approximately 300 individuals), 
Lundberg estimated that in I964 they owned over/7 billion in stocks and 
bondsl Ibid., p, 168.
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The 'managerialists* also argue that shareholders are no longer 
capable of watching over the executives who administer their property. 
This is so because they lack the information and technical skills 
necessary to make such an assessment of management performance. While 
this claim is true of the majority of small shareholders, it does not 
follow that large shareholders are in the same position. The fact that 
organizations such as banks, insurance companies, trust houses and 
holding companies have substantial interests in most of the larger 
corporations means that managers are subject to constant scrutiny, by
67organizations which do have the capacity to evaluate their performance.
And, as Lundberg notes, there are more firms under the control of family
60interests than most economists are willing to admit. However, this
control is now commonly exercised through trusts, foundations, and other
"street" organizations which effectively conceal the controlling interest
from the glare of publicity. It is only when these controlling interests
69are threatened that their power becomesvisible. When pressed, as 
Zeitlinshows, shareholders are quite prepared to use their position on *689
67# Maurice Zeillin, "The Large Corporations and the Capitalist Class", 
op. cit., pp. 1073-1119» On this point I am grateful to 
Dr. James Rinehart of the University of Western Ontario, who brought 
the relevant information to my attention. See alsoi Gabriel Kolko, 
Wealth and Power in America, op. cit., pp. 53-69. G. William Domhoff, 
Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967) PP» 47-57 and passim}
P. Sargant Florence. The Logic of British and American Industry, op. 
cit., pp. 214, 215} Gus Tylor, "A Labour View of the New Class",
The American Federationist, Oct., . 1973» PP» 14» 15»
68. Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich, op. cit., pp. 155-171.
69. On this question see the enlightening discussion by G. William Domhoff 
on the use of pseudonyms by families, banks and trust houses to hide
the extent of their ownership in Who Rules America? op. cit., pp. 55» 56. 
See also* Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control! The Large 
Corporation and the Capitalist Class",ojd, cit., pp. 1085» 1086.
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the board of directors to remove top executives who fail to perform to
70their satisfaction.
Nor is each enterprise an island by itself. There is an intricate 
web of connectionsamong large firms, banks, trust houses and insurance 
companies. In the United States, and to an increasing extent in Great 
Britain, it is common for representatives of banks and finance houses to 
take their places on the boards of directors of companies in which their 
institutions have an interest. Richard Barker in his study of U.S.banks 
found that "...of the 373 members of the boards of the nation’s fifteen 
commercial banks, 324 held more than fifteen hundred management positions 
(primarily directorships) in other financial institutions, insurance 70
70. Maurice Zeitlin provides a good example of this exercise of shareholder 
power. The two major American copper companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, 
followed different strategies for guaranteeing the security of their 
interests in Chile. Kennecott adopted a policy of worldwide 
diversification to ensure that if Chile attempted to nationalize its 
assets, it could fall back upon other operations. In contrast,
Anaconda believed that such diversification was unnecessary because 
the Christian Democratic government of Frei was likely to remain in 
power indefinitely. When Allende came to power and nationalized the 
copper companies, Kennecott was still in a strong international 
position because it was no longer dependent upon Chilean copper.
However, Anaconda was confronted with major losses. Within two months 
of the take-over, according to Zeitlin, more than half of the latter 
company’s top U.S. executives, including its president, were fired.
The Chase Manhattan Bank suddenly emerged as the controlling interest 
in the Company and appointed one of its vice-chairmen as the chief 
executive. This may, in itself, not seem extraordinary. But for 
almost forty years, since the Berle and Means study, reports of the 
company had concluded that it was firmly under management control 
and that no group of shareholders was in a position to challenge 
management. See: Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control:
The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class" 0£. oit., pp, 1092- 
1094. Of course, Zeitlin's example only shows that shareholders 
are able to use their legal prerogatives where management is 
demonstrably incompetent. It says nothing about what shareholders 
would be prepared to do if it became clear that management was not 
even attempting to fulfil its legal obligations. For other instances 
of the exercise of shareholders* power see: G. William Domhoff, Who 
Rules America? pp. 47-50; C.S. Bede, "The Separation of Ownership 
from Control" 0£. cit., pp. 143, 144; Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich 
and the Super-Rich, op. cit., p. 284. Lundberg points out that when 
the top executive is also a major shareholder,he does not lose his 
job. For example, Henry Forcl^ . II»s decision on the Edsel cost the 
company 250 million dollars. The other, smaller,shareholders quietly 
paid for his mistake. Ibid., p. 284.
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71companies and industrial concerns«" These interlocking directorates
ensure that each company is tied in seouraly with the larger economio
system. Such findings challenge the view that all managers have to do
to assert their control is to hoodwink the scattered and uninformed 
73shareholders.
The separation of ownership from control argument also confuses 
the day-to-day administration of industry with the formulation of company 712
71. Richard J. Barker, Who Controls America? op. cit., pp. 64» 66, See 
also! Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America, op. cit.. pp. 55-69}
C.W. Mills, The Power Elite, op. oit., pp. 122, 123; C.W. Mills, White 
Collar, op. oit., p. l05} Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist 
Society, op. cit., pp. 28-39» Clive Jenkins. Power at the Top (London, 
1959) pp.41 *82JMichael Barratt-Brown, "The Controllers of British 
Industry" in Ken Coates (ed.) Can the Workers Run Industry? pp. 42-48» 
62-69* (This essay includes an extensive list of the names and 
directorships of British inerchanlb- bankers); and, finally, John 
Westergaard and Henrietta Reisler, Class in a Capitalist Sooiety, (London,
1975) PP* 51-140.
72. In Great Britain, the process of intervention is usually more discreet 
than in the U.S. Nevertheless, when managers fail to meet the 
expectations of shareholders, it is not unheard of for the latter 
group to flex their fiscal muscles. This in response to management 
wheeler-dealing in the early 1970fs the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee was established. The purpose of this seoretive committee 
was to keep a closer eye on the activities of managers in certain top 
companies and thus proteot the interests of institutional shareholders. 
Sees Stewart Flemming, Financial Times, Feb. 21, 1975* The same paper 
carried an editorial several months later exhorting owners to make
use of their legal rights more frequently in order to deter ’abuses* 
of management power. Financial Times, July 28, 1975* For other 
evidence on this point sees P. Sargant Florenoe, The Logio of British 
and American Industry, op. cit., pp. 236-238.
73*' On this issue we disagree with the analysis of Baron and Sweezy. Although 
these authors are highly oritical of the Berle and Means thesis, in 
Monopoly Capital, they acoept the view that managers are no longer subjeot 
to the oontrol of shareholders. Their reason is that they believe that 
corporations are now largely self-finanoing. However, the work of 
Lundberg, Domhoff and, more reoently, Zeitlin, is more persuasive, 
particularly as Baron and Sweezy do not attempt to prove their assertion 
empirically. Indeed, Sweezy himself has altered his position in a 
subsequent article. Sees Paul Sweezy, "‘Who Rules the Corporations?" 
Monthly Review. December, 1971» ns oited by Robin Blackburn» "The New 
Capitalism" 0£. oit., p. 174* However, it is interesting to note that 
acceptance of the view that management is independent of ownership does 
not necessarily imply that managers and owners have different interests. 
For as Baron and Sweezy point out, the olass position of managers, the 
institutional constraints placed on their behaviour and their own self- 
interest combineto ensure that they behave in the interests of the 
property-owning olass. See: Paul A. Baron and Paul Sweezy. Monopoly 
Capital (New York, 1967) PP* 14-51* ----
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policy. Those who establish the structure and. goals of the enterprise
need not be involved in the detailed administration of company affairs.
As James Rinehart points out:
It is true that major shareholders do not generally 
interfere in the day to day operations of the 
enterprise. However, this simply means that the 
job of managing is separated from ownership; it 
does not mean that control is separated from 
ownership. In most large corporations final power 
continues to rest in the hands of major stockholders.
Those who do accept the Berle and Means thesis fail 
to make the important distinction between persons 
who establish the general guideline for organizational 
performance and those who, while exercising formidable 
powers within the organization, must operate within
these guidelines.74
For the same reason, the fact that managers possess expertise does
not mean that they are free to use their skills in whatever they see fit.
Members of the board of directors are perfectly capable of assessing the
direction of management policy even though they are not intimately
75familiar with the details. And this situation is by no means exceptional. 
Managers themselves make decisions on numerous aspects of their firm's 
operations without knowing all the details involved. For example, they 
oversee research departments even though they may have little knowledge 
of the exact' nature of the research. They are able to do so because 
it is their job to establish policy and monitor results, not to carry out 
experiments. Yet, strangely, proponents of the separation of ownership
74» James 'R,inehart, "Post Industrial Society and White Collar Worlds" 
Unpublished Paper (University of Western Ontario, Department of 
Sociology, 1974) p. 28. It is interesting to note that management 
texts generally tend to stress the question of training managers to 
achieve the •goals1 of the enterprise rather than the question of 
what these «goals' ought to be. And, when this latter question is 
raised, the answers of profit, growth and security are usually taken 
for granted. See, for example: Peter Drucker, The Practice of 
Management (London, 1973) (orig. pub. 1955)»
75» Michael Barratt-Brown, "The Controllers of British Industry" op. cit. 
PP. 53» 54.
from control argument believe that shareholders are incapable of 
exercising a similar kind of control»
VI
Turning to the second issue, the assertion that contemporary 
business managers pursue goals which are different from those pursued 
by entrepreneur owners raises the obvious question of what is meant by 
'»different.'' If all that is meant is that a higher priority is placed 
on long term growth rather than immediate dividends, as Galbraith
76maintains, the argument may, perhaps, be true. But it is also trivial. 
Similarly, if what is meant is that managers are able to spend a tiny 
portion of overall profits on themselves, the point is no less true, but 
is hardly indicative of a 'fundamental1 conflict of interest between the 
two groups.
However, as Baran and Sweezy point out,there is a conflict of interest
within the modern corporation. But it is not between managers and share-
77holders* father, it is between large and small stockholders. Because 
large owners save a relatively greater proportion of their income and 
because dividends are subject to hi$ier rates of taxation than capital 
gains, they prefer to take their profits in the form of appreciated share 
values. However, the small shareholder is dependent on his stocks as a
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76. There are also many cases which refute Galbraith's claim that owner 
managers place immediate profitability above growth. For example, 
Henry Ford refused to pay out dividends to other shareholders in 
the Ford Motor Company, preferring to re-invest everything in 
expansion of the business.
77» Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp, 34, 35»
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source of current income. Consequently, he prefers high dividends.
In this conflict within the propertied class, managers normally side
with large investors because it is the large investors who are in a
79position to dictate policy to them. Thus conflict between small and
large property owners provides no evidence that the interests of
property are being subordinated to those of management, as Berle and
Means suggest. It only demonstrates that the interests of big capital
take precedence over small capital.
The separation of ownership and control thesis also assumes that
owners and managers are two distinct groups within society. This view
assumes a pluralist social and economic framework. But we would argue
that owners and managers are part of the same class and that their common
class interest transcends any alleged difference between them. As
Ralph Miliband notes,' "...these are tactical differences within a
80strategic consensus." It is in the interests of each to preserve
78
78, Ibid., p, 35. The same applies in Britain. See for example*
I.C. McGivering, D.G.J. Matthews and W.H. Scott, Management in 
Britain (Liverpool, 1969)* These authors note that "the interests 
of shareholders and the organization are not completely dichotomous, 
however, for the existence of differential rates of taxation...in 
conjunction with the absence in this oountry of a capital gains tax, 
may mean that the direct interests of shareholders can be best 
served by the reinvestment of profits and the reward of bonus issues 
of stock and increases in the market value of shares. It might be 
reasonable to suppose that a policy of the investment of profits 
would be more popular with large stockholders than with small whose 
main needs are for immediate inoome." Ibid., pp. 51» 52»
79» Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op.cit., pp. 35i 36. 
Baran and Sweezy note that some concessions are usually made to appease 
the small shareholder, for political, as well as economio reasons. 
Domhoff also points out that some of the large companies see the small 
shareholder as a potential customer and hence encourage individuals 
to buy a few shares in their company for that reason. William Domhoff, 
Who Rules America? op. cit.
80. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, op. cit., p. 35* See 
also* Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op. cit.,
PP« 34* 35} John H. Westergaard, "Sociology» The Myth of Classlessness" 
op. cit., pp. 136-139« G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America*; op. cit, 
pp. 38-62} Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America, op. cit., Ch. IV} 
Robin Blackburn, "The New Capitalism" in R, Blackburn (ed.) Ideology in 
Social.Science, £&• cit.. pp. 165-168} Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control 
and Ideology , op. cit., pp. 134-142} C.S. Beed, "The Separation of 
Ownership from Control" ojj. cit.. pp. 145, I46.
inequality and privilege in industry. It is in the interests of each 
to exclude workers from the decision-making process. And it is in the 
interests of each to see that the hierarchical structure of business 
enterprises remains intact.
Moreover, as members of the same class their more narrowly economio
interests also tend to overlap. The manager who owns shares in companies
other than his own, will readily understand the need to ensure that the
interests of owners are given paramount consideration. His family,
friends and fellow Managers will, in many cases, also be shareholders!
consequently, the interests of owners will not be seen as those of a
81special group, but rather of people just like himself. As Baran and 
Sweezy argue:
»..(M)anagers are among the biggest owners; and 
because of the strategic positions they occupy, 
they function as the protectors and spokesmen 
for all large-scale property. Far from being a 
separate class, they constitute in reality the 
leading echelon of the property-owning class.82
According to Robert J. Lamer who examined the sources of income of
top executives in Fortune*s 1963 list of 500 leading industrials: "The
average expected dividends and capital gains from stockholdings earned
by the chief executive officers in our sample amounted to 64,519 dollars
- 37 -
81. On this point, see: Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich. 
op. cit., Ch. XI; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? op. cit., 
pp. 57» 58* Theo Nichols, Ownership, Ideology and Control, op. ctt.
Ch. X-XII.
82. Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. 34, 35, 
Westergaard notes that one assumption made by many advocates of the 
separation of ownership from oontrol thesis is that a "non propertied 
managerial elite" was evolving. As he points out, however, such an 
assumption bears little relation to the fact that most managers are 
property owners. See J.A. Westergaard, "Sociology, the Myth of 
Classlessness" 0£. cit., p. 159} W. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?op« oil 
pp. 57-62; J.A. Westergaard and Henrietta Reisler, Class in a Capitalist 
Society, op. cit., p. 161; Michael Barratt-Brown, "The Controllers of 
British Industry", oj). cit., p, 37»
-  3 8  -
O
per year." ^ Nor is it uncommon for managers to have an ownership 
stake in their own firms. Through stock-option plans and other 
devices, senior executives are given ample opportunities to acquire 
a direct financial interest in the companies they manage. To the 
outsider, such arrangements may appear as a wasteful give-awgyof 
shareholders* money. However, these schemes are quite functional 
to the interests of owners. The amount of money involved is small 
in relation to the revenue of a large company, hut to the individual 
manager it is a vital source of income. Henoe the executive who 
reoeives a substantial portion of his earnings in the form of 
dividends will think twice before adopting policies which are
O  j
detrimental to shareholders.^ This argument is explicitly stated 
by Alfred P. Sloan, jr., former president of the largest corporation
83. Robert K. Lamer, Management Control and the Large Corporation 
(New York, 1970) p. 66, as cited by Robin Blackburn "The New 
Capitalism” in Robin Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science,
op. cit.. p. 167. Blackburn also points out that a 1955 survey 
by the Oxford Institute of Statistics revealed that the average 
shareholding of the top British managers was £28,000 - a figure 
which was actually double that of titled individuals! Ibid., 
p. 167.
84. C.W. Mills, White Collar. 0£. cit., pp. 103-105; C.W. Mills, The 
Power Elite, op. oit.. pp. 129» 130, 156; Gabriel Kolko, Wealth 
and Power in America, op. cit., pp. 65-69; Paul A. Bar an and 
Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op. oit., p. 34; Robin Blackburn, 
'•The New Capitalism” oj>. oit.. p, 167T  Blackburn notes that while 
the chairman of General Motors owned only 017 per cent of the 
company*s shares in 1967» the aotual value of his tiny shareholding 
was /$3»917»000. We should point out that the stock option is a 
fairly recent innovation in the U.S. According to Kolko, it was 
introduced in 1950 (ibid., p. 66). Henoe Berle and Means'earlier 
study cannot be criticised on this point. However, both
A.A. Berle and Gardiner Means have published works sinoe this 
innovation was introduced. They have not, so far as I know, 
conceded that it makes a notable difference in the behaviour of 
managers.
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in the world:
Although the General Motors Bonus Plan was 
first adopted on August 27th 1918» its 
fundamental principles have never changed - 
that the interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders are Best served by making 
key employees partners in the corporation*s 
prosperity, and that each individual should 
be rewarded in proportion to his contribution 
to the profit of his own division and the 
corporation as a whole.^5
Such insurance, according to Sloan, is worth the small price shareholders
86
pay*
The polioy of encouraging successful managers to obtain a share­
holding in their companies also performs an additional function. As 
Domhoff notes, it provides a "...means for assimilating the successful 
corporate executive into the upper olass."^ Moreover, "stock ownership
certifies the permanenoe of the manager*s status and ensures the future
88of his children and grandohildren at a high socio-economic level."
Most companies also have incentive schemes which are designed to
89reward the manager on the basis of the profitability of his firm. ' In
85* Alfred P. Sloan, jr,, My Years with General Motors (London, 1967) 
(orig. pub. 1963) P* 431* In an earlier passage Sloan quotes the 
1942 annual report which Btates that the management polioy of G.M. 
"has evolved from the belief that the most effective results and 
the maximum progress and stability of the business are achieved by 
plaoing its executives in the same relative position, so far as 
possible, that they would occupy if they were conducting a business 
on their own aocount." Ibid., p. 430. Sloan also gives a detailed 
acoount of the Managers* Securities Company, a scheme set up by the 
Du Ponts in 1923 to fuse the interests of managers with shareholders 
by giving the former an opportunity to acquire shares in G.M. Ibid., 
PP* 433-441 *
86. Ibid., pp. 449-452.
87* G, William Domhoff, Who Rules Amerioa? op. oit., p. 58*
88. Ibid*, p. 58.
89. Robert J. Lamer, Management Control and the Large Corporation, op. 
oit., pp. 63-66, as cited by Robin Blackburn, "The New Capitalism" 
op. cit., p. 176. See also: Alfred P. Sloan, jr,, M.Y Years with 
General Motors, op. oit., Chapter 22.
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this way, the objective of profit is kept in the forefront of the manager’s
mind. Such attempts to fuse the interests of managers with those of the
owners they represent do not square with the argument that managers are
anxious to pursue their interests at the expense of shareholders, f'or
if this were true, it is highly unlikely that managers would establish such
bonus schemes in .the firms they control.
The social origins of top executives tend also to be in the upper
class. Despite the common belief that it is easy for the intelligent
or highly skilled to rise in the occupational hierarchy, upward mobility
is actually quite limited because the education training which are
increasingly necessary to qualify for management positions are still
90monopolised by the children of those at or near the top. And, the effects
of social background do not end once an aspiring manager has completed his
formal education. Those whose families are ’’well connected” find the route
to the top free from many of the pitfalls which beset their colleagues from
91a humbler background.
Inheritance also remains an important factor in the selection of top 
managers. Families such as the Fords, Rockefellers, Rothchilds and Du Ponts
90. Although the statistics vary among the major Western industrialized 
countries, the disparity in educational opportunity is quite significant 
in each case. For a brief, but good statistical review of the 
disparities in educational opportunity between upper and lower classes 
in Germany, France, the U.S. and the U.K. see: Ralph Miliband, The 
State in Capitalist Society, op. cit., pp. 40-43} See as well:
Frank Parkin, Glass Inequality and Political Order (London, 1971) 
pp. 107-114} J.Ii. iiestergaard, "Sociology: The llyth of Classlessness" 
in R. Blackburn (ed.) Ideology in Social Science (London, 1972) pp. 129- 
141} Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America, op.I, cit., pp. 113-121}
G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? pp. 16-21 and passim; Thco Nichols, 
Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. cit., pp. 112-120.
91. On this point, see the review of U.S. Studies by Reinhard Bondix and 
S.M. Lipset in Social Uobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley, 1966)
Oh. IV, esp. pp. 138-143, and the excellent study of G>'. William Domhoff, 
The Higher Circles (iTew York, 1970).
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continue to play an active role in managing the cnmpanies they own.
The existence of a substantial or controlling interest in an 
enterprise enables shareholders and their relatives to assume executive 
positions. These appointments are made not simply for the benefits 
which accrue to family members who become top managers, but, more 
importantly, to give the family the ability to oversee the activities 
of the enterprises they own.
To the factors just listed, we can add several more which act as 
additional guarantees that cnmpanies will be managed in the interests 
of their owners. The process whereby managers are recruited and promoted 
is one which ensures that only individuals with attitudes, values and 
goals acceptable to the owners will be seleoted. The power of the board 
of directors to choose its top executives - and to dismiss them if they 
fail to perform their job properly - when considered in the light of the 
hierarchical structure of the enterprises conoemed, means that effective 
control over policy can normally be exercised simply through the careful 
selection of executive personnel. Those who reach the top of the
92. For a good outline of the role of inheritance in the selection of 
top executives, see: Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and 
Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class" op. cit. 
pp. IO8O-IO84, 1097» 1098. And, for an examination of the influenoe 
of inheritance in determining who will sit on the boards of 
directors of large companies, see: Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power 
in America, op. cit., pp. 62-64« Kolko has done considerable research 
on the continuity of family representation on the boards of directors 
of Amerioan industrial corporations. Although he was able to obtain 
sufficient data on only 72 of the top 100 industrial companies in 
1957» he found that the same family names appeared "in board after 
board." When compared with 1937» 22 families still had at least 
one member on the board. This, in itself, may not seem striking.
But Virtually none of these families, according to Berle and Means, 
had enough shares to exercise effective oontrol. Kolko maintains 
that their control was exercised through foundations, brokers and 
other devices which concealed the extent of their ownership. Ibid.» 
pp. 62, 63« More reoently, R. Sheehan found that "...30 per cent 
of the five hundred largest (U.S.) industrials are olearly controlled 
by identifiable individuals or by family groups," R, Sheehan, 
"Proprietors in the World of Big Business", Fortune, 15 June 1967» 
as cited by Ralph Miliband, in The State in Capitalist Society, op. 
oit., p. 30. Such assessments tend to be conservative simply because 
much information about company activities is not available to outside 
researchers.
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organizational pyramid are allowed to do so precisely because they
excel in those qualities which are considered desirable by share- 
93holders. As long as the criteria for promotion are determined by 
the owners, the possibility of those with different aims rising to 
the top is minimized*
With his usual astuteness, C.W. Mills outlines why those who
possess technical expertise rather than the appropriate instinct for
profit are unlikely to reach the top.
On the middle levels, specialization is required.
But the operating specialist will not rise; only 
the •broadened' man mH.11 rise. What does that 
mean? It means, for one thing, that the specialist 
is below the level on which men are wholly alerted 
to profit. The 'broadened' man is the man who, no 
matter what he may be doing, is able clearly to see 
the way to maximize the profit for the corporation 
as a whole, in the long as well as in the short run.
The man who rises to the top is the broadened man 
whose 'speciality* coincides with the aims of the 
corporation which is the maximization of profit.
As he is judged to have realized this aim, he rises 
within the corporate world.94
Prom the viewpoint of the individuals concerned, a similar process 
of self-selection is at work. Those who do not believe in the values.
93. Gus •. Tylor, "A Labour View of the New Class" 0£. cit., pp. 4* 5l
C.W. Mills, The Power Elite, op. cit., p. 176; Theo Nichols, Ownership, 
Control and Ideology, op. cit., pp. 121-133« The Importance of being 
able to select management personnel was underlined by Knight as long 
ago as 1921. See: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,p. 297» as cited by 
P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry, op. 
cit.,.p. 211.
94« C.W. Mills, The Power Elite, op. cit., p. 136. In assessing the value 
of "managerial ability" as a factor influencing the executive's 
promotional opportunities, Mills is more cynical: "...(T)he most 
accurate single definition of ability - a many-sided word is: 
usefulness to those above, to those in control of one's advancement." 
Ibid., pi 141. In the Ü.K. the tendency for Oxford and Cambridge Arts 
graduates, and, more generally, arts graduates with a public school 
. background to monopolize the top management positions has also been 
noted. In contrast, scientists and engineers are normally relegated 
to subordinate roles. See, for example: I.C. McGivem, D.G.J. Matthews 
and W.H. Scott, Management in Britain, op. cit., pp, 66-68; Theo Nichols, 
Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. cit., pp. 115, 116.
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and goals of business, or who do not believe in them with sufficient
commitment are unlikely to make the necessary effort to reach the top.
In arguing this we are not adopting a psychological explanation for the
behaviour of managers» rather, we are simply pointing out that business
enterprises select and socialize individuals to suit their requirements
andhenoeonly those individuals who conform to such standards are allowed
to hold the reins of corporate power.
Turning to the actual behaviour of executives in firms which are
claimed to be under management control, a detailed study by Robert J. Lamer,
who himself supports the separation ownership from control thesis, came to
the conclusion that 'Wo fundamental differences in the level of profit
96rates which might be attributed to management control were found." The
most important reason for this similarity, according to Lamer, is the
fact that management income is tied to profits. The "...profit dependence
of executive inoome", he suggests, "acts as a check to keep managerial
97discretion within fairly tight limits."'' Little evidence oould be found 
to prove that the behaviour of managers was motivated by faotors other 
than the traditional business objectives.
Consequently, the two major claims of the Berle and Means thesis are
95
95» Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, op. cit.. p. 40.
See also the discussion of this question by Theo; Nichols in Ownership. 
Control and Ideology.pp. oit.» pp. 121-133«
96. Robert J. Lamer, Management Control and Large Corporation, op. oit. 
p. 63. Other writers have noted the same phenomenon. See, for 
example, the comparison management versus owner controlled firms in 
Britain,in»Michael Barratt-Brown,"The Controllers of British Industry", 
op. cit., pp. 45-50.
97» Robert J. Larner, Management Control and the Large Corporation, op. 
oit., p. 65. See also: John Westergaard and Henrietta Reisler,
Class in a Capitalist Society, op. cit., pp. 156-170. Obviously 
such findings conflict with Galbraith's theory that managers no 
longer attempt to maximize profits. See: J.K. Galbraith, The New 
Industrial State, op. cit., pp. 69-105»
- 44 -
highly questionable. It is by no means clear that there has been a
major separation of ownership from control: nor is it obvious that
top managers have interests which are distinct from the shareholders
they represent. The argument that managers are independent professionals
exercising authority on the basis of their acknowledged expertise is
thus quite misleading. For the source of managerial authority is still
ownership, and the exercise of that authority is based upon the desire
to pursue the interests of property, which means, as often as not, the
interests of the manager-shareholders themselves. Whatever may be said
about the need for a highly trained executive group to oversee the running
of a modem industrial society, the fact remains that managers are agents
of owners, not autonomous professionals. They may attempt to justify
their power on the basis of expertise or service to the community. But
in the final analysis their authority within the factory rests not on
consent, but on property. Indeed, C.W. Mills* assessment of the role
of managers is as appropriate today as it was twenty-five years ago:
The managers are often thought of as scientific 
technologists or administrative experts having 
some autonomous aims. But they are not experts 
in charge of technology; they are executors of 
property. The managers who are supposed to have 
usurped the owners* function actually fulfil it 
with as much or more devotion as any owner could.
The personal relations between big owners and 
their big managers are, of course, not necessarily 
•authoritative', except insofar as the owners and 
their boards of directors are interested in the 
profitable balance sheet, and, accordingly, judge 
their managers as, in fact, the managers judge 
themselves. External authority is not necessary 
when the agent has internalized it.98
VII
The fact that the purpose of management is one of pursuing the 
interests of shareholders has significant implications for relations
98. C.W. Mills, White Collar, op. cit., p. 103.
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between managers and workers. As executors of shareholders* property,
managers are obligated to see that the interests of shareholders always
come first. The interests of workers are not their concern, except
insofar as such interests affect the fulfilment of the owners'objectives.
Moreover, because decision-making authority within the enterprise is
based upon the owners' prerogative to dispose of their property as they
see fit, managers have a duty to ensure that this prerogative is not
infringed upon by other parties. Workers must not be allowed to usurp
control over decision-making, for this would be an illegitimate
infringement of property rights. As Neil W. Chamberlain points out
"... to accede to such a demand would be to violate the obligations inherent in
99its own legal relationship with the owners."
Management's sole obligation to its shareholders has other implications 
as well. It is not accountable to workers, consumers or the public for its 
actions as long as it doe3 not contravene the law. Outside parties have 
no right to information concerning executive decision-making} nor do they 
have the right to be consulted about management's plans for the future of 
the enterprise.'*'00 Management's refusal to allow workers or their 
representatives access to information about company affairs again follows 
its position as trustees of the shareholders, for this information could 
be used by other groups, such as trade unions or competitors, to damage 
the interests of the company.
99» Neil W. Chamberlain, "Management in Theory and Practice" in
E. Wright Blakkeand Clarke Kerr, Unions, Management and the Public 
(New York, 1940) p. 255.
100. We would not deny that there are exceptions and special cases where 
the above assertion does not apply. For example, the government may 
legislate that a minimum period of warning must be given to workers 
before a plant is closed. But we would argue that such cases 
constitute minor limitations on managerial prerogatives. And they 
do not change management's legal responsibility to pursue only the 
interests of stockholders.
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Similarly, decisions about capital expenditures, product lines, 
research and development, mergers and a host of other matters are the 
exclusive preserve of management. Although such decisions may have a 
profound effect upon other groups, and particularly on employees, it is 
managements legal responsibility to make such judgements solely in the 
interests of shareholders. Of course, in defending the interests of 
ownership, top managers are normally defending their own interests as 
stockholders as well. Consequently, their desire to prevent encroachments 
on managerial prerogatives can be seen as an attempt to protect the 
interests of the propertied class of which they are leading members.
However, there are other reasons for management’s desire to maintain 
control over all that transpires within the business enterprise. The very 
notion of what it means to manage acts as an important influence on 
management behaviour. The idea that management ought to control decision­
making within the enterprise is held by most executives and business 
leaders. "Effective prediction and control", according to Douglas McGregor, 
"are as central to the task of management as they are to the task of 
engineering or m e d i c i n e . I n  a similar vein, Peter Drucker, another 
well known management thinker, contends that "The manager is the dynamic, 
life giving element in every business. Without his leadership the 102•resources of production' remain resourdes and never beoome production."
This view is reinforced by the belief that the tasks of planning, 
organizing and co-ordinating production are quite distinct from those 
of performing work on the shop floor. The expertise and training 
associated with contemporary management are construed as major reasons 
for giving those who perform these functions a free hand to manage as
101. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York, 1969) P« 11.
102. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit., p. 13.
they see fit. In addition, the social background, education and class 
position of most senior executives combine to support their belief that 
they are most suitable individuals to make the important decisions in 
industry.Conversely, involvement by ordinary workers is seen as a 
threat to economic performance because it is widely assumed that workers 
lack the intelligence and expertise required to manage industry 
effectively.
And, finally, we ought not to discount the intrinsic rewards 
associated with managing a large enterprise as factors influencing the 
executive^ desire to monopolize decision-making. Top executives are 
not simply motivated by the rewards of status, money and other benefits 
associated with their jobs* they also derive satisfaction from wielding 
power itself. Knowledge that their decisions influence the lives of 
hundreds or, perhaps, thousands of individuals enhances their sense of 
i m p o r t a n c e . j j or -j^ e ability to control considerable quantities
- 47 -
103. On this question, see the discussion by Theo Nichols of the social 
origins, training and outlook of British managers. One of the 
ironies revealed by Nichols is the fact that while managers were 
convinced that they were the most qualified people to run industry, 
few had any training. "Of the 65 directors and senior managers we 
interviewed in Northern City, 61 had experienced no formal management 
training prior to taking up their first management position. Nor 
had many of them attended management or specialist courses since 
they became managers." Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, 
op. cit., p. 85. Recent studies have revealed little improvement in 
this area. See, for example! Ian Glover, "Barely Managing with 
Academic Qualifications" The Guardian, Feb. 4, 1976, p. 15» We should 
add, however, that this lack of training is not characteristic of 
American managers.
104. On this point, see * Alan Fox, Man Management (London, 1974) P« 136.
The intrinsic satisfactions of management have also been emphasized 
by proponents of the separation of ownership from control thesis.
Indeed, they have been anxious to show that managers are not primarily 
concerned with maximizing profits and thus that there is a difference 
in interest between owners and managers. For example, Gardiner Means 
postulates four factors which are important in motivating managers! 
power, prestige, job satisfaction, and, lastly, profits. However,
Means fails to demonstrate that there is a fundamental contradiction 
between the first three intrinsic rewards and the goal of profitability. 
Sees G. Gardiner Means, The Corporate Revolution in America (New York,
1962) p. 171.
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of resources - both human and material - an inconsiderable source of 
gratification. And while the manager is subject to the overall 
constraints noted earlier, he does have substantially more discretion 
about how to perform his job than the average worker. He is not subject 
to close control which is so irksome to lower level employees» Because 
he has much greater responsibility than his subordinates, he can point 
with pride to his achievements in running the enterprise. Thus the 
desire of senior executives to protect their prerogatives is reinforced 
by the intrinsic benefits associated with management control» To allow 
workers to have a greater say in decision-making would threaten these 
rewards.
Indeed, the tendency for managers to identify the maintenance of 
managerial control with organizational effectiveness can be interpreted, 
with only a touch of cynicism, as an understandable desire to preserve 
the power they now wield. For it reflects a wish to believe that the 
arrangements which give them so many advantages are beneficial to society 
as well,’^
Thus we see that because of their legal obligation to shareholders, 
their class position, their conception of the management function, and, 
finally, their interest in preserving the intrinsic benefits associated 
with their jobs, managers are anxious to preserve for themselves exclusive 
control of decision-making within the enterprise they oversee. It should
105» That management has a vested interest in maintaining control of 
decision-making can be seen in other ways as well. For example, 
top managers are normally paid very high salaries and given 
numerous tax-free fringe benefits. Were they accountable to workers, 
rather than shareholders, it is doubtful if they would be able to 
maintain such benefits. This argument is developed more extensively 
in Felix R. Fitzroy, "Foundations of Political Economy" Proceedings 
of the First International Sociological Conference on Participation 
and Self-Management (Dubrovnik. Dec.. 15-17. 1972) Vol. 5. no. 89-105, 
esp. pp. 97» 98»
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be emphasized that this view of the purpose of management is not based 
upon a conspiracy thesis. It is not a question of managers meeting in 
a back room to decide the most appropriate strategy for establishing 
their dominance within their firms. Rather, it is a question of how 
property ownership defines the role of management in a capitalist society, 
and, consequently, what managers come to see as their legitimate function 
within this framework.
VIII
Despite the legal basis of management control, the realities of 
running an enterprise are such that the formal power of management is 
subject to various checks and limitations. In law, the company may be 
simply a piece of property. But a company is also a complex network 
of relationships among human beings. Management power is not all- 
encompassing precisely because it is power over people rather than 
material objects - people who may, and frequently do, devise methods of 
protecting themselves from its exercise.
The principal limitations on management's power arise from its 
dependence on workers to carry out production. For it must take into 
account the fact that workers possess skills and knowledge which are 
essential to the success of the enterprise. And it must accept that 
it is often not in a position to keep an accurate check on their behaviour. 
Consequently, it is forced to rely upon their honesty and goodwill if 
production is to be carried out efficiently.
Thus we confront the fundamental contradiction within the modern 
business corporation. The legal rights of property give management 
virtually complete control over all that transpires within the enterprise. 
But management's de facto dependency upon workers to carry out production
undermines its ability to make full use of these legal rights, for 
workers are able to use management's dependency upon them to assert 
their own priorities. Although the extent of this dependency varies 
considerably, its very existence imposes restrictions upon managerial 
decision-making which conflict with management's theoretical control.
How have managers attempted to resolve this problem? When we 
consider the legal obligations of management and the various economic 
and social factors which encourage managers to believe that they ought 
to be in full control of organisational decision-making, the answer is 
not difficult to discern* it is to seek more effective methods of 
extending managerial control over the productive p r o c e s s . I n  so 
doing management hopes to reduce its dependence on workers and thus 
restrict their ability to interfere with its pursuit of the objectives 
of shareholders.
Two major strategies can be identified in management's quest for 
extending control over the productive process. The first has been to 
reduce the amount of discretion that employees have over the way they 
perform their jobs. Management has attempted to organize the work of 
its employees in such a way that it is in a better position to control 
their behaviour. It has sought to transfer much of the planning and 
co-ordination of work into its own hands to ensure that workers are 
not allowed to use their control of these activities to frustrate the 
aims of shareholders. This has meant that the design of jobs and the 
division of labour itself have been utilized to promote management 
control.
As Stephen Marglin has shown in relation to the early development 
of capitalist production, a major factor encouraging the extensive
106. On this question see* Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital,
(New York, 1974) pp. 59-83.
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division of labour was the desire of employers to create a role for 
themselves as co-ordinators of production. This role could then be 
used to control and exploit the labour of the workers who performed 
the simplified tasks assigned to them. By separating the planning 
and organization of production from its execution, the early 
entrepreneurs were able to enhance their own position and reduce the 
market value of the tasks performed by ordinary workers. And they 
were able to use their new power to ensure that the enterprises they 
managed were run according to their own priorities rather than those 
of workers.
Twentieth century managers have also grasped this principle, 
although few would state it so openly. Nevertheless, they have 
recognized that insofar as managers are able to monopolize the planning 
and co-ordinating functions, they are in a position to dominate the 
process of production and to maintain control over workers. Hence 
they have been actively seeking methods of taking these functions away 
from workers. In particular, managers have sought to organize the 
technical side of production in such a way as to expand their control 
over the shop floor. The design and lay-out of equipment, the extreme 
simplification of tasks and the elaborate set of rules and regulations 
governing the worker*s behaviour when using this equipment have all been 
utilized as tools for extending management control.
The attempt to reduce the amount of discretion exercised by 
ordinary workers is illustrated clearly in the »scientific management* movement.
107» Stephen Marglin, •'What Bo Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions 
of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production" Discussion Paper No. 222, 
Nov. 1971» Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Reprinted in 
Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 6, No, 2, Summer, 
1974» and Vol. 7» No. 1, Spring, 1975»
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Although scientific management is widely assumed to be simply a method 
for rationalizing production methods, it had another appeal to managers»
For its founder, F.W. Taylor, had devised a method of reorganizing work 
which gave management far more control over the shop floor. By using 
the science of engineering, managers could redesign the jobs of employees 
in such a way as to force them to work at the pace which management felt 
was appropriate. And it could reduce its dependence on the work force 
because Taylor's methods enabled it to take possession of the knowledge 
and skills required to carry out production on the shop floor. This 
interpretation of scientific management is not the conventional one. 
Consequently, we shall devote the first of our three chapters on management 
theory to the task of showing that the objective of extending managerial 
control was central to Taylor»s approach to management.
Although scientific management achieved some notable successes, it 
did not prove to be the panacea for management*s problems as Taylor had 
claimed. The task of 'engineering away* the discretion of workers proved 
considerably more difficult than first thought. Moreover, workers 
reacted strongly to the destruction of their traditional craft skills 
and to the simple, repetitive jobs which were the ultimate product of 
Taylor's engineering principles. Consequently, the importance of enlisting 
the full co-operation of workers in the pursuit of management aims became 
increasingly evident. If management were to extend its control, it would 
have to be by manipulating the attitudes and values of workers and not 
simply by reorganising their tasks.
Such considerations gave rise to the "human relations” approach to i 
management. Of course, the attempt to foster co-operative attitudes 
among workers was not new. Various forms of paternalism had been used 
by employers since the beginning of the industrial revolution. What 
distinguished the human relations school from its predecessors, however,
was that its proponents advocated the use of social science research 
in the quest to establish management hegemony. Knowledge of sociology 
and psychology would enable management to identify the sources of 
worker discontent and to devise appropriate remedies. The attitudes 
and values of workers would be brought into conformity with the 
productive requirements of business enterprises. In short, by applying 
the knowledge of human behaviour gained by social science, management 
would gain a new lever of control over its employees.
Alas, human relations was not a panacea either. The task of 
manipulating the attitudes of workers was far too complex for the 
rudimentary tools developed by the Hawthorne researchers. Supervision 
and counselling, the two major techniques of the human relations school, 
provided only marginal benefits to management. However, the idea of 
using social science research to further management control has remained 
a central tenet of postwar management thought. Thus in the last of our 
three chapters dealing with management control we shall examine the way 
in which research on the sources of human motivation has been utilized 
by management theorists to provide more sophisticated methods of making 
the behaviour of workers conform to the demands made upon them by 
owners. Participation, job enlargement, job enrichment; and various 
other techniques of social control will be analyzed and their underlying 
similarity with previous management strategies made explicit.
On the basis of our analysis of twentieth century management theory, 
we shall conclude that the management function has not been a natural 
•technocratic' one, but rather has been integrally connected with the 
pursuit of the interests of shareholders. The subordination of workers 
has not arisen 'inevitably* as a response to the constraints of size, 
organizational complexity and technological development as suggested 
by Dahrendorf, Galbraith and other advocates of 'managerialism'. Rather
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it has resulted from management's desire to control the behaviour of 
workers so that their needs and aspirations are not allowed to 
interfere with the business objectives established by stockholders*
In the second section of the thesis we shall look at the impact 
of this pattern of control on the workers whose lives are so affected 
by it. Our purpose will be to highlight the conflict between the human 
needs of workers and the demands made upon them by a pattern of industrial 
organization based upon property ownership. We shall argue that the 
exclusion of workers from industrial decision-making has given rise to 
a number of major abuses.
To begin with, the physical health and safety of workers has been 
subordinated to the shareholders' objective of maximizing output and 
profits. Because the risks associated with using unsafe equipment or 
following dangerous work procedures are borne by workers, while the 
benefits of higher production arising therefrom are reaped by owners, 
and because managers are obligated to pursue only the interests of 
shareholders, production has been organized on the basis of what is 
profitable rather than what is safe. Yet the confliot between the 
demands of owners and the needs of workers is not restricted to the 
questions of physical health and safety. Pressure for production places 
severe strains on the psychological well-being of workers. As the work 
of Arthur Komhauser and other industrial psychologists has shown, the 
impact of simple, repetitive jobs performed under close supervision has 
been to endanger the mental health of ordinary workers and to reduce 
their overall happiness and sense of personal worth. And, finally, the 
fact that property forms the basis of industrial organizations has 
meant that attempts by workers to exercise self-determination at work 
have been stifled. This situation, we will argue, is not merely 
detrimental to the interests of workersi it is antithetical to the
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democratic belief in self-determination and the sanctity of the individual 
personality.
In the third section of the thesis, we shall evaluate the effectiveness 
of contemporary trade unionism as a response to management power. After 
discussing the major arguments in favour of the existing system of 
collective bargaining, as outlined by Beatrice and Sydney Webb and refined . 
by Hugh Clegg, we shall indicate the limitations of this approach in 
countering the abuses of management control discussed earlier. Specifically, 
we shall point to the implicit acceptance of the values underlying private 
ownership of industry. Acquiescence to the treatment of labour as a
V.
commodity and to' the right of those who own to.control has meant that 
trade unions have been unwilling to attack the source of the problems 
faced by workers. Nor have they been willing to question the view that 
the purpose of industry is primarily one of maximizing output and profits. 
Instead, they have focused their energies on eliminating some of the more 
obvious abuses of the system. While their role in this regard ought not 
to be disparaged, it has had the unintended effect of legitimizing the 
framework of private ownership by curtailing some of its glaring 
injustices. Yet our critique of trade unionism should not be misinterpreted, 
We are not suggesting that unions be abolished. Rather, we are pointing 
to the need for a fundamental re-appraisal of their objectives so that 
they can become an effective instrument for pursuing the interests of 
producers.
As we have devoted the first three sections of this thesis to a 
critique of the existing framework of industrial organization, it is 
appropriate that, in the final section, we examine an alternative view 
of how industry should be organized. It seem3 almost inevitable that 
R.H. Tawney's eloquent statement of the case for workers' control should 
be the starting point of our discussion. Characteristically, Tawney'
went straight to the heart of the matter "by asking what the purpose of 
industry ought to be. Should it be simply to maximize the profits of 
shareholders? Or were other objectives of greater importance? In 
particular, should it provide an opportunity for the producers to 
utilize their talents and skills to the fullest in the provision of a 
service to the community? And, if this were its purpose, what 
justification was there for a system of ownership and control which 
denigrated the role of the producer and subordinated service to private 
greed? Tawney’s answer - that control ly producers over their labour was 
the only morally acceptable basis of industrial organization - is still, 
we shall argue, as relevant as when it was first put forward over a half 
century ago.
Yet, if Tawney, more than any other writer, was able to clarify the 
moral justification for workers* control, it has been the historic role 
of the Yugoslavs to attempt the transition to a socialist economio system 
based upon this idea. Thus in the final chapter we shall turn to examine 
the Yugoslav experiment to see to what extent it provides an answer to the 
problems discussed earlier. Of particular note is that contrary to 
Schumpeter’s view that workers* management would result in a ’lack of 
bread* Yugoslavia has been remarkably successful from an eoonomio point 
of view, achieving a rate of growth surpassed only by Japan in the 
post-war period. However, our concern with self-management is not 
primarily in terms of ’efficiency* and ’productivity* but rather in 
giving producers self-determination at work and eliminating the abuses 
of management oontrol outlined in the earlier sections of the thesis.
Our conclusion, after an extensive review of recent social science 
research on Yugoslav enterprises is that self-management has been 
reasonably successful in achieving-fhis objective. Indeed, when the 
numerous obstacles — cultural, ethnic, economio and political — which
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confronted the implementation of workers* democracy in the Yugoslav 
setting are taken into account, the achievement of the Yugoslavs can 
only be described as remarkable. On the basis of this evidence, plus 
the analysis of the function of management developed earlier in the 
thesis, we shall conclude by arguing that workers' control is both the
most logical end .'morally acceptable basis for the organization of
r
industry in a democratic society.
CHAPTER II
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH ENGINEERING» F.W. TAYLOR 
AND THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH
As a boy and as a man...Taylor split his world 
into its minutest parts. Playing croquet, he 
worried his fellows by plotting the angles of 
his strokes. When he walked, he counted his 
steps to learn the most efficient stride.
Nervous, high strung, although he neither smoked 
nor drank, not even coffee or tea, he was a victim 
all his life of insomnia and nightmares? and, 
fearing to lie on his back, he could sleep in 
peace only when bolstered upright in a bed or in 
a chair. He couldn't stand to see an idle lathe 
or an idle man. He never loafed and he'd be 
damned if anybody else would.
This compulsive character Taylor stamped onto 
a civilization. - Daniel Bell.
I
Much has been written about "Scientific Management" since Frederick 
Winslow Taylor introduced the concept at the turn of the century.^ 1 
Taylor's ideas on industrial organization have had a profound effect 
on the lives of tens of millions of workers throughout the world. His
1. The term "Scientific Management" was not adopted by Taylor until 
1910 even though his approach to management was largely developed 
by this date. Previously Taylor had referred to his system by a 
number of terms including "Functional Management" and, less modestly, 
the "Taylor System" of Management. However in 1910 at the Hearings 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission examining a proposed increase 
in railroad freight rates, Louis D. Erandeis, one of the lawyers 
opposing the increase, asked the leading proponents of Taylor's 
methods to settle on a name for their system. "Scientific Management 
was adopted. Seet Horace Brookwalter Drury, Scientific Management» A 
History and Criticism (New York,1918) Chapter I. For a critique of 
the use of the term "science" to describe Taylor's techniques see* 
Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society (Glencoe, 111., 1964) (orig. 
pub. 1955) Ch. Ij‘ Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. 
cit., pp. 86, 87.
- 59 -
views have become the basis of twentieth century management theory
and many would argue that Taylorism is still the most important
2component of contemporary management practice. Indeed, even Lenin,
3no friend of business, expressed admiration for Taylor’s methods.
It is thus logical to begin our examination of management theory with 
the views of the man who laid its foundations.
Unfortunately, the underlying philosophy of scientific management 
has too often been confused with the specific techniques used to implement 
it. A great deal of attention - and criticism - has been focused on the 
deleterious effects of time and motion study, job analysis, task 
simplification and the abolition of craft skills. Although these facets 
of Taylor*s system are by no means unimportant, they are not the essence 
of scientific management. Rather, they are its most dramatic 
manifestations. The core; of scientific management lies in the attempt 
to transfer control of the productive process from the hands of workers 
into the hands of management. It is because scientific management offered 
a systematic and coherent strategy for achieving this goal that it has 
had such an impact on industrial organization, and not primarily beoause 
it simplified and roùtinized tasks of workers.
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the problems 
that Taylor set out to solve. It is generally thought that Taylor*s 2
2. On the impact of Taylorism on contemporary business organizations, 
see Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital (New York, 1974)
Ch. 4 especially pp. 86-92; Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management. 
op* cit., p. 377 and passim; James O'Toole (ed.) Work in America 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1973) pp. 17-21.
3* V.I. Lenin, "Scientific Management and the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat". This was a speech given in June 1919 and reprinted 
in V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 7 as cited by Daniel Bell, Work 
and its Discontents (New York. 1970) (orig. pub., 1956) p. 41,
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system involved the application of engineering principles in order to
4rationalize the organization of production. This is perfectly true.
But it is also true that Taylor saw engineering principles as a method 
for solving another problems the resistance of workers to the demands 
made upon them by their employers. Because management was unable to 
counteract the adverse effects of low worker motivation on production, 
Taylor saw a pressing need to extend managerial control over the 
shop-floor. And the key to doing this, he argued, lay in using 
engineering principles as the basis for a radical, social re-organization 
of work - a reorganization which would greatly enhance management’s *
4» Taylor's arguments first came to public notice with the publication 
of "A Piece Rate System, Being a Step Toward a Partial Solution of 
the Labour Problem" Transactions of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers XVI (1695) reprinted in CJ3ertrand Thompson 
(ed.) Scientific Management (Cambridge, Mass., 1922) pp. 636-665.
Eight years later, a more comprehensive and sophisticated outline 
of his views appeared. This was his well-known study, "Shop Management" 
Tran3. A.S.M.E. XXIV (1903) reprinted in a collection of his works 
entitled simply Scientific Management (New York, 1947)» The next 
important statement of his views was made in his inaugural address 
as President of A.S.M.E. in 1906. "On the Art of Cutting Metals."
Trans, A.S.M.E. XXVIII (1907) reprinted in C.Bertrand Thompson 
(ed.) Scientific Management, op. cit., pp. 242-268. In 1911 Taylor 
published his last and most influential work on the topic, The 
Principles of Scientific Management (New York, 1911). However, 
the following year he was asked to give evidence to a Special 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. His Testimony 
before this Committee has subsequently become one of the most 
valuable sources of information on his approach to management. See» 
Hearings Before the Special Committee of the House of Representatives 
to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management Under 
Authority of House Resolution 90 (1912) reprinted in F.w7 Taylor 
Scientific Management (New York. 1947). In the following discussion 
we shall refer to this simply as Taylor's Testimony.
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ability to control the behaviour of its employees.
Taylor believed that output restriction or( as he referred to itj 
"soldiering”, was widespread in industry. He distinguished two kinds 
of soldiering: natural and systematic. The former stemmed from what 567
5
5. The fact that scientific management enhanced managements control has 
been noted, in*passing, by many writers. Yet most have assumed that 
this was merely an unintended side-effect rather than its basic purpose. 
Of course, not everyone was persuaded that Taylorism was simply a 
neutral device for rationalizing and modernizing production. The trade 
unions who were threatened by Taylor's methods quickly recognized the 
underlying drive to extend managerial control. And, a number of labour 
relations analysts of the day, such as Robert F. Hoxie, saw scientific 
management in a similar light. Nevertheless, the prevailing view among 
social scientists was one which accepted the neutrality of Taylor's 
approach. However, in the post-war period, and particularly in the last 
five years, a more critical attitude towards scientific management has 
emerged. Stimulated by accounts of the development of contemporary 
management by writers such as Lorin Baritz and, more recently,
Harry Braverman, a major re-evaluation of Taylorism has taken place. 
Studies by Brian Palmer, Mike Davis and Catherine Stone have attempted 
to assess Taylor's ideas in terms of their impact in transferring 
control of production from workers to employers. Although the views of 
these writers differ on a number of points - Palmer, for example, sees 
Taylorism'as only one aspect of a larger "thrust for efficiency" - 
they all reject the conventional view that the question of control was 
incidental to Taylor's approach. For further references, see:
Robert F. Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labour (New York, 1915) 
pp. 98-156} Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., esp. pp. 97»
98; Brian D. Palmer, "Class, Conception and Conflict: The Thrust for 
Efficiency, Managerial Views of Labour and the Working Class Rebellion" 
Review of Radical Political Economics Vol. 7» No. 2 Summer, 1975}
Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. 85-157}
Mike Davis, "The Stop-Watch and the Wooden Shoe: Scientific Management 
and the Industrial Workers of the World", Radical America Vol. 8, No. 6. 
Jan.-Feb., 1976,-pp. 69—95» Catherine Stone, "The Origins of Job 
Structures in the Steel Industry" Review of Radical Political Economics, 
Vol. VI No. 2, 1974, pp. 113-144. !
6. F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit.. p. 119; F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate 
System", o£. cit., pp. 644, 645. According to the historian Samuel Haber, 
Taylor opened virtually every speech he gave with a warning about the 
detrimental effects of soldiering on industrial efficiency in the United 
States, See: Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago, 1964) p. 2. 
Similarly, Lorin Baritz asserts that "Taylor believed that this situation 
(soldiering) was characteristic of virtually every factory in the country 
and he saw it as his task to devise methods whereby the control and 
determination of rates of production would be taken from the hands of the 
workers and put into the hands of management." See: Lorin Baritz, The 
Servants of Power (Middletown, Conn., i960) pp. 97, 98.
7. F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit.. p. 119.
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he saw as man’s natural tendency to be lazy. Although natural soldiering
could, at times, be a major obstacle to higher productivity, any determined
manager could devise effective strategies for counteracting it. On the
other hand, systematic soldiering presented employers with a more complex -
and serious - problem. This was so because it involved the social
regulation of output by groups of workers who followed their own, rather
0
than management's, standards about how much they ought to produce. Thus
it involved a conscious attempt by workers to deceive their employers.
"...(Systematic soldiering", Taylor asserted, "is done by the men with
the deliberate object of keeping their employer ignorant of how fast work 
9can be done." Not only did work groups establish their own output quotas, 
they also pressurised all members to conform to these quotas. Even if a 
worker wanted to comply with management’s objectives, fear of retaliation 
by fellow workers made him comply with the group's standards.
The adverse effects of systematic soldiering on production were of 
enormous proportions, according to Taylor. Workers commonly limited their 
output to one third or one quarter of what was feasible. Prom Taylor's 8*
8. P.W. Taylor, Shop Management, op. cit., p. 31 and passim. However, as 
Earnest Dale notes, Taylor saw soldiering, in some circumstances, as a 
rational response to anomalies and perceived injustices in the wage 
structure. Taylor believed that when management was ignorant of the 
amount of work involved in the tasks assigned to workers, inevitably 
some ended up working harder than others for the same wage. Because 
management could not distinguish between the diligent worker and the 
plodder, it frequently cut the rate of the former and raised that of 
the latter in its attempt to maintain relatively equal wa&es among 
employees with the same skills. Workers quickly concluded that there 
was nothing to be gained by increasing their output. Thus they 
conspired to turn out that amount which they thought would maximize 
their earnings with the minimum of effort. Seei Earnest Dale, 
Management» Theory and Practice (New York, 1973) P» 114»
9» P.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., p. 119.
m 6 3 —
point of view this constituted an immense swindle of employers who were 
paying wages for work that was not performed. Because he believed that 
employers had the right to demand that their employees work to the limit 
of their ability, Taylor deplored this practice and felt that employers 
should do everything in their power to end it. Indeed, the notion of 
relaxing on the job or working at a congenial pace was quite repugfiant to 
him, for he believed that the sole purpose of work was to maximize output. 
According to his official biographer, Prank Copley, "The idea of a man 
doing less than his best was to him morally shocking. He was concerned 
for the effect of it on the manís own character."^ So strong was Taylor*s 
reaction to soldiering, that he called it the greatest evil within 
contemporary industry.
A good deal has been said and is being constantly 
said about the "sweat shop" work and conditions.
The writer has great sympathy for those who are 
over-worked, but on the whole, a greater sympathy 
for those who are under-paid. For every individual, 
however, who is over-worked, there are a hundred who 
intentionally under-work - greatly under-work - 
every day of their lives, and who for this reason 
deliberately aid in establishing those conditions 
which in the end invariably result in low wages. And 
yet hardly a single voice is being raised in an 
endeavour to correct this evil, (his emphasis)10 1
Taylor believed that soldiering existed because workers, rather than 
managers controlled the planning, organizing and execution of work on the 
shop-floor. This was most obvious in the case of skilled workers, although 
it was by no means restricted to them. The craft worker performed his job 
according to methods evolved within his own trade rather than .'to rules 
and regulations established by management. He had a strong sense of what 
we now refer to as "job property rights" and he guarded these rights
10. Prank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management 
(2 Vol.) (New York, 1918) Vol. I, p. 207 (his emphasis).
11. F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. cit.,
pp. 17, 18.
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jealously from infringements by management» In addition, he exercised
control over the methods to be followed in production, the tools to be
used and the time allotted to each job. It was normal for management to
assign him a task and then leave it to him to perform it in whatever way
he thought best. Although management scrutinized the work of unskilled
workers to a greater degree, it was still customary for them to be given
13considerable discretion over the way they did their jobs.
Control of production methods by workers meant that management was 
dependent upon them. Because management had little idea of how much effort 
or time was required to perform the various jobs done by its employees, 
it simply had to rely on their honesty and good faith. Given the 
prevalence of soldiering, Taylor felt that this was quite unsatisfactory. 
Management had no way of telling whether inefficient methods of working 
were being used because it had no objective standards against which to 
measure worker performance. And, because it laoked clear standards, it 
had no effective method for establishing whether workers were restricting 
their output.
Taylor's views on soldiering crystallized during his apprenticeship 
at the Midvale Steel Plant. As a worker, he had participated in the 12
12. The role of the craft worker in the steel industry where Taylor
developed his ideas is outlined in Catherine Stone's recent article 
"The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry" op. cit., 
pp. 115-127.
13» F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate System! Toward a Partial Solution of the 
Labour Problems", 0£. cit., pp.637-642;F.W. Taylor, The Principles of 
Scientific Management, op. cit., pp. 31» 32. On the question of the 
value of craft knowledge to the worker as a means of increasing his 
bargaining power, See: "Modem Industry and Craft Skill" an editorial 
published by the International Moulder's Journal as cited by 
Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labour, op. cit., pp. 131-133» 
Hoxie argues that craft workers were well aware of the threat that 
scientific management posed to their autonomy and for this reason were 
anxious to prevent its implementation. For a more recent discussion of 
this issue, See: Mike Davis, "The Stop-Watch and the Wooden Shoe", op. 
cit., pp. ¿9-73» See also: David Jenkins, Job Power, (Baltimore, Md., 
1974) (orig. pub. 1973) P» 25, and; Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly 
Capital, op. cit., Ch. 2.
deliberate restriction of output along with his fellow machinists. Hence 
he was familiar with the various ploys used to hoodwink management.
However, when he was promoted to foremen of the shop, he vowed to stamp 
out this practice. Por three bitter years he harassed his former work­
mates unrelentingly to force them to produce what he thought was a fair 
day's work. Eventually they capitulated in the face of his ruthless 
tactics. But the emotional strain incurred during this period led him to
14
search for a better way to make employees conform to management objectives.
Upon reflection, he came to believe that what management required was 
a systematic method of determining precisely how much work an employee 
could performi
When I came to think over the matter, I realized 
that the thing which we on the management side 
lacked more than anything else was exact knowledge 
as to how long it ought to take a workman to do 
his work...I could take any workman and show him 
how to run his lathe but when it came to telling a 
man how long it ought to take him to do his work, 
there was no foreman who at that time could do this 
with any degree of accuracy, even if he knew ten 
times as much about the time problem as I did. You 
will remember, of course, that the chief object of 
the men in soldiering was to keep their foreman 
ignorant of how fast the work could be done.*5
Taylor reasoned that if management took upon itself the responsibility 
of organizing the jobs workers performed, it would be able to regulate 
the pace and quality of their work more effectively. By adopting the *
14» F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., pp, 79^85. For a detailed account 
of this period in his life seei Frank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor»
Father of Scintific Management Voi. I, o£. cit.
15* F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., pp. 85, 86. We might add that the 
factor of uncertainty itself influenced Taylor's views on this question. 
As long as workers maintained their monopoly of information, management 
would never know if the methods used and the time allotted to a job 
were such as to maximize efficiency. Thus even if workers were 
diligently pursuing management's objectives in this regard, management 
would still have no way of verifying this. As a consequence, suspicions 
about their performance could never be assuaged. But, with the transfer 
of knowledge to management and the implementation of Taylor's techniques, 
this element of uncertainty would be eliminated.
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principles of "Scientific Management" which we will examine in a moment, 
it would reduce its dependence on workers and at the same time be in a
16much more favourable position to control production on the shop floor.
The major difference between Taylor's new approach and what he referred to
as the traditional "initiative and incentive* approach to management lay
in the enhanced responsibilities assumed by management. Where the old
system allowed workers to plan as well as execute their tasks, his new
method involved a radical separation of these activities»
The philosophy of the managemait of 'initiative 
and incentive' makes it necessary for each 
workman to bear almost the entire responsibility 
for the general plan as well as for each détail 
of his work, and in many cases for his implements 
as well. In addition tb this, he must do all the 
actual physical labour. The development of a 
science, on the other hand, involves the 
establishment of many rules, laws and formulae 
which replace the judgement of the individual 
workman and which can be effectively used only 
after having been systematically recorded, indexed, 
etc. The practical use of scientific data also 
calls for a room in which to keep the books, records, 
etc. and a desk for the planner to work at. Thus 
all of the planning which under the old system was 
done by the workman, as a result of his personal 
experience, must, of necessity, under the new 
system, be done by the management in accordance with 
the laws of the science; because even if the working 
man was well suited to the development and use of 
scientific data, it would be physically impossible 
for him to work at his machine and at a desk at the 
same time. It is also clear that in most cases one 
type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely 
different type to execute the work. ^*7
As the preceding quotation demonstrates, particularly in the rather 
lame argument that a man cannot work on a machine and sit at a desk at 
the same time, Taylor's approach was consciously designed to take away 
the workman's autonomy. The goal of breaking the oontrol workers 16*
16. P.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. cit», 
PP. 36-J8.
!7. Ibid., pp. 37, 38.
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exercised over production lay behind Taylor's new techniques for the 
organization of work» Thus the extension of managerial control over 
the worker and his work was not an accidental by-product of scientific 
management as is commonly thought. Rather, it was the central objective.
II
To reach this objective it was necessary for management to collect all 
relevant information associated with the performance of each job. In so 
doing it would eliminate labour's monopoly of knowledge. Once it had done 
this it could select the most efficient methods from among those used by 
different workmen. These would then become the standard methods which all 
workers would be required to use. As Lorin Baritz notes, the implications 
of this reorganization of work were that "Labour skills would be 
transferred to management for analysis, then handed back piecemeal to 
workers with the result that they would no longer be masters of a craft.
Taylor outlined the steps in this re-organization of work in the 
following way»
First» Find, say,10 or 15 different men (preferably in as 
many different establishments and different parts of the 
country) who are specially skilled in doing the particular 
work to be analyzed.
Second» Study the exact series of elementary operations or 
motions which each of these men uses in doing the work which 
is being investigated, as well as the implements each man 
uses.
Third» Study with a stop-watch the time required to make 
each of these elementary movements and then select the 
quickest way of doing each element of the work.
Fourth» Eliminate all false movements, slow movements and 
useless movements. 18
18. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 29. See also» 
Horace B. Drury, Scientific Management» A History and Criticism 
(New York, 1918) pp. 201-210} Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management 
and Labour, op. cit., pp, 15-20, 131-156* and passim: and 
Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society (Glencoe, 1964) (orig. pub.
1955) PP» 63, 64.
Fifth: After doing away with all unnecessary movements, 
collect into one series the quiokest and "best movements 
as well as the best implements.
This one new method is then substituted in place of the 
ten or fifteen inferior series which were formerly in 
use. The best method is taught first to the teachers 
(or functional foremen) and by them to every workman in 
the establishment until it is superseded by a quicker 
and better series of movements.*9 *
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19» F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management« op. cit.. pp.
117, 118. See also: Prank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of 
Scientific Management, op. cit., Vol. I. pp. 223-236 and passim. Of 
course, the idea of breaking down jobs into their simplest components 
antedates Taylor. Adam Etaith, in his famous discussion of pin-making, 
pointed out the economio advantages of the division of labour in the 
following way:
"The great increase in the quantity of work, whioh, in consequence of 
the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of 
performing is owing to three different oircumstanoes: first, to the 
increase of dexterity in every particular workman^ secondly, to the 
saving of time whioh is oommonly lost in passing from one species 
of work to another; and, lastly, to the invention of a great number 
of maohines which facilitate and abridge labour and enable one man 
to do the work of many."
And, we might add, Etaith also noted the deleterious effects of such 
a division of labour on workers. See: Adam Smith, The Wealth of 
Nations, Bruce Mazlish (ed.) (New York, 1961) (orig. pub. If 7£>) Ch. I 
and II. The quotationiB to be found on page 7» For an interesting 
discussion of Smith*s unconsoious bias in favour of employers, see: 
Stephen Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? op. pit.
In the l830*s Charles Babbage published On The Economy of . Machinery 
and Manufacture. In this book he suggested that the division of labour 
had another advantage from the employer* s point of view:
"(T)he master craftsman, by dividing the work to be executed into 
different processes, each requiring different degrees of skill or 
force, can purchase exaotly the preoise quantity of both which is 
necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work were executed 
by one workman, that person must possess sufficient skill to perform 
the most difficult, and sufficient strength to exeoute the most 
laborious, of the operations into whioh the art is divided."
Babbage also measured the time it took for workers to perform different 
tasks. However, as Taylor*s offioial biographer, Frank Copley, points 
out, neither 3nith, nor Babbage, attempted to determine how much time 
it "ou^it" to take to perform a job. Nor did they focus attention on 
the elimination of all extraneous motions. Thus what was unique about 
Taylor*s contribution was the use of time and motion study to oontrol 
the performance of workers. If Etaith can be credited with recognizing 
the advantages of the division of labour in increasing worker effioienoy, 
and Babbage with seeing its value to employers in substituting less 
skilled labour, Taylor can be given the dubious honour of seeing its 
potential in extending management control. See; Charles Babbage, On The 
Economy of Machinery and Manufacture (4th ed. 1835) reprinted, in part, 
in Louis E. Davis and James C. Taylor, Design of Jobs (London, 1972) 
p. 26. See also: Frank W. Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of 
Soientifio Management, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 223-236.
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The principle of developing standard tools and work procedures 
allowed management to monitor the 'behaviour of workers more effectively .-because 
now it could readily identify a worker who was deliberately restricting 
his output. Although Taylor believed that there was usually "one best 
method" of performing a task, his advocacy of standardized work 
procedures was based primarily on their value as a method for regulating 
employee behaviour, and not because they invariably embodied the •'best1' 
method of performing a job.
After management has simplified and reorganized the tasks of its
employees to eliminate all unnecessary motions, the next step was to
discover preoisely how fast an energetic and hi^ily motivated worker
could perform them. Through the use of the stop-watch, the exact amount
of time required to perform a task was measured and the number of times
20a task could be repeated during an hour or a day was calculated. This 
figure then became the established "rate" of production.
The principle of timing each task and setting a rate of production 
gave management an important new technique for controlling the performance 
of its employees. Now it could set the paoe of work and dismiss employees 
who failed to meet this pace. Soldiering could thus be sharply reduoed 
and management was no longer confronted with the uncertainty of whether 
its employees were maximizing output - an uncertainty which was inherent 
in the older techniques of management. 20
20. F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Soientifio Management, op. oit., 
pp. 117-118. Taylor*s attitude towards employees who resented 
the observation of their working methods by the time-and-raotion 
study experts was oharaoteristically unsympathetio. "...(l)f 
any man objects to time study, the real objection is not that it 
makes him nervous. His real objection is that he does not want 
his employer to know how long it takes him to do his job."
Frederick W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., as cited by Frank Copley, 
Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Soientifio Management, op. cit.,
Vol. I, p. 234. For a critique of Taylor’s time and motion techniques, 
Bee: Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society, op. cit., pp. 51-63»
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Once management had analyzed, reorganized and timed the jobs of its
workers, the next step was to plan each day*s work for them in advance«
This was now feasible because it could calculate the time required for
each task. Moreover, in planning work ahead of time, it could specify
precisely how the job was to be done, the tools to be used and the time 
21allotted. As a consequence, it could extract maximum production from 
each worker.
The reorganization of work according to the principles of scientific
management had other benefits, as well. Work normally performed by skilled
workers could now be done by the semi-skilled or unskilled. This resulted
in significant reductions in labour costs. Moreover, the use of less
skilled workers further reduced management*s dependency on its labour 
22force.
Ill
In addition to reducing the discretion of workers, Taylor argued that
23there ought to be a clear separation between planning and execution. He 
believed that the person who performed a job was unlikely to understand 
the principles underlying its organization. Consequently, he felt that 21*
21. F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. cit., p. 39.
22. F.W. Taylor, Shop Management, op. clt.. p. 105. According to his 
biographer, Frank Copley, Taylor believed in the "economic principle 
that none of the time of higher priced labour should be devoted to 
work that could be done by lower priced labour." Frank Copley,
Frederick W. Taylor* Father of Scientific Management, op. cit.. Vol. I,
p. 278. See also« Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society, op. cit., p. 63.
23» On this point see the discussion by Samuel Haber in Efficiency and
Pplift, op. cit., pp. 24-26. The impact of Taylor’s view that planning 
should be separated from performance is still being felt in modern 
industry. See, for example, Harry Braverman's excellent discussion of 
post-war attempts in this direction in Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. 
cit.. Ch. 5»
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management should do the thinking while workers should simply do as
they were told. 24 This division reflected his belief in the superior
knowledge, skill and intelligence of managers. Of course, Taylor did
not deny that some workers were as intelligent as managers. But he
argued that they had the opportunity to join the ranks of the latter
group if their performance merited promotion. And, he had no reservations
in categorizing the majority as distinctly inferior, both morally and
intellectually. They could all be what he described as "first class men."
But the definition of a "first class man" was quite different for each
group. According to Samuel Haber»
When discussing the place of each worker in the 
factory, Taylor turned to Platonic metaphors of 
racehorses and dray horses, songbirds and sparrows.
He saw the factory hierarchy as one of abilities.
The division of labour did not constrict the worker 
excessively, because he might rise to that level of 
competence of which he was capable. Taylor insisted 
that each worker be treated individually and not en 
masse. Each was to be rewarded and punished for his 
particular deeds. In this way Taylor introduced 
individualism into the factory, but individualism in 
a diminished form. It could not measure up to the 
model of the entrepreneur in the market.25
When Taylor was not comparing workers with animals, he was comparing
26them with components of a machine. Yet machine or beast, it made little 
difference. The point was that the narrow and circumscribed tasks devised 
by scientific managers were seen as appropriate for the limited *26
24* As Frank Copley, Taylor's official biographer, noted, Taylor never 
tired of informing recalcitrant workers that they were not paid to 
think. Seet Frank Copley, Frederick W, Tavlori Father of Scientific 
Management, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 13«
25» Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, op. cit., p. 23. (his emphasis).
26. Brian Palmer, "Class, Conception and Conflict» The Thrust for Efficiency, 
Managerial Views of Labour and the Working Class Rebellion", ojd. cit. 
pp. 57-40. See also» Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, op, cit.
pp. 23-26.
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intelligence of the workers assigned to them. Men were to be fitted 
to the needs of the productive system, rather than having production 
organized to fulfil their needs. The separation of planning and execution 
of work also enabled management to choose the cheapest grade of labour for 
each job. Taylor referred to this as finding the "right man for the right 
job." By this he meant that it was managements responsibility to give 
each worker a job that made full use of the labour for which management 
had paid. Careful placement of workers would ensure that the productive 
potential of each was utilized to the maximum. In choosing men for heavy 
physical work, for example, Taylor advised that only the strongest should 
be used. Nine out of ten men would be unsuitable. Once management had 
selected the strongest, it could establish a rate of production which would 
maximize their output. Needless to say, the pace set for these "first
27class men" would be far higher than any ordinary worker could achieve.
Thus, by separating the planning frçin the. performance, of. work, management 
obtained a new and important method for reducing labour costs.
IV
Taylor and his followers also laboured diligently to devise technical 
innovations which would give management more effective control of work 
procedures. One of the major impediments to the attainment of this goal 
at the Bethlehem Steel Company was the fact that there was no method other *
27* Taylor's response to charges that he was overworking his employees 
was that only those who were fit to perform a job were placed at it. 
Naturally the rate of work established for an 18 stone man was far 
higher than that for a 10 stone man. But as long as 18 stone men 
performed the job, Taylor asserted, they could not be overworked. Of 
course, what Taylor failed to answer was the question of how to prevent 
abuses of this system. Management clearly had much to gain if it set 
the rate according to the strongest workmen and then expected others to 
meet the pace. And, this, of course, is precisely what happened.
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than trial and error for determining the hardness» speed and angles of
the tools used for cutting metals. Each workman learned, throu^ihls
own experience, roughly what was required to do the job. Because there
were more than a dozen variables associated with this task, it was thought
28impossible to devise a more exact method. However, after aa number of 
years' research and with the encouragement of Taylor, Carl Barth developed 
a slide rule which solved this problem.
The value of this technical innovation, according to Taylor, lay not
so much in the fact that it enabled workers to select the most efficient
cutting speeds but rather in that it gave management the information
required to control work procedures more effectively.
The gain from these slide rules is far greater 
than that of all other improvements combined 
because it accomplishes the original object for 
which in 1880 the experiments were started, i.e. 
that of taking the control of the machine shop out 
of the hands of the many workmen and placing it 
completely in the hands of the management, thus 
superseding 'rule of thumb* by scientific control. '
As Catherine Stone points out, the extension of managerial oontrol over 
the technology used in production also made it possible to exclude workers 
from a share of the benefits of that technology. Whereas under the old 
craft system, the master craftsman customarily received payment on a scale 
which took into account the selling price of the product, under the new 
system workers were paid only as wage labourers. The "partnership" between 
labour and capital was replaced by the unilateral right of employers to 
distribute the profits of technology as they saw fit. Thus workers not 
only lost control of how they performed their jobs; they lost the 28*
28, F.W. Taylor, "On the Art of Cutting Metals" in Clarence B. Thompson (ed.), 
Scientific Management, op. cit., pp. 242-244 and passim.
29* F.W. Taylor, "On the Art of Cutting Metals" 0£. cit., p. 59 as cited 
by: Frank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, 
o^cit., Vol. II, p. 120. ; ; '
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accompanying financial rewards as well« From managements point of view 
this constituted a major advance because it was now free to substitute
labour saving machinery without having to share the benefits with workers« 
The development of the assembly line, chiefly by Henry Ford, carried 
Taylor*s approach to technological innovation to its logical conclusion.
As managers soon realized, the value of the assembly-line lay not simply 
in cutting out unnecessary motions by bringing tasks to workers in a planned 
and convenient way. It also enabled management to control the pace of 
production more effectively. So long as management was able to determine 
both the lay-out and the speed of the assembly-line it could regulate 
precisely how much work each of its employees turned out in a day. As 
Lorin Baritz observes*
The basic idea that Henry Ford implemented in 
his factory was not simply the mechanical 
organization of the conveyor belt system, but a 
conception of a predetermined social organization 
in relation to such technical innovation.31
In many respects, the Assembly line epitomizes the approach of
scientific management to the organization of work. It involves a complete
separation of planning from execution. It standardizes and simplifies tasks
such that a minimum of skill is required. It carefully times each motion
in order to ensure that every second is used in a productive way. And,
most importantly, it shifts control of the shop-floor from the hands of
workers to management. 301
30
30. Catherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry", 
op. cit., pp. 121-123 and passim.
31. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 10. We might add 
that it is precisely because the assembly line affords management the 
opportunity to exercise greater social control that it has given rise
to so much conflict between workers and managers. For recent discussions 
of this question, See* Hugh Beynon, Working For Ford (London, 1973) andj 
Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. I46-I49.
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v
Taylor did not limit his advice to the reorganization of the technical
side of production. He believed that the careful design of payment systems
would give management another way of making workers comply with its demands.
The principle underlying the design of wage incentives, Taylor argued,
ought to be one of rewarding workers who met managements rate, while
penalizing those who did not. By feeding the ambitions of individual
workers, Taylor felt that it would be possible to persuade workers that
their interests were best served by striving to obtain the output quotas
32established by management.
Although Taylor believed that different systems of payment, inoluding 
day work, had a legitimate role to play under scientific management, he 
favoured his own differential piece rate system. What distinguished this 
system from the earlier Halsey Premium Plan and other piece rate systems 
was that workers were paid according to how fast they worked as well as 
how much they produced. For example, if the number of pieces established 
for a day's work was 100, then the worker who met this quota was paid at 
the top rate per item. And he received a bonus for meeting the quota as 
•well. However, if he produced only 80 pieces, he lost the bonus and was 
paid less for each piece. Consequently, the difference in earnings between 
the worker who met or exceeded the quota and one who failed to do so was 32
32. Catherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry", 
op. cit., pp. 130, 131»
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quite substantial.
Taylor»s differential piece bate system was integrally connected with 
his advocacy of time and motion studies. Because he believed that it was 
possible to determine the exact amount of time and exertion required to 
perform each job, he felt that anomalies in the payment system could be 
eliminated. Under the traditional "initiative and incentive" management 
system, piece-rates were assessed on a guess-work basis. Hence the rate 
set by calculating the output of an energetio workman might be considerably 
more difficult to meet than one established by examining the speed of a 
laZy worker. This lack of standardization meant that some workers obtained 
high wages with little effort while others could not do so even if they 
worked to the limit of their capacity. Such inequalities, Taylor argued, 
gave rise to resentment towards management because wages did not correspond 
to effort.^ However, time and motion study made it possible to link wages 
directly to the work performed. Once payment reflected effort, Taylor felt 
that workers would recognize the inherent fairness of his system and thus
33
33» F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate System: Being a Step Towards Partial Solution 
of the Labour Problem." Reprinted in C. Bertrand Thompson (ed.) Scientifio 
Management, op. cit., pp. 653-665» See also the detailed explanation in: 
Prank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, op. cit. 
Vol. I, pp. 304-314 and passim; and, in: Horace Drury, Scientific 
Management: A History and Criticism, op. cit.. pp. 6I-67. For a critique 
of this system see: Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labour, op. 
cit., pp. 61-67; and, more recently, J.E.T. Eldridge, Sociology and 
Industrial Life (London. 1971) PP» 51» 52. Additional methods for 
assessing the wages were developed by other members of the Scientific 
Management Movement. Gantt and Emerson, two of Taylor's associates, oame 
to believe that the differential piece rate system had major limitations 
arising from the large gap in eaming3 between the worker who met or 
exceeded his quota and the worker who failed to do so. Consequently, both 
Gantt and Emerson devised their own systems using different combinations 
of piece work and day work. For an outline of the three systems, see:
Robert F. Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labour, op. cit.. pp. 61-87.
34» F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate System: Being a Step Toward Partial Solution 
of the Labour Problem." ££. cit., p. 657»
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co-operate with' management in making it work successfully.
Taylor admonished managers to pay higher wages under his new system; 
otherwise, workers would resent the fact that they were working harder 
without earning more. Higher wages . would secure their agreement to the 
increased demands made upon them. As a general guide, he suggested that 
a 30$ increase in wages was normal, although in some cases 20$ might be 
sufficient, while in others a 75$ or 100$ increase might be required. In 
virtually every paper and speech he gave, Taylor reiterated the point that 
the payment of higher wages was an integral part of scientific management. 
Unless workers could see the financial benefits of his system, he warned
TtC
managers, they would sabotage it. 356
35
35, Ibid., p. 663. The fallacy in this argument has been noted by many 
critics of Taylorism. The fact that a man can do as. job in a certain 
period of time does not tell us how fast he ought to work. Secondly, 
as J.E.T. Eldridge rightly points out "...no matter how accurately one 
can time a job one is still involved in a bargain over its price.
Conflicts of interests are...not eliminated by «scientific' rate fixing." 
See: J.E.T. Eldridge, Sociology and Industrial Life, op. cit., pp, 51» 52. 
I am grateful to Dr. James Rinehart of the University of WestemOntario 
for underlining the importance of the first point to me.
36. F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate System: Being a Step Toward Partial Solution 
of the Labour Problem" op. cit., pp, 653» 665. F.W. Taylor and 
Sanford Thompson, Concrete Costs, op. cit.. pp. 103, 104} F.W. Taylor 
Testimony, op. cit., pp. 133» 134* Taylor was quite serious about raising 
wages and he did so in the various factories that he reorganized. Indeed, 
it was one of the conditions which he laid down before he would help an 
employer introduce scientific management. For example, when asked by 
Robert P. Linderman, President of the Bethlehem Steel Company,to establish 
his new methods in the firm» Taylor made it ¿Lear that he would raise 
wages. See his letter to Robert P. Linderman, Jan. 19» 1908, as cited by
F.W. Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, Vol. II 
op. cit., p. 13. This idea was implemented amidst a great deal of 
publicity by Henry Ford a few years later when he introduced the $5*00 
day. Although Ford was given considerable credit for his genorisity, he 
was actually attempting to counteract the rising labour turnover which 
his mass production techniques gave rise to. Because Ford« s competitors 
had not simplified the tasks of their workers to the same degree, 
opportunities for the exercise of ccaft skills existed in their factories. 
By 1914 the drift of Ford workers to other car manufacturers had reached 
such alarming dimensions that Ford came to believe that only such a 
dramatic gesture would stop the trend. It was then that he realized
that generosity was also good business. For a concise discussion of 
the influence of Scientific Management on Ford, see: Roger Barlingame, 
Henry Ford (London, 1957) esp. f>p. 74-77* Barlingame has also written 
one of the standard biographies of Taylor. See also: Harry Braverman, 
Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. I48-I5O.
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Yet while Taylor advocated the payment of higher wages, he did not 
believe that they ought to be directly proportional to increases in 
output. In practice, this meant that workers who doubled their output 
were paid only 20$ or 30$ more. Taylor* s method of determining how much 
to pay workers belied his scientific pretensions. For what he did was to 
reorganize a job and establish the appropriate pace of work for it. Then 
he would offer workers the opportunity of taking this job at different 
rates of pay. Some would receive 15$ more, some 20$, some 30$ and so on. 
Normally, he found that workers at the lowest wage would leave while those 
at the highest would remain. However between these two rates, there would 
be one which provided a sufficient incentive to keep men at that job. This
T Q
then became the "scientifically" determined rate.
Taylor justified paying wage rises which were substantially less than 
increases in worker output in several ways. First, he.argued that a worker 
whose production trebled under the scientific management ought not to get 
three times his former wage- because management had to recoup the money 
spent in reorganizing his job. Second, because the worker was not 
responsible for his increase in output he had no moral claim on it.
Third, the surplus that remained after the worker*s wage and the cost of 
innovation had been deducted was not entirely profit- for the owners. 
Through the interplay of market forces, labour savings were transmitted
37« F.W. Taylor, "A Piece Rate System, Being a Step Towards Partial Solution 
of the Labour Problem," ££. cit., pp. 661, 662; F.W. Taylor, Concrete 
Costs, op. cit., pp.
38.' F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. oit., as cited by Horace B. Drury, Scientific 
Management; A History and Criticism, op. cit., pp. 204, 205. Drury goes 
on to point out that far from being science, this method of calculating 
wages was simply a "rough and ready solution" which "found out by trial 
and error the least amount for which they will perform it." Ibid., p. 205. 
In the three establishments which Taylor pointed to as examples of how his 
system ought to work, the average increase was, according to Drury, only 
25$. The three firms were the Tabor Manufacturing Company, the Link Belt 
Company and the Watertown Arsenal. See; Ibid., p. 226.
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to the consumer in the form of lower prices» Taylor acknowledged that
shareholders could make excessive profits in the short run» But he argued
that in the long term, market competition would ensure that the benefits
of scientific management were passed on to the public. Thus employers
were quite justified in retaining most of the profits accruing from
39scientific management.
Finally, Taylor believed that too great an increase in wages was harmful 
to the interests of the worker because he would be unlikely to spend his 
enlarged income wisely. This attitude reflected Taylor's own puritanism 
and his desire that the working class adopt middle class values such as 
thrift, hard work and abstemiousness. Without such values, Taylor feared
40that the worker would dissipate his increased wages in laziness or drink. 
Hence, management was acting in the worker's interest by not allowing him 
to double or triple his wages. *40
39» Taylor's position on this question is outlined in an exchange of letters 
with Upton Sinclair in The American Magazine. Sinclair began the 
correspondence in response to the publication, in the same journal, of 
the first instalment of The Principles/Scientific Management. In 
replying to Sinclair's criticism of the disproportionate benefits owners 
received, Taylor outlined the above reasons as justifications. The 
letters are reprinted in Frank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor» Father of 
Scientific Management, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 59-65»237» 238. See also: C. 
Bertrand Thompson, The Theory and Practice of Scientific Management, op. 
cit., pp. 156-159«
40. Frank W. Copley, Frederick W. Taylort Father of Scientific Management.
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 325-331« See also: Brian Palmer, "Class, Conceptions 
and Conflict: The Thrust for Efficiency, Managerial Views of Labour and 
the Working Class Rebellion", 0£. cit., p. 39« Palmer notes Taylor's 
lack of concern over the huge profits that were being made from his 
methods: "When Taylor concluded that 'it does not do for most men to 
get too rich too fast* he excluded companies such as the Bethlehem Steel, 
which, through the implementation of efficiency measures, increased output 
from 300-500 percent, cut costs 60 per cent, and saved, strictly on the 
level of labour costs, $126,000 over a two year period." Ibid., p. 39« 
Similar savings were made at other plants where Taylor's methods were 
introduced. See again: Frank Copley, 0£. cit., Vol. I, pp. 384t 385}
Vol. II, pp, 50-53} Catherine Stone, "The origins of Job Structures in 
the Steel Industry", op. cit., pp. 126, 127.
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Of course, another, less altruistic reason was also in Taylor*s 
mind. If workers were paid too much, they might choose to work only 
three or four days a week. Alternatively they might Bave enough to "be 
able to quit working for a substantial period each year. In either case, 
the reduced economio dependence of workers on their employers would make 
it harder to enforce the kind of discipline necessary to run a factory 
according to Taylor*s principles. Thus by keeping wage increases to a 
moderate level, management would ensure that its employees reported to 
work on a regular basis.
VI
Taylor did not limit his advice to the reorganization of the tasks 
of workers and the development of effective wage incentives. He believed 
that there were a number of other things management could do to reduce 
employee opposition to its policies. Of these, the most important was 
to limit the influence of the work group over produotion. As we noted 
earlier, his experience as a foreman at the Midvale Steel Plant led him 
to the conclusion that the impact of work groups on output was almost 
always negative. When employees worked together they engaged in systematic 
soldiering and subverted management objectives.^
The solution to this problem was to remove the individual from the 
influence of the group. As a matter of policy, Taylor argued, management 
should cbal with workers solely as individuals and never in terms of 
categories, classes or groups. There were a number of things it could do to 
implement such a polioy. It oould organize the jobs of its employees in such 
a way that wherever possible they worked alone. At the Bethlehem 
Steel Company, for example, Taylor banned groups of more than four employees 41
41. F.W. Taylor, Shop Management, op. cit.. p. 31? F.W. Taylor, The Principles 
of Scientific Management, op. cit.. pp. 69, 70. For a detailed account of 
Taylor*s attitudes towards work groups, see: Frank Copley, Frederick W. 
Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, op. oit.. Vol. I., pp. 2<5i>-£i5 
and passim.
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from working together anywhere in the works. Management could also 
design wage incentive sohemes to encourage individualistic attitudes 
and hehaviour. And, finally, it could use its oontrol of promotion 
to reward compliant workers while ignoring those who were less 
oo-operative. Such practices would ensure that the interests of each 
worker differed from those of his f e l l o w s . A n d  they would create a 
situation in which each worker could pursue his interests most effectively 
ty co-operating fully with management.
What the breaking up of work groups meant in terms of extending 
managerial control was quite simple. It ensured that eaoh worker had to 
deal, with the organizational power of management in an individual capacity. 
The formation of employee collectivities - even if they were only work 
groups - gave rise to the possibility of mutual support and co-operation 
among workers against the interests of management. Henoe it tended to 
reduce managerial control over employees and their work. Because Taylor 
felt that the only legitimate basis of social organization within the 
enterprise ought to be the hierarchical one controlled by management, he 
believed that management was perfectly justified in eliminating such groups, 
and thus weakening the ability of workers to resist management demands.
This attitude was reflected in his position on trade unionism 
as well. Taylor said that he had no objection to trade unions as long 
as they did not advocate the restriction of output. He believed that 
workers formed unions primarily to protect themselves from bad management 
praotioes and not beoause there was any fundamental confliot of interest 
between employers and workers. Within conventionally managed firms, Taylor 423
42. P.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. oit., p. 73.
43. P.W. Taylor, A Piece Rate System. o£. cit., pp. 66O-665. See also: 
Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labourj. op. cit., pp. 105-112 
for a disoussion of the implications of this approaoh on trade unions.
42
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conceded, there were no objective standards by which, to assess the
fairness of management decisions. Instead, employers established the
terms and conditions of employment in an arbitrary manner. Under such
a system abuses were inevitable, even when managers had no intention of
treating their workers unfairly. And, when workers disputed the fairness
of management decisions, there was no objective method of determining
who was right. Hence the only solution was for the two parties to
44bargain over their differences.
Under scientific management, however, such bargaining would no longer
be necessary, for these issues would be resolved by the investigation
of scientifically trained experts. Onoe these experts had established
the appropriate standards of work and remuneration, all that remained
was for workers and managers to co-operate in the implementation of their
findings. The exercise of arbitrary managerial authority was thus
replaced, according to Taylor, by objective, scientific standards which
both parties were required to follow. As Reinhard Bendix argues:
Taylor *eliminated* the personal exercise cf 
authority altogether. Once his methods had 
been introduced the managers would be as muoh 
subject to rules and discipline as the workers 
themselves. And these rules would not be 
arbitrary, for they would be determined by 
impartial enquiry, not by the judgment of 
those who exeroised authority. Thus co-operation 
resulted from the fact that workers and managers 
oomplied with the results of scientific enquiries... *
44« F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. cit., 
pp. 182-4, passim; P.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., pp. 143-8,
151, 152. See also: Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, op. cit. 
p. 33; Horace B. Drury, Scientific Management: A History of 
Criticism, op. oit., pp, 190-193» Prank Copley, Frederick W. Taylor: 
Father of Soientifio Management, op. oit., Vol. I«, pp. 314-331» 
406-408, Vol. II, pp. 403-41¿ 1 and, finally, Robert Hoxie, Sclentifio 
Management and Labour, op. cit.
45« Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, (New York,1956) 
p. 278. On this point see, as well: Samuel Haber, Efficiency and 
Uplift, op. oit., pp. 24-26; Horace Drury, Scientific Management:
A History and Criticism, op. cit.. p. 223? and Robert Hoxie, 
Soientifio Management and Labour, op. pit.« pp. 9» 10 and passim.
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Even the wage rates assigned to individual jobs could be determined
"scientifically" according to Taylor.^ Ignoring the normative question
of how much a worker ought to receive for his work» he argued that nnce
management had learned how to make the proper measurements and oalculatinns,
it could determine the rate for each job in a manner which was wholly 
47objective. In a letter to Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School»
Taylor outlined why there would no longer be room for disputes between
management and labour on these issues:
The tasks which a good man in a trade can perform and
the wages he should receive for performing that task
are matters which can be determined by expert
investigations and should be so determined. They are
not the subjects for collective bargaining any more ¿g
than the determination of the hour at which the sun rises. 46*8
46. F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit.. pp. 133, 134» F.W. Taylor, A Piece
Rate System, op. cit., pp. 649-658; C. Bertrand Thompson, The Theory and 
Practice of Scientific Mangement. op. pit., pp. 139-156.
47» As we mi$it expect, Taylor has been criticized for failing to recognize
that value judgements cannot be resolved simply by pointing to the "facts" 
whatever they may be. The faot that a man can shovel a particular number 
of scoops of gravel per hour does not tell us how much he should be paid , 
or even whether it is desirable for him to work at suoh a pace. As one 
of Taylor’s contemporaries rightly noted:
"(w)hen it comes to a decision as to the number of hours in the working 
day, the day rate and the percentage of bonus, it is misleading to apply 
the term ’scientific*. The length of the working day should be fixed 
with a view to enabling the employee to get the most satisfaction out 
of life as well as the greatest possible work out of his limbsi"
Horace B. Drury, Scientific Management: A History and Criticism, op. cit. 
p. 204; See also: Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labour, op. cit., 
PP« 39-61; and more recently, %.E.T. Eldridge, Sociology and Industrial 
Life, op. cit., pp. 51-53; Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, 
o£. cit., p. 97.
48. F.W. Taylor, Letter to Felix Frankfurter, 1914» as cited by Frank Copley, 
Frederick W. Taylor; Father of Scientific Management, op. cit., Vol. II, 
p. 420. From Taylor onward, time and motion study engineers have taken 
their work seriously, believing that the human variables associated with 
production could be brought under "scientific"maasureraent and control.
As Daniel Bell points out in the passage that follows, such dedication 
might profitably be replaced with the recognition that a single-minded 
commitment to any task can verge on the absurd:
"Perhaps the ultimate tool in rationalization is the mathematical formula 
to determine the fine shadings of skill between jobs recently worked out 
by the Aluminium Corporation of America in order to set wage differentials 
scientifically. The programme, which oovered 86,000 jobs, took three and 
a half years to complete, at a cost of fSjOOfOOO, The final equation, 
three pages long, juggles fifty-nine separate variables; it took thirty- 
five hours of Uhivac (oomputer)time, at a cost of $10,000 to compute.
As Alcoa said diffidently, the formula is simply a »mathematical tool for 
resolving day to day wage problems rationally and without dispute’".
Daniel Bell, Work and Its Discontenta. £&« £¿1*» P« 13«
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What this meant, of course, was that the normal trade union functions 
of regulating the terms and conditions of employment had no plaoe in a 
scientifically run enterprise* As one of Taylor*s followers, C. Bertrand 
Thompson, succinctly puts it: "You do not "bargain about or vote on 
scientific facts."^ Of course, the practical effect of Taylor*s argument 
was to rule out any attempt "by workers to have a say in determining their 
pace of work or wage rates. And, the fact that the »experts* who 
established the »scientific* rates were employed "by management ensured
50that their impartial decisions would not harm the interests of owners.
With regard to the other objectives of trade unions such as shorter
hours and higher wages, Taylor felt that these were laudable goals.
However, they could be attained under scientific management, and without
51the interference of trade unions. Similarly, he rejected the argument
that trade unions were necessary to prevent abuses of management power.
Taylor refused to concede that managers who followed his principles could
misuse their power. If workers had legitimate grievances, he argued, they
could voice them to their supervisors. These grievances would then be
resolved on the basis of the impartial enquiries of management. That
managers could be fair in deciding such matters was something he simply
52took for granted. On all these questions, Taylor asserted that he would
49.
50.
51.
C. Bertrand Thompson, The Theory and Practice of Scientific Management. 
op. cit., p. 146.
Not surprisingly, Taylor*s two major objections towards the trade unions 
of his day were that they encouraged systematic soldiering and that they 
promoted the view that there were fundamental conflicts of interests 
between labour and management. See: Robert Hoxie, Scientific Management 
and Labour, op. oit.
Taylor*s followers, however, did attempt to reconcile scientific 
management with the existence of trade unions. By the early 1920*s 
labour*s initial hostility to Boientifio management had greatly 
diminished, while scientifio managers had aocepted the ri^it of trade 
unions to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment. This 
reconciliation was brought about largely through neoessity as each 
party came to realize that the elimination of the other was unlikely.
On this question see: Mike Davis, "The Stop-Watch and the Wooden Shoe", 
op. cit., p. 73} Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, op. cit., and, 
Milton Nadwomy, Scientific Management and the Unions Toambridge, Mass.,
52. P.W. Taylor, Testimony, o p. oit.. pp. 143-8» 151» 152.
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deal no differently with unions than with individual workers, thus 
denying the principle of collective "bargaining.
Because Taylor couched his techniques in the language of science, 
he was able to claim that the overt exercise of management power in 
obtaining the compliance of workers was justified on the grounds of 
scientific necessity. He argued that management was not exercising 
power at all: rather, it was merely implementing policies which were 
scientifically determined,. Yet the implications of his attitude towards 
trade unionism were the same as those associated with the reorganization 
of work. The ability of the worker to control his labour, in this 
case by collective means, was undermined. Taylor*s opposition to trade 
unions reflected his belief that management should have complete control 
of the shop floor and, consequently, that all impediments to such control 
ought to be removed. As Reinhard Bendix notes, it was not accidental 
that scientific management was frequently accompanied by a concerted effort 
to break trade unions.
The open shop campaign went hand in hand with 
the rise of the scientific management movement.
In their attack upon trade unions, American 
employers came to make their own absolute 
authority within the plant so central a tenet 
that the compliance of the worker became 
ideologically a far more important value than 
his independence and initiative.53
VII
Considering that scientific management made such inroads on the 
autonomy of workers, the question of why workers would aocept this new 
system logically arises. Taylor*s answer was that it would generate such
53« Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, op. oit.. p. 274» 
also» Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., pp. 12, 97» 98»
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an increase in productivity that the loss of control over work would
seem relatively unimportant. Far from engendering conflict, Taylor
54argued, scientific management would foster harmony.
The great revolution that takes place in the mental 
attitude of the two parties under scientific 
management is that both sides take their eyes off 
the division of the surplus as the all important 
matter, and together turn their attention towards 
increasing the size of the surplus until this surplus 
becomes so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel 
over how it shall be divided. They come to see that 
when they stop pulling against one another, and instead 
both turn and push shoulder to shoulder in the same 
direction, the size of the surplus created by their 
joint efforts is truly astounding. They both realize 
that when they substitute friendly co-operation and 
mutual helpfulness for antagonism and strife they are 
together able to make this surplus so enormously greater 
than it was in the past that there is ample room for a 
large increase in wages and an equally great increase in 
profits for the manufacturer.
What Taylor was demanding of workers, then, was to exchange control
over their labour for an increase in wages. He asked them to submit to 
a much closer and more exacting kind of supervision at work. And, in
return, he offered them compensation in the form of a higher standard of
54» Taylor*s belief that harmony between employers and their employees 
would be fostered by the introduction of his methods of work 
organization has been seen by Alan Fox as indicative of an attempt 
by Taylor to win the consent of workers to the aims of their employers 
by offering the prospect of greatly increased economic benefits.
There is some truth in this assumption but, as we have argued earlier, 
Taylor's approach was primarily designed to eliminate the need for a 
high level of employee commitment. Although he stressed the usefulness 
of wage incentives, his main concern was how to extend managerial 
control by reorganizing production rather than how to hoodwink 
employees into b elieving that there was an underlying harmony between 
owners and workers. See« Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement (London, 1974)
pp. 62-66.
55» F.W. Taylor, Testimony, op. cit., pp. 133, 154» As we noted earlier, 
however, the division of this surplus was to be determined on the 
basis of providing the minimum increase in wages which would elicit 
the maximum increase in the efforts of workers. The fallacy in Trior's 
argument, outlined above, is cldarly demonstrated in R.H. Tawney's .
The Acquisitive Society, (London, .1921) bp. 41, 42.
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living.^ The fairness of this exchange seemed beyond dispute to 
Taylor» for he believed that the most important thing that workers 
wanted from their jobs was the pay envelope. Adhering to a narrowly 
economistic view of needs and aspirations of working people, he 
interpreted objections to his system as indicative of the inability 
of his critics to comphrehend,that, once implemented, his system would 
foster a "mental revolution" among workers and managers.
Yet if Taylor believed that his system would establish industrial
harmony in the long run, he had no hesitation in using coercion during
the transitional period:
•It is only through enforced standardization 
of methods, enforced adoption of the best 
implements and working conditions, and enforced 
co-operation that this faster work can be assured. And 
.the. duty of enforcing the adoption of standards 
and of enforcing this co-operation rests with the 
management alone. The management must supply 
continually one or more teachers to show each new 
man the new and simpler motions, and the slower men 
must be constantly watched and helped until they 
have risen to their proper speed. All of those 
who, after proper teaching, either will not or 
cannot work in accordance with the new methods 
and at the higher speed must be discharged by the 
management, (his emphasis)^' 56
56. Such practices are not uncommon in more recent management strategies 
either. For example, the Fawley Productivity agreements consisted, in 
part, of a deal between unions and management which facilitated the 
reorganization of work in order to eliminate restrictive practices. 
Management was given a freer hand in organizing production and in 
return the unions received a substantial pay increase. The wage 
agreement gave workers earnings which were substantially higher than 
before, even though the customary overtime was abolished. See:
Alan Flanders, The Fawley Productivity Agreements (London, 1964)» 
Similarly,in the United States, as Harry Braverman notes, trade unions 
accepted higher wages in compensation for the destruction of traditional 
craft skills in industries such as coal-raining. See Harry Braverman, 
Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. 147-151»
57» F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, op. cit., p. 83. 
Similar statements are scattered throughout his writings. See for 
example: Letter to Robert Linderman, President of the Bethlehem Steel 
Company, Jan. 19» 1898, as cited by Frank Copley, in Frederick W. Taylor: 
Father of Scientific Management, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 12. See also: 
p. 17 of the same volume; and, his description of his practices as a 
foreman at the Midvale Steel Works cited earlier.
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Regardless of Taylor's scientific pretensions, the issue of control 
lies at the heart of scientific management. It is for this reason that 
Taylor has had such a profound effect on contemporary management practioe. 
For his system presented a rational and coherent strategy for overcoming 
worker opposition to management objectives. It opened up a whole new 
realm of techniques for suppressing challenges to the legitimacy of 
managerial power. And it gave rise to the hope among managers that they 
could reduce the discretion of workers to the point where the legitimacy of 
management power and management objectives would become largely irrelevant. 
Reliance on the honesty and goodwill of workers would be replaced by 
detailed regulation of all aspects of their behaviour. Workers would truly 
become "hands"} instruments controlled by the will of managers. In this 
way the conflict between their needs and aspirations and the demands of 
owners would be resolved in the latter's favour.
Thus we see that Taylorism was not a neutral "scientific" attempt to 
rationalize production methods as is commonly assumed. Rather, it was 
designed specifically to further the ends of employers. As Harry Braverman 
rightly notes»
Scientific management, so called,is an attempt to 
apply the methods of science to the increasingly 
complex problems of the control of labour in rapidly 
growing capitalist enterprises. It lacks the 
characteristics of a true science because its 
assumptions reflect nothing more than the outlook 
of the capitalist with regard to the conditions of 
production. It starts, despite occasional protests 
to the contrary, not from the human point of view, 
but from the capitalist point of view, from the point 
of view of the management of a refactory work force 
in a setting of antagonistic social relations. It 
does not attempt to discover and confront the cause 
of this condition, but accepts it as an inexorable 
given, a 'natural' condition. It investigates not
labour in general, but the adaptation of labour 
to the needs of capital. It enters the work­
place not as the representative of science, but 
as the representative of management masquerading 
in the trappings of science.5°
Scientific management reorganized production not according to the 
impersonal demands of technology, size or organizational needs, but 
rather according to the speoifio requirements of owners. Taylor and his 
fellow engineers saw themselves as agents of property whose task was to 
apply their knowledge of engineering science for the benefit of employers.
The resistance of workers to management's attempts to treat them simply 
as instruments of production was seen as an obstacle to be overcome by 
devising more effective techniques of control, rather than an indication 
that it might be wrong to treat people as objects.
Indeed, Taylor expressed few moral reservations about the impact of 
scientific management on those subjected to it. His contempt for ordinary 
workers, his acceptance of exclusive right of owners to manage, and his 
obsessional commitment to production, led him to minimize the adverse effects 
of curtailing the worker's autonomy. He had a peculiar inability to 
understand that work could also be an avenue for self-expression and self­
development. He could not see that the satisfactions arising from 
exercising a skill or performing a socially useful job could be as important 
as the pay packet. Nor could he understand that self-determination at the 
workplace was more vital to the workers' self respeot and dignity than 
any incentive bonus managemait offered in return for his subordination.
That men desired to be treated as men and not 'hands' iras an idea which 
was largely foreign to his way of thinking.
Instead, Taylor believed that workers ought to adopt a purely 
instrumental attitude towards their work - and indeed towards themselves - 
while on the job. Like other instruments of production they should allow 59
59. Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., p. 86.
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themselves to he used in whatever manner management saw fit. They 
were to renounce their aspirations for industrial self-determination 
or even the control of their own jobs. So long as their employer paid 
a fair price for their labour and did not abuse it, it was to be of no 
concern of theirs how he made use of it.
Although scientific management involved treating people as means 
rather than ends, Taylor saw nothing wrong with such an approach. He had 
little respect for the opinions of workers who disagreed with his views 
on how their labour ought to be used, and even less for trade unionists 
who questioned the right of employers to destroy craft skills in the 
interests of extending their control over the shop floor. Nor did he 
accept that people with different values and goals had the right to reject 
his system. As we noted, his response to those who did object was simply 
to use force, believing that once they had worked under his new system, 
they would see the light. Harmony would be established not by co-operation 
between equals but rather by the complete subordination of one side of 
industry to the will of the other. In short, individuals would be moulded 
to conform with the demands of industry as established by employers.
IX
The impact of Taylorism on contemporary management practice has been
profound. Scientific management is still the basis of the organization
59of production in modem industry. Of course, new techniques such as 
job evaluation have been devised to supplement Taylor's time and motion 
study. And new technical innovations such as computers have been utilized
59» to this question see the excellent discussions by Harry Braverman in 
Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit.. Ch. 4i and Lorin Baritz, The 
Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 31, and passim.
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to provide management with more precise methods of monitoring the behaviour 
of workers. Yet the principles articulated by Taylor almost a century ago 
are still operative today. The organization of work is the prerogative 
of management. The planning of production is separated from its execution 
on the shop floor, just as Taylor argued it should be. Jobs are laid out 
to minimize labour costs and maximize management's ability to regulate the 
behaviour of its employees. But most importantly, his view that 
management ought to have complete control of production has been fully 
accepted by subsequent management theorists.
This is not to suggest that management thinkers have not been active 
in other areas. As we shall see in the following chapters, the adjustment 
of the worker to the jobs created for him by scientific managers has been 
of vital concern. However, subsequent theorists have not challenged Taylor's 
approach to the organization of work* rather, they have attempted to fill 
in the psychological and social gaps in his theory. Where he concentrated 
on extending managerial control over production itself, these theorists 
have focused attention on the problem of manipulating the worker's attitudes 
and values so that he would accept his circumscribed role within the factory. 
Claims by proponents of human relations and job enrichment that their 
theories replace scientific management must be viewed with scepticism.
For these approaches to management are primarily concerned with controlling 
the responses of the worker to a work process which has already been created 
by the engineers. They are involved with what Daniel Bell appropriately 
calls ”human engineering” and not the organization of production itself.
In this latter area, Taylorism remains supreme.
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CHAPTER III
HUMAN RELATIONS : SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH NORMATIVE
, •
INTEGRATION
I
Like scientific management, the human relations approach was based 
upon the desire to_ extend management control over the workforce. It 
arose both as a response to specific management problems and as a method 
of supplementing the techniques developed by Taylor. Influenced by the 
growth of social science - particularly psychology and sociology - during 
the interwar years, it reflected a shift in management’s orientation from 
the design of the tasks workers performed to the attitudes and values of 
the workers themselves. Yet while the human relations theorists frequently 
condemned earlier management techniques, they did not discard them. Rather 
they built upon the foundations already laid. Taylorism gave management 
the tools to redesign the jobs of workers in order to maximize control} 
human relations provided a strategy forextending that control to their 
attitudes and values as well.
This is not the conventional view of human relations. Indeed, the 
movement is widely seen as an approach to management which attempts to 
humanize industry by taking into account the needs of .workers as well as 
the requirements of efficient production. Taylor’s mechanistic attitude 
towards the organization of work is contrasted with the human relations 
view that the worker is a person and must be treated accordingly. It is asserted 
that human relations encouraged management to recognize that men were not 
merely rational economic beings and that industry was not simply a collection 
of atomistic individuals united only in the pursuit of financial gain.
Rather, men were social beings who looked for fellowship and social
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recognition at the workplace. And, industrial organizations were complex 
social systems which provided opportunities for the satisfaction of the 
social as well as economic needs of their members. In short, human 
relations constituted a progressive step in the evolution of more humane 
industrial organizations.
This view is false. The human relations approach did not arise as a 
response to the adverse impact of Taylorism on the lives of workers.
Rather, it was developed in response to management problems such as output 
restriction, absenteeism, labour turnover and the threat of trade unionism. 
There is nothing in the writings of the leading proponents of this school 
which suggests that they were opposed to the minute division of labour, the 
use of time and motion studies and other techniques associated with 
scientific management. Their view of the worker was similar to Taylor'si 
a means to achieve management objectives. Their opposition to Taylorism 
was based not upon the belief that scientific management was morally 
objectionable but rather that it did not work. Or, more accurately, that 
it did not work as effectively as it might because it ignored certain key 
factors which influenced the productive behaviour of workers.
If the purpose of human relations was to extend management control, 
its strategy embodied a marked shift from that of Taylor. To control the 
worker, it was necessary to understand him. This was the central idea 
underlying the human relations approach. It suggested that the key to 
regulating the productive behaviour of workers lay in knowing the 
psychological and social factors influencing this behaviour. It gave rise 
to a strategy which underlined the need for management to embark upon 
research which would provide a more sophisticated and, therefore, more 
effective method of counteracting the adverse effects of hostile worker 
attitudes on output. To this end, the research methods of social science
were enlisted by management. Insofar as academic research could provide 
useful insights into the sources of worker motivation, it was welcomed.
Not, we might add, universally, or with an equal degree of enthusiasm 
among all managers, but gradually and, according to Lorin Baritz, only 
where managers were convinced it would "pay". Nevertheless, the adage 
that "knowledge gives power" was one which struck a sympathetic chord 
among those employers who believed that there were still major problems 
to be overcome in managing the labour force and who were willing, or 
forced, to admit that their techniques were inadequate.
The shift in emphasis from the design of the jobs workers performed 
to the workers themselves was the result of a process of speculation and 
experimentation over a period of two decades. The history of the 
development of human relations is enlightening because it illustrates 
how recognition of the impact of the attitudes and values of workers on 
the output gave rise to strategies designed to control such attitudes and 
values.
II
During the years immediately following the First World War, as the 
principles of scientific management were adopted by an increasing number 
of American businessmen, doubts began to arise about its effectiveness. 
Ironically, its very success was partly responsible for the growing 
recognition of its limitations, for the harmony predicted by Taylor was 
not forthcoming. Trade unions, for example, had grown considerably before 
and during the First World War. It was thought by s ome managers that 
scientific management had provoked this growth. And, while the influence 
of unions declined during the 1920s, they were still seen as a major threat.
1 Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 11.
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Problems of a different character also added to managements
difficulties# Prosperity brought with it higher rates of absenteeism,
labour turnover and a general reduction of the dependence of workers on
any single employer. Of course, these problems were not entirely new.
But with the technical side of production more firmly under management's
2control, such problems now appeared relatively more important#
The war had stimulated the growth of psychology as a tool for placing
recruits. To avoid spending valuable resources training soldiers to
perform jobs for which they were unsuited, aptitude and intelligence tests
3had been developed to screen out unsuitable recruits. After the war, 
business men began to use similar tests for the selection and placement
4of their own personnel. These practices were, in one sense, only
an extension of Taylor's belief that management ought to find the 'right
man for the right job'. Yet, they constituted a break from scientific
management in that they involved a more sophisticated way of measuring
the aptitudes and character traits ofyorkers.
These early attempts to apply psychology to industry had major
shortcomings which soon became apparent, however. For the ability to
perform a job quickly and efficiently provided no guarantee that the worker
5
would be motivated to do so. Moreover, many of the early industrial 
psychologists made unrealistic claims about the benefits of testing.^
The failure of testing to provide a panacea for management's labour 2*6
2. Ibid, p. 11. and passim.
3* Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry. (New York, 1956) 
p. 291.
4* Ib^i, p, 291.
5« Ibid, pp. 291, 292; Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, dp. cit., 
pp. 66-69*
6. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., pp, 69-71«
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problems rapidly led to disillusionment among managers and a notable
decline in the number of firms using the techniques by the mid 1920s. 
However, the tests did contribute to future developments by stimulating 
interest in how worker motivation influenced output.
The desire to learn more about the worker as a faotor in production 
also gave rise to an interest in industrial physiology during this period. 
One common theory was that the accumulation of impurities in the blood 
during long periods of work caused fatigue and thus reduced worker 
efficiency. Improper diet, inadequate rest and similar factors were also
Q
seen as potential sources of low productivity. Interest in physiology led 
to numerous experiments to assess the effects of different fadtors in 
reducing or enhancing the worker efficiency. Although such enquiries 
proved of marginal value in uncovering the major impediments to higher 
output, they established the practice of experimenting within the factory 
itself.
As the decade advanced, the limitations of a purely physiological 
approach became increasingly apparent. Yet some of the experimenters had 
unwittingly promoted improvements which, although not directly attributable 
to physiological causes, were still of great interest to management. In 
one of his early experiments, Elton Mayo had increased output and decreased 
labour turnover from 250 per cent to 5 per cent simply by introducing rest 
pauses.
The rest periods had been initiated by the president of a spinning 
mill against the protests of his supervisory staff who felt that the 
time "wasted" would not be compensated for by the increased productivity 
resulting from the rest periods. Yet over a four month period Mayo was 78
7
7. Ibid., pp, 71* 72; Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society (Glencoe. 
1955) Ch.'ll.
8. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New
York, 1935) pp.' ¿3-27.-------------------------------- -----  V
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able to increase production from its previous maximum of 70 Per cent
to a new high of 82 per cent» However, lower level supervisors remained
hostile to Mayo's innovations and when a rush order was received, the
rest periods were abolished. Production fell to 70 per cent. At the
request of the supervisors, a scheme whereby workers would 'earn' their
rest pauses was established. Production did not improve. However, when
the pauses were re-introduced on the original basis, production rose to
77 per cent. And, when the workers were allowed to choose when they would
take their rest pauses it shot up to 86 per cent. Moreover, absenteeism
gand employee morale were greatly improved.
Mayo felt that the increase in output was not primarily a result of 
the reduction of fatigue associated with the rest periods. For if this 
had been the case, the 'earned' periods would have produced the same 
improvements as the unearned ones. More complex factors appeared to be 
at work. At one point in the experiment, Mayo had noticed a marked 
•improvement' in worker attitudes. This suggested that the morale of 
workers might have as much effeot on output as physical fatigue.^
Independently of Mayo, in 1924» The National Research Council of the 
National Academy of Sciences and the Western Electrio Company, a 
manufacturing subsidiary of the giant American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, began a series of experiments to assess the "relation of quality 910
9. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., 
pp. 25-27, 34-37; Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization, op. cit., pp. 59*^71 See also: J.A.C. Brown, The Social 
Psychology of Industry, o£. cit., pp. 74-76. This pattern of 
collaboration with top management was characteristic of Mayo and the 
other Hawthorne researchers. Not only did the researchers hold a 
pro-management bias: they identified only with top management. Much of 
their advice, as we shall see, was addressed to the problems confronted 
by senior executives about how to ensure that lower level managers and 
foremen carried out company policy properly.
10. Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit..
pp. 62-67. “
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and quantity of illumination to efficiency in industry."'^ For two
and a half years they studied the effects of changes in lighting on
the productivity of a group of telephone assemblers. The assumptions
underlying the initial stages of the research were not far removed from
those of Taylor. It was thought that worker output was influenced
directly by factors such as temperature, lighting, humidity and noise.
The task of management was to discover the precise effects of these
factors and adjust them in such a way as to maximize production. Although
there was a rudimentary attempt at understanding the psychology of workers,
the basis of the theory was still mechanistic. By pulling the various
levers controlling lighting, heating and so forth, management could
12regulate the behaviour of workers in a predictable vway.
In the first experiment, the output of three groups of workers was
measured under normal conditions. Then the level of illumination was
increased in stages and changes in output were recorded. The results
did not confirm the original hypothesis» no direct relationship between
the intensity of illumination and the level of output was observed."^
However, in two of the departments an increase in output had occurred.
The researchers concluded that their experiment had failed because there
14had been inadequate control of external variables. They decided to 
attempt a second, more rigorous experiment. This time two groups of 12*5
11. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker,
(New York, 1964) (orig. pub. 1939) p. 14» This is the "standard” 
account of the Hawthorne research and the following discussion of 
the experiments is drawn from it. Both Elton Mayo and I.N. Whitehead 
wrote accounts of the research as well. Their descriptions of the 
experiments have been used to supplement the information given by 
Roethlisberger and Dickson.
12, Ibid., pp. 15, 16. See also» David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit.,
p. 33? J.A.C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry, op. cit.,
PP. 69, 70.
15. Ibid., p. 15.
14* Ibid., p. 15.
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workers within a single department were selected. One was used as a 
control while the other was subjected to increases in illumination. To
l  r
their surprise, output increased in both groups. Under the belief 
that they, had again introduced unintended changes in the test rooms - 
changes which had led to the control group's increase in output - the 
experimenters set up a third study to clarify matters. Instead of 
increasing illumination, however, they decreased it. To their surpirse, 
output remained constant. Even when the lighting was reduced to the 
intensity of a moonlight night, workers kept production at the original
i i 16level.
Although these findings discredited the rather simplistic hypothesis
underlying the three illumination experiments, they acted as a spur to
further research, because the reason for the paradoxical behaviour of the
17workers remained obscure. Moreover, the researchers felt that they had 
learned a great deal about how to conduct this type of study and were 
anxious to make use of their newly acquired knowledge. And, not 
unimportantly, the Western Electric Company was willing to finance further 
research.
They decided to begin an experiment to assess the significance of
18physical fatigue as a factor limiting output. Although the experiment 
was planned to last only for a short period of time, it continued for 
five years and became a land-mark in social science research. For the 
Relay Assembly Test Room was the first of five major projects which 
comprised the Hawthorne study. And this study provided the empirical
15. Ibid., p. 16.
16. Ibid.. pp. 16-18. See also» Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an 
Industrial Civilization, op. cit., pp, 55» 5^» .
17« F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
eit*, pp. 16, 19*
18. Ibid.. p. 19.
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basis for the development of the Human Relations School»
Needless to say, the founders of the human relations approach did
not foresee the eventual direction of their research. Rather they
stumbled from one experimental failure to another in their quest to
find out precisely what factors influenced employee motivation. Yet each
unsuccessful experiment gave rise to new hypotheses and further research.
By the end of the study, the Western Electric Company, its principal
sponsor, had spent over one million dollars, while Harvard University,
M.I.T. and the National Research Council had also made substantial
19contributions of staff and resources. As a result, the Hawthorne study 
grew into the largest and, arguably, the most influential piece of social 
science research ever undertaken.» and, ultimately, its impact- on. 
management theory, came to rival that of scientific management.
Ill
The experiments were conducted at the Hawthorne works of the Western
Electric Company. Located in a predominantly immigrant, working class
area in the West side of Chicago, the works employed 29,000 workers at
20the beginning of the experiment in 1927. The factory produced telephone
equipment for A.T. and T., the owners of Western Electric. The management
followed a paternalistic approach to industrial relations and prided itself
on Hawthorne's extensive system of employee benefits. These included a
hospital, a subsidized canteen, sickness benefits, a workmen's compensation21fund and a pension scheme. *201
19» P.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. x-xii, 3. See alsoi Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power. 
op.cit., p. 77»
20. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., p. 6. Roethlisberger was a member of the staff of Harvard 
University, while Dickson was a manager at Hawthorne.
21. P.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. cit. 
p. 6; T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit.. pp. 32, 33»
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The workers were not unionized and subsequent research has shown
22
that the company was engaged in suppressing union activities. The 
faot that Hawthorne was not organized is of more than passing interest, 
for it gave the researchers a free hand to alter the work situation of 
the employees under study. Management*s unilateral right to introduce 
changes in the jobs of its employees was taken for granted throughout 
the study.
The first experiment involved studying the behaviour of six women
who assembled telephone relays. This job was selected because it was
typical of repetitive work prevalent in industry, and because production
could be measured accurately. At the beginning of the experiment the
23output of the women was recorded at their regular place of work. Then
they were moved to a special test room which had been set up to isolate
the experiment from the influence of external variables. No other changes
were introduced, but their output and conversations were carefully recorded.
Next, the pieoe rate was changed so that the operators were paid according
to the output of the test room rather than their former departments. No
24change in output oocurred.
In the next three stages of the Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment,
various rest pauses were introduced and increases in output were noted.
25In phase seven a free lunch was added. Output rose. In period eight, 2
22. Lorin Baritz, The Servants cf Power, op. cit., p. 106. Baritz*s 
information is drawn from a 1955 Senate Inquiry into A.T. and T*s 
industrial relations policies during this period. See: Mary B. Gilson, 
'•Review of Management and the Worker" in The American Journal of 
Sociology (July, 1940). Gilson notes that the Western Electrio Company 
spent more than twenty-five thousand dollars between 1933 and 1936 on 
industrial spying. Referenoesto this evidence are also to be found in 
Henry Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958)«
23« F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. oit. 
p. 31.
24» Ibid., pp. 33-36.
25» Ibid., pp. 46-53« However, Roethlisberger and Dickson also note that 
two of the girls were replaced at phase seven of the experiment beoause 
they talked too much and were generally tuico-operative", Ibid., p. 53«
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the day was shortened by half an hour. Output rose again. In period
26nine, an entire hour was taken off the working day. Total output
declined, but only slightly. Phase ten entailed a reversion to the
conditions of period seven. Again, output rose. In period eleven
the conditions of period ten were retained but with Saturday mornings
off. Output declined, but still remained above that achieved in all
but three of the previous phases. In period twelve, the experiment
reverted to the conditions of period three. This meant that the rest
periods, lunches and diorter hours were abolished. To the surprise of
the researchers, output reached its highest level. In period thirteen,
the final phase of the experiment, the conditions of period Beven were
28restored. Output rose even higher.
The researchers posed five different hypotheses to explain their 
findings. First, the "material conditions and methods of work" had been 
improved in setting up the test room. This was thought to be unlikely,
26. Ibid., pp. 60-63. Ironioally, Taylor himself had experimented with 
the shorter working day. He felt that much of the time spent during 
a 10 or 11 hour day was not used productively. Workers frequently 
took unauthorized rest periods and engaged in other activities which 
were not functional to maximizing output. If the working day was 
reduced to 8 or 9 hours, he believed that it would still be possible 
to obtain the same output, assuming that the "pores" - to borrow a 
term used by Marx - in the working day were filled. In 1897 ho 
experimented with the shorter working day at the Simmonds Company, 
a manufacturer of steel ball bearings. He found that by reducing it 
from 10*5- hours to 8^ - hours he was able to increase output by one third. 
Taylor also experimented with rest pauses and obtained favourable 
results from this innovation as well. However, the human relations 
theorists were apparently unaware of his researoh, for they failed to 
discuss its relevance to their own experiments. See: Frank Copley, 
Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, op. cit., pp. 458-
4Z2I '
27» F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dicksôn, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. 64-70.
28. Ibid., pp. 69-74»
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however, because the changes were not nearly as significant as had occurred
in the illumination experiment. Second, "...the rest pauses and shorter
29working hours provided a relief from cumulative fatigue." There was some
evidence to support this hypothesis so the researchers made further studies.
After a careful analysis of the output records at different times of the
day and during different days of the week, it became clear that this
hypothesis could not account for the rise in productivity.^0 The third
explanation was that "...the introduction of rest pauses and shorter
working hours had been effective not so much in reducing fatigue as in
reducing the monotony of the work. Influenced by the work of two
British researchers, Wyatt and Fraser, . they thought that the repetitive
nature of assembling relays led to boredom and this, in turn, to
inefficiency. However, this hypothesis proved difficult to assess
because monotony was a subjective state of mind rather than an objectively
measurable factor such as output. Moreover, the experience of monotony
depended on the personality of the worker as well as the task performed.
Hence the explanation was set aside in the hope that one of the remaining
two would provide a more satisfactory answer.^
The fourth hypothesis was that the change in wage rates provided a
34new incentive to increase output. There was substantial evidence to
support this hypothesis because the group piece rate system introduced
in the test room had made earnings more responsive to effort. Consequently,
a second relay assembly experiment was set up to evaluate the wage incentive
35•scheme. Its findings supported the hypothesis. To provide further *30125
29» Ibid., p. 87. See also: Henry A. Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited. 
op. cit., pp. 11, 12; Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit.,
pp. S?T 85.
30. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit.. pp. 90-92, 116-1171 122-127.
31. Ibid., p. 83.
32. Ibid., Ch. V, esp. pp. 92, 93» 117» 118.
33* Ibid.» p. 127*
34* Ibid-»« P* 87 and Ch. VI.
35. Ibid., pp. 134-138.
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confirmation a third experiment was initiated. This time a group of mica 
splitters was seleoted. They were subjected to changes similar to those 
made in the first Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment with the exception 
that the piece rate system remained as it was in the larger factory.
This time the results were inconclusive. It seemed that wage incentives 
might have been responsible for part of the rise in output, but, as the 
experiment proceeded, numerous other factors appeared to be involved as 
well. Although subsequent researchers, such as Argyle and Carey, have 
argued that there was ample evidence to support the view that the wage 
incentive scheme was responsible for the improvements in output, the 
Hawthorne researchers became convinced that the "other faotors" were of 
greater significance. 36
The fifth hypothesis was that changes in supervision had led to a new
pattern of social relationships in the test room. Under these changed
oircumstanoes, the morale of the workers improved and they became committed
to making the experiment a success. Henoe they focussed all their energies
37
on the task of raising output. It was this final hypothesis that gradually 
came to be accepted by the researchers as the most satisfactory explanation 
for the rise in output in the test room. The detailed records of 
conversations in the test room provided them with evidence that there had 
been a major improvement in morale. The policy of consulting workeisabout 
the changes to be introduced and allowing them to veto some suggestions had 
stimulated interest in their work. This, in turn, led to "improved" *•
36. Ibid., pp. 158, 159» See: Alex Carey, "The Hawthorne Studies: A
Radioal Criticis®" American Sociological Review, 1967, pp. 403-416. 
See also an earlier paper by M. Argyle, 'The Relay Assembly Test Room 
in Retrospeot" Oocupational Psychology. 27, 1953, pp. 98-103.
• P.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson. Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., p. 88.
37
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attitudes towards it. In the words of Elton Mayo:
(T)here had been a remarkable change in the 
mental attitude of the group. This showed 
in their recurrent conferences with high 
executive authorities. At first shy and 
uneasy, silent and perhaps somewhat suspicious 
of the company’s intentions, later their 
attitude is marked by confidence and candour.
Their comments are listened to and discussed; 
sometimes their objections are allowed to 
negate a suggestion. The group unquestionably 
develops a sense of participation in the critical 
determinations (sic) and becomes something of a 
social unit.38
The comments made by the workers in the Relay Assembly Test Room
39also focussed on the lack of customary supervision. In setting up 
the test room, the experimenters had decided to take over the supervisory 
function. Because the experiment was to involve numerous changes in the 
work routine of the women, the researchers were anxious to secure their 
co-operation. It was thought that a hostile group of subjects might 
disrupt the progress of the experiment and invalidate the results.^ 
Consequently, the normal supervisory practice of enforcing company rules 
and regulations was discarded.^ 38*401
38. Elton Mayo, The Human Relations of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit. 
p. 73* Although his name, more than any other, has become associated 
with the experiment,. Mayo was not involved in setting it up. In faot, 
he was not brought in to the Hawthorne Study until phase ten of the 
Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment. Sees Lorin Baritz, The Servants 
of Power, op. cit.
39» F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
c>it^ «, p. 45*
40. Ibid.« pp. 21, 181.
41. However, as several critics of the experiments have pointed out, the 
researchers did use their supervisory prerogatives to remove two 
operators from the test room because they engaged in "excessive 
talking". Their replacements were, apparently, more satisfactory.
When the problem of talking arose again it was only necessary to 
warn them that "...if the practice continued, the experiment might be 
brought to an end." See: F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, 
Management and the Worker# op. cit.. pp. 53-55» 182.
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(A)lmost all the practices common to the shop were 
altered. The operators were advised of and consulted 
about changes to he made, and several plans suggested 
by the experimenters were not introduced because they 
met with the disapproval of the operators. The operators 
were questioned sympathetically about their reactions to 
the different conditions of work. Ilany of these 
discussions, in the beginning of the test, took place in 
the office of the superintendent. The girls were allowed 
to talk while at work. The "bogey” was eliminated. Their 
physical health and well being became matters of great 
concern, and their opinions, fears, qualms and anxieties 
were eagerly sought. The observer fostered a kind of 
relation with the operators that a busy supervisor in a 
regular department would scarcely have time or opportunity to
develop.42
These changes, according to Roethlisberger and Hickson, had led to 
a more relaxed, informal and friendly relationship between the women and
43their supervisors. G.A, Pennock, a company executive who played a
leading role in the.research, noted that the women had "ceased to regard
the man in charge a3 a boss."^ Under these new conditions the women came
to support the goals of the experiment and were anxious to see that the
tost room was continued. Their commitment to the experiment’s success was
45reflected in the steadily rising output curve. J
Ironically, in attempting to control external variables by setting up 
a special test room, the researchers had accidentally precipitated major 
changes in attitudes and social relationships. "(T)he investigators",
42. Ibid., p. 181.
43*  F.J. Roethlisberger and VJ.J. Dickson, llanagement and the Worker, op. 
cit.t pp. 73, 179-186.
44t G.A. Pennock, as cited by Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society, op.
cit., p. 307. See also: Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial
• Civilization, op. cit., pp. 71—73*
45* Although the Hawthorne researchers felt that the change in supervisory 
practices and the formation of a sense of group commitment had led to 
the rise in output, Paul Blumberg-has questioned this interpretation.
The rice in output, he argues, can bo better explained as a consequence 
of the increased participation of the workers in the decisions affecting 
their work. The experimenters in thoir desire to obtain the co-operation 
of the women, had unwittingly dispensed with most of the traditional 
supervisory controls. They had allowed the women to play a much greater 
role in organizing their work. And this, in turn, had led the women to 
make a collective commitment to maximize output as a way of showing 
that they could organize production more efficiently than management.
^ee: Paul B^gyberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation
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according to Roethlisberger and Dickson, "had not been studying an 
ordinary shop situation, but a socially contrived situation of their 
own m a k i n g . B u t  what was undoubtedly of greater significance to the
46. Ibid., p. 183. An extensive critique of the methodology used in the 
Hawthorne experiments has been presented in a recent article by 
Alex Carey in the American Sociological Review. Carey argues that a 
combination of slipshod experimental design and unstated preconceptions 
about the effects of social interaction on output enabled the Harvard 
researchers to "cook" the results. He points out that in the initial 
stages of the Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment, the six operators 
used the more relaxed environment of the test room not to increase 
their rate of production, but to converse with one another. It was 
only after the two most talkative women were replaced that output began 
to rise significantly. Moreover one of the two new women was the sole 
financial support of her family and hence had a very strong motivation 
to maximize her earnings. This girl became the informal leader of the 
group and pressured the others to increase their output.
On the question of supervision, Carey notes that the relaxed atmosphere 
at the beginning of the Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment was 
gradually replaced by a more authoritarian approach when it became 
clear that only marginal improvements were taking place. This culminated 
in attempts to discipline the two most talkative girls and eventually 
in their dismissal. The two replacements were carefully selected to 
ensure that they would have a "co-operative" attitude towards the 
experiment. Once it became clear that the new operatives were strongly 
motivated to increase their level of output, discipline was again 
relaxed. Carey notes that* "After the arrival of the new girls and 
the associated increase in output, official supervision became friendly 
and relaxed once more. The investigators, however, produced no 
evidence that output increased because supervision became more friendly 
rather than vice versa. In any case, friendly supervision took a very 
tangible turn by paying the girls for time not worked. The piece rate 
was in effect increased." (p. 416)
After listing a number of potentially significant Variables which were 
omitted by Mayo and only casually referred to by Roethlisberger,
Dickson and Whitehead, Carey summarized his critique of the study in 
the following way*
"The results of these studies, far from supporting the various components 
of the "human relations approach", are surprisingly consistent with a 
rather old-world view about the value of monetary incentives, directive 
leadership and discipline. It is only by massive and relentless 
reinterpretation that the evidence is made to yield oontrary conclusions. 
To make these points is not to claim that the Hawthorne studies can 
provide serious support for any such old world view. The limitations 
of the Hawthorne studies clearly render them incapable of yielding 
serious support for any sort of generalization whatsoever!' (p.416)
Alex Carey, "The Hawthorne Studies* A Radical Criticism", op. cit., 
pp. 403-416.
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Western Electric Company was the fact that in creating this "socially 
contrived situation" they had stumbled upon a new method for raising 
output:
What impressed management most, however, were the 
stores of latent energy and productive co-operation 
which clearly could be obtained from its working 
force under the right conditions. And, among the 
factors making these conditions, the attitudes of 
the employees stood out as being of predominant 
importance...47
IV
If attitudes played such an important role in determining output,
then it appeared fruitful to obtain more information about them. To
this end, an interview programme was set up. Between 1928 and 1930,
over 21,000 interviews were conducted. To the surprise of the researchers,
the interviews revealed considerable discontent at Hawthorne. According
to their own method of classification, of the 86,371 comments about the
48terms and conditions of employment, 41»892 were "unfavourable."
The findings also gave rise to what must be one of the greatest 
efforts of rationalization in the literature of social science. Convinced 
of the fairness of company policy, the researchers refused to accept that 
workers could have legitimate grounds for their numerous complaints. If 
the company was not at fault, they reasoned, the source of these complaints 
must lie with the workers themselves. They must be distorting the situation 
in the factory. Influenced by Freudian psychology, the researchers 
asserted that the complaints could not be accepted at face value. Instead, 
they were indicative of more deep seated psychological disorders. Thus 
it was necessary to "interpret" them in the light of the "morbid
47.Ibid., p. 185.
48.Ibid., Ch. IX,pp. 234» 235*
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preoccupations” and ’’obsessive thinking” which seemed to afflict the
49workers at Hawthorne.
The plausibility of this argument derived, in part, froin the fact 
that most grievances involved value judgements rather than empirically 
verifiable assertions. The researchers assumed that management decision­
making was rational and value-free because it was based upon economic 
calculations. Within this narrow and somewhat peculiar view of
50rationality, worker criticisms were interpreted as subjeotive and biased. 
Althou^ithis explanation glossed over a whole range of issues, it had the 
advantage of exonerating management. Consequently, during the early part 
of the experiment, it provided an explanation satisfactory to researchers 
and company executive alike.
Nevertheless, the existence of these hostile sentiments raised a
number of questions for management. Why was it that workers distorted
the situation in the factory? And, why did they blame management for
their personal problems? At first the researchers looked for explanations
based upon the psychological problems of workers. Elton Mayo culled the
writings of Freud and Janet for clues to the reasons underlying their
tendency to "distort” management behaviour. He oame to believe that
modem industrial societies encouraged "obsessional" and "compulsive
neurotic" disorders. From Janet, he took the idea that people who feel
inadequate in relationships tend to distort the behaviour of others.
In so doing they are able to minimize their own feeling of inferiority.
Thus workers who complained about bad supervisors were actually attempting
51to assuage their feelings of inadequacy. *501
49» Ibid., pp. 292-335» See also« T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free 
Society, op. cit., pp. 59* 103-106; Elton Mayo, The Human Problems 
of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., pp. 96-98 and passim.
50. R.F. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. 292-328.
51. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit. 
pp. 96, 98» See also: T..N. wniteneaa, Leaaersnip m  a Free Society. 
o£. cit., pp. 103-106.
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Roathlisberger and Dickson adopted a slightly different, if equally 
unconvincing explanation:
A certain class of statements in which there was a 
tendency towards exaggeration and distortion, and 
in which thesezesponses seemed to be directed more 
towards persons than towards things, suggested to 
the interviewers the problems of the relations between 
complaints and personal equilibrium. Interviews have 
been presented in this chapter to illustrate the 
relation between the obsessive response and the factors 
in the workers* personal background. Personal situations 
in which there was a serious distortion of general 
attitude were frequently accompanied by a reduced capacity 
to work and an increase in morbid reflection.-32
Given that the researchers were anxious to demonstrate the irrational 
nature of worker criticisms of the company, the above interpretation seems 
less than persuasive. Perhaps because they sensed the weaknesses inherent 
in this approach, Mayo and Whitehead gradually revised their explanation 
for the widespread psychological "disorders" revealed in the interview 
programme. In particular, they sought to understand why the number of 
workers who showed signs of 'distorted* thinking was so great.
The problems of workers, they now decided, were largely the result
of wider social developments. Rapid industrial change was breaking down
the social bonds uniting the individual to his society. Traditional
centres of social integration such as church, family and geographic
community were no longer capable of providing a stable and supportive
social environment. Industrial society was thus giving birth to a rootless
population. Deprived of social support, growing numbers of individuals
were suffering from what Durkheim had described as "anomie". This was
reflected in feelings of "personal futility", "social discontent" and a
general inability to cope with the demands of social situations such as 
53in industry. y 52
52. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op., 
eit., p. 525.
53» Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Society, op. cit., 
pp. 20-137; T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit. 
pp. 231-240. ---
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This new analysis reflected the influence of contemporary developments
in sociology and social anthropology. The writings of Redcliffe-Brown,
Malinowski and other members of the Chicago School were mentioned
frequently by the researchers. W. Lloyd Warner had participated in the
latter phases of the Hawthorne study and academics from Harvard University
and M.I.T. had been encouraged to visit the factory. Under their influence,
the frame of analysis had gradually shifted from the psychological
difficulties of individuals to the social problems arising within an
54industrial society.
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with this societal approach also
developed, primarily because it offered no method of dealing with the
specific problems faced by the Western Electric Company which was paying
for the research. Knowledge that workers were suffering from problems
generated by industrialization was of little value to managers confronted
55with the immediate question of how to get them to produce more.
Attention was thus shifted back to the factory.
After a re-examination of the interview material, the researchers
found that some psychologically ’'maladjusted" workers were able to perform
their jobs effectively while others were not. This indicated that the
work situation could "...relieve or exaggerate the tendency towards 
56distortion." And it suggested that if management eliminated the 
sources of dissatisfaction in the factory, it could minimize the adverse 
effects on output of the psychological and social problems that workers
54« T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 27, 142} 
Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker, 
op. cit., p, 558} Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization, op. cit., pp. 154, 155, 179. See alsot Lorin Baritz, 
The Servants of Power, op. cit., pp. 91» 92 and passim.
55» F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J.Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. 375, 374.
56» Ibid., pp. 325-528 and passim. See also« Elton Mayo, The Human 
Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., pp. 115,116.
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brought with them to their jobs. However, the researchers did not 
drop their sociological frame of reference. Rather, they shifted 
it from the larger society to the factory itself. Social relationships 
within the plant now became the focus of their attention*
Anxious to learn more about the sources of dissatisfaction arising
from relationships between supervisors and workers, the researchers
extended the interview programme to lower level supervisor personnel.
It was hoped that the problems and weaknesses of supervisors would be
uncovered and this information used as the basis for changes in the
company^ supervisory policies. Again a good deal of dissatisfaction
was uncovered. Many supervisors were unhappy with the way the company
treated them. The quality of social relationships with those above and
below them in the company hierarchy appeared to be of particular
57significance in this regard.
Out of this research on the attitudes of workers and supervisors 
emerged one of the central conclusions of the Hawthorne study» the 
development of negative attitudes towards work was largely a consequence 
of the inability of workers and supervisors to develop satisfying social 
relationships on the job. The Western Electric Company, "...is not merely 
an organization for the manufacture of telephones in the most efficient 
manner'*, Roethlisberger and Dickson now concluded, "it is also a human 
organization in which the needs, hopes and desires of human beings are 
trying to find expression.""^
57» F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, 
op. cit., p. 363. This approach reflected the tendency of the 
researchers to identify with the position of top management. It 
was assumed that lower level supervisors lacked the skills and 
insight of their superiors. Yet it was through these lower-level 
supervisors that the policies of top management were implemented. 
Thus it was necessary to find out exactly what supervisors were 
thinking and doing in order to be able to develop a programme to 
improve their performance.
58. IMI«» P* 563.
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V
The next stage of the Hawthorne experiment was established to study
this "human organization" within the formal struoture cf the company. The
experimenters decided, once again,to study a small group, this time using
59an explicitly sociological approach. Detailed observations were to be
made of conversations and sooial interaction. One aspect of group
behaviour was of particular interest to the researchers: output restriction.
The interviews had revealed what Taylor could have told them half a
century earlier: that workers limited production to what they saw ad'a
fair day*s work." As Roethlisberger and Diokson noted:
Some of the evidence obtained suggested that 
the wage incentive systems under which some 
of the groups worked had been rendered 
ineffectual by group pressure for controlled 
output. Informal practices by means of which 
certain operators were placed under pressure 
and kept in line were brought to light. There 
was evidence of informal leadership on the part 
of certain persons who took upon themselves the 
responsibility of seeing that the members of a 
group clung together and protected themselves 
from representatives of other groups within the^^ 
company who could interfere with their affairs,0
Not surprisingly, the managers of Hawthorne were greatly interested in this
aspect of group behaviour. They were concerned to know the reasons
underlying such practices and how they were enforced by the group.
The experiment itself involved monitoring the activities of fourteen 
men engaged in assembling a piece of telephone equipment oalled a bank.
The job consisted of wiring one hundred and two hundred seotions of 
insulated wire to teiminals at either end of the bank, soldering them in 
place and inspecting the finished product.*’3. The work was divided among
59. Ibid., p. 379.
60. Ibid., p. 380.
• Ibid., p. 394} T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit. 
PP. 54-55.
61
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nine wiremen, three soldennen and two inspectors. Each solderman worked 
with three wiremen, while the two inspectors divided the work of the three 
teams of hank builders between them.^ This interdependence tf production 
was reflected in the system of remuneration which combined a group bonus 
with individual payments 'based upon the number of banks wired, soldered 
or inspected.
Originally, the researchers wanted to study workers at their regular 
place of work to avoid what is now referred to as the »’Hawthorne Effect.” 
They wanted to avoid creating a new experimental situation, for this 
would defeat the purpose of the experiment. However, this proved impossible, 
so a special observation room was set up.^^ Unlike the Relay Assembly 
Test Room, no additional changes were made other than stationing an 
observer in the room. It was made clear to the workers that the observer 
was not there in any supervisory capacity. Thus it was hoped that they 
would come to ignore his presenoe and return to their customary work 
practices. This hope was largely fulfilled.^
The observer recorded an exceedingly complex pattern of social 
interaction among the workers in the bank wiring room. The group had 
evolved an elaborate set of norms and values which guided the oonduct of 
its members. Although the workers were of the same labour classification, 
there was a clear hierarchy among them based upon the jobs they performed.
The fourteen workers were divided into two informal oliques. Not all 
workers played a oentral role in these cliques: some appeared to be 62*4
62. P.J. Roetlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
oit.» PP. 394-396. ; --------
63» Ibid., pp. 305-391»
64. Ibid., pp. 384-403
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outsiders, while others assumed the role of leaders. These informal
leaders were influential in establishing and maintaining the group's
65customs and in protecting it from management interference.
As we might expect, the connection between output restriction and 
group interaction was studied in great detail. The researchers found to 
their surprise that the output was not related to individual capabilities. 
Thus workers who had demonstrated a hi^i aptitude for their jobs on 
tests of manual dexterity often produced less than workers who scored 
poorly. This finding challenged one of the major assumptions of Taylor. 
For there seemed little point in finding the "right man for the right 
job" if output did not reflect ability. The test room showed that 
productivity was far more dependent upon the mutually agreed output norms 
than it was on individual factors.
But what was even more disturbing for management was the disoovery 
that the group was consoiously restricting output to a level considerably 
below the capabilities of its slowest members. Ignoring the offioial 
quota and management's carefully designed wage incentive scheme, workers 
produced only what they felt was a fair day's work. And to ensure that 
this objective was not exceeded by individual members, they used a variety 
of informal sanctions which proved more effective in controlling the 
behaviour of group members than the incentives and disciplinary measures 65
65. Ibid., pp. 495-501:,. 5221 523» See also: TJT. Whitehead, Leadership 
in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 55» F»J» Roethlisberger, Management 
and Morale, op. cit., pp. 22-26.
66. T.N. Whitehead. Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 67J
F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, 
op. cit., pp. 408-447»
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used "by the company. ' From these observations, it became clear to the
researchers that the productive behaviour of individual workers could not
be understood without studying their social relationships. Output, they
68concluded, was primarily a social activity. This finding not only
revealed the weaknesses of Taylor* s individualist approach: it demonstrated
the continuing failure of management to control production on the shop 
69floor. y Without control of work groups, the researchers decided, 
management could not make workers comply with its objectives.
Yet, unlike Taylor, who saw the rationality of soldiering, the 
researchers were still puzzled about why the work group restricted its 
output against what they saw as its rational self-interest. Evidence from 
conversations in the observation room and from subsequent interviews with 
workers revealed that workers were afraid that their rates would be cut 
if they produced more. This same suspicion of management led them to
70oppose other attempts by the company to make changes in their work routine. *6870
67
67# F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. cit., 
Ch. XVIII, esp.pp. 445-447. See also: Elton Mayo, L.J. Henderson and 
T.N. Whitehead, "The Effects of Social Environment" in Papers on the 
Science of Administration, ed. Luther Gylick and L. Urwick (New York,
1937) pp» 143-158» One implication of this finding which the 
researchers quickly noted was that if output reflected social attitudes 
rather than individual motivations, paying higher wages might well have 
no effect on performance. Conversely, it appeared that by mandpuilating 
the social attitudes of workers it might be possible to obtain greater 
output without paying a penny more. The appeal of such a line of 
reasoning to managers was self-evident.
68. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. cit., 
p. 496 and passim.
69» F.J.Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. cit., 
pp. 456-458» Lorin Baritz also points out that recognition of the 
role of informal social controls, in influencing the behaviour of 
individual workers called into question attempts by industrial 
psychologists to match the personality, characteristics and aptitudes 
of individuals to the jobs they were to perform. See Lorin Baritz,
The Servants of Power, op. cit., pp. 94» 95»
70, Ibid,, p. 524» T.N.Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. citw, 
pp. 57-62, 104-107*
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Although the bank wiring observation room was begun during a period
when the effects of the great depression were becoming visible at
Hawthorne, the researchers refused to accept the rationality of enployee
suspicions about the Western Electric Company. They failed to see that
in a period of declining employment, output restriction was a rational
71strategy used by workers to preserve their jobs. Instead, they repeated
the argument that worker opposition was based upon non^logical sentiments
72and misunderstanding about the purposes of management.
Yet by this time, the researchers had come to believe that the factors 
influencing the development of such sentiments were primarily social 
rather than psychological. Membership in work groups gave individuals 
an opportunity to satisfy their social needs at work. As a consequence, 
the pattern of relationships established within the group was of great 
importance to them. Any change in the work routine by management posed 
a threat to these relationships. Thus worker opposition to management was 
seen as an attempt to preserve the social life of the work group from 712*
71. This fear was, unfortunately, proved correct* the experiment was 
terminated and the men were made redundant.
72. P.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. 523-535« Why the researchers failed to understand the logic 
of restrictive practices from the worker's point of view is a question 
that will forever remain a mystery. Indeed, they noted numerous 
instances where management had dismissed or demoted workers because 
there was insufficient work. To cite only one example, Roethlisberger 
and Dickson casually mentioned that during the Bank Wiring Room 
Experiment one inspector was transferred ahd the group chief "...was 
demoted because of the general decline in business activity." op.; cit., 
p. 45* Moreover, the researchers had a peculiar inability to see that 
from the viewpoint of workers restrictive practices had a number of 
obvious benefits. Not only did they provide the opportunity to 
exercise control over their work; they also enabled workers to strike 
what they saw was the most satisfactory balance between effort and 
remuneration. For an excellent discussion of the value of restrictive 
practices to workers see* David Guest and Derek patchett, Worker
Participation*.Individual Performance and Control, op. cit., pp. 96-117» 
and, an earlier study by William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation
(New York, 1955)» Part I.
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unwanted interference.
Because management was unaware of the complex social systems evolved
by work groups, Whitehead argued, it tended "...to rearrange the working
conditions of employees with scant regard for the social routines and
sentiments it was unwittingly b r e a k i n g . T h e  response of workers to
management's interference was to attempt to obstruct such changes. Repeated
intrusions by management gave rise to group norms and values designed to
75frustrate managements aims. J Moreover the distance between top management
and the shop floor made it difficult for senior executives to know what was
happening "down below." Hence, out of ignorance - but not, of course, bad
faith - they frequently made decisions which unwittingly threatened work
76groups. *76
73
73* F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, 0£. cit., 
pp. 546, 547» T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, opl cit., 
p. 62. Landsberger defends Roethlisberger and Dickson from the charge 
that they failed to see that workers were being treated badly by the 
company. He notes their discussion of the problems of workers at 
Hawthorne and their attack on the poor supervision in the plant. Yet 
Landsberger does not explain why Roethlisberger and Dickson viewed such 
problems solely as the result of bad : management practices rather th^ ui the 
conflict between the demands of shareholders and the needs of workers.
74* T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 57»
75» Ibid., pp. 65, 66. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management 
and the Worker, op. cit., pp. 567» 568.
76. The responsibility of management to satisfy the social needs of workers 
did not, of course, extend to providing them with guarantees of 
continued employment. Although the management of the Hawthorne works 
was in the process of laying off thousands of workers a3 the depression 
deepened and although the Relay Assembly Test Room Experiment was 
terminated by such lay-offs, there is hardly any mention of the effects 
of this on workers at Hawthorne. Characteristically, when the problem 
of redundancy was raised by Roethlisberger and Dickson, it was to 
argue that the fear of unemployment was not a major factor influencing 
the behaviour of the men in the Bank Wiring Observation Room. Even 
the paternalism of the researchers was confined within the bounds of 
an exact calculation of the profits and losses involved. See«
F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, op. 
cit., pp. 531-542.
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Thia explanation appealed to the researchers for a number of 
reasons. It avoided the question of whether employee opposition was 
based upon perceived conflicts of interest. It defined the problem 
of worker opposition in such a way that it appeared to be the result 
of management»s previous lack of understanding about the social 
functions of work groups. And it pointed to a solution which was 
within managements grasp. If the opposition of work groups was based 
upon non-rational sentiments, it might be feasible to bring such 
sentiments into line with management objectives.
VI
As we have seen, Taylor was aware of the ability of work groups 
to restrict output. The "discovery" of systematic soldiering in the 
Bank Wiring Room would not have surprised him greatly, for he had 
practised the same type of output restriction in his apprenticeship as 
a machinist. Yet what was different about Hawthorne was the frame of 
reference used to analyze the behaviour of the wiremen. Taylor had 
assumed that the only purpose underlying the formation of work groups 
was to subvert management objectives. The human relations researchers 
rejected this view. Influenced by contemporary work in sociology and 
anthropology which underlined man's social characteristics, they came 
to believe that the existence of informal groups reflected the natural 
desire of workers to satisfy their social needs on the job. Their 
analysis of the social disruption caused by industrialism suggested 
that the development of strong ties of loyalty and friendship at work 
was perfectly normal and healthy, for it constituted an attempt to 
counteract the anomic tendencies of modem society. By forging new 
social bonds at the workplace, employees were attempting to create
120
a substitute for the role played formerly by church, family and local 
community. Thus the tendency for work groups to resist management- 
imposed change reflected an understandable desire to preserve the 
social life of the group from undue disruption, rather than a rational 
belief that there was a conflict of interest between the two parties.
If this explanation were correct, then there was no reason why 
workers could not develop equally satisfying relationships within a 
group oriented towards rather than against the pursuit of management 
objectives.1 Moreover, if the energy and thought that was expended 
in frustrating management goals were channelled towards fulfilling them, 
the benefits to employers would be enormous, as the Relay Assembly Test 
Room had demonstrated.
Consequently, the researchers argued that management ought to strive 
to control work groups rather than suppress them, as Taylor had advised. 
Indeed, Taylor's approach was quite harmful. For the attempt to suppress 
work groups was likely to arouse their hostility. By controlling them, 
management would not merely neutralize their impact on production* it 
would be able to ensure that they made a positive contribution to their 
employer.^® *78
77» For an excellent summary of the human relations position on this 
issue, see* Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement (London, 1974) PP« 68-74«
78. Roethlisberger and Dickson noted that the major difference between 
the informal organization of the Relay Assembly Test Room and the 
Bank Wiring Room was that the former was committed to management 
goals while the latter was not. From this analysis, they went on to 
argue • that once management had found out how to establish group 
norms and values similar to those in the Relay Assembly Test Room, 
it would be able to unleash a great reservoir of unused productive 
potential. See* Management and the Worker, op. dit., pp. 558-563«
On the point about controlling rather than suppressing work groups, 
see* C.W. Mills "The Contribution of Sociology to Studies in 
Industrial Relations" Proceedings oflhe First Annual Meeting. 
Industrial Research Association, Vol. I. 1948, pp. 199-222, as cited 
by* Henry Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited, op. cit., pp. 40, 41«
See also* J.A.C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry, op. cit.. 
p. 82.
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Mayo saw another value in informal work groups» Group membership
79created a bond between the individual and his work situation. To the 
extent that the social needs of workers were satisfied within the 
factory, employees would be more likely to show up for work and remain 
with their company. Cohesive work groups were thus perceived as a 
solution to absenteeism and labour turnover. The anomie resulting from 
the breakdown of traditional centres of social integration was to be 
counteracted by building a community within the plant. In the process, 
employee dependence on the factory would increase and management would 
gain a new lever of control over them.
The establishment of better work group relationships was also seen 
as a method of reducing discontent. Whitehead claimed that an
80"enrichment of social living" would make monotonous tasks more bearable.
He argued that workers did not view work exclusively in terms of its
economic benefits. Thqy looked for intrinsic satisfactions on the job
as well. Although the tasks employees performed were often too routine
to provide much fulfilment, the human relationships associated with these
tasks could compensate for this. Thus by encouraging the development of
satisfying group relationships, management could minimize the discontent
81arising from repetitive work.
Given that work groups arose from the natural sociability of men 
rather thanaiy perceived conflict of interest between management and 
workers, and that their goals were primarily social rather than economic, 
the question that the Hawthorne researchers posed was how could management 801
79» This point is developed more fully in Georges Friedmann, Industrial 
Society, op. cit., pp. 317-330.
80. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit.. pp. 22, 23.
81. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 22, 23. 
F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, 
op. cit., pp. 573» 574.
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control them? Amid the rapid, and often inconsistent, shifts in the 
experiments from the physiological to the psychological and social, 
two separate but compatible strategies emerged. The first, supervision, 
constituted an attempt to control group norms and values by transforming 
the role of foremen from disciplinarians to * leaders'. The second, 
personnel counselling, was an attempt to siphon off discontent by 
persuading workers that their problems arose either from situations 
outside the factory or from their failure to "adjust" to the demands of 
industrial life. Both strategies were designed to bring the attitudes 
of workers and the norms of work groups into line with the objectives 
of employers.
VII
The central idea in the strategy of supervision was that of leadership. 
As we noted previously, the researchers had discovered that the informal 
leaders of work groups played a central role in creating and enforcing 
the group norms and practices which regulated the productive behaviour 
of group members. Consequently, they reasoned that if supervisors assumed 
the role of group leaders, they would be able to harmonize group norms 
and values with management objectives. Supervisors were to become the
82informal a-9 well as formal leaders of the workers under their authority.
Senior management could do a number of things to ensure that its 
supervisors assumed such a position. The most important was to give them 
training in what Mayo referred to as "social skills." These skills were 
based upon an understanding of the social needs of employees. Supervisors 
must be taught how to avoid disrupting existing group relationships or 
threatening the integrity of work groups. They must be trained in the 82
82. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 101-120.
- 123 -
art of fostering group solidarity so that employees could satisfy 
their social needs on the job. This, in turn, called for a new non­
directive approach to managing men. Rather than giving orders, foremen 
must consult with employees and persuade them that their interests were 
best served by pursuing management1s objectives. It was no longer
adequate for supervisors to obtain formal compliance» they must obtain
83the active commitment of workers to the goals of their enterprises.
Of course, this meant that the role of supervisors had to be 
redefined. They must now see their jobs in terms of manipulating 
attitudes as well as directing behaviour. "What is required”, argued 
T.N. Whitehead, ”is that the social sentiments and activities of groups 
be regarded not as hurdles to surmount, but as an integral part of the 
objective for which the organizer is working."®^ He went on to outline 
how supervisors could foster group cohesion and use it to further 
managements goals»
The manager has first and foremost to assist his 
groups in building up their integrity, or social 
ways, and so far as possible in guarding these 
from unnecessary shock. Insofar as he achieves 
this he will be included in some sense as a member 
of the group, and as its leader. In this way the 
group customs and sentiments will tend to become 
organized around the purposes of management rather 
than in opposition to them. 35
An important component of leadership was communication with 
subordinates. The researchers believed that conflicts between workers 
and management were frequently caused by misunderstandings. Thus if 
supervisors explained company policy in greater detail, they could assuage *845
83* Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit. 
pp. 183-185; T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op, cit., 
pp. 108-116. P.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and 
the Worker, op. cit., pp. 530-589» See also» J.E.T. Eldridge, 
Sociology and Inddstrial Life, op. cit., p. 107»
84. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 86.
85. Ibid., pp. 97, 98.
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employee suspicions. At the same time, by discussing problems with 
employees, supervisors could find out what wa3 disturbing them and take 
steps to rectify matters. Communication, of course, had another function. 
To the extent that employees confided in their supervisors, management 
would be able to learn what was happening on the shop floor. Sources of 
discontent could be recognized, analyzed and dealt with before they cost 
employers money. Similarly, union agitators and other malcontents could 
be identified and fired before they had time to disrupt company activities.
However, the Hawthorne researchers believed that not all problems 
could be solved by better communication, for employee suspicions of 
management were frequently of a non-rational nature. Consequently, more 
subtle techniques were required. In particular, supervisors must be 
taught how to convey feelings of sympathy and understanding in order to 
create an emotive bond between workers and their enterprise. V/orkers must 
come to feel that the company cares for them and that they can place their 
trust in management. By giving supervisors training in the sociology and 
psychology of work groups, it would be possible fortiiem to learn how to 
foster normative integration among the employees under their control.
AOd, once workers identified with the objectives of the company, management 
could put an end to soldiering and other forms of anti-organizational 
behaviour.
An understanding of the sociology of work groups was particularly 
important when management wa3 implementing change. The researchers saw 
rapid technological innovation as an integral part of business activity. 
Industrial enterprises were constantly in the process of adjusting 
methods of production to new market conditions or technical advances, 86
86. Ibid., pp, 108-120; F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J, Dickson, Management 
and the Worker, 0£, cit.. pp. 581-58}j Elton Mayo, The Human Problems 
of Industrial Civilization, op. cit.. pp. 183-185* F.J.Roethlisberger, 
Management and Morale, op. cit., pp. 88-108, 111, 112 and passim.
- 125 -
The social structures of work groups» on the other hand» were essentially
conservative» Workers were anxious to protect their social relationships
87from unwanted disruptions.
In order to reconcile these conflicting demands without damaging
economic performance, it was necessary that the manager "...systematically
consider the social structure of his group and guide his technological
88progression in such a manner as to be acceptable to that structure."
Whitehead did not claim that it would always be possible to introduce
change without disrupting work groups. But an understanding of sociology
would enable managers to minimize such disruption. Conversely, failure
to consider the social life of the work group would provoke its opposition
89and thu3 defeat the economic purpose of the enterprise.
Mayo gave a more practical example of how sociology could be used to
help managers. The study of group interaction could be used as a guide
when selecting foremen and transferring employees. By identifying the
informal group leader and selecting him for promotion, management could
use his influence to encourage the group to follow company policy.
Similarly, by distinguishing between employees who played a key role in
group activities and those who were marginal, it would be able to transfer
90workers without upsetting the group. Thus the careful observation of 
work groups would enable management to manipulate them more effectively.
87. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 83-86 
and passim. See also» Georges Friedmann, Industrial Society, op.
• cit., pp. 313-317.
88. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 85.
89. Ibid., p. 85.
90. Elton Mayo and George F. Lombard, Team Work and Labour Turnover in 
the Aircraft Industry in Southern California, Harvard School of 
Business Administration, Business Research Study No. 32 (Oct., 1944).
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Vili
The second technique, counselling, arose from the interview programme.
As we noted, this programme had given the researchers a large body of
information about the attitudes of employees. In the process, it also
seemed to provide an outlet for employees'grievances. By talking to the
interviewers, workers were able to unburden their problems and frustrations.
Thus the interviews appeared to have therapeutic value. Moreover, the
opportunity to talk to a sympathetic listener seemed to reduce worker
discontent - a fact which the researchers did not fail to notice. And,
on some occasions, the interviewers had been able to facilitate "...the
91adjustment of the individual to the industrial structure."
These .findings suggested to management that it might be worthwhile
to set up a programme of employee counselling. In 1936, several years
after the completion of the bank wiring experiment, counselling services
were established at Hawthorne. Later they were expanded to five other
Western Electric plants. By 1954 when the programme reached its peak,
92the company employed sixty-five counsellors. The purpose of counselling 
was to provide a harmless outlet f or employee grievances and to help them 
to adjust to the'demands* of industrial life. This latter function also 
included keeping an eye out for indications of unrest. By obtaining the 
confidence of employees, counsellors would be in a position to gauge the 
level of discontent and thus to advise management of impending dangers. 
Although the researchers did not openly discuss counselling in terms of 
spying on employees, the fact that management expected economically useful 
services from them suggested that this role would be difficult to avoid.
91* F.J. Roethlisberger and W*J. Dickson, Management and the Workers, op. 
cit., p. 601} F.J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale, op. cit., 
p. 18. See, as welli J.A.C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry. 
op. cit., pp. 78-80.
92. Ibid., pp, 593-604. See also» Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power.
op. cit., pp, IO5-IO7.
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Moreoever, two of the researchers» RodthLisberger and Dickson» made it 
perfectly clear that the counselling functions would in no way impede 
normal supervisory practices. Counsellors were there only to ’’improve"
95employee attitudes, not to interfere with supervision and discipline. 
The benefits of counselling to management are clearly spelled out by 
Lorin Baritz:
(P)ersonnel counselling...using the tested techniques 
of the Catholic confessional and the psychiatric couch, 
has frequently resulted in labour losing control over 
the nature and conditions of work. It has often meant 
that the potency of labour organization has been weakened 
and made less meaningful; and that management has finally 
found if it chooses to use counselling, as such, a most 
devastating weapon to employ in its continual struggle for
power.94 934
93. F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the’Worker, op. 
cit., p. 603. The authors are quick to point out that counsellors 
would not have to violate their promises of confidence to do this.
In their own words ”...(T)he material obtained by the counsellor 
provides, within limits of the activity, an accurate source of 
information for management. Many problems which the counsellor 
encounters at the work level, of course, cannot be transmitted.
A general appraisal of the work situation, however, can sometimes 
be made without in any way violating the confidences of employees 
or supervisors. As a matter of fact, it is possible with a programme 
of this kind to keep management accurately informed as to the major 
factors which are affecting the attitudes of employees." op, cit., 
p. 603.
94. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 115. Ironically, 
V/hitehead makes precisely the same analogy between counselling and 
the "confession^'made to doctors, priests and psychiatrists*
"(E)mployee3 are only too anxious that their executives should 
understand the sentiments and loyalties of working groups, provided 
these executives make it clear that their motives are not disciplinary, 
but spring fron a real desire to understand and meet the needs of the 
groups for their mutual economic benefit. This will not surprise 
anyone who has considered the ease with which intelligent and 
sympathetic priests, doctors, psychiatrists and others obtain full 
confessions from their 'patients.1 The needs are not so different 
in the two cases."
T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 105. 
Presumably management will absolve employees of their sins as long 
as they promise to mend their ways.
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IX
As we might expect, the human relations theorists had little
sympathy with trade unions. The belief that worker opposition to
management was based upon non-rational sentiments enabled them to
dismiss, trade unionism as an unnecessary - and unwanted - intrusion
into industry. The existence of unions was explained not in terms of
95conflicts of interest but rather in terms of management failure.
The human relations researchers saw conflict as an indication of
'•social disease" whereas harmony and co-operation were signs of social 
96health. By neglecting the social needs of workers, management had 
left the door open for other organizations to capture their loyalty.
The role of trade unions was thus defined exclusively in terms of their 
social functions. Workers joined unions in order to gain the social 
satisfactions which management had failed to provide. Of course, the 
organizers of unions were seeking other, less savoury objectives and 
were anxious to provide workers with social satisfactions in order to 
use them to challenge the status quo. But the majority of workers had 
no such aims and were simply seeking to satisfy their sooial needs by 
joining a union.
The human relations researchers had a peculiar inability to 
comprehend that from the viewpoint of workers, unions might appear in 
a different light. They denied even the possibility that alternative 
definitions of the role of unions might have some validity. The *96
95» T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. oit., pp. 141-156;
P.J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale, op. cit., pp. 25t 26;
Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. oit., 
pp. 181, 182. See also: J.E.T* Eldridge, Sociology and Industrial 
Life, op. cit.« p. 110, and Alan Fox«Man Management« op. oit.. pp. 70-74»
96. On this question see the enlivening artiole by Reinhard Bendix and 
Lloyd H. Fisher, "The Perspectivesof Elton Mayo" in Amitai Etzioni, 
Complex Organizations (London, I964) pp. 115. 119» Reprinted from 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 31 (1949; PP» 312-319»
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rational goals of trade unions were dismissed as irrelevant» or simply
ignored. And the idea that unions were necessary to protect workers
from the arbitrary exercise of management power was rejected out of hand.
For this argument implied that management could abuse its power - an idea
that was as foreign to the Hawthorne researchers as it was to Taylor.
Instead» they hinted that unions were subversive organizations whose /
objectives were not to help those they represented but rather to pursue 1
97the unsavoury political ends of their organizers.
This analysis» with its emphasis on management failure rather than 
conflicts of interest, suggested that a solution lay within managements 
reach. If the rise of trade unionism was a consequence of inept management 
techniques which ignored the social needs of workers, the solution was to 
develop more sophisticated ones. And this, of course, was precisely where 
human relations came in. Supervision and personnel counselling, it was 
claimed, were useful methods of counteracting trade union activity.
Moreover, some of the researchers warned that if management did not adopt 
these techniques, it would leave itself vulnerable to union organizers who 
would have no qualms about exploiting the frustrations and misunderstandings 
of workers.
If management does not put itself in a position where 
it is able to understand the social activities of its 
employees in terms of their situations (sic), then 
other organizations will arise to perform this very 
function. This function is performed by a variety of 
organizations at the very moment: trade unions and 
kindred bodies are obvious examples, and in some 
countries this function is also performed by political 
organizations, party organizations and other groups 
whose methods are not always desirable or easy to 
control. Management*s best guarantee against a 
socially and economically unsound leadership is to do 
the job itself,98 98
97» T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 119, 141-156; 
Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., p. 181  ^ —  ;
98. T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., p. 119. See
also: Elton Mayo,The Political Problems of an Industrial Civilization, 
op. cit., pp. 19-21.,
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To prevent union organizing, management had to get there first.
By building a community at work which satisfied the social needs of 
workers, it could alleviate the sources of discontent.
Although this strategy was clearly designed to preserve the existing 
power of management, the human relations researchers were reticent even 
to admit that power relationships existed in industry. Yet the language 
of co-operation, leadership and harmony concealed the fact that overriding 
management power was taken for granted. Workers were to »co-operate* in 
the pursuit of aims established by management. They were to follow the 
♦leadership* of their supervisors even though they had no say in their 
selection. And they were to be »integrated* into an industrial community 
whose structure and objectives were decided unilaterally by employers.
The human relations theorists did not avoid the question of power.
They merely eschewed discussing it openly. That management ought to
extend its control over work groups was simply taken for granted. Beoause
the researchers identified with the views of top management, whatever
enhanced or extended managerial control was seen as legitimate. The
argument that trade unions were unnecessary because the needs of workers
could be met within the framework of the formal organization thus concealed
their real objection to trade unionisms unions threatened the establishment
of a factory community based upon managerially approved values. By
presenting an alternative focus for the loyalty of workers, they made it
99more difficult for management to oontrol attitudes and behaviour. *
99* Of course, the anti-union bias of Human Relations has been the subjeot 
of much criticism and debate. Mary B. Gilson, Daniel Bell, C.W. Mills, 
Lorin Baritz and numerous other critics ' of the approach have pointed 
out how the problems identified by the researchers, the frame of 
analysis used to examine these problems and the solutions advocated 
reflected an anti-union bias. However, one researcher has attempted 
to defend Roethlisberger and Dickson (but not Mayo and Whitehead) from 
this charge. Henry Landsberger argues that unions were ignored because 
they were not a major force in American industrial life until after the 
Hawthorne research was completed. Yet as Gilson and Baritz note, the 
Western Electric Company was spending large amounts of money on 
industrial surveillance in order to prevent unionization during the 
same period that the research was being carried out. Sees Henry 
Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited, op. cit.. pp. 51-55»
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Thus the human relations theorists rejected industrial pluralism. 
Unlike recent management theorists, they saw trade unions not as 
legitimate organizations fulfilling a necessary function in protecting 
worker interests but rather as impediments to be overcome. Like Taylor, 
proponents of human relations adhered to a theory of managerial absolutian. 
Decision-making within the enterprise was the sole prerogative of managers. 
The human relations theorists said little about what management ought to 
do if its employees refused to •co-operate', or if they rejected the 
'leadership' of supervision, for they assumed that all opposition was 
of a temporary nature. However, their acceptance of the policies followed 
at Hawthorne during the experiments - policies which included arbitrary 
dismissals, transfers, demotions and large-scale redundancies - indicates 
that they saw nothing wrong with the unilateral use of management power 
when persuasion had failed.
The jurisdiction for giving management such control over the lives 
of its employees was one of straightforward paternalism: management knew 
best. The non-rational sentiments which governed the behaviour of workers 
were contrastedwiththe rational economic decisions engaged in by managers»^ 10
100. As Reinhard Bendix notes, however, the contrast between the rational 
behaviour of management and the non-rational behaviour of workers was 
a result of a conscious attempt by the former group to train itself 
to think rationally and not its intellectual superiority. Managers 
were also prone to behave according to non-rational customs. What 
distinguished them as managers, however, was their capacity to 
overcome this tendency. Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in 
Industry, op. cit., pp. 313-316. Bendix goes too far in his claim 
in thi3 respeot, though. For he contrasts the tendency of the Human 
relations school to assume that both workers and managers were 
"creatures of sentiment and non-logical thinking" with Taylor's 
assumption of the superior intelligence and virtue of management. 
Bendix does not show how this argument can be reconciled with the 
explicit elitism of the Human Relations school and its assumption 
that the problems of industry are to be solved exclusively by the 
managerial elite. Like Taylor, the Human Relations theorists simply 
assume the superiority of the elite.
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Workers were seen as wayward children in need of guidance» And the 
human relations theorists had no douht that management ought to provide 
it» Moreover, like children, workers were to he denied the opportunity 
to determine such matters for themselves because they might make the 
wrong choice. Although the authoritarian implications of this position 
ought to have been obvious, such questions did not trouble the Hawthorne 
researchers: they were too enthused about the possibilities for control 
that social science offered to management to waste time in philosophical 
speculation.
X
Two of the researchers, Mayo and Whitehead, ext ended'.their analysis
of the problems of workers from the factory to the larger society. They J
argued that the breakdown of traditional centres of social integration
such as the family, church and geographically-based community was
threatening industrial civilization itself. 101 102 In the words of Mayo:
It would seem that one of the important problems 
discovered by the research at Hawthorne - the 
failure of workers and supervisors to understand 
their work and working conditions, the widespread 
sense of personal futility - is general to the 
civilized world and not merely characteristic of 
Chicago. The belief of the individual in his 
social function and solidarity with the group - 
his capacity for collaboration in work - these are 
disappearing, destroyed in part by rapid ;scientific 
and technical advance. 102
This general breakdown in social cohesion threatened management in 
two ways. Because individuals were less responsive to traditional social 
controls, it was more difficult for managers to run their factories
101. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit..
PP. 123-143.--------------------------------------------------- —
102. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilizaion, o£. cit., 
P. 177.
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efficiently. Workers were increasingly unwilling to accept the discipline 
of factory life. And they were more inclined to engage in 'irrational* 
activities which undermined economic perfoiroance. Second, the widespread 
discontent which accompanied the "breakdown in social cohesion posed a 
political threat to business.Influenced by the upheavals of the great 
depression, Mayo and Whitehead expressed the fear that this discontent 
would be manipulated by radicals whose aim was to overthrow the existing 
social order.
Their solution to this threat lay in building social groups which 
would support the status quo. As the traditional centres of social 
integration - church", family and local community - were proving incapable 
of doing this, it was necessary for industry to take a more active role.
The factory, according to Mayo and Whitehead, should become a new centre 
of social life.*0 "^ The political advantages to business would be 
substantial, for the norms and values associated with this new centre 
of social integration would be those approved by management. Workers 
would identify their interests with those of their employer and hence 
would be less likely to support politioal movements opposed to business.
In addition, they argued that business men ought i> provide 
'leadership' to. the larger community, in order to prevent sooial
disintegration and to ensure that the democratic process was not abused \\\
by unscrupulous agitators. Moreover, beoause government policy reflected ^
103« T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit«t pp. 165-171 
and passim; Eli on Mayo, The Political Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization, op. cit., pp. 17-20; Elton Mayo, The Human Problems 
5f an Industrial .Civilization, op. cit., pp. 172-17
104. T.W. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. cit., pp. 169-176. 
Mayo was opposed to direct intervention by business in politics on 
the grounds that politics had expanded beyond its legitimate sphere 
of influence. Instead, he wanted to reduoe the scope of government 
activity and let other organisations such as business fill the gap so 
created. The effect, of course, would be the same: to enhance the role 
of business. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization, op. cit., pp. 144-167•
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public opinion, Whitehead argued that "business men must make a determined 
effort to influence its development Their new role as oommunity
leaders would parallel their role within the factory. Workers would look 
to them for guidance in "both spheres of life.
Whitehead outlined the unique qualifications in his most popular
"book, Leadership in a Free Society:
As a leader, the "business executive has obvious 
qualifications. In general, executives are 
responsible men, selected largely for their ability 
to undertake and carry through complex practical 
affairs; they are well trained in the techniques 
of organization. In the running of community 
activities, executives have under their control 
firms accustomed to the use of skilled techniques, 
and with the necessary local prestige to undertake 
a job and see it through. As a matter of fact the 
present tendency is for a greater participationcf 
firms in the activities of their communities. This 
participation often starts as a service designed for 
the exclusive use of a firm’s employees, and. it 
spreads out through the employees* families and 
relatives into the local community. 6
Business executives, he went on to argue, must also recognize the
need for greater co-ordination among themselves. Their perspective must
expand beyond the confines of their factories to the larger society. They
must come "to see themselves as collectively responsible for the maintenance
107of the social order.
Elton Mayo argued, in a similar vein, that one of the major deficiencies 
of the industrial societies of the West lay in the absence of a properly 
trained administrative elite. Drawing on the theories of Pareto and Brooks 
Adams, he discussed the question of how a successful administrative group 
is developed and maintained. Like Pareto and Adams, Mayo believed in the 
inevitability of elite rule. And he agreed with the former writer that 
social stability depended upon an adequate circulation of elites. A major
105. " Ibid., pp. 170-172.
106. TETd.. p. 170.
. Ibid., pp. 208-210.107
impediment to "business administration in Europe, he felt, was that the
circulation of elites was inadequate. Hence industry was controlled "by
men unahle to respond to the challenge of rapid technical and economic 
108change.
However, in the United States, according to Mayo, the problem was
not that of infusing new "blood into the administrative elite "but rather
109of overcoming inadequate training and over-specialization. Under the 
influence of scientific management, the American "business elite had become 
preoccupied with technical matters and failed1d develop the needed social 
and administrative skills. Ignorance of the behavioural sciences had 
reduced its ability to control subordinates and limited its capacity to 
counteract the breakdown of social cohesion.Consequently, it had 
found itself unable to counteract the social unrest which had developed 
during the great depression.
Mayo's solution to the social problem highlighted by the great 
depression lay in educating America's business elite in the social sciences. 
Members of this elite would then be able to use their knowledge of sociology
i
and psychology to build up stable and cohesive social groups. 3y assuming J  
control of the social as well as economic life of their societies, they 
would be able to foster nouns and values which would reinforce existing
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108'. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit. 
pp. 176, 177* Roethli: sberger and Dickson also refer to the influenoe 
of Pareto on their analysis of the conflict between technical change 
and social cohesion. See: Management and the Worker, op. cit., 
pp. 567» 568, and P.J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale, op. cit. 
p. viii. For a brief discussion and critique of the influenoe of 
Pareto on Mayo and the other Hawthorne researchers, see: Daniel Bell, 
"Adjusting Men to Machines", Commentary. Vol. 3» 1946| PP* 79-88*
109* Ibid., p. 177. Seo also: Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an 
Industrial Civilization, op. cit., p. 122.' '
110. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., 
p. 177* See also: T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op. 
cit., and Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, 
op. cit., p. 120.
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institutions. Ill
The world over we are greatly in need of an 
administrative elite, who can assess and handle 
the concrete difficulties of human collaboration.
As we lose the non-logic of a social code, we must 
substitute a logic of understanding. If at all 
critical posts in communal activity we had 
intelligent persons capable of analyzing an 
individual or group attitude in terms of, first, 
the degree of logical understanding, second, the 
non-logic of social codes in action, and, third, 
the irrational exasperation symptomatic of conflict 
and baffled effort; if we had an elite capable of 
such analysis, very many of our difficulties would 
dwindle to vanishing point.
It was an outline of business hegemony over society as well as industry. 
And it rested on the assumption that success in business conferred the 
right to determine social and political as well as economio priorities.
Mayo's belief in the need for a greater degree of social cohesion
within industrial societies also led him to criticize liberal democratic
theory for placing too much emphasis on individualism and individual 
113rationality. As we noted, he felt that the balance between social 
integration and individual differentiation had swung too far in the 
latter direction. The breakdown of social cohesion had serions 
implications for the existing social order. Individuals were becoming 
less amenable to social controls of any description. And, if society 
were not able to reverse this trend, civil disorder would result.
111. Elton Mayoy The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit. 
pp,l21-130;T.N. Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society, op, cit.,
pp. 245-247; Reinhard Bendix and Lloyd H. Fisher, "The Perspective of 
Elton Mayo", 0£. cit.. pp. 116-119. Not surprisingly, even liberals 
reacted strongly to Mayo's corporatist views. See, for example*
Clarke Kerr, "What became of the Independent Spirit" Fortune. Vol. 48, 
1953» as cited by Henry Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited, op. cit..
PP. 30, 31.
112. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit.,
p. 185, as cited by Reinhard Bendix and Lloyd H. Fisher, "The Perspectives 
of Elton Mayo", op. cit.. p. 113«
113. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civlization, op. cit., 
pp. 146-148. Mayo's criticism is extremely confused however. For 
example, he sees the views of Rousseau and J.S. Mill as being virtually 
identical.
114. Ibid., pp. 126-130, 136-138, 146-150.
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In laying too much emphasis on the individual, liberal democratic 
theorists failed to see that the real danger to society lay not in 
the oppression of individuals by ruling elites but rather in the 
anarchy arising from the disintegration of the social fabric. By 
underestimating the dangers of a normless society, liberal democratic 
theorists were unwittingly encouraging the anomic tendencies which 
were threatening it.'^'*
Moreover, liberal democratic theorists such as J.S. Mill had over­
estimated the role of rationality in determining individual behaviour. 
Following Piaget, Mayo categorized the individual's social responses into 
three compartments: logical, non-logical and irrational. By logical he 
meant behaviour which was consciously planned. By non-logical he meant 
behaviour in which individuals conformed to social norms without being 
conscious of the reasons for these norms. By irrational he meant a 
behaviour pattern which was non-logical but contravened existing norms 
and m o r e s . I n  stable societies behaviour was determined primarily by 
the second category of response. "The non-logical response", Mayo:
115. Ibid., pp. 148-150. Bendix and Fisher point out that in Mayo's first 
work, Democracy and Freedom: An Essay in Social Logic, he outlines why 
politics cannot provide a solution to the problem of social 
disintegration. Referring to the two party system in his birthplace, 
Australia, Mayo contends that "Democracy has done nothing to help 
society to unanimity, nothing to aid the individual to a sense of 
social function. Under its tutelage, social development has achieved 
a condition of perilous instability, a condition which democracy as 
such can do little or nothing to cure." (p.116). In his later writings 
and particularly in The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization.
Mayo reiterated his scepticism about the value of politics in fostering 
a more chhesive society. Actions by government he argued created an 
"artificial rather than spontaneous form of co-operation among people. 
Genuine co-operation must be based upon social life, not on political 
organization." Moreover, attempts by government to promote co-operation 
tended to destroy the capacity for spontaneous co-operation. However, 
private organizations such as industry were able to create spontaneous 
co-operation and ought to be encouraged to do so. Underlying this 
peculiar, and not altogether consistent, argument lay Mayo's corporalist 
conception of society - a conception which had no place for effective 
democratic institutions. For a good discussion of Mayo's views on this 
question see: Reinhard Bendix and Lloyd H. Fisher, "The Perspectives of 
Elton Mayo", 0£. cit., pp. 116-119»
116. Ibid., pp. 164-167. .See also: F.J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale. 
op. cit., pp. 30-33»
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asserted, "makes for social order and discipline, for effective 
collaboration in a restricted range of activity and for happiness and 
a sense of security in the individual." Customs and habits are 
normally adequate to guide the individual's activities. It was only 
in periods of crisis that it became necessary for people to behave 
according to a process of conscious, rational decision-making. However, 
unless they had the requisite training in guiding their behaviour in 
this way, they were unlikely to be successful.
Thus social and political institutions ought to be organized on 
the assumption that the individual's behaviour should be guided largely 
by non-rational norms and mores rather than conscious, rational decision­
making. If the individual were not given adequate social support and 
direction, he would be prone to irrational, erratic behaviour and thus 
would threaten the fabric of society. To keep modem industrial societies 
from disintegrating, it was essential that their leaders learn how to 
strengthen and control the non-rational norms and mores which guided the 
behaviour of the majority. Emphasis on individual rationality ought to 
be subordinated to custom, tradition and other non-logical determinants 
of behaviour. By stressing the importance of allowing the individual 
rationality to guide his behaviour, liberal democratic theorists were 
making it almost impossible for the elite to take the necessary measures 
to strengthen the social fabric.
XIX
As we have seen, the human relations theorists explained industrial 
conflict in terms of the anomic tendencies of modem industrial societies. 
Although they were aware of other analyses, their response was normally to
117. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit.,
p. — —
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ignore them. Mayo made an exception to this practice. He singled
out the position of R.H. Tawney for criticism because he believed that
Tawney provided a good example of the weaknesses in the socialist
analysis of industrial conflict. Mayo’s main point was quite simples
Tawney lacked sociological insight. Instead of recognizing that the
source of industrial strife lay in the break-down of social cohesion,
Tawney laid undue emphasis on the moral issues underlying industrial
conflict. And he tried to pin the blame for industrial unrest on the
exploitation of labour by wealthy capitalists.
Two irrelevancies led Tawney away from the interesting 
task to which he had set his mind. The first is the 
idea that morality is a quality which can be developed 
personally and then practised socially. In the latter 
part of his essay he sets himself not merely to describe 
the deterioration of social organization but also to 
claim that some person or groups of persons are very 
much to blame for these changes. In an apostrophe of 
.the investor he says: "The rentier and his ways, how 
familiar they were in England before the warj A public 
school and the club life in Oxford and Cambridge, and 
then another club in town; London in June when London 
is pleasant, the moors in October, Cannes in December 
and hunting in February and a whole world of rising 
bourgeoisie eager to imitate them, sedulous to make 
their expensive watches keep time with this preposterous 
calendar."
This is the language of abuse and has no serious value.
There were, no doubt, those who lived thus before the 
war, but, the percentage of 1Oxford and Cambridge* 
graduates of that doubtful class of ’rising bourgeoisie* 
who sedulously imitated such a scheme was negligible. H 9
Mayo also criticized Tawney for "...his curious belief that morality 
and religion axe something more than specified aspects of a social life
118. Henry Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited, op. cit., pp. 1-4. However, 
Landsberger notes that several recent advocates of the human relations 
approach have done so. See: C.C. Homans, "Some Corrections" Review of 
Economics and Statistics. Vol. 31» 1949»PP* 319—321; S* Chase, "Comment" 
Antiooh Review, Vol. 10, 1950» PP. 405-406; C.M. Arensbeigand C. Tootell, 
"Plant Sociology: Real Discoveries and. New Problems," Common Frontiers of 
the Social Soience3 (Glencoe, 111., 1957) PP» 310-337^"'We rai^ it ’add that 
Landsberger himself is a qualified supporter of the approach and feels 
that much of the criticisn of human relations is misplaced.
119. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization.QP. cit..
p. 152. See' also: pp. 181-184. 1 , 1  ^
and organization.” By this he meant that Tawney had placed too much
emphasis on rational, moral decision-making. Tawney failed to see that
non-rational social norms and mores were of greater significance in
fostering co-operation in industry. Moreover, Tawney interpreted the
opposition of workers as a perfectly reasonable reaction to the way they
were treated by owners. Such opposition, Mayo argued, was more frequently
based upon irrational, anarchic sentiments. Thus the solution to
industrial conflict lay not in rational discussion, but rather in rebuilding
121the non-rational norms, mores and social controls which had broken down.
Although Mayo*s own analysis of the breakdown of social cohesion 
within industrial societies was based on the work of Durkheim, Mayo showed 
little interest in the moral question of what organizational structures 
would establish an appropriate balance between satisfying the individuals 
social needs and providing him with the maximum opportunity for personal 
development and self-expression. Unlike Durkheim he saw the value of 
social integration in terms of establishing a stable social order:
DurkheimS socialist views were ignored. Social integration was desirable 
from MayoS point of view not because society was failing to satisfy the 
needs of individuals but rather because widespread anomie posed a threat
to the existing political and social order. Without sufficient social
122controls, Mayo feared, the working class would become ungovernable.
Indeed, the human relations theorists were largely unwilling to 
accept that fundamental moral questions were associated with the organization
120
120. Ibid., pp. 152-153» Whitehead criticized the Webbs» book Industrial 
Democracy on similar grounds. For example, he referred to their 
support of trade unions as »»a disturbing bias,” See: Leadership in a 
Free Society, op. cit., pp. 141, 142.
121. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, op. cit., 
pp. 181-188.
122. For a discussion of the contrasting attitudes towards social integration 
expressed by these two writers, see: J.E.T. Eldridge, Sociology and 
Industrial Life, op. cit., pp. 106-111.
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of industry. When confronted with a challenge to their views based upon
moral grounds, their response was to deal with it in a purely sociological
fashion. They assumed that morality - or at least the morality held hy
workers - could be reduced to mores. And they saw mores as valuable
because they acted as a "social cement" which fused the individual to
123the existing social order. As a consequence they saw nothing wrong
with attempting to modify social mores in such a way that they bound
individuals more firmly to the status quo.
So enthused were the human relations theorists about the discovery
that behaviour was determined by non-logical sentiments, customs, norms
and mores, that they lost sight of the fact that rational considerations
also played an important part. The idea that workers acted according to
non-rational social codes was reinforced by their own elitism. They did
not see workers as rational moral agents but rather as socially programmed
beings who unconsciously - and unthinkingly - adhered to the norms and
values of their work groups. By denying the rationality of worker
opposition to management goals, the researchers avoided the thorny questions
associated with challenges to the distribution of power, income and status
within industrial enterprises. And they were able to persuade themselves
that such challenges would disappear once managers had learned how to
124control norms and mores more effectively. ^
The issue of whether management had any right to manipulate employee 
attitudes and values was also ignored. This was particularly disturbing 
beoause the techniques of supervision and counselling involved controlling 
behaviour in a manner that was to be concealed from workers. Supervisors 
were to be trained in the art of modifying group norms not by rational 
argument, but rather by establishing an emotive bond with their subordinates. 
Similarly, counsellors were to persuade workers that their frustrations were
123« The term "social cement" is explicitly used by P.J.- Roethlisberger.
See: Management and Morale, op. cit., p. xii.
124» See, for example: Reinhard Bendix and Lloyd H. Fisher, ’The Perspectives
of Elton Mayo", oj>. cit., op. 124-126; Daniel Bell, "Adjusting Men to Machines" op. citT, vol. 3, 194?.
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the result of deep seated emotional problems or an inability to adjust 
to the demands of industrial life in a mature way. In either case the 
rationality of worker grievances was simply discounted. And, no respect 
was shown for the worker* s ri^rt as an individual to adhere to a 
different set of values or to come to his own conclusions about the 
problems he confronted in industry. In short, the human relations theorists 
were completely intolerant of the worker*s right to dissent from managements 
view of his welfare.
Proponents of human relations were unwilling to see that workers were 
people and not merely tools of production. Indeed, the idea that workers 
were ends in themselves was as foreign to them as it was to Taylor.
Because workers were seen as means for the pursuit of employer objectives, 
Mayo and his colleagues had no sympathy for the view that work ought to 
provide an outlet for individual creativity and self-development. They
studiously ignored the stultifying effects of the routine, repetitive
125'
work in the test rooms. And, they failed to see that the *hostile* responses
of workers were an attempt to assert their priorities in the face of
unrelenting management demands for greater output. Instead, opposition
was seen as a failure to accommodate to the demands of industrial life.
True, it was argued that certain social needs ought to be fulfilled on
the job. But, as we have seen, this was a means for increasing productivity
and reducing discontent and not a goal in its own right. The justification
for such policies was not that they made workers hajpy but rather they
made than productive. As Daniel Bell ri^itly notes:
The fundamental point, as it affects the worker in 
his own work environment, is that the ends of 
production are taken as »'given'* and the worker is 
to be"adjusted'' to his job so that the human *. 
equation matches the industrial equation. As one 
management consultant, Burleigh Gardner*succinctly
125. Roethlisberger and Dickson made an exception to this, however.
They argued that there was little evidence to show that workers 
objected to their simplified tasks. Rather it was the poverty 
of their social relationships which gave rise to their 
dissatisfaction. See: P.J. Roethlisberger and W.M. Dickson, 
Manaf^efljL_giad wths, Worker, op. cit,, pp. 573-575«
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phrased it: "The more satisfied [the worker] is, 
the greater will be his self-esteem, the more 
content he will be, and, therefore, the more 
efficient in what he is doing." A fitting 
description not of human but of cow sociology.
Like Taylor, proponents of human relations saw working people exclusively
in terms of their role as a factor of production. Yet their vision of the
control business ought to have over its employees was more encompassing
because theywanted the factory to be the centre of the social as well as
the economic lives of workers. However, they refused to see the
authoritarian implications of making the factory a new centre for social
integration. No attempt was made to reconcile the rights of the individual
within a democratic society with the pattern of authority in industry.
The increasing role that business was to play in the lives of its employees
was to occur within a framework based exclusively upon commercial priorities.
No thought was given to the question of whether industry might be organized 
according to other principles or that it might pursue different objectives. 
Nor was any consideration given to the effects of business hegemony on the 
democratic aspirations of working people, for the right of property owners
to determine social and political priorities was taken for granted.
Thus we see that the human relations movement had nothing to do with 
humanizing industry. Rather, it arose in response to specific management 
problems such as output restriction, absenteeism, labour turnover and the 
challenge of trade unionism. Satisfaction of the worker1s social and
psychological needs was seen as a way of reducing discontent and manipulating 
his behaviour more effectively. The development of new supervisory 
techniques was not undertaken to enable supervisors to help their 
subordinates solve the problems they confronted on the job but rather to 
give supervisors the tools’ to 'adjust* workers to those problems.
126. Daniel Bell, V/ork and Its Discontents, op. cit., p. 25
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Similarly, counselling was seen not as a method of improving the 
psychological well-being of workers, hut rather as a technique for 
manipulating their attitudes and diverting their attention from the 
repetitive jobs assigned to them.
The human relations theorists refused to acknowledge that there 
might be a conflict between the demands of shareholders and the needs 
of workers or that production and profits might be sacrificed for a 
more congenial and humane work environment. Whenever the requirements 
of business clashed with the needs of workers, the former automatically 
took precedence. Thus human relations was nothing more than a strategy 
designed to bring the human side of industry into line with the aims 
of shareholders. As such, it provided a useful supplement to scientific 
management by giving managers the sociological and psychological tools 
necessary to mould . worker attitudes and behaviour to the jobs designed 
by the engineers.
The cynical and manipulative attitude of the management of the 
Western Electrio Company is revealed clearly in an ironio antedote by 
Charles' Hampden-Turner:
The behaviour of Western Electrio over the publication 
of the book Management and the Worker is illustrative 
of the extent to which the Hawthorne findings modified 
management's attitudes. The book became a best seller, 
being translated into several languages. Western 
Electric demanded and received half the royalties on 
the grounds that it had hosted the experiment. It then 
remembered that while Dickson, the joint author, had 
been working on the book, Western Electrio had paid his 
salary, so it pocketed his share as well. (After all, 
why be generous? There's a special department for that.) 
Roethlisberger was so upset that he sent half of his 
quarter share of the royalties to Dickson. So the company 
got three-quarters and the two authors one eighth of the 
royalties each. As for the girls, who had told everyone 
the answers, they got nothing. The moral is that you can 
lead a horse to water but you can't stop it drinking 
your share, and then fouling the water hole.127
127» Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man, op. cit., p. 222
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XII
Despite its initial promise in extending managerial control, human 
relations was only partially successful in achieving this aim. This 
was not because its advocates had moral reservations about using social 
science to manipulate the attitudes and values of other human beings. 
Rather, it was because workers were less malleable than had first been 
thou^it in the euphoric days when psychology and sociology promised a 
quick end to the labour problem. Supervision and counselling, while of 
some use in certain industries, were not panaceas for management’s 
problems. Indeed, to the consternation of the human relations theorists 
unions expanded rapidly in the decade following the Hawthorne research. 
And, practices, such as output restriction, proved hi^ily resistant to 
management's attempts at manipulation.
Failure to establish managerial hegemony was not a result of the 
inability to apply the new techniques correctly - although undoubtedly 
there were deficiencies in this regard. Rather, it was a consequence 
of the faulty analysis upon which the techniques were based. The 
researchers assumed that the major source of conflict in industry was 
between the social needs cf workers and the economio requirement s of the 
formal organization. As they saw no reason why the sooial needs of 
workers could not be satisfied within a work group structure committed 
to management goals, they felt that all that was needed was to develop 
techniques which would bring work group norms and values into line with 
the aims of management. However, as Alan Fox notes, if work groups 
were formed to pursue other goals, this analysis disintegrates:
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The group would then he seen hy its members predominantly 
as a means to certain specific ends. To he sure, members 
might also derive intrinsic satisfactions from their 
mutual cooperation trust and fellowship which they would 
he sorry to lose, hut these would not he the reasons why 
the group evolved. The basis of group affiliation would 
therefore he totally different from that postulated hy 
the early Human Relations school, which envisaged members 
valuing the group not as a means to an end hut as an end
in itself.12o
Ironically, Taylor*s belief that work groups were formed to oppose
management revealed much more insist into the nature of their activities
than the allegedly sophisticated analysis of the social scientists. A
second major weakness in the analysis was the belief that opposition to
management was based upon non-logical sentiments. They dismissed the
view that there was a fundamental conflict of interest between workers
and employers as a misunderstanding hy workers of the purpose of 
129management. Because the human relations theorists thought that the 
existing pattern of authority relationships within business enterprise 
was based upon rational economic principles, they found it difficult to 
see how any thoughtful person could object to it. They assumed that the 
workers' position of subordination and dependence was both necessary 
and, given their tendency to behave according to non-rational sentiments, 
perfectly appropriate as well. Thus attempts by workers to challenge 
the content of management decisionsor the structure which gave management 
power over them were treated in the same way that a parent would deal with 
children who misbehaved.
Yet workers were not children and resented being treated as such.
In failing to acoept the rationality of worker suspicions of management,
128. Alan Pox, Man Mismanagement, op. cit., p. 75»
129. On this point, it is appropriate to recall H.H. Tawney's pointed 
critique: '"The idea that industrial peace can be secured merely by 
the exercise of tact and forebearance is based on the idea that there 
is a fundamental identity of interest between the different groups 
engaged in it, which is occasionally interrupted by regrettable 
misunderstandings. Both the one idea and the other are an illusion. 
The disputes which matter are not caused by a misunderstanding of 
identity of interests but by a better understanding of diversity of 
interest. ' 1 R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, (London, 1966)
(orig. pub. 1921) p. 40.
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the human relations theorists committed, a major error of judgement.
For their strategy made no provision for those who rejected management’s 
claim that there was an identity of interest between workers and 
employers. It was thus not surprising that the techniques of supervision 
and counselling proved largely incapable of overcoming such rationally- 
based opposition.
The belief that many of the problems managers f iaced within the factory
were the result of the anomio behaviour of employees was also questionable.
As we noted earlier, under the influence of the great depression, with its
widespread social upheavals, Mayo and his colleagues had come to believe
that social cohesion was breaking down. Yet their analysis mistook cause 
131for effect. The social unrest which they saw as a threat to business 
was a result of the economic collapse, not its source. And, what is perhaps 
more surprising, they failed to see that those who were suffering the ravages 
of the great 'depression had justifiable reasons for questioning the existing 
social and economic framework.
Finally, the human relations researchers had little insight into the 
effects of structural inequalities on attitudes and behaviour. They were 
reticent to acknowledge that the existing framework of ownership and control 
might itself be the source of the oonflict between workers and managers.
1 5 0
130. Roethlisberger and Dickson made the above analogy in a discussion of 
the attitudes of workers to authority. The major difference between 
the father-son relationship and the supervisor-worker relationship, they 
argued, was that the former had the support of "...numerous social 
institutions, such as the church and the school" whereas the latter
was supported only by the "logio of efficiency." Because the norms of 
the social life within the factory did not coincide with the goals of 
the formal organization, the supervisor's task was much harder than 
that of the parent's. See» F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, 
Management and the Worker, op. cit., p. 547»
131. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Hawthorne experiments took 
place in Chicago with its large population of immigrants. In an area 
characterized by recent influxes of workers from different parts of the 
world, it was not surprising that traditional community ties had not 
been formed. Although the researchers were aware of these facts, they 
felt that Chicago was an example of what cities in the future would be 
like, rather than an atypical case.
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It did not occur to them that workers would react to their narrow and 
circumscribed jobs, their position of subordination, their lack of 
control over their work and the numerous other constraints imposed upon 
them by that framework. Nor were they willing to accept that human beings 
had needs for self-expression, creativity and the opportunity to use their 
talents and energies in their work.
Rather, they assumed that the limited abilities and intelligence of 
most workers made it relatively simple for them to adjust to the restricted 
demands that industry made upon them. Even in the one area where the 
researchers recognized the importance of satisfying the needs of \workers - 
that of social relationships - they refused to accept the possibility that 
the formal organization might be incapable of so doing. The conflict 
between providing a satisfactory pattern of social life within the plant 
and maximizing output was ignored even though such conflict ought to have 
been obvious.
There is both irony and justice in the failure of the Human Relations 
approach to live up to expectations of its founders. For this failure was 
largely a result of their own arrogance and elitism. By consistently 
underestimating the rationality of working people they devised a theory 
of control which, as Bell noted, was more appropriate to bovine than human 
behaviour. By defining the problems in simplistic terms, they arrived at 
correspondingly simplistic answers. And by assuming that it would be a 
relatively uncomplicated matter to manipulate the attitudes and behaviour 
of workers they failed to recognize just how complex human beings were.
XIII
Although the usefulness of the specific recommendations of the 
Hawthorne researchers "has been questioned and criticized by later 
management theorists, their basic strategy has left a deep imprint upon
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subsequent management thought» The view that social science research 
can provide management with appropriate tools for controlling workers 
has been retained by proponents of job enrichment, participation and 
various other contemporary management theories. These theorists have 
learned much from the mistakes made at Hawthorne. Consequently, they 
have been able to place the techniques of supervision and counselling 
in perspective. J Rather than being viewed as the panacea for management 
problems, as suggested by Mayo and his colleagues, these techniques have 
taken their place beside Taylor's engineering strategy. Both have come 
to be part of management's tool kit for controlling the behaviour of its 
employees. And like a craftsman's tools they are valued not because they 
can perform all tasks indiscriminately, but rather that because in 
particular situations, they can provide an effective weapon for breaking 
down the defences of workers.
132. On this question, see the interesting evaluation of Mayo's contribution 
to the development of more effective methods of controlling the work 
foi'ce by William F. Whyte. "Human Relations - A Progress Report" in 
Amitai Elzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit., pp. 100-112,reprinted 
in part, from the Harvard Business Review (547 1956, pp. 125-132.
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CHAPTER IV
PARTICIPATION AND JOB ENRICHMENT: THE POST-WAR 
APPROACH TO SOCIAL CONTROL
Like a late night T.V. re-run, the issues of job satisfaction 
and democratizing the workplace are becoming increasingly 
'popular' once again. Academics, sociologists, researchers 
and corporate consultants whose only tangible contribution to 
production is to add to overhead co.sts, are all once again hard 
at work re-polishing, refining and updating their old theories 
of 'participation'. In an effort to pour old wine into new 
bottles, to shape old content into new form, to make minor 
re-adjustments in what is basically an oppressive and demeaning 
system of production, they are busy concocting, in the name of 
'job enrichment' in particular, the means by which to stimulate 
greater productivity and profits and to control the rising 
discontent with wotking conditions being expressed by more and 
more workers today. - Jack Rasmus.
I
Management thought has taken great Strides in the post-war period 
freeing itself from many of the misconceptions which impeded attempts by 
earlier theorists to control worker behaviour. Social science research 
has provided managers with a number of useful insights into the factors 
affecting employee motivation and thus has facilitated the development 
of a new range of techniques designed to harness worker needs more 
effectively to business objectives.
Whereas Taylor concentrated on 'engineering away' the employee's 
discretion and Mayo on manipulating his social relationships, contemporary 
managers now utilise a much larger number of strategies. Techniques 
involving the re-design of jobs, the calculated enlargement of employee 
discretion, group methods of production and increased worker participation 
have all been used with varying degrees of success in recent years. In
- 151 -
some cases, traditional management practices have been discarded in 
favour of ones embodying the latest developments in sociology and 
psychology on how to motivate workers. Indeed, some managers have 
shown a willingness to try out new methods of organizing production 
which would have surprised, and perhaps shocked, their conventional 
predecessors - at least until the beneficial effects on the balance 
sheet were pointed out.
Yet like Taylor and proponents of human relations, the managers who 
advocate these new techniques maintain that their innovations are not 
simply devices to promote the aims of shareholders. Rather, they 
assert that job enrichment and participation constitute major steps 
towards eliminating the conflict between the demands of the formal 
organization and the needs of workers. Post-war research in the social 
sciences, according to them, has established that the satisfaction of 
employee needs on the job is a precondition for efficient production. 
Consequently, progressive managers are now firmly committed to the goal 
of humanizing work."*-
Not unexpectedly, there has been substantial publicity in recent 
years about management’s efforts to provide work that is more satisfying 
for its employees. Job enlargement, enrichment, rotation and the like
1. See, for example: Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise 
(New York, 1968); Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man 
(London, i960); Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through the Work Itself. 
American Management Association (New York, 1969); Judson Gooding,
"It Pays to Wake Up the Blue Collar Worker" Fortune, Vol. LXXXII,
No. 3 (Sept., 1970); Richard E. Walton, "Alienation and Innovation 
in the Workplace" Harvard Business Review Vol. 50» No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 
1972); David Jenkins, Job Power, op.cit.; Rensis Likert, New Patterns 
of Management (New York, 1961); Rensis Linkert, The Human Organization: 
Its Management and Value (New York, 1967)«
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have been given widespread coverage in the media. Similarly, schemes 
to give workers greater participation in decision making have been 
heralded as major advances in managemenfcpractice. And, considerable 
interest has been shown in »democratic’ management, ’employee centred’ 
supervision and ’autonomous work groups’. The impression business 
would like to convey by such reports is that it has become conscious 
of its responsibilities to workers and is anxious to provide them with 
opportunities to satisfy their needs and aspirations on the job. 
Contemporary management, it is asserted, now recognizes the shortcomings 
of Taylorism and is intent upon redressing the damage that has been done 
to workers by failing to consider the human costs of production. For 
this reason, employers are attempting to replace the authoritarian 
approach to management, characteristic of early capitalist enterprises, 
with one which accommodates the democratic aspirations of working people. 
As a result of such efforts, co-operation is gradually replacing coercion 
as the basis of authority within modern industry. Admittedly, managers 
still have the final say in many areas of decision-making. But because 
they are now aware of their obligations to workers, they exercise their 
authority in a more responsible and humane way.
The preceding claims about the trend towards more humane and democratic 
management practices have some truth in them. Managers are more anxious 
than in the past to secure the co-operation and good-will of workers.
And, they are willing to implement job enrichment and participation 
schemes to achieve this end. But the reason for their new interest in 
satisfying the needs of workers has little to do with the desire to 
promote democracy within industry. There is scant evidence that managers 
now question the role of property as the source of industrial authority.
Nor have they been converted to a view of the purpose of industry which
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challenges the primacy of production and profits. Rather, their interest 
in participation and job enrichment arises from the new circumstances 
which confront them in the post-war period.
What are these new pressures which have precipitated management’s 
recent interest in the happiness of employees? Obviously, one factor has 
been a growing recognition of the limitations of earlier strategies of 
control. As we noted previously, one of the major reasons for the 
development of human relations was the failure to ’engineer away’ employee 
discretion.^ As a consequence, managers came to recognize the importance 
of obtaining the commitment of workers to business objectives. Yet while 
Mayo and Whitehead saw that the manipulation of employee attitudes and 
values was central to extending management control over the shop-floor, 
the specific techniques they devised were not equal to the task. True, 
supervision and counselling did have some successes, particularly in 
non-unionized firms. But they remained of marginal value for most managers. 
Consequently, the need for more sophisticated methods of fostering normative 23
2
2. As Lorin Baritz notes, discussions of management innovations xvhich 
increase employee satisfaction invariably end with the comment that 
"incidentally" output and profits are raised. See: Lorin Baritz,
The Servants of Power, op. cit. The title of a recent Fortune article 
by Judson Goodingunde.rlines this point nicely: "It Pays to Wake Up The 
Blue Collar Worker" See: Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up The Blue 
Collar Worker" o£. cit.
3. There have also been a number of influential post-war critiques of 
scientific management. See, for example, the persuasive .attack on 
time and motion study by William Foote Whyte in Money and Motivation 
(New York, 1955) and Peter Drucker’s criticism of organizing work on 
the basis of simple, repetitive tasks in The Practice of Management 
(London, 1973) (orig. pub. 1955) PP. 337-346 and passim. More recently, 
there have been attacks on the principles of scientific management by 
proponents of job enrichment, participation and similar schemes. The 
following are among the most well known: Douglas McGregor, The Human 
Side of Enterprise, op. cit., esp. the contrast between Theory X and 
Theory Y, pp. 33-57» Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New 
York, 1957) Ch. Ill, IV, V; Frederic Herzberg, The Motivation to Work, 
op. cit.; See also: Daniel Bell, Work and Its Discontents (New York»' 
1970) (orig. pub., 1956) pp. 5-21; James O’Toole, Work in America, op. 
cit., pp. 17-20.
- 154 -
integration has become increasingly apparent to managers.
The importance of obtaining employee commitment has been underlined
by a growing recognition of the ability of workers to exercise discretion,
even in the most repetitive, machine-paced jobs. No matter how carefully
management defines the activities of its workers, contingencies arise for
which company directives make no provision. Thus employees must decide
what course of action to take. If they distrust management or feel they
have been unfairly treated, they will exercise their discretion
accordingly. As John Child points out:
(R)esearch studies have indicated that employees, 
whether organized into unions or not, frequently 
have the ability to counter managerial control if 
they wish, and that they can use this power quite 
rationally to further interests at variance with 
those of management. Indeed, it is today becoming 
clear that the process of management is liable to 
• far greater frustration by various groups in the g 
enterprise than was acknowledged by earlier writing. 456
4. Critiques of Human Relations by managers are now almost as common as 
those of scientific management. Again, the most virulent are by 
advocates of participation and job enrichment. For example,
Chris Argyris (cited above) refers to the work of Mayo and Whitehead 
as the '»Human Relations Fad" (p. 139). McGregor and Herzberg, although 
not quite so disparaging, argue that Human Relations is, at best, of 
marginal value in motivating employees. See: Douglas McGregor, The 
Human Side of Management, op. cit.j Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time:
How Do You Motivate Bnployees?" Harvard Business Review. Vol. 46, No. 1 
(Jan. - Feb., 1968) pp. 53-62. Disillusionment with human relations has 
also emerged in Britain during the post-war period. For a good discussion 
of the reasons for this change see: John Child, British Management 
Thought (London, I969) Ch. 6, esp. pp. 185-192.
5. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit., pp. 320, 321}
Judson Gooding, "Blue Collar Blues on the Assembly Line" Fortune Vol. 
LXXXII, No. 1 (July, 1970) pp. 69-71» 112-117} William Foote Why.te,
Money and Motivation, op. cit., pp. II-49.
6. John Child, British Management Thought (London, 1969) pp. 204, 205, See 
also: Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, op. cit., pp. 42, 43 and pa33im;
William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation, op. cit; H.B. Wilson gives a 
fine example of how the workers' goodwill benefits management:
•My father, who wa3 for many years a locomotive engineer, maintains that 
if he had followed all the railway rules he would never have got a train 
in on time. He retired with an excellent record because he was never 
responsible for an accident and so was judged by his performance instead 
of by the rules he broke,"
H.B. Wilson, Democracy and the Workplace (Montreal, 1974) pp. 97, 98. 
Needless to say,workers who use their discretion in this way are exactly 
the type management desires.
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.dissatisfied workers can respond to management demands in a number
of other ways. They may obtain considerable pleasure in using their
otherwise dormant talents in devising ingenious methods to sabotage
production. Indeed, it is remarkable how creative workers can be when
they put their minds to this task. As the management theorist,
Peter Druclcer, points out, despite efforts to limit worker discretion
and control worker attitudes, management’s ability to detect and put an
end to such activities remains highly circumscribed:
In the most completely machine paced operation, 
the speed and quality of which appear to be 
completely determined by the machine, the worker 
still retains decisive control. It may not be 
possible to find out how he manages to beat the 
machine; but as the old Latin proverb has it, human 
nature asserts itself - even if thrown out with a 
pitchfork - or with a conveyor belt.7
A loose belt welded into the wheel-well of an automobile will
ensure a rattle for the life of the car. And, it will result in
substantial expenditures by the company in searching for the mysterious
8and untraceable noise about which the customer so bitterly complains.
Similarly, workers may deliberately perform a slipshod job to make their
employer spend money on costly repairs. Industrial sabotage is not new,
of course. But it is now taken more seriously because research has shown
qhow great its costs can be.
In high technology, capital-intensive industries a hostile or 
indifferent employee can also do considerable damage through negligence 789
7. Peter Brucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit.t p. 320.
8. This example is given by Judson Gooding in his widely read Fortune 
article on American automobile workers. See: ’’Blue Collar Blues on 
the Assembly Line” 0£. cit., p. 70* See also: William Serrin, The 
Company and the Union (hew York, 1973) pp. 233-236.
9. : See, for example, Richard E. Walton, ’’Alienation and Innovation in the
Workplace” in James O'Toole (ed.) Work and the Quality of Life, op. cit., 
pp. 228,-229; William F. Whyte, Honey and Motivation, op. cit., esp. 
pp. 14-19.
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or carelessness.^ The worker who does a slipshod job now costs his 
company far more than was the case fifty years ago because so much 
additional investment is involved. A simple mistake in a continuous 
process plant may result in tens of thousands of pounds worth of damage 
to equipment or products. Moreover, because production is now highly 
integrated, effective co-ordination of the activities of workers is 
increasingly important. Consequently, the need to have a conscientious 
work force is more pressing than in the past as W.J. McCarthy and
N.D. Ellis point out:
It is not only that more capital intensive systems 
of production tend to increase the strategic power 
of workers if the conflict between them and management 
is pushed to a point where industrial action occurs.
More important still, we think, are the developments 
that combine to make modem business an increasingly 
co-operative and inter-dependent activity, where 
efficiency and flexibility in the face of the growing 
demands of the external environment depend on the 
maintenance of effective group inter-action through 
the performance of a series of related task3. Most 
students of management studies now agree that the most 
appropriate management style in circumstances of this 
kind is participative, even democratic.^
Dissatisfied workers may also disrupt production simply by failing 
to show up for work. The theoretical efficiency of the assembly line 
provides little consolation to the manager who finds that his employees 
do not appear in sufficient numbers to run it. As James Roche, former 
Chairman of General Motors» commented in a moment of frustration: "Tools 10
10. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit., pp. 344» 345?
See also: W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right to Manage? op. , 
cit., pp. 3-9, 55-66; W.E.J. McCarthy and N.D. Ellis, Management by 
Agreement (London, 1973), PP* 95» 96; Alan Fox, Man Management, op. 
cit., pp. 42-45» Emma Rothschild, "G.M. in Trouble: I The Vega"
New York Review of Books, Vol. XVIIINo. 4 (Feb. 25» 1971) pp. 14-19? 
Emma Rothschild, "G.M. in More Trouble" Vol. XIX No. 6 (March, 23»
1972) pp. 18-25? William Serrin, The Company and the Union, op. cit., 
pp. 227-235*
11. W.E.J. McCarthy and N.D. Ellis, Management by Agreement (London, 1973)» 
p. 95* See also: Richard Hyman,"strikes (London. 1972).
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and technology mean nothing if the worker is absent from his job."
Of course, the problem of absenteeism is not new. But since i960 
there has been a marked increase in such behaviour among hourly paid 
workers in some industries. For example, absenteeism at General Motors 
in the II.S. rose from 2°/a to Ofo from i960 to 1970. By I96Q the rate
■ j j
of absenteeism at Ford was twice what it had been in i960. A 1968
survey by the Department of Employment and Productivity in the U.K.
discovered that on average, 15 per cent of employed men failed to obtain
15full wages each week because of absenteeism. In Sweden, industry has
experienced similar troubles. Before the introduction of the new work
group systems at Volvo and Saab-Scania, absenteeism was running as
high as 2j/o at the latter and Vjf/a at the former."^ In 1968 the situation
became so serious for Saab-Scania that it simply could not recruit workers
17for a new assembly-line at Sodertalje. In Italy, according to a recent 
feature article in the Sunday Times, "On a normal day at Fiat some 12,000 
men fail to turn up for work - more than one in every eight - and on bad 1234*67
12. James Roche, as cited by» Judson Gooding, "Blue Collar Blues on the 
Assembly Line" ojo. cit., p. 70«
13. "G.M. - The Price of Being Responsible" Fortune, Vol. LXXXV, No. 1.
(Jan. 1972) as cited by» Ken Weller "The Lordstown Struggle" (London, 
Solidarity P.-mphlet No. 45) P« 2. See also» Emma Rothschild, "G.M. 
in More Trouble" o£. cit., p. 21.
14. Judson Gooding, "Blue Collar Blues on the Assembly Line," op. cit.,
pp. 69, 70} See also» Ken Weller, "The Lordstown Struggle" op, cit., p. 2.
15» Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The New Unionism (London, 1972) p. 35» also 
pp. 33-36. Included under absenteeism were» sickness, arriving late or 
leaving early, injuries and unexplained absences.
16. B.B.C. II ‘Money at Work1 Feb. 9» 1973 oq'cited by Ken Weller in "The 
Lordstown Struggle" 0£. cit., p. 2. See also» Joseph Mire, "European 
Workers' Participation in Industry", Monthly Labour Review, U.S. Dept, 
of Labour (Feb. 1973) PP» 9-15* Mire notes that absenteeism was running 
at 10 to 11 per cent in the engineering end metal industries in Sweden 
in the ^ate i960's and early 1970's.
17. James Ensor, "Can ,You Transplant the Swedish Experiment?" Financial Times 
Jan. 28, 1975* P* 15* See also» Lars G. Bjork "An Experiment in Work
■ Satisfaction" Scientific American. Vol. 232, No. 3 (March, 1975) PP« 17-23 
David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., pp. 270, 271} Harford Thomas,
"Factory Life Saab Style" Guardian, Jan. 17» 1974a ,P* 17j ."Sweden Still 
Has Its Industrial Problems" uuarcTian, Dec. 2, 1974* P» 14»
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days when there are football matches» this figure rises to 30»000*"
But even if absenteeism were not rising, the problem would still
be of greater concern to contemporary managers because production is
now more integrated. A hold-up in one section of a plant can result in
large numbers of other workers being made idle. Because the costs of
absenteeism have risen, the need for a more committed work force has
become more pressing in many industries.
The costs of labour turnover have also played a role in persuading
managers that a high level of employee commitment is desirable. The low
unemployment of the post-war period - at least until recently - has made
19it easier for workers to leave unsatisfying jobs. Their ability and
willingness to do so has had a double effect. First, it has reduced
the effectiveness of management's traditional methods of control. Now
the worker who is threatened with disciplinary aotion can simply quit.
Second, it has raised the costs of personnel administration. "Employees
who don't remain longer than six months", according to Robert N. Ford of
A.T. and T., "are clearly expensive since they are not with the business
20
long enough to return the costs of employment and training." Such costs 18920
18. Peter Wilsher, "Fiat* Where They Hope £50 Million Will Buy Happy 
Workers" Sunday Times, July 8, 1975* P* 63. See also* Francesco Novara, 
"Job Enrichment in the Olivetti Company" International Labour Review 
Vol. 108, No. 4 (Oct., 1973) pp. 283-294.
19. On this point see: Judson Gooding: "Blue Collar Blues on the Assembly 
Line" ££. cit. Gooding notes that some U.S. auto manufacturers have 
experienced turnover rates as high as 25fo per year. Ibid., p. 70}
See also: Edmund Faltermayer, "Who Will Do The Dirty Work Tomorrow?" 
Fortune. Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2 (Feb. 1974) pp. 128-136} J.K. Galbraith,
The New Industrial State, op. cit., pp, 136-145*
20. Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through the Work Itself, op. cit.. p. 13.
Ford notes that high labour turnover was the key factor persuading 
A.T. and T. to set up a job enrichment programme. See also the 
extensive review of experiments on job enrichment and participation in: 
David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit.. In most instances cited by Jenkins, 
high labour turnover played a major role in influencing managers to try 
out these iddas. According to a Swedish report similar pressures have 
forced Swedish companies to embark upon the same kinds of schemes.
Bjork cites one example of a company which lost over £2000 every time 
an employee had to be replaced. See Lars E. Bjork, "An Experiment in 
Work Satisfaction." ojd. cit.. pp. 17, 18.
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may become so great that they outweigh the benefits gained from
conventional methods of organizing work.
Changes in social values are also forcing managers to seek new 
21techniques of control. People are less willing to accept the
directives of traditional authorities without question. Instead, they
want to know why they are expected or required to do this or that.
Deference has been supplanted by the demand to be treated as equals.
Moreover, the aspirations of working people have risen dramatically.
Increasingly, they feel they have a right to a say in the decisions which
affect their lives. And, they are no longer willing to put up with
many constraints which their parents accepted without question.
The rise in the level of education among working people .has also
been a factor contributing to changing attitudes towards work. "As
people acquire more education", according to the management theorist.,
Rensis Likert, "their expectations rise as to the amount of responsibility,
22authority and income they will receive." Moreover, recent trends 
towards a more participatory approach in education are thought to be 
be^having an important effect on the outlook of younger workers. In "the 21*
21. This idea is particularly fashionable among management theorists 
advocating job enlargement, enrichment, participation and similar 
schemes. See, for example* Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization, 
op. cit., Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Management, on, cit., 
pp. 22-32; Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit., 
pp. 1-4 and passim; Peter Drucker, "The Romantic Generation" in 
The New Markets (London, 1971) (essay orig. pub. 1966)}
William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation, op. cit.; James O'Toole 
Work in America, op. cit.} Richard U. Walton, "Alienation and Innovation 
in the Workplace" in James O'Toole (ed.) Work and the Quality of Life, 
op. cit.t pp. 229» 230; Judson Gooding "Blue Collar Blues on the 
Assembly Line" op. cit. Of course, this argument has not been confined 
to the ranks of business theorists. Critics of business have argued 
that changing social values will eventually force a major shift in 
industrial authority. See, for example: David Jenkins, Job Power, 
op. cit.; Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, op. cit.; And, Jack Rasmus,
Job Control:' Not Job Enrichment, op. cit.
?2. Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit. p. 2. This argument 
is most’widely accepted in the U.S. where the number of years of schooling 
has risen substantially since the Second World War. See, James O'Toole, 
Work in America, op. cit., pp. 134-152; Paul 0. Gladdis, "Winning Over 
Indifferent louth'TTü'irvard Business Review, Vol. 47* No. 4 (July-Aug.
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light of such changes, progressive managers now believe that the
traditional pattern of authority within the factory will have to be
23modified if their co-operation is to be secured.
These shifts in social values have been reinfurced by economic
changes which have given working people the ability to resist
management demands more effectively. The post-war period has witnessed
a notable rise in the standard of living. Security of employment has
increased as a result of trade union activity and the full employment
24policies followed by government in the West. The greater provision of 
social services and unemployment benefits has also tended to reduce the 
fear of redundancy.
Under these new conditions, the employee^ who dislikes his job or
his employer has a wider range of options open to him. Economic security
gives him the confidence to make additional demands upon his employer and
to take action to support these demands. If he is still unsatisfied he
is frequently able to change jobs without incurring hardships. These
economic changes make it less fruitful for management to deal with
25challenges to its authority by applying sanctions. As Peter B>rubker *25
23» Rensis Likert, ITew Patterns of Management. op. cit., p. 2;
David V/. Ewing., "Who Wants Corporate Democracy?" Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 49» No. 5 (Sept. - Oct., 1971) PP* 12-25," 146-149»
24.On this issue, see the discussion by Alan Fox in: Man Mismanagement, 
op. cit., pp. ¿O-45. Of course, the new economic security of working 
people has been noted by many other researchers. And, in some cases, 
it has been inflated out of all proportion. Liberal management 
theorists, in particular, are prone to describing the change in tem3 
which suggest that economic necessity is no longer a major source of 
motivation. See, for example: Douglas McGregor, Tho Human Side of 
Enterprise (ITew York, I960); Poter Drucker, Tho Practice of Management, 
op. cit.; Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Bloch BnyHerman, 
The Motivation to Work (llew York, 1959)» W.E.J. McCarthy and N.D. Ellis, 
Management by Agreement, op. cit.; W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The 
Right to Manage? (London, 19727*"
25. J.K. Galbraith, Tho ITew Industrial State, op. cit., pp. 136-145»
Vi.Vi. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right to Manage? op. cit., p. 52*,
Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, op. cit., Ch. 2. This problem is particularly 
important in countries such as Sweden which ha3 only 2/o unemployment.
See: David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., pp. 246-231; Lars ' . Bjork, "An 
Experiment in Work Satisfaction" op. cit.; Roger Harrison, "Understanding 
Your Organisation’s Character" Harvard Business Review, Vol. $0 , ITo. 3* 
(May-June, 1972) p. 119*
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notes, in a comment echoed by many other management theorists:
(p)ear, the traditional motivation of the 
industrial worker, has largely disappeared in 
the modern West. To eliminate it has been the 
main result of the increased wealth produced by 
industrialization. In a society rich enough to 
provide subsistence even to the unemployed, fear 
has lost its motivating power. And to deprive 
management of the weapon of fear has also been 
the main aim of trade unionism; indeed, the 
worker’s rebellion against this weapon and its 
use is among the main driving forces behind the
union movement. 26
Although Drucker over-states his case - large numbers of unorganized
workers still have good reason to be afraid of their employer - he does
underline the fact that the ’stick’ has become less effective. Indeed,
there is a notable consensus among contemporary management theorists
that the use of force is to be avoided. According to Rensas Likert,
•The highest producing managers feel, generally, that this manner of
functioning does not produce the best results, that the resentment created
27by direct exercise of authority tends to limit its effectiveness.”
Similarly, Douglas McGregor argues that "(e)xolusive reliance upon
authority encourages counter-measures, minimal performance, even open 
28rebellion.” And Chris Argyris notes that "directive”, "autocratic”
or "pressure oriented” leadership heightens the individual’s sense of
dependency, frustration and impotence. And, not unimportantly, it leads
29to poorer performance. Thus coercion has important limitations which 26*8
26. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit., p. 319« See also: 
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 21-26; 
Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Bnployees?” 
op. cit.. pp. 53-56.
27» Rensis Likert, Hew Patterns of Management, op. cit,., p. 100.
28. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., p. 26.
. Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization, op. cit., p. 216. -29
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managers now feel they must take into account when dealing with employees.
Another factor which has given rise to management*s interest in new
methods for controlling the labour foxirce is a belief that worker
discontent is rising.^ Although there is a good deal of controversy
about how much dissatisfaction with work has increased, there is no doubt
that in some industries the rise has been dramatic as evidenced by
increasing numbers of strikes, higher labour turnover, more absenteeism
31and poorer quality work. This discontent may be a result of a
deterioration in the terms of conditions of employment in certain industries
32as Jack Rasmus argues. Or it may be a consequence of expectations rising 
faster than improvements in working conditions and pay, as Paul Blumberg 
suggests.^ But in either case the fact is that growing numbers of workers 
are demanding more from their jobs.
■ Not surprisingly, the question of employee dissatisfaction has 3012*
30. Not surprisingly, this issue has split liberal management theorists 
from their conservative counterparts. The former wish to emphasize 
the rise in discontent to show the need for their new theories. The 
latter prefer to believe that the recent concern over disoontent is 
simply a fad and that there is nothing basically wrong with the 
present system. See, for example: George Strauss, »'Workers: Attitudes 
and Adjustments" in Jerome A. Rostow (ed.), The Worker and the Job 
(EnglewoQd Cliffs, N.J., 1974) PP» 74-82, 96; George Strauss "Is There 
a Blue Collar Revolt Against Work?" in James O’Toole (ed.) Work and 
the Quality of Life esp. pp. 42, 43; Iver Berg, "The End of the 
Protestant Work Ethic and All That" in James O'Toole (ed.) Work and 
the Quality of Life, op. oit., pp, 32-38.
31. On this point see: Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through the Work Itself, 
op. cit.; Wickham Skinner, "The Anachronistic Factory" Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 49» No. 1 (Jan. - Feh. 1971) PP» 61-70. For a dissenting 
view, see: Peter Henle, "Economic Effects" in Jerome M. Rostow (ed.)
The Worker and the Job, bp. cit., esp.p»23»
32. Jack Rasmus, "Workers* Control and the Nixon Economic Programme" in: 
Gerry Hunnius, G. David Garson and John Case, Workers* Control, (New 
York, 1973); Jack Rasmus, "Job Control: Not Job Enrichment" op. oit.,
A recent Fortune article on health and safety at work in the U.S. 
revealed startling figures about the increases in industrial accidents, 
fatalities and occupational diseases during the period from i960 to 
1970. See: Dan Corditz, "Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job For 
Management" Fortune, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 5 (Nov., 1972) p. 112.
33» Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation 
(London, 1968) introduction. See, as well, the U.S. Task Force on 
Work which accepted the above argument: James O'Toole fed.), Work in 
America, op. cit.
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received, considerable attention in management journals during the past
ten years.^ For example, a widely discussed Fortune article by
Judson Gooding entitled '’Blue Collar Blues on the Assembly Line” raised
the spectre of an increasingly hostile and disruptive work force: "What
the managers...hear is a rumbling of deep discontent and, particularly
from younger production workers, hostility to and suspicion of
management...” And he went on to note that "Talks with dozens of workers
35produced few words of praise for management."
Richard E. Walton, writing in the Harvard Business Review, articulated
the apprehensions of many other managers when he asserted that "The
current alienation is not merely a phase which will pass in due time."J
With rising aspirations and greater economic security, discontent with
work, he went on to argue, was becoming the central management problem
of the future. For this reason, writers such as Gooding, Waiting, McGregor,
Herzberg, Likert, Drucker, and Argyris contend that top executives must
begin to devise effective counter-measures, before the problem becomes 
37uncontrollable. 34*67
34. See, for example: Edmund Faltermayer, "Who YJill Do The Dirty Work Tomorrow?" 
Fortune, Feb. 1974» Douglas S. Sherwin, "Strategy for Winning Ehployee 
Commitment" Harvard Business Review, (May-June, 1972); William J. Roche 
and Neil L. MacKinnon, "Winning People with Meaningful Work" Harvard 
Business Review, (May-June, 1970)» Alfred Vogel, "Your Clerioal Workers 
Are Ripe for Unionism" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 49» 'No. 2 (March- 
April, 1971); David Sirota, "Productivity Management" Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 5t (Sept.-Oct., I966).
35« Judson Gooding, "Blue Collar Blues on the Assembly Line" ojd. cit., p, 116«
36. Richard E. Walton "How to Counter Alienation in the Plant" Harvard 
Business Review, Vol, 50, No. 6. (Nov.-Dec., 1972) Reprinted in 
James O'Toole (ed.) Work and the Quality of Life (Cambridge, Mass.,
1974) P. 227.
37. Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up the Blue Collar Worker" Fortune, 
op. cit.; Richard E. Walton, "How to Counter Alienation in the Plant, 
op. cit.; Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit.;
Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit.; Peter Drucker,
The Practice of Management, op. cit.; Chris Argyris, Personality and 
Organization, op. cit.; Edmund .Faltermayer, "Who Will Do The Dirty Work 
Tomorrow?" o£. cit.; William Skinner, "The Anachronistic Faotory, op. 
cit., pp. 61-70. See also The U.S. Task Force on Work. James O ’Toole
(ed.) Work in America, op. cit.
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Managements concern over worker discontent is heightened by the 
fear that this unrest may be channelled into trade union activities.
Those who preside over non-unionized firms are worried that discontent
70
will open the door to union organisers. Others are apprehensive
39about their white-collar personnel. A recent survey among middle 
managers in the U.S. revealed that over one-third would now be willing 
to join a trade union.^ Although such findings may not appear startling 
in Great Britain where a substantial number of white collar workers are 
organized, in the U.S. they are viewed with apprehension by the executives 
who see unionization as a sign of management failure. In unionized 
industries managers are also worried. They fear that discontent may 
result in further trade union encroachments on the exercise of their 
prerogatives.^ Hence evidence that workers are becoming more frustrated 
with their jobs is cause for alarm.
Contemporary managers are also worried about the rising costs of 
industrial disputes. As we noted earlier, because industry is now more 
integrated, interruptions in production are becoming disproportionately 
costly for firms. This is particularly significant, according to 
Richard Hyman, because strikes impede the ability of companies to engage 38*401
38. See, for example: Debora De Witt Malley, "How the Union Beat Willie 
Farah," Fortune, August, 1974»
39« Alfred Yogel, "Your Clerical Workers are Ripe for Unionism" Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 49» No. 1 (March-April, 1971) pp. 48-54*
For more critical assessments see: Lorin Baritz, The Servants of 
Power, oo. cit., George Sayers Bain, The Growth of White Collar 
Trade Unionism (Oxford, 1970)} Clive Jenkins and J.E. Mortimer,
The Kind of Laws the Unions Ought to Want (London, 1968).
40. James O'Toole, Work in America, op. cit.,p. 40.
41. "How to Tell When the Union Will be Tough" Fortune, Yol. XCII, No. 1 
(July, 1975)* See, as veil, the excellent critique by Lorin Baritz 
in The Servants of Power, op. cit. esp. the final chapter} ajad 
William Serrin, The Company and the Union, op. cit.
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in long range planning:
While strikes have always represented a problem 
for those in control of industrial enterprises, 
the seriousness of this problem is increasing.
But the recent rise in the number and duration of 
stoppages is only marginally responsible for this.
Far more important are contemporary trends in the 
very nature of industrial organization and production.
The development of large scale multi-national 
companies; the integration of diverse productive 
activities; the decreasing life-span of capital 
equipment which is itself escalating in complexity 
and cost: all these create a need for long term 
centralized planning within modern corporations.
And effective planning requires company control over 
all factors which might otherwise interfere with
manufacturing and marketing programmes.42
A co-operative work-force is thus an important asset for the modem 
corporation, particularly in industries where high capital investments 
and rapid technological change make any disruption in production 
exceedingly costly.
However, it is not only changes within the labour force that are 
pushing managers towards the adoption of new strategies. Competitive 
pressures are also forcing them to re-assess their labour policies. 
Throughout the w'orld companies are engaged in international competition 
of unprecedented dimensions. Markets in the TJ.K. and U.S. which seemed 
secure ten years ago are now besieged by Japanese, German and East 
European goods. With rising commodity, high inflation and numerous 
other economic difficulties, companies are hard pressed to meet their 
traditional profit margins. This means that the costs of production, 
and particularly the costs of labour, must bo reduced Indeed, labour 
costs are frequently one of the few areas where significant economies 
can be realised. As Jerome Rostow, an E.X.X.O.N. executive and economic 42*
42. Richard Hyman, Strikes (London, 1972) p. 161.
45« On this issue see: Richard E. Walton "Alienation and Innovation in the 
Workplace" 0£. cit., p. 228; Jack Rasmus, "Workers Control and the 
Nixon Economic Programme" o£. cit., esp. pp. 401-403; Gilbert Burck,
"The Hazards of Corporate Responsibility" Fortune. Vol. LXXXVTII, Ho. 6. 
(June, 1973) P* 115} John B. Rhodes, "'The American Challenge' 
Challenged" Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct. Vol. 47. No. 5 
(Sept.-Oct., 196y) pp. 45-57»
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advisor to several U.S. presidents, recently commented:
The energy crisis has created a new urgency 
for change at the work place. Today the human 
side of the enterprise looms as a critical factor 
in the accommodation of industry to a period of 
scarcity, ohartages of energy, of materials, and 
of equipment are evident...
At this time of rising unit labour costs, general 
inflationary pressures and the need to remain 
competitive, companies must turn to their workers 
to achieve the adjustment effectively.44
Yet the factors which have given rise to management’s search for
new techniques to control the workforce have not been exclusively
negative. Under the influence of contemporary social science, managers
have come to feel that there is a vast reservoir of untapped resources
45within the labour force. By treating workers simply as hands, business 
has failed to utilize their intelligence, skills and initiative to the 
full. However, under the right conditions, managers believe that the 
latent human resources of business enterprises can be transformed into 
valuable productive assets. It is thought that the worker who is committed 
to company objectives will volunteer suggestions about how to improve 
production methods. He will devise innovations to reduce labour costs 
and will see that impediments to production are dealt with rapidly and 
effectively.^ The conscientious worker will also produce higher quality 
work and there will be more of it. These potential benefits have been *46
44» Jerome M. Rostow, The Worker and the Job, op. oit., p. ix.
45» Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management, op. cit., pp. 318,319»
See also: Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake up the Blue Collar Worker" 
op. cit., pp. 133, 135, 158, 162, 167, 168.
46. Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up The Blue Collar Worker" o£. oit., 
p. 162. Gooding provides a number of examples of innovations made 
by workers which saved their employers large sums of money. See 
also: George P. Shultz, "Worker Participation on Production Problems" 
in: Frederick G. Lesieur, The Scanlon Plan (New York, 1958) pp. 50-60; 
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit.
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outlined concisely by the United States Government’s recent task 
force on work;
The evidence suggests that meeting the higher needs 
of workers can, perhaps, increase productivity from 
jfo to 40$» the latter figure including the "latent” 
productivity of workers that is currently unused.
Indeed, the potential gains in productivity are so 
impressive, it is very likely that the redesign of 
jobs must be accompanied by an equivalent effort to 
create jobs...47
Thus we see that management’s recent interest in job enrichment, 
participation and similar plans has not been the result of a sudden 
conversion to the principles of industrial democracy. Nor has it 
derived from the recognition of the deleterious effects of Taylorism 
on the lives of workers - although there is no reason to doubt the 
’humanitarian’ motives of some managers. Rather, it stems from new 
economic and social forces which are making the traditional methods of 
social control less effective. The rising discontent of workers, when 
combined with their increasing ability - and willingness - to challenge 
management priorities,is becoming a serious.impediment to production and 
profits. Under these new conditions managers must find ways of evoking 
the commitment of workers to the goals of business. They must learn to 
use their power more judiciously to avoid alienating the very people 
upon whom their plans for lower costs and higher profits are to depend# 
And, most importantly, they must find new management techniques which 
will enable them to manipulate employee attitudes and values so that 
elusive goal - normative integration - can finally be achieved.
II
Because control over men’s minds is now central to effective 
management, businessmen have turned increasingly to social scientists *
47» James O’Toole (ed.) Work in America, op. cit., p. 27«
-  1 6 8  -
to provide them with the appropriate tools of manipulation. On their
part, social scientists have shown little hesitation in putting their
knowledge to use in the service of management. Some, undoubtedly, have
felt that they were merely attempting to provide ’solutions’ to the
problems of industry - solutions of benefit to managers and workers alike.
But-naivetl . has been only one factor. Most, as Lorin Baritz notes, have
simply assumed a managerial view of industry.
Clearly...industrial social scientists have not been 
forced to accept the assumptions, biases and frames 
of reference of America's industrial elite. These 
specialists...freely shared the assumptions of this 
elite. Most managers have had no trouble in getting 
social scientists to grant managerial premises because 
such premises have also been assumed by the social 
scientists.48
This integration of psychology and sociology with contemporary 
management theory has proceeded to the point where the major academic 
work of many social scientists is now exclusively in the field of 
management theory. Argyris, Likert, McGregor, Herzberg and many others 
have become known as psychologists and sociologists through their 
contributions to management thought. Their close association with business 
has not been viewed as a threat to their scientific integrity. In fact, 
the opposite has occurred: their industrial research has been incorporated 
into the mainstream of post-war social science.
Recent findings of psychologists and sociologists have certainly 
been encouraging to managers, for they have discovered that under certain 
conditions a reduction in the use of directive controls can evoke a greater j 
degree of worker commitment. If management offers the employee an 
opportunity to participate in decision-making and delegates more responsibility 
he will respordby using his increased discretion to pursue management 
objectives. Of course, there is a good deal of controversy among social 48
48. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., pp. 204, 205.
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scientists about the most appropriate techniques for achieving this 
objective. Nevertheless, there is an underlying consensus that giving 
workers more control over their immediate tasks will precipitate more 
positive attitudes towards work.
One of the most influential of the recent generation of management- 
oriented social scientists has been Rensis Likert. As director of the 
prestigious Michigan Institute for Social Research, he has been involved 
in a number of projects designed to uncover the social and psychological 
factors affecting productivity. One of the most well-known of his 
projects has been a study of the effects of leadership styles on work 
groups. Likert compared supervisory techniques in different companies to
49see if successful supervisors behaved differently from unsuccessful ones.
He found that those who delegated responsibility to subordinates* eschewed
close supervision and behaved in a supportive rather than directive manner,
fostered higher output, lower labour turnover, less absenteeism, greater
worker satisfiction and better morale.
The data show the great importance of the quality 
of leadership. For every criterion, such as 
productivity, absence, attitudes and promotability...the 
• • same basic patterns of supervision yielded the best
results. Supervision and the general style of leadership 
throughout the organization are usually much more 
important in influencing results than such general factors 
as attitudes towards the company and interest in the job
itself.50
To motivate employees, Likert concluded, managers must be prepared
to discard the traditional, authoritarian approach to management and adopt
a supervisory style which provides subordinates with opportunities for
51self-expression and autonomy. *501
49* Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit., pp. 17-19»
50. Ibid., p. 25. See also! Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New 
York, 1967)»
51. Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit., esp. Ch. 6.
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Following the earlier human relations theorists, Likert also
investigated the effects of work group membership on output. He
found that cohesive work groups were more productive than loosely-
knit ones.*^ This was true even when the individuals in loosely
53knit groups were strongly committed to management goals. Likert put
forward a number of reasons for this finding. In cohesive groups
there was more co-operation and mutual aid. Social solidarity tended
to reduce personal stress because individuals could turn to the group
for support. As a consequence absenteeism and sickness were also
reduced. And, finally, because cohesive work groups were frequently the
result of the leadership abilities of the more gifted supervisors, they
54tended to identify with management objectives.
From these findings, Likert concluded that supervision which
fostered strong work groups would lead, in most instances,to a substantial
increase in productivity.
Research in organizations is yielding increasing 
evidence that the supervisor's skill in supervising 
his subordinates as a group is an important variable 
affecting his success: the greater his skill in 
using group methods of supervision, the greater are 
the productivity and job satisfactions of his 
subordinates.55
An important aspect of Likert's approach is the discussion group. 
Supervisors should encourage employees to talk about the problems they 
face at work and to help one another in searching for solutions.
Management should emphasize co-operation rather than competition. It 
can do this, Likert argues, by reorganizing work to facilitate social 5234
52. Ibid., Ch. 3, 4 and 8.
53. Likert acknowledged that a cohesive work group opposed to management 
aims could be exceedingly effective in sabotaging management goals. 
However, his findings indicated that cohesive work groups tended to 
be committed to company objectives.
54. Ibid., Ch. 3» 4 and 8.
55. Ibid., p. 26.
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interaction and by delegating responsibility to groups for particular 
tasks.^ These techniques will enable management to foster greater 
worker participation, involvement and, ultimately, identification with 
business objectives.
Likert has also been engaged in an ambitious project to evaluate
the human assets of business organizations. Managers have long realized
that it is possible to make short-run gains in output by '•pushing"
subordinates excessively. Yet in the long run such practices destroy the
goodwill of employees, raise labour turnover and undermine performance.
Because most firms now rotate managers every two or three years, it is
possible for a manager who 'drives' his workers unrelentingly to raise
productivity, create a good name for himself and be transferred before
the effects of his bad labour policies become apparent. As a consequence,
Likert has been concerned to find ways of placing a cash value on employee
goodwill and work group morale so that management can assess the costs
57of different methods of managing the labour force more accurately.
While Likert and his research team at the Michigan Institute for
Social Research have been concerned with improving supervision, learning
to use group techniques and devising a system of Xhuman asset accounting*,
other social scientists have followed different lines of research. The
psychologist, Chris Argyris, has focused attention on the relationship
between the needs of workers and the demands of business. Drawing on
psychological theory, Argyris postulates that the healthy human being has
58a natural tendency towards self-actualization. However, business 
enterprises are founded upon the principles of hierarchy, division of 
labour, task specialization and bureaucratic rationality. This means 56*8
56. Ibid., pp. 38-43 and. passim.
57» Ibid., Ch. 13. See also* Rensis Likert, The Human Organization, op. cit. 
Ch. 9.
58. Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New York, 1958) pp. 50, 51.
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that the jobs assigned to most workers severely limit their ability to
express themselves in their work. In the word3 of Argyris, business
organizations "...make demands of relatively healthy individuals that
59are incongruent with their needs."
Workers respond to these demands in a number of ways, according 
to Argyris. They may strive to be promoted or transferred. Or they may 
simply quit. They may 'adjust' by regressing or by adopting a passive 
orientation to work. Or, they may choose to pursue their personal needs 
at the expense of organizational goals. Psychologically healthy
individuals, Argyris warnsmanagers, are most likely to follow this last
, ,. 60course of action.
Once the employee's reaction becomes visible to management, it
adopts counter-measures. Supervision is tightened. The work role is
more narrowly defined.^ Hence the employee's personality is put under
greater strain. The application of sanctions to force compliance leads
to a further deterioration in the relationship between management and
the worker. "As a result of the pressure, tension and general mistrust
of management controls", Argyris notes, "employees tend to unite against
62management."
The solution to the problem, Argyris cautions managers, is not to 
tighten management controls. Rather, it is to modify the organizational 
demands made upon the worker. "The employee must be provided with more 
'power' over his own work environment."^ This means that "...he must *60123
59* Ibid., p. 74» See alsoi Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual 
and the Organization (New York, 1969)} Chris Argyris, "The 
Organization» What makes it Healthy?"Harvard Business Review, (Nov.- 
Deo., 1953)» pp. 107-116.
60. Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization, op. cit., pp. 78» 79 and 
passim.
61. Ibid., pp. 130, 131.
62. Ibid., p. 137.
63. Ibid., p.181.
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be given responsibility, authority, and increased control over the
64decision-making that affects his immediate work..." One way of 
fostering this change is to introduce job enrichment. But Argyris 
admonishes managers to make sure that the ’enriched' jobs give workers 
a chance to satisfy their need for self-actualization. If workers are 
only given a greater number of simplified tasks, no improvement will 
result. Another way is to replace authoritarian leadership practice's
65with ones that are "integrative", "employee centred" or "democratic."
Argyris recognizes that less directive leadership does not always lead
to higher output because workers sometimes choose to exercise their
increased discretion to pursue other aims. But he emphasizes that
these new methods have had a high rate of success. And he points out
that the growing dissatisfaction of workers under conventional management
66practices necessitates a new approach to man management.
Another well-known management theorist, Frederick Herzberg, also 
looks to social science for the answer to management's labour problems. 
Herzberg has been particularly concerned with the relationship between 
job satisfaction and productivity. A survey of over two thousand 
articles and books on this issue led him to the following conclusions. 
First, the factors which lead to high levels of job satisfaction are 
associated with the actual task workers perform. Second, the factors 
which give rise to dissatisfaction are not associated with the task 
performed, but rather with the economic and social conditions surrounding 
it. And, finally, the factors which influence job satisfaction are not *65
64* Ibid., p. 181.
65. Ibid., pp. 182-191*
66. Ibid., pp. 192-208.
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related to those which affect dissatisfaction. "The opposite of job
satisfaction", he concluded, "was no job satisfaction." And, "the
68opposite of job dissatisfaction was no job dissatisfaction."
When our respondents reported feeling happy with 
their jobs, they most frequently described factors 
related to their tasks, to events that indicated to 
them that they were successful in the performance of 
their work, and to the possibility of professional 
growth. Conversely, when feelings of unhappiness 
were reported, they were not associated with the job 
itself but with the conditions that surrounded the 
doing of the job. These events suggest to the 
individual that the context in which he performs his 
work is unfair or disorganized and as such represents 
to him an unhealthy psychological work environment. 9
What makes Herzberg's research valuable for contemporary managers
is the fact that job satisfaction has been found to be connected with
high productivity. Conversely, dissatisfaction has been found to be
70related - although to a lesser extent - with low productivity. Herzberg
has also found that high levels of job satisfaction are associated with 67890
67
67. Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner et al. Job Attitudes: Review of 
Research and Opinion (Pittsburg, 1957); Frederick Herzberg,
Bernard Mausner and Barbara Sny.derman, The Motivation to Work (New 
York, 1959) PP» 110-115; Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time» How Do 
You Motivate Employees?" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 46, No. 1,
(Jan. - Feb., 1968) pp. 55-62; William J. Paul Jr., Keith B. Robertson 
and Frederick Herzberg, "Job Enrichment Pays Off" Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 47» No. 2 (March-April 1969) pp. 61-78; Frederick Herzberg, 
"New Approaches in Management'Organization and Job Design" ini
Maneck S. Wadia (ed.) Management and the Behavioural Sciences 
(Boston, 1968).
68. Frederick Herzberg, The Motivation to Work. op. cit., p. 76.
69. Frederick Herzberg et al., The Motivation to Work, op. cit., p. 115, See 
also the earlier study: Frederick Herzberg et. al., Job Attitudes:
Review of Research and Opinions. Herzberg and his associates came to 
their conclusion about the difference between motivating factors and 
hygiene factors in the earlier study. Butanother review of the same 
period by Grayfield and Crockett concluded that there was no 
relationship. Hence Herzberg set up his own experiments to verify
his findings. These, he claims, provided strong support for his 
position. See: A.H. Grayfield and W'.H. Crockett, "Employee Attitudes 
and Employee Performance" Psychological Bulletin (52) No. 5» 1955• 
pp. 596-424.
70. Frederick Herzberg et al., The Motivation to Work, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
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less absenteeism, labour turnover and industrial conflict. Moreover, 
employees who are satisfied with their jobs tend to be more favourably
71disposed towards their employer.
How, then, can management increase job satisfaction and output?
Herzberg's analysis of the factors leading to job satisfaction and
dissatisfaction provides the clue. To raise satisfaction the tasks
themselves must be made more interesting; they must be "enriched".
Man tends to actualize himself in every area of life, 
and his job is one of the most important areas. The 
conditions that surround the doing of the job cannot 
give him that basic satisfaction; they do not have the 
potentiality. It is only from the performance of a 
task that the individual can get rewards that will 
reinforce his aspirations.72
Job enrichment, according to Herzberg, means giving workers more
responsibility, discretion and challenge in their work. Like Argyris,
he warns managers that simply providing workers with a greater variety
of repetitive tasks will not do because such taoks do not affect the
73factors which motivate individuals. The image Herzberg wants to 
convey of job enrichment, in contrast to job rotation and job 
enlargement is that of the "vertical" expansion of jobs, rather than 
a "horizontal" expansion of similar tasks.
Because higher pay, better working conditions and other fringe 
benefits are not directly associated with the task workers perform, 712*4
71. Ibid,, pp. 86, 87»
72. Ibid., p. 114.
73» Ibid., pp. 132, 133» See also: Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: 
How Do You Motivate Employees?" o£. cit., p. 59; Frederick Herzberg, 
Work and the Nature of Man, op. cit., p. 177»
74. Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?" 
op. cit., p. 59. On this point Herzberg is anxious to distinguish 
his views from earlier work on job enlargement outlined by writers 
such as C.R. Walker and Robert H. Guest in: The Man on the Assembly 
Line (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) esp. the concluding chapter.
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improvements in these areas will not lead to increased worker 
motivation. J This also explains why so many schemes involving 
financial incentives are unsuccessful. And it points to the basic 
flow in human relations according to Herzberg. For supervision 
affects the conditions associated with the job, and not the work 
itself.* 76 7
Unlike Argyris and Likert, Herzberg is sceptical about the benefits
of employee participation in organizational decision-making. Experiments
demonstrating the connection between participation and the development
of more positive attitudes towards work are misleading, he feels,
because the effects they document are short term. Workers may show
greater interest in their work during the period of change. But it is
the job they ultimately perform that provides the basis for sustained 
77motivation. Thus Herzberg advises management to focus its energies 
on designing the right type of job and not to worry about involving 
workers in the process.
Another psychologist, Douglas McGregor, has adapted Maslow's 
"hierarchy' of needs" theory to industry. This theory assumes that 
there are various levels of needs which influence motivation. Food, 
shelter and the other biological requirements of life are the most 
basic needs. When these are not satisfied, they become the dominant
75* Frederick Herzber£ et al. The Motivationto Work, oo. cit., p. 116$ 
Frederick Herzberg, "One More Tiraei How Do You Motivate Employees?" 
op. cit., p, 59. Herzberg does qualify this argument by suggesting 
that where increases in wages or salaries are interpreted by the 
employee as recognition for his service to the firm, they may act as 
a positive motivator. However, he emphasizes that the motivating 
factor here is recognition and not the money itself. Ibid,t p. 116.
76. Frederick Herzberg, "Hew Accroaches in Management Organization and 
Job Design" op. cit.. p. 297.
77. Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time? How Do You Motivate Employees?" 
op. cit.. pp. 60-62.
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motivators of behaviour.However, once met, another level of needs 
comes into play: the safety needs. These are associated with
79"protection from danger, threat, deprivation." When these have
been met, the docial needs emerge. These include friendship, love,
and a sense of belonging to a social group. And, finally, at the top
of the hierarchy are the ego needs. These are of two types: the desire
80for self-esteem and the need for recognition by others.
In contemporary Western society, with its high standard of living, 
low unemployment, and ample social security benefits, man's lower level 
needs are largely satisfied, according to McGregor. This means that 
businesses are less able to motivate people by offering them rewards 
aimed at these needs. Thus the traditional motivators, fear and 
monetary incentives, must be replaced by ones which appeal to social 
and ego needs. Management must design jobs which provide opportunities 
for self-development, achievement and social recognition if it is to
harness the higher level needs of employees in pursuit of business
. . .. 81 objectives.
McGregor's views are summarized in his well-known Theory X - Theory
Y paradigm. Theory X represents the traditional, directive,
82authoritarian approach to management. This approach rests on what
78. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., p. 56, See 
also: Abraham Ma3low, Motivation and PersonalityCNew York, 1954)*
79» Dogglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., p. 37» See 
also: Douglas McGregor, Leadership and Motivation, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1966).
80. Ibid., p. 3 7 .
81. Ibid., Ch. 4 and 5» See also: Douglas McGregor, "The Manager, Human 
Nature and Human Science" in: Douglas McGregor, Leadership and 
Motivation, op. cit., p. 214; Douglas McGregor, "The Scanlon Plan 
Through a Psychologist's Fyes" in F.G. . Lesieur (ed.) The Scanlon 
Plan: A Frontier in Labour-Management Co-operation (New York, 1958) 
pp. 09-108. McGregor explicitly attacks Scientific Management in 
his critique of older theories of motivation.
82. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit.. Ch. 3
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he considers to be three discredited assumptions. First, "The average
human being has an intense dislike of work." Second, "...most people
must be coerced, controlled, directed, (or) threatened with punishment
to get them to put forward adequate effort towards the achievement of
organizational objectives." And, finally, "The average person prefers to
be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little
ambition, wants security above all." ?
In contrast, Theory Y, is based upon contemporary social science
research on motivation. It indicates, according to McGregor, that "The
expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play 
8Aor rest." ^ Human beings prefer to take responsibility for their actions
rather than to be directed as had been assumed by Taylor and his followers.
And, finally, the capabilities of most workers are far greater than
assumed by traditional managers. Hence the human resources of business
enterprises are not being properly utilized under conventional systems 
85of management.
This radically* different view of human nature has major 
implications for contemporary management practice. "The control principle 
which derives from Theory Y, according to McGregor, is that of integration: 
the creation of conditions such that the members of the organization can 
achieve their own goals best by directing their efforts towards the success
85. Ibid., pp. 55, 54. See also an earlier essay with the same title: 
Douglas McGregor, "The Human Side of Enterprise" in Leadership and 
Motivation, op. cit., p. 5* (orig. pub. in Adventures in Thought and 
Action: Proceedings of the Fifth Anniversary Convocation of the 
School of Industrial Management, M.I.T., 1957).
84. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 47» 48 
and Ch. 4* See also: Douglas McGregor, "The Manager, Human Nature and 
the Social Sciences" op. cit., p. 212.
85. Ibid., Ch. 4. McGregor's Theory X - Theory Y paradigm has also 
influenced British management thought in recent years. See, for 
example: Alan Flanders, "The Internal Social Responsibilities of 
Industry" (1966) published in: Alan Flanders, The Theory and Reform 
of Industrial Relations (London, 1970), pp. 150-152.
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of the enterprise.” To do this, managers must reorganize work to enable8 6
people to satisfy their higher level needs within the organization.
Perfect integration of organizational requirements 
and individual needs is, of course, not a realistic 
objective. In adopting this principle, we seek that 
degree of integration in which the individual can 
achieve his goals best by directing his efforts towards 
the success of the organization. 'Best' means that 
this alternative will be more attractive then the many 
others available to him: indifference, irresponsibility, 
minimal compliance, hostility, sabotage, It means that 
he will be continuously encouraged to develop and 
utilize his capacities, his knowledge, his skill, his 
'' which contribute to the success of
This extension of responsibility must not be given in a laissez-faire 
manner, McGregor cautions managers. Rather, it must be darefully guided 
so ' that the employee comes to perceive an identity of interest between 
the satlsfaction of his personal needs and the attainment of business 
objectives. In practical terms, the degree to which the employee*s.-self-control 
can be allowed to replace external control will vary according to his level 
of commitment. Yilhere the individual identifies strongly with the purposes 
of the organization, the need to control his behaviour through the 
techniques of Theory X will be minimal. Unfortunately, McGregor adds,
where such identification is not forthcoming, close supervision will still
88be required. Yet reliance on coercion is to be avoided wherever possible,
because it cannot evoke the same high level of performance characteristic
89of the integrated employee.
Ono of the more effective devices for implementing the change 
from directive control to self-control, according to McGregor, is the
86. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., p. 41.
87. Ibid., p. 55.
88. Ibid., p, 56 and passim.
89. Ibid..pp. 52-56.
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Scanlon Plan.^0 This plan has two major features: cost reduction sharing
and worker participation. The former involves giving workers a percentage
of any savings made by their company as a result of their ideas or
suggestions. This bonus is added to the basic salary of all workers in
the department affected. It operates as a group, rather than individual
incentive scheme because one of its purposes is to foster co-operation.
Participation is encouraged through a network of elected committees which
give workers a chance to voice their ideas. Department or shop committees
are empowered to implement certain types of suggestions on their ovm
authority. Proposals affecting a larger part of the enterprise or involving
substantial allocations of resources are passed on to higher level committees
which evaluate them and make recommendations to management. These are
normally accepted, according to McGregor, because they are generally
worthwhile and because they give management an opportunity to demonstrate
91its commitment to the plan.
The Scanlon Plan satisfies the higher needs of employees because 
it provides them with an incentive to develop and apply their own ideas.
For the worker who devises a method of cutting costs not only receives a 
bonus along with the rest of his department: he also obtains recognition 
from co-workers for the contribution he has made. And, he has the 
satisfaction of seeing his ideas implemented. In this way, the Scanlon 
Plan enables the individual to satisfy both&s ego needs and his desire
90. Douglas McGregor. The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 110-123; 
Douglas McGregor, "The Scanlon Plan Through a Psychologist's Eyes" in: 
P.G. LeAieur (ed.) The Scanlon Plan: A Frontier in Labour Management 
Co-operation (New York, 1959). Reprinted in Douglas McGregor, 
Leadership and Motivation (Cambridge. Mass,, 1966), pp. 123-125. For 
more detailed description of the Scanlon Plan see: William F. Whyte, 
Money and Motivation (New York, 1955) pp. 166-188 and F.G. Lesieur, 
(ed.) The Scanlon Plant A Frontier in Labour Management Co-operation, 
op. cit.. See also the more recent discussion by F.G. Lesieur and 
Elbridge S. Puckett, "The Scanlon Plan has Proved Itself" Harvard 
Business Review. Vol. 47» No. 5 (Sept. - Oct., I969).
91. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 110-116.
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for social recognition.
Scanlon Plan companies have been highly successful during the past
thirty years, both in terras of profitability and good labour relations. 
Although only a small minority of American firms have adopted the Scanlon 
Plan, McGregor argues that it will soon become popular. For social science 
research underlines the need to provide employees with opportunities to 
participate in decision-making and to assume greater responsibility for 
their own work.
92
93
Ill
A major boost for the ideas of job enrichment and participation in
current management thought has come from former President Nixon's Task
Force on the problems of work in the United States. Commissioned at a
time when American industry was facing increasing competitive pressure
from Europe and Japan, the Task Force was charged with developing new
approaches to resolving the problems of American industry. Drawing on
the advice of sixty nine business consultants and evidence presented in
thirty nine research studies which it commissioned, the Task Force came
down firmly in favour of a major restructuring of jobs as the solution
94for the problems of American industry. Its comprehensive survey of
U.S. and European experiments in job enrichment conoluded that companies using
such techniques were moreprofitable than their conventional counterparts.^^
In company after company it found that the restructuring of work led to 
less absenteeism, lower labour turnover, higher productivity and fewer 
industrial disputes. These findings led the commission to challenge the
92. Ibid., pp. 111-123.
93. Ibid., pp. 119-123. See also: F.G. Lesieur and Elbridge S. Puckett, 
"The Scanlon Plan Has Proved Itself", op. cit.
94. James O'Toole et al., Work in America, op. cit., Ch. 4 and passim.
95* Ibid., pp. 17-20. See also the collection of research papers done for 
the' commission in: James O'Toole (ed.), Work and the Quality of Life. 
op. cit.
-  182 -
uncritical acceptance of Taylorist principles in large sectors of 
American industry.
Perhaps the most interesting of the experiments which led the
Task Force to recommend greater worker participation was initiated
hy the management of General Foods in a new pet food plant at Topeka,
96Kansas. This factory was designed hy a group of business consultants 
who believed in the feasibility of the ideas just outlined. It 
incorporates a number of radical changes from traditional management 
practice. Instead of assigning individual workers to specific jobs, 
autonomous work teams of between seven and fourteen workers are given 
collective responsibility for a group of related tasks. Teams are 
encouraged to rotate the various tasks among their members. They are 
also given * support functions’ such as maintenance, quality control,
97selecting new members and the like. Repetitive tasks are divided as 
equally as possible among workers, while each job is designed to 
include some interesting or demanding activities. Another innovation 
is the provision of an incentive for learning new skills. Wage increases 
are based upon the number of jobs a worker can perform. Once he has 
acquired all the skills used in his own work group he is encouraged 
to move on to another group engaged in a different activity. Because 
no limit is placed on the number of employees who can qualify for 
bonuses, the system fosters co-operation and the sharing of information 
and skills.^
96. James O’Toole (ed.) Work in America, op. cit., pp, $6t 97» See also: 
David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., pp. 225-231? Richard E. Walton, 
’’Alienation and Innovation at the Workplace” in: James O’Toole (ed.) 
Work and the Quality of Life (this is a revised version of "How to 
Counter Alienation in the Plant” cited earlier). For a critical view 
of the experiment see: William Gomberg, "Job Satisfaction: Sorting Out 
the Nonsense” The American Federationist, June 1973» pp. 14-19•
97« Richard E. Walton, "Alienation and Innovation at the Workplace” 0£. cit. 
pp. 232, 233.
98 Ibid., pp. 233-235*
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The physical lay-out of the plant was also designed with the new
pattern of working in mind. According to Richard B. Walton, one of the
consultants, "The architecture facilitates the congregation of team
members during working hours." In some cases rooms were built larger than
99necessary to provide opportunities for work groups to socialize.
Customary distinctions between facilities for office staff and manual 
workers have been abolished in order to create a co-operative atmosphere 
in the plant. All workers, regardless of status, enter the plant through 
the same entrance, park their cars in the same lot, eat in the same 
refectory, and work in rooms decorated in a similar fashion. This absence 
of status differentials, according to Walton, creates a feeling of
solidarity between workers and managers and thus fosters normative
. . . .  100 integration.
Rules and regulations within the plant also reflect the new 
management approach. Work teams are assigned responsibility for dealing 
with tardiness and absenteeism among their members. Similarly, they 
judge when their members have learned a particular skill with sufficient 
competence to merit a pay increase. Finally, workers are given 
assignments , such as purchasing equipment and supplies, normally 
restricted to management.^'*'
The results exceeded the expectations of General Foods. Had the 
plant been organized according to traditional engineering principles, it 
would have employed 110 workers. However, because work teams were given
99. Ibid., pp. 234, 235.
100. Ibid., pp. 235, 236. Similar ideas have been introduced in other job 
enrichment projects. For example, Texas Instruments, in one of the 
first and most well-known experiments of this kind, eliminated 
executive dining rooms, parking places and various other visible 
status symbols in order to promote the idea that the company was a 
co-operative venture. See: David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit.t
pp. 197. 198; Judson Gooding, "It Pays To Woke Up The Blue Collar 
Worker" oja. cit., p. 158.
101. Ibid., p.’ 237.
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responsibility for support functions, servicing equipment, purchasing
102and other tasks, the number was reduced to 70. Yet total output, 
according to Walton, was higher than that expected from the larger 
workforce. Major savings were also made because quality rejects were 
92/o less than in a comparable plant owned by the company. A b s e n t e e i s m  
safety, turnover and labour relations were significantly better while 
overhead costs were 33$  lower. As a result, the additonal money spent 
in planning and designing the new factory was recouped within a year.^^ 
Procter and Gamble, manufacturers of soap and detergents, have 
incorporated a number of similar innovations in their highly automated 
factory at Lima, Ohio. According to Charles Krone, director of 
organizational development, the management philosophy underlying the 
planning of the factory has been one of encouraging maximum employee 
participation.
Hie plant was designed from the ground up to 
be democratic. The technology - the location 
of instruments, for example - was designed to 
stimulate relationships between people, to 
bring about autonomous group behaviour, and to 
allow people to affect their own environment.105
A major feature of the plant is the abolition of specialized categories
of jobs. Workers are encouraged to learn as many skills as possible and no
one is allowed to concentrate exclusively on a single job."^ Laborious
or repetitive tasks are shared by all workers. Decisions about hiring
102. James O ’Toole (ed.), Work in America, op. oit., p. 93»
103. Richard B. Walton, "Alienation and Innovation in the Workplace", op. cit. 
p. 238. These claims are disputed in a persuasive artiole by
William Gomberg. See; "Job Satisfaction; Sorting Out the Nonsense", 
op. cit., pp. 15-18.
104. Ibid., pp. 238-40; James O’Toole (ed.),-Work in America, op. cit., 
ppT 9£, 99. it was also found that the workers in this new plant 
became much more active in community affairs. The extensive 
participation in deci3ion-making at work apparently gave workers both 
the experience and the desire to play a more active role in civio life.
105. Chales Krone, as cited by David Jenkins, Job Power, ojdjl cit., pp. 231,232.
106. David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit.. pp. 231, 232.
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and firing are made by the entire working community, as are a whole 
array of other functions such as the plant's accounting, purchasing, 
and payment structures. The hourly wage has been replaced by a yearly 
salary while earnings differentials are now established by agreement 
among workers.
These changes, according to the business consultants involved,
have been accompanied by higher productivity, better quality and lower
lOGcosts. The explanation for the plant's excellent performance, 
according to David Jenkins, lies in the new social relationships among 
workers:
...(T)he plant's hard data are easily 'understandable.
Even though the pay scale is considerably higher than 
is customary, overall casts are approximately 50 per 
cent of a conventional plant. Thoi^i much of that is 
because of the advanced technology/could not function.^ 
properly if there were not an advanced social system. y
Procter and Gamble have already extended similar personnel praotice3 
to ten per cent of their U.S. workforce and plan to make further 
innovations in the near future.
Less ambitious schemes have been implemented by a number of other 
U.S. firms. The Corning Glass Company replaced its hot-plate assembly­
line by a system which allowed individual employees to build entire 
units. Quality control and other support functions were also assigned 
to the assemblers. Each employee now stamps hi3 name on the completed 
unit and is responsible for repairing faults that develop in it. The 
results have been excellent - at least from the viewpoint of the company. 
Absenteeism, which had been running at 8$,dropped to 1$. Rejects 
declined from 23$ to 1$, And, not unimportantly, profits rose substantially]’
10?. Ibid., pp. 232, 233.
108. Ibid., p. 234.
109. Ibid., p. 234*
110. Ibid,, p. 234«
HI* J^es O'Toole (ed.), Work in America, op. pit., p. 100
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Texas Instruments reorganized the janitorial services at one 
of its plants because the outside contractor failed to do the job 
properly. It hired its own workers and organized them according to 
the autonomous work—group principle. Work groups were given 
collective responsibility for maintaining a certain standard of 
cleanliness. They were also given the training and equipment necessary 
to do the job. However, it wa3 left to each work group to decide how 
to go about its task. The results were highly successful. The number 
of janitors was reduced from 120 to 71« Labour turnover was reduced 
from over 100$ to 9*8$ per year, while the standard of cleanliness was
considerably improved. And, the company saved an average of $103,000, v x 112per year on labour costs.
A job enrichment programme established by the Motorola Company 
involved allowing workers to construct entire receivers rather than 
assembling simple components. Each employee was also given responsibility 
for repairing faults that developed in his work. Although this method 
of construction required substantially more labour time than a 
conventional assembly-line, the benefits in reduced turnover, absenteeism, 
and fewer defects have compensated for this loss. In addition, the 
company's reputation was improved because of the high quality products 
it now sells.
. One of the most widely publicized job enrichment schemes has been 
undertaken by the giant telecommunications firm, A.T. and T. High 
labour turnover persuaded its executives to experiment with Herzberg*s . 
ideas on job enrichment. Under the supervision of its personnel director, 
Robert N. Ford, a pilot project was initiated in 1964.^^ A group of
112. Ibid., pp. 100, 101. See also: M. Scott Myers, Every Employee a 
Manager (Hew York, 1969) (Myers is Personnel Director at Texas 
Instruments).
113. James O'Toole, Work in America, op. cit., p. 101.
114» Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through the Work Itself, op. cit., p, 26.
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highly educated young women answering customer complaints was selected 
for the experiment. The 104 workers were divided into five groups.
Two groups had their jobs 'vertically* enriched by being given more
responsibility and greater discretion in responding to customer
complaints. Supervisory checks on the letters they sent out were
reduced and they were given the tasks of following through any further
complaints from the same customer. To avoid the 'Hawthorne Effect*
the women were not informed that the changes were part of a.n experiment.
115In the other three groups no changes were introduced.
At the end of six months the experiment was evaluated. A.T. and T.
were pleased with the results. Using five different measures of
performance, it found that the experimental group exceeded the others
in every case.^-^  The level of job satisfaction among employees in the
experimental groups was also considerably better than in the control
groups. Moreover, these improvements were achieved without altering
wages, fringe benefits or working conditions. Thus Herzberg*s argument
that job satisfaction was dependent upon the task performed and not
upon the conditions surrounding the task was given support. And,
A. T and T. had uncovered a new - and cheap - method for lowering
117costs and raising production.
As a result of the successful pilot study, 18 additional studies 
involving over 2000 workers were initiated within the A. T. and T. 
empire. Different types of jobs were included to ensure that the
115. Ibid,, pp. 27» 28.
116. Ibid.. -op. 31-39.
117. Ibid., p. 39. See also; Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up The Blue 
dollar Worker", ojd. cit. p. 158.
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conditions in the customer complaints department were not exceptional.
Sales representatives, office supervisors, keypunch operators, clerks,
switchboard personnel and several other occupations were included. The
results ranged from "moderately successful" to "quite successful".
Certainly A.T. and T's chief executives were imoressed. Eor they
incorporated job enrichment as a standard part of the personnel programme
118from 1968 onwards.
In Great Britain, similar experiments have taken place. I.C.I.
has restructured the jobs of a number of employees with the objective, of
raising job satisfaction and output. In one experiment, fifteen salesmen
were given greater discretion in dealing with customers. Detailed reports
of each customer visit were abolished. And, the salesmen were given
authority to raise or lower prices by as much as 10 per cent according to
119their assessment of what was necessary to make a deal. They were 
also empowered to pay up to £100 on the spot to resolve customer 
grievances.
As a result of these changes, 11 per cent of the salesmen reported
an improvement in job satisfaction. This contrasted with a negligible
increase in the control group. Moreover, while other I.C.I. salesmen
experienced a decline of 5 per cent in sales during the experimental period,
120members of the experimental group raised their output by 18.6 per cent.
118. Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through The Work Itself, op. cit., pp. 45-79»
119» W.J. Paul, Jr., K.B. Robertson and F. Herzberg, "Job Enrichment Pays 
Off", 00. cit., pp. 61-78. For a more detailed account see the 
subsequent publication by W.J. Paul, Jr. and K.B. Robertson, Job 
Enrichment and Employee Motivation, (London, 1971)» Other discussions 
are to be found in W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right to Manage? 
op. cit., pp. 17. 18} David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., pp, 182, 18J. 
According to Alan Moscovitch, a former member of the research 
department of A.S.T.M.S., I.C.I's job enrichment programme was an 
integral part of its attempt to forestall the unionization of its white 
collar personnel. (Personal interview, Dec. 14, 1975)* I.C.I's 
opposition to the unionization of its staff has been most recently 
demonstrated in its support for the Association of Professional 
Scientists and Technologists (a non T.TJ.C. affiliate) in its struggle 
with the more militant A.S.T.M.S. Seei David Churchill, "I.C.I. Ballot 
Victorj'- Steps Up Inter-Inion Struggle" Financial Times, Jan. 2j5, 1969,p*9.
120. W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right to Manage? 6p. cit., pp. 17, 18.
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Another I.C.I. project was designed to improve morale among non­
university trained laboratory technicians assisting graduates with 
experiments. Most technicians had considerable experience but felt 
frustrated because their prospects for promotion were limited without a 
degree. Three groups of fifteen workers were selected for the experiment. 
One acted as a control. In the other two, workers were given new 
responsibilities such as writing up their own reports of each experiment, 
being consulted at the planning state of new.projects, helping with the 
selection of new assistants and assuming authority for ordering new 
equipment and materials. The performance of the two experimental groups, 
as judged by their supervisors, improved substantially, while that of
122the control group improved at the beginning, but subsequently declined.
Thus I.C.I. concluded that job enrichment was an effective method of
123raising output and improving worker attitudes.
IV
As the preceding review of job enrichment and participation 
experiments indicates, these new techniques offer a number of significant 
benefits to management. Of primary importance is their ability to foster 
normative integration. By providing the worker with opportunities to 
satisfy his needs through activities which promote business objectives, 
participation and job enrichment schemes encourage him to identify with 
the purposes of his enterprise. To the extent that his personal 
fulfilment can be harnessed to corporate objectives, management has a
121. W.J. Paul, Jr., K.B. Robertson and F. Herzberg, "Job Enrichment Pays 
Off" op. cit., pp. 61-78.' See alsoi W.W. Daniel and Heil McIntosh, 
The Right to Manage, op. cit., pp. 18,. 19.
122. W.J. Paul, Jr., K.B. Robertson and P. Herzberg, "Job Enrichment Pays 
Off o p. cit.
I23. Ibid.
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potent lever of control over him. Moreover, because this method of 
control involves the manipulation of attitudes and values rather than 
the use of coercion, it is particularly valuable in dealing with the 
new problemswhich confront managers in the post-war period.
Job enrichment and participation schemes also provide management with 
an effective means for containing demands by workers for more control over 
their work. Because they provide workers with more discretion, autonomy 
and responsibility over their immediate tasks, they give workers the 
impression that they now have a substantially greater role in decision­
making. Yet this increased control is confined by management to areas 
associated with raising output and productivity. Workers have more 
discretion in the way they pursue management’s ends; they do not have 
more say about what those ends are. Thus management can placate worker 
demands for greeter self-determination without conceding any important 
prerogatives.
These innovations also promise to reduce the growing discontent 
which so many managers are now worried about. By providing workers with 
greater job satisfaction, managers hope to reduce strikes, absenteeism, 
sabotage and other forms of anti-organizational behaviour. Similarly, 
by reducing the use of directive controls, managers feel that they can 
eliminate many of the sources of friction which presently generate hostile 
worker attitudes.
Job enrichment and participation are also seen as techniques for
cutting labour costs by giving workers increased work loads. Whenever a
job is reorganized, management stands to gain. For it can U3e this
124opportunity to slip in additional tasks. Job enrichment is particularly
124» Jack Rasmus, "Job Controls Not Job Enrichment" op. cit., pp. 5-7;
Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Y/ake Up the Blue Collar Worker" op. cit., 
p. 167? RichardE . V/alton, "Alienation and Innovation in the Workplace" 
0£. cit., pp. 252-240; William W. V/inipi singer, "Job Satisfactions A 
Union Response" The American Federation!rt (Feb., 1973) PP. 8-10.
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suited to this ploy because it involves providing the worker with more
•challenge’ and ’responsibility’. Thus the 'enrichment' of a job
frequently means giving the worker not only a greater variety of tasks,
but more of them, lichen a job is enlarged to include maintenance,
janitorial, personnel or quality control functions, the men who previously
performed this work can be dropped from the payroll. Similarly, when work
groups are assigned collective responsibility for discipline, job
allocation, production quotas and related matters, the foremen who normally
125do these tasks can be made redundant.
By training workers to perform a number of jobs, companies can also 
reduce the costs of absenteeism and labour turnover. A missing employee 
can be replaced by any one of a number of equally qualified candidates.
And, firms are less vulnerable to strikes because the strategic power 
of specific groups of workers is greatly reduced. Firms can also avoid 
paying the wages demanded by skilled workers by training unskilled 
employees to do their jobs under the guise of job enrichment. Because 
their training is not accredited, such workers are not able to transfer 
to another employer like their skilled counterparts. Th.us they are tied 
more firmly to their company. And they are less likely to have the 
strong craft union ties which are typical of skilled workers.
Participation and job enrichment have also been viewed by managers 
as ways of obtaining higher output 'on the cheap'. As Lorin Baritz 
notes, the idea that non-monetary sources of motivation could be effective 
in encouraging the employee to labour more diligently has not gone
125« Jack Rasmus, "Job Control: Not Job Enrichment" 0£. cit., p, 14.
126. The best example of this i3 Herzberg's distinction between "hygiene" 
and "motivating" factors. Money according to him is a "hygiene" 
factor. Hence paying higher wages does not motivate workers to 
produce significantly more.
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unnoticed by managers.
To find out what made workers work or regulate 
output,. rebel or obey, was...a desideratum of 
progressive managements. Both social scientists 
and managers had long discussed various devices 
calculated to spur workers to greater efforts.
Though most managers had assumed that money was the 
greatest incentive for employees, many social 
scientists insisted that the workers needed other, 
less tangible rewards. The idea that workers were 
really less interested in hard cash than most 
managers had long assumed had obvious and attractive 
implications for management. 2'
Not unexpectedly, managers have shown considerable interest in non­
monetary sources of satisfaction which can be substituted for wage 
increases. At the same time, considerable effort has been expended in 
attempting to divert attention from wages to less tangible forms of 
gratification. Employees whose-work experience has been confined to 
factories organized according to scientific management may be flattered 
by the increased 'responsibility1, 'discretion' and 'freedom' given to 
them by these new methods of organizing work. Managers hope that they 
will be sufficiently content with such rewards that they do not demand 
more pay as well.
. Another objective of participation and job enrichment is to attack
the age-old problem of output restriction. In the post-war period managers
have come to realize that conventional wage incentive schemes have certain
inherent weaknesses. William Foote Whyte, for example, points out how it
Ì3 impossible for management to establish piece rates on a 'scientific'
X28basis. As a consequence, such systems encourage workers to hoodwink 
management about how fast they can work. Whyte, like many other 
'progressive' management theorists, believes that this struggle between
127. Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit., p. 175} William Gomberg, 
"Job Satisfaction: Sorting Out the Nonsense" The American Federationist 
(June, 1973) PP» 18, 19.
128. William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation, op. cit., pp. 14-49»
See also: Robert N. Ford, Motivation Through the Work Itself, op. cit.,
pp. 51-53» 57» and passim; Rensis Likert, New patterns of Management, 
op. cit.
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workers arid, managers arises because the incentive scheme is faulty. Thus 
it can be eliminated by adopting a system which fuses the interests of 
workers and managers more closely.
And this is precisely what the new management techniques are designed 
to do. By making the satisfaction of the employee's self-actualizing needs 
dependent upon the pursuit of business objectives, managers hope to engineer 
a situation where the employee can maximize his personal satisfactions only 
by maximizing his output. By tailoring the incentive scheme more exactly 
to the needs of employees - both financial and psychological - they believe 
that the weaknesses of earlier systems can be overcome.
Similarly, by giving work groups collective responsibility over 
production, managers believe they can manipulate group norms and values 
more effectively. As we saw in our discussion of human relations, one of 
the customary functions of work groups has been to protect their members 
from management interference and to conceal restrictive practices. However, 
managers believe that if they can persuade work groups to accept 
responsibility for meeting production quotas, they will use their informal 
controls to end output restriction. Thus group methods of production 
promise to succeed where Mayo's strategy of supervision failed.
Managers also hope to eliminate the need for first line supervisors 
by assigning collective responsibility for production to groups of workers. 
Moreover, if work groups can be persuaded to carry out many of the personnel 
functions which are the source of so much friction between employers and 
workers, so much the better. To the extent that work groups accept 
responsibility for dealing with questions such a3 discipline, wage 
differentials and the allocation of jobs, management is spared the delicate 
task of resolving these matters.
The benefits to management of delegating responsibility for 
production to work groups are outlined concisely by Jack Rasmus:
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...(B)y assuming direct responsibility for production, 
workers, in effect, also assume responsibility for 
rationalizing the work process and often at their own 
expense in the long run. They are thus led to carrying 
out a task voluntarily which they might otherwise 
resist if initiated by management alone. In addition 
by assuming responsibility for production they also assume 
the task of enforcing discipline and eliminating those .pg 
personal 'obstacles' to greater output indicated above.
Participation and job enrichment schemes also facilitate the
introduction of change. Aa experiments by Coch and French, Lewin, Israel,
Likert and other post-war researchers have shown, if workers are allowed to
participate in the re-organization of their jobs, they will be more inclined
to accept their new work assignments than~i'f such changes are imposed
130unilaterally by management. Thus participation schemes give management 
a way of obtaining worker consent to new production methods which they might 
otherwise oppose. And, frequently, such schemes enable management to tap 
the ideas of workers about how to install new equipment or design new working 
arrangements to maximize productivity.
V
Management's recent interest in job enrichment must also be assessed 
in light of its fear that worker discontent may be channelled into trade 
union activity. Although it is fashionable to assume that managers now 
accept the right of workers to join unions, it is more accurate to say that 
they acquiesce because it is expedient for them to do so. Admittedly, some J 
managers, especially in Britain, accept a pluralist industrial framework. 1 ^1
129. Jack Rasmus, "Job Control« Not Job Enricimient" 0£. cit., p. 14.
130. L. Coch and J.R.P. Frdnch, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance to Change"
Human Relations No. 1 (1948) pp. 512-532; J.R.P. French, Jr., J. Israel, 
and D. Aas, "An Experiment in Participation in a Norwegian Facotry",
Human Relations No. 13 (i960); Kurt Lewin,' "Studier* in Group Decision" 
in D. Cartwright end A. Zander (ed.) Group Dynamics (Evanston, 111.,
1953) Ch. 21; Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit.
131. On this point seei, for example: W.E.J. McCarthy and N.D. Ellis, Management
Agreement (London, 1973"); W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right To 
Manage? (London. 1972). ------°
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And, some managers have come to recognize that unions pan perform, useful 
functions in regulating labour relations• But employer opposition to 
trade unions remains strong, particularly in the United States and Canada 
where less than one third of the labour force is unionized. And, many 
apparently ’progressive' British and European firms follow labour 
relations policies abroad which belie their pluralist claims.
Moreover, it is not only manual workers who are the object of job
enrichment and participation schemes. Top management is particularly worried
about the unionization of. clerical and lower-level managerial staff. Even
where management has accepted unionization among its hourly-paid production
workers, it is frequently unwilling to concede that salaried employees need
132to be organized as well.
In the past, managers who feared the intrusion of trade unions were 
able to engage in a number of practices to dissuade workers from signing 
up. They could dismiss, arbitrarily, anyone suspected of harbouring union 
sympathies. Blacklegs could be hired to replace striking employees. And 
private ’security’ firms could be engaged to intimidate workers who failed 
to demonstrate the proper attitudes. However, such practices are no longer 
publicly acceptable. True, a determined employer can still find effective 
way3 of punishing or dismissing workers who join trade unions. But he must 
be more circumspect in the methods he uses. Moreover, as we noted previously, 
there is a growing recognition of the drawbacks associated with using force.
132. See, for examples Alfred Yogel, "Your Clerical Workers are Ripe for 
Unionization" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 44» Ho* 3* (March-April, 
1971) PP* 37-49* For a good account of employer policies towards 
white collar trade unionism sees George Sayers Bain, The Growth of 
Y/hite Collar Unions (Oxford, 19^9)* and» more critically; Clive Jenkins 
and J.E. Mortimer, The Kind of Laws the Unions Ought to Want (London, 
1968). Jenkins and Mortimer cite several examples of U.K. employers 
who formed "staff associations" to forestall the unionization of their 
employees. Banking and insurance firms have been particularly active in 
this area. U.K. employers have also encouraged organizations such as 
the 60,000 member Foreman and Staff Mutual Benefit Society. One 
criterion of membership in this society is that the employee not belong 
to a union. Any employee who does join a union automatically loses all
the benefits paid_in by his employer. As this may be a substantial sura 
in the case of older employees, it creates a powerful financial 
deterent to unionization. And this is exactly what the organization 
was set up to do. Sees Ibid., pp. 57-67*
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Consequently, managers have been anxious to find new techniques - 
techniques which will undermine union activities but still maintain 
the goodwill of employees. Job enrichment, participation and other 
devices have an obvious appeal in such circumstances.
In a recent Fortune article on job enrichment, Judson Gooding
133noted that "almost all" the companies he examined were not unionized.
A survey carried out in 1974 by the director of the Quality of Work 
Programme, sponsored by the U.S. National Commission on productivity, came 
up with similar results. Of 150 companies involved in job enrichment and 
participation schemes in the U.S., 80 per cent had no union. A "private 
poll" among the managers of these corporations revealed that new
134techniques "...were part of such firms' overall anti-union policy."
It is ironic that the same managers who state publicly that they are 
anxious to extend the amount of control and responsibility exercised by 
ordinary workers are busy devising techniques to reduce their collective 
power.
Considering the continuing opposition of many managers to trade 
unionism, it is not surprising to find recent articles in journals such 
as the Harvard Business Review and Fortune suggesting that job enrichment 
provides a 'solution' to the 'problem' of trade unionism. According to 
Alfred Vogel, a properly organized job enrichment programme can reduce 
worker dissatisfaction and thus undermine the appeal of unions.
M. Scott Meyers points with pride at a job enrichment programme in a
153« Jud3on Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up The Blue Collar Worker" 0£. cit.
p. 135. Gooding also gives some examples of companies who have been
consciously using participation schemes to forestall unionization. 
Sees Ibid., pp. 158, 162.
134. Iver Berg, "They Won't Works The End of the Protestant Ethic and
All That" in James O'Toole (ed.) Work and the Quality of Life
(Cambridge, Mass., 1974) PP» 37» 38« For a more critical assessment
of the anti-union policies of management sees Lorin Baritz, The 
Servants of Power, op. cit., and, more recently, Jack Rasmus 
"Workers Control and the Nixon Economic Programme", on. cit.
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Toronto factory which was so 'successful' that the workers voted to
135de-certify the union. Another v/riter describes how a company 
"...plagued by a hostile union..." was able to reduce the level of 
conflict by introducing a participation programme. In the process, it 
persuaded its workers to repplace their militant union leaders with 
"...a group of highly respected, able individuals..." who were willing 
to bargain with the company "...in an atmosphere of good faith and 
reasonableness.
Hot all proponents of job enrichment and participation are hostile
to-trade unionism,however. More sophisticated theorists such as
Douglas McGregor and William Foote Whyte recognize that trade unions
are a permanent feature on the industrial landscape. Hence managers
who want to cultivate the commitment of workers must do so within a
I 3 7collective bargaining framework. These theorists believe that
130management's early paranoia about trade unionism was largely unfounded.
135* Alfred Vogel, "Your clerical Workers Are Ripe for Unionism" Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 49» Ho. 2 (March-April 1971) PP* 48-54»" Wee' also: 
LI.Scott Meyers "Overcoming Union Opposition to Job Enrichment
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 49» Ho. 3 (May-June 1971) PP* 37-49j 
Judson Gooding, "It Pays to Wake Up the Blue Collar Worker" op. cit., 
pp. 133» 153| 159» David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., p. 205.
136. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 142, 143*
137* Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp. 110-123; 
Douglas McGregor, "The Significance of Scanlon's Contribution" in 
Frederick G. Lesieur (ed.) The Scanlon Plan: A Frontier in Labour 
Management Co-operation (Hew York, 1958)' pp. 2—6; Douglas McGregor,
"The Scanlon Plan Through a Psychologists's Eyes" in Frederick G. Lesieur 
(ed.) The Scanlon Plan, op. cit., pp. 89-99» William Foote Whyte,
Money and Motivation, op. cit., pp. 81-188. See also: W.W. Daniel and 
Heil McIntosh, The Right to Manage? op. cit., pp. 111-1J3;
U.E.J. McCarthy and H.D. Ellis, Management by Agreement, op. cit.
138.For a revealing account of the concern of some managers about the 
dangers of unionization, see: Alfred P. Sloan Jr., My Years With 
General Motors, op. cit., pp. 414-430. And, for an excellent case 
study of how General Motors has been able to contain the challenge of 
the United Auto Workers Union, sec: William Serrin, The Company and the 
Union, op. cit.
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Trade unions do not pose a serious threat to managerial prerogatives.
They are, for the most part, committed to the existing industrial
framework and have long since abandoned any ideas about overthrowing
it. It is only in the area of regulating the terms and conditions of
employment that they want a share in decision-making. And, even in
this area, their influence is not altogether negative from management*s
point of view. For they institutionalize conflict which otherwise would
be expressed in acts of sabotage, output restriction, higher labour
turnover and simmering discontent. By allowing workers to participate in
decision-making, unions can play an important role in legitimizing the
existing framework. And, by providing a channel through which employees
can express their grievances, they enable managers to discover what is
139happening on the shop-floor.
But more significantly, trade unions can also provide a useful
avenue for employee - employer co-operation on issues which ostensibly
140benefit both sides. Although such co-operation must be negotiated with 
'•thd unions, often this is not a major impediment. Insofar as job 
enrichment or participation schemes are accepted by the relevant unions, 
workers may be even more willing to implement them. This is so because 
voluntary agreements create a sense of moral obligation on the part of 
workers which may not be forthcoming in schemes initiated unilaterally 
by management. Consequently, if management can persuade unions that they
139» William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation, op.cit., pp. 81-188;
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit., pp, 110-123} 
Russell W. Davenport, "Enterprise for Everyone" in Frederick G. Lesieur 
(ed.), The Scanlon Plan, op. cit., pp. 26-28 (orig. published in 
Fortune, January 195C0.
140. See, for example: Frederick G. Lesieur (ed.) The Scanlon Plant A 
Frontier in Labour-Management Co-oporation (New York, 1958);
William Foote Whyte, Money and Motivation, op. cit.; Douglas McGregor, 
The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit.; W.E.J. McCarthy and N.D. Ellis, 
Management by Agreement, op. cit.; W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh,
The Right to Manage? op.cit.; Alan Flanders, The Fawley Productivity 
Agreements, op. cit.
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have a mutual interest in restructuring jobs then it can enlist their 
aid in implementing change.
The Scanlon Plan, for example, was developed as a way of
circumventing union-management conflict in a factory threatened with
bankruptcy. Paced with the loss of its member! jobs, the union negotiated
an agreement which committed its members to raising production and cutting
141labour costs in return for a fixed share of the firm's earnings. As
a result, the company prospered. Other managers quickly saw the potential
of such agreements in obtaining worker commitment to business objectives.
By giving workers a larger stake in the enterprise, managers concluded
that they could transform the union's role from one of opposition to one 
142of co-operation. Thus they could contain the union challenge to their
143prerogatives and, in the process, raise output and profits as well.
Not surprisingly, innovations such as the Scanlon Plan have become 
increasingly popular among managers in recent years.
Thus we see that participation, job enrichment, employee-centred 
supervision, 'democratic' management and similar techniques provide an 
answer to many of the problems confronting managers in the post-war period - 
an answer which, not insignificantly, is also highly profitable. The social 
scientists have shown that knowledge of the employee's human needs can be 
utilised by management to design more effective ways of controlling his 
behaviour. Conflict between the individual and the organization can be 
reduced by providing him with more satisfaction on the job. The demand
141. Clinton S. Golden, "A Tribute to Joseph N. Scanlon" in Frederick
G. Lesieur (ed.) The Scanlon Plan, op. cit., pp. 2-4» William Foote Whyte 
Money and Motivation, on. cit., Ch. 14} George P. Shultz, "Worker 
Participation on Production Problems" in Frederick G. Lesieur (ed.)
The Scanlon Plan, op. cit.,pp. 50-64*
142. Eldridge S. Puckett, "Measuring Performance Under the Scanlon Plan" in 
Frederick G. Lesieur (ed.) The Scanlon Plan, op. cit., pp, 65-79*
143* Douglas McGregor, "The Scanlon Plan Through a Psychologist's lijyes"
°?« Çit., pp. 93-96; William Foote Whyte, I io n e y  and M o t i v a t i o n ,  op. cit..pp. 134-188. — :-----------  —
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for participation can be met without altering the traditional goals of 
business. And, ultimately, productivity and profits can be raised 
because a normatively integrated work-force will pursue management's
9
objectives more diligently than one chained to Taylor's stopwatch.
V
Now that we have seen why contemporary managers are so anxious to 
•humanize' work, we are in a better position to assess their claims 
that job enrichment and participation provide solutions to work \
alienation. Although it is clear that these innovations are designed 
to enhance managerial control, it is not altogether contradictory to 
assume that they might also make work more satisfying. Indeed, the 
social scientists promoting them maintain that it is only by giving
t
workers an opportunity to fulfil their human potential that increased 
production can be achieved. In replacing the stultifying jobs designed 
by scientific managers, with ones involving more challenge, variety and 
responsibility, they claim that they are resolving the conflict between 
employee needs and the economic requirements of business. Thus despite 
their commitment to raising output, the practical effects of their 
innovations are of great benefit to workers.
Yet the argument that job enrichment and participation schemes will 
humanize work has major weaknesses. Obviously, there is nothing inherently 
objectionable about innovations which give employees greater satisfaction. 
But as we have seen, these schemes are being implemented not because the 
happiness of workers is desired as an end, but because happy workers are 
thought to be productive workers. Since the happiness of workers is viewed 
as a means to greater output and profits, managers are committed to 
raising job satisfaction only to the extent that it facilitates the 
attainment of business objectives. As Arthur Kornhauser rightly points
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The psychology of industrial work has devoted itself, 
for the most part,to problems of productivity and 
organizational effectiveness. Working people have 
been studied primarily as a means to the ends of 
efficiency, whether of the single enterprise or of 
the larger society. Even when attention is directed 
to attitudes, feelings, and morale interest usually 
centers on how these subjective, states affect work 
performance and the functioning of the industrial 
organization.144
Historically, of course, business has always used the needs of 
workers as levers to control their behaviour. The only difference now 
is that 'higher level' needs are being appealed to. Whereas workers 
complied with management demands in the past because they required wages 
for the necessities of life, they comply now because management offers 
them the prospect of developing their human capabilities more fully. In 
either case, the fact that management has the power to satisfy their needs 
enables it to control their behaviour. Consequently, the claim that these 
schemes constitute a fundamental break from earlier systems of management 
is unwarranted. They differ only in technique« the underlying principle 
remains the same.
Job enrichment theorists also maintain that the major problems of
workers are caused by faulty management techniques such as Taylorism.
Hence new approaches to management will eliminate them. The flaw in this
argument lies in the analysis upon which it is based. If the source of
worker dissatisfaction does not lie with poor management techniques,
145better management techniques will not cure it. True, some lubrication 
of the .causes of friction may be feasible. Simplified, repetitive task3 
may h; rearranged to alleviate boredom. Close supervision may be relaxed. 
And, workers may be given more discretion in how they perform the tasks
144. Arthur Kornhauser, The Mental Health of the Industrial Worker (London. 
1965) p. 2.
145. Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, o£. cit., pp. 116-120 and passim.
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management a ssigns them. But if the problems workers face- derive'
from the organizational framework of industry then, as David Jenkins
notes, * improvements' in management techniques csnnot solve them.
In much of the recent discussion of work-related problems 
in America, there is the assumption that, since a main 
culprit is an abundance of tedious jobs created by short­
sighted managements, the answer is the creation of 
fascinating jobs by far-sighted managements. A great 
deal of attention is given to the rearrangement of tasks 
in job enlargement or 'job enrichment' or 'job design' 
projects by managements which, having noted worker discontent 
and desire for more control, are sagely expanding the worker- 
control area by a fixed amount and therefore assuming they have 
liquidated the root problem.
But the root problem is not a faulty arrangement of jobs, it 
is a question of faulty power patterns; the arrangements of 
jobs are only surface symptoms, and projects that do nothing 
but rearrange jobs without altering the power structure are 
only surface solutions. 146
Yet proponents of job enrichment make no attempt to assess the 
structural impediments to greater employee fulfilment at work. Their 
response to the argument that there is a basic conflict between the demands
of owners and the needs of workers is to paper it over. In much of the 
writing on job enrichment and participation ther-_- is a 'best of all 
possible worlds' outlook. These new techniques, they argue, will bring 
higher output, better quality, lower costs and increased profits to owners. 
At the same time, they will provide higher wages, better interpersonal 
relations and increased job satisfaction for employees.
However, it is not always true that happy workers are productive 
workers. Nor is it the case that the only way to raise output is to 
increase the satisfaction of employees. In many instances, a trade-off 
between higher output and greater employee fulfilment at work is necessary. 
Increased proauction may be obtainable only through the use of methods of 
work or management techniques which reduce worker satisfaction.^1^
146. David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., p. 241. Ironically, Jenkins himself 
goes on to praise the activities of a number of large American firms 
which he believes are altering the power relationships between employers 
and employees!
147. On tola point see, for example, Alan Pox, Man Mismanagement, op. olt
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Conversely, working arrangements which are more congenial may not be as 
productive as ones involving a high division of labour, close supervision 
and consideraole pressure from management.
There are obvious reasons why management theorists are reluctant 
to admit the conflict between job satisfaction and output. To concede 
that the needs of workers are sacrificed to maximize profits is to admit 
that there are structural sources of conflict within the enterprise. And 
it is to acknowledge that there are important limitations on the 
implementation of job enrichment and participation projects within the 
existing framework of private ownership. For employers can be expected to 
increase worker satisfaction only where it improves the profitability of 
their enterprises. Thi3 does not preclude them taking into account the 
long term advantages of employee goodwill, such as lower labour turnover,
■ I A Q
less absenteeism, fewer strikes and the like. But no matter how j
i
sophisticated and comprehensive management’s calculations are, if, at the^| 
end, job satisfaction is not conducive to profitability, it will not be 
provided.
Moreover, the conflict between worker fulfilment and profits casts 
doubts on claims of management theorists that changes in po.'/er relationships 
within industry are unnecessary because progressive ramagers are now 
committed to satisfying the needs ofvrorkers. Insofar as worker needs and 
aspirations conflict with management’s drive to maximize output and profits, 
the disparity in power between the two remains important for it means that 
workers must, subordinate their needs to the demands of owners. Indeed, 
even the most cursory examination of why the satisfaction of workers has 
not had higher priority in the past would suggest the reasons the disparity 
in power between management and workers has been sufficiently great that 
the happiness of the latter could be ignored as a consideration influencing
148. The work of Rensis Likert in the area of "human asset accounting"
provides a good example of this longer range assessment of the benefits 
of a more happy and well-integrated workforce to management.
204 -
how the former organized industiy, Employees have worked under scientific 
management, human relations, paternalism and plain industrial autocracy 
because they have not had the power to organize work according to their own 
priorities. They have sacrificed the opportunity for greater fulfilment 
not because they felt that the maximization of output v;a3 the only 
objective worth pursuing in industry, but because they had no choice in 
the matter.
Ironically, evidence gathered by social scientists and management 
theorists in the post-war period points in the same direction. Their 
research indicates that one of the most important factors influencing job 
satisfaction is the amount of control workers have over their job3. Yet 
as we have seen, proponents of job enrichment have been unwilling to 
interpret the notion of control in terms other than the immediate tasks 
workers perform. In their view, extending the worker's contrhl over his 
job means giving him more responsibility, autonomy and discretion in how 
he carries out the tasks management assigns him. It does not mean allowing 
him more influence in deciding what those tasks ought to be. Nor does it 
mean giving him a greater say in determining organizational objectives, nor 
in influencing the distribution of power, status and rewards within his 
enterprise.
Discussions about how to increase job satisfaction cannot be confined 
to the immediate tasks workers perform for two reasons. First, to the 
extent that workers are able to control higher level decision-making, they 
can alter the priorities of business and thus ensure that their needs are given 
more consideration. Second, the opportunity to participate in such decisions 
may be valuable in itself. However, proponents of job enrichment show no 
interest in such matters. This is because they feel that worker 
participation in policy-making is not functional to the attainment of 
traditional business objectives. And, more significantly, they recognize 
that it may pose a threat to managerial prerogatives. Thus we see that
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despite claims that they are anxious to humanize work proponents of 
job enrichment arbitrarily limit their investigations about how to 
raise job satisfaction to areas which are compatible with the aims of 
business.
The unwillingness of the social scientists engaged in job enrichment
programmes to follow the logic of their arguments when it challenges
business priorities underlines their commitment to management aims and
their lack of scientific objectivity. If they were genuinely concerned
with the happiness of workers, they would have no hesitation in pointing
out the structural impediments to it. And they would be prepared to
challenge this framework where it seemed to limit worker fulfilment - a
point rightly emphasized by Paul Blumberg in his attack on American social
scientists promoting job enrichments
Despite the almost unanimous evidence on the favourable 
effects of participation in general and in industrial 
settings in particular, almost no one in the related 
fields has raised the question: to what extent does private 
ownership and control of modern industry place sharp limits 
upon the amount of participation that is structurally 
possible? Given the demonstrated beneficial effects of 
participation, to what degree is its application inherently 
limited by the framework of private ownership?...These 
questions are never raised. But what happens when staid 
social scientists conduct perfectly conventional research 
only to find their results telling them that perhaps the 
old advocates of ‘workers' control' had something there?
’.That happens is that they draw the narrowest possible 
conclusions which allow them to stay safely within the 
confines of. the here and now. Participation is praised, 
but no one asks any basic questions. Instead, the present 
system of ownership and control is merely assumed to be 
universal, despite the fact that economic experiments are 
everywhere to be studied. But this is very rarely done. The 
current system is assumed to be given and then, within the 
accepted framework, minor adjustments (of supervisory 
techniques for example) are urged.^49
Ironically, insofar as the new management techniques enhance management's 
ability to control workers, they perpetuate the inequalities of power 
which lie at the root of much of. the dissatisfaction proponents of job 
enrichment claim they are so anxious to alleviate. This is demonstrated
149. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation. 
(London, 196fl)p. 1 2 9. His words in brackets.
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clearly where job enrichment is being used to subvert unionization»
Because unions give workers the ability to assert their priorities 
more effectively than their unorganized counterparts, they can be an 
important vehicle for the satisfaction of worker needs. Yet the social 
scientists advocating job enrichment have shown no interest in 
strengthening unions or in encouraging them to pursue job satisfaction 
more aggressively. Rather, they have been anxious to prevent unions 
from interfering with management's attempts to manipulate the attitudes 
and values of workers.
The limitations of humanizing work within the present framework of
private ownership have also been revealed in the termination of a number
150of successful job enrichment experiments. The most important reason
for ending such experiments,according to David Jenkins, has been the
151threat they posed to managerial prerogatives. For example, at Polaroid, 
workers were proving so successful in performing the jobs of lower level 
supervisory personnel, that top management felt it was losing control of
I
the organization. Although worker participation was profitable, senior
management feared that workers were assuming so much control over
production that they could pursue other objectives with impunity. Moreover,
lower level supervisory jobs were being undermined. Thus justifications
for traditional differentials in power, status and income were rapidly
disappearing. Once management realized that the experiment in participation
152was becoming an experiment in workers' control it put an end to it.
According to Andrew Zimbalist, a number of other promising experiments
150. Andrew Zimbalist, "The Limits of Work Humanization" Review of Radical 
Political Economics Vol. 7» No. 2 (Summer, 1975) pp. 50-59»
151. David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., p. 314 as cited by Andrew Zimbalist 
"The Limits of Work Humanization" op. cit., p. 55»
152. David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit. p. 3 14,
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have suffered a similar fate for the same reason.
Thus we see that where experiments in job enrichment and participation 
threaten traditional business objectives or challenge hierarchical structure 
of industry, managers have no hesitation in terminating them. In light of 
such evidence, talk of commitment of business to satisfying the needs of 
its employees is less than persuasive. Business is interested in raising 
job satisfaction only where it ‘pays'. And the areas where it 'pays' are 
much more circumscribed than proponents of these new management theories 
are willing to admit.
153
VI
It is also questionable whether job enriclunent has been as successful 
in raising the happiness of workers as management theorists claim. Job 
enrichment programmes have an important public relations function of which 
companies are not unaware. By cultivating the image that they are in the 
process of humanizing work, managers can avoid interference by government 
or trade unions who might otherwise force them to show more concern for 
their employees. As we have seen, managers frequently maintain that 
because they have a job enrichment programme their workers do not need to 
be unionized. Similarly, by suggesting that they are in the process of 
humanizing work, they are able to promote the idea that business is now 
socially responsible and that the economic system, ofwhich they are a part, 
is perfectly capable of satisfying the needs of workers. Thus business 
has a number of reasons, both economic and political, for claiming that 
job enrichment and participation schemes are providing substantial benefits 
to employees.
153» Andrew Zimbalist, "The Limits of Work Humanization" 0 £ .  cit., pp, 5 5 ,  5 6 .  
He also speculates that there have beennany other experiments which have 
been quietly terminated by companies anxious to avoid publicity.
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However, when we turn to examine some of these experiments in more 
detail, v;e find that the benefits to workers are not as significant as 
management theorists suggest. Often 'improvements' in job satisfaction 
are nothing more than a transfer of satisfactions from one group of 
workers to another. For example, unskilled workers are frequently given 
the work of skilled craftsmen while the latter are made redundant. As 
long as such programmes are seen only in terms of the benefits accruing 
to the unskilled, management is able to say that it has 'enriched' their 
jobs. But all that has really happened is that it has used the . rubric 
of job enrichment to disguise a policy of cutting labour costs.
Even where these schemes have led to genuine improvements in job 
satisfaction, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the benefits received 
by workers. This is exacerbated by the fact that it is always managers 
and the social scientists in their employ who assess how »satisfied' 
workers are. Of course, we would not deny that some firms have made 
substantial improvements in certain instances. But when we consider the 
circumscribed jobs assigned to workers under scientific management, it 
is obvious that even minor ameliorations will raise job satisfaction 
considerably. Marginal improvements in work routines may be sufficient 
to reduce absenteeism, labour turnover and other manifestations of 
dissatisfaction which employers are now finding so costly. Slight 
relaxations of discipline may be enough to eliminate the more irksome 
sources of friction between management and workers. And, minor extensions 
of employee discretion and responsibility may be adequate to raise 
performance to the level of management desires.
However, if we compare the job satisfaction of workers performing 
•enriched' jobs with that of skilled craftsmen or professionals, it 
becomes clear that the yardsticks used to measure job satisfaction are 
quite limited. It is legitimate to ask how many of the social scientists
-  209 -
and management theorists who extol the virtues of participation would be
satisfied to work under such arrangements? In what sense do the definitions
of words such as •autonomy», »discretion*, »responsibility», 'job
satisfaction* and other terms used by management theorists differ when
applied to themselves rather than workers on the shop-floor? As Alan Fox
observes, job enrichment theorists have been notably reluctant to compare
the jobs of workers under these new systems of management with the roles
of those at or near the top of the occupational ladder.
Even in technologically favourable conditions, job 
enrichment has not, so far as present evidence appears 
to carry us, resulted in jobs that are seriously 
comparable, in respect of discretion, with those of 
middle or upper managers, engineers, scientists 
and others of a similar high discretion status.
Despite the inflated rhetoric about satisfying the »higher needs' of 
employees, improvements which are essentially of a cosmetic nature are 
being interpreted by business as if they constituted a fundamental change 
in the role of workers in industry. Yet what is notable about the new 
techniques is how similar they are to traditional approaches to management. 
Workers are still viewed as 'hands' whose function is to fulfil the aims 
of shareholders. They remain subordinate to management in all key areas 
of decision-making even where they perform 'enriched' jobs or 'participate* 
in decision-making. And, finally, the purpose of work remains one of 
pursuing the narrow commercial objectives of property.
Like human relations and scientific management, job enrichment is 
primarily a device for extending managerial control over workers. It is 
being introduced not because companies have become more aware of the 
deleterious effects of work on their employees but because they have 
become aware of the harmful effects of unsatisfied workers on the balance
154» Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, op. cit., p. 120.
.lawyers
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sheet. Insofar as job enrichment facilitates the attainment of 
business objectives, we can expect that managers will utilize it to 
supplement the earlier approaches. But where tradltonal methods of 
control remain adequate, they will be retained and intensified. In 
sum, job enrichment constitutes a valuable addition to managements 
growing list of techniques for making workers comply with business 
objectives.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: THE FUNCTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT
I
Our analysis of the development of contemporary management in the 
preceding chapters leads to a number of conclusions which challenge 
commonly held beliefs about modem industry. In the first chapter, 
we showed that production is organized not according to Clarke Kerr’s 
•logic of industrialization' or John Kenneth Galbraith's 'technocratic 
imperatives' but rather according to the specific requirements of 
shareholders. Although it is fashionable to believe that ownership no 
longer plays a part in determining how industry is run, we argued that 
it remains of key importance in two areas. First, owners still define 
the purpose of industrial activity. In practice, this means that 
efficiency and the maximization of profits are pursued to the exclusion 
of other potential goals. Second, owners remain in control of the 
organizational structure within which these goals are pursued. This 
docs not mean that they always play an active role in management. But 
thqy do monitor the behaviour of the managers appointed to administer 
their property. And, they ret-ain the prerogative to step in if the latter do • 
not fulfil business objectives adequately.
The fact that industry is still controlled by shareholders has major 
implications for the management function. Managers are not independent 
professionals who administer industry according to their view of the common 
good: they are agents of owners, obligated to pursue the latter's 
objectives. Their authority does not rest on their skills or expertise, 
necessary ,i$ these are to the functioning of industry. Rather, it is 
derived from their position as trustees of shareholders' property. And,
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it remains contingent upon their fulfilment of commercial objectives.
As a consequence, managers have been concerned not with the problems 
of industrialization in the abstract, but rather with the specific 
question of how to make an industrial system based upon property work 
effectively.
Yet it is not self-evident that the purpose of economic activity 
ought to be confined to maximizing the profits of shareholders. 
Historically, values such a3 craftsmanship and the satisfaction from 
performing a task well or creating a beautiful product played a far 
greater role in influencing how production was carried out. Work was 
seen not simply as a means but also as an end with the consequence that 
the worker's need for creativity and self-fulfilment were given a 
prominent place. Work was valued, too, because it provided opportunities 
for fellowship and co-operation and thus played an important part in the 
worker's social life. And, work enabled individuals to establish their 
worth as human beings through performing a socially useful function.
Thus the attempt by managers to restrict the role of labour to the 
pursuit of narrowly co;rmercial purposes entailed a deliberate attempt 
to exclude these alternative values.
Moreover, it is not obvious that an economic system which stresses 
efficiency and productivity will be more conducive to human happiness 
than one which places greater emphasis on other values. There is no 
reason to assume that the consumer goods purchased with higher wages 
associated with methods of work which are repetitive and stultifying 
are of greater value than the satisfactions arising from a challenging 
job accompanied by less money. Nor is there any reason to accept the 
view that because jobs which limit opportunities for fellowship and cocial 
interaction lead to heavier pay packets, they are preferable to ones 
which are socially rewarding but less productive. Indeed, it is not
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unreasonable to assume that many people would prefer an economic system 
which allowed them to satisfy their creative needs at work even though 
it was less efficient than the one we now have.
The fact that industry could be organized on the basis of different 
values and that workers, if given the opportunity, might choose to 
pursue objectives other than the maximization of output, has had important 
implications•for the development of contemporary management practice. To 
ensure that other objectives did not interfere with the pursuit of 
shareholders' aims, managers have striven to extend their control over all 
aspects of the productive process. If workers were allowed to exercise 
substantial control over decision-making, they might and, as history 
shov/s, would use their power to pursue their own rather than shareholders' 
objectives. It was only by maintaining dominance over workers that 
management- could ensure that the narrow, commercial aims of owners were 
achieved. Thus we saw tjfrat management's quest to consolidate its control 
within industry stemmed not from the demands of technology or the 
requiremaats of effective administration as is frequently asserted.
Rather it arose as a response to the demands of shareholders that the 
values associated with private ownership and control take precedence over 
the alternatives which workers might choose to pursue.
In the following three chapters, we traced the evolution of 
managerial strategies to extend and consolidate control over the 
productive process. Frederick W. Taylor used engineering principles not 
simply to rationalize production methods as is commonly thought, but 
rather to carry out a social reorganization of work designed to 
transfer control of the shop floor ffora workers to 'managers. By 
analyzing work in a scientific way, he believed that management oould 
collect all information essential to production. In so doing it would 
eliminate the monopoly craft workers exercised over production methods.
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Once management had accumulated this information, it could then 
reorganize production by dividing work into its simplest components 
and assigning the cheapest grades of labour to perform it. By using 
time and motion study, Taylor argued that management could regulate the 
behaviour of workers in a precise way and thus put an end to soldiering 
and other non-productive activities. As a result, management would be 
able to ensure that all the resources of the enterprise - both material 
and human - were utilized to the full in the quest to raise efficiency 
and productivity.
Although scientific management was a major step towards achieving 
managerial hegemony over the productive process, it was not a complete 
solution. The attempt to restrict the worker*s autonomy by chaining him 
to a simple, repetitive task provoked hostile reactions. Managers soon 
realized that control over the technical side of production had to be 
supplemented by control over the worker*s mind. Hence the aid of 
psychologists, sociologists and other social scientists was enlisted to 
understand and, ultimately, control workers more effectively. A decade 
of intensive research at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric 
Company gave birth to the human relations approach. Of course,
Elton Mayo, T.N. Whitehead and the other researchers involved claimed 
that their new management techniques were designed primarily to help 
workers ’adjust* to the demands of industrial life and not as tools of 
psychological manipulation. But as we saw, supervision and counselling 
were utilized for precisely that purpose.
Managers soon discovered that human relations also had significant 
limitations. However, the potential of social science for controlling 
workers was not lost on them. In the post-war period,they have attempted 
to incorporate the latest theories of psychology and sociology into their 
management strategies. As we saw, contemporary managers have been 
particularly anxious to understand more about the needs of workers so
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that they could design incentive systems which would tap these needs 
more effectively, Insofar as employees appeared to require opportunities 
for self-fulfilment on the job, new techniques such as job enrichment, 
employee centred supervision, democratic management participation and 
the like have been devised. These have had substantially more success 
than human relations in fostering normative integration, particularly 
in non-unionized firms, and as such have become a useful supplement to 
previous approaches. Moreover, they have given managers an excellent 
tool for public relations. The reorganization of work to increase output 
can be disguised as an attempt by managers to humanize it by giving 
workers more responsibility, autonomy and challenge. But despite the 
progressive* rhetoric of its proponents, the purpose of job enrichment 
remained the same as that of scientific management and human relations.
In our introduction, we argued that the issue of control lay at 
the heart of the management function under private ownership. The purpose 
of management, we maintained, was not simply one of dealing with the 
technical and organizational problems of industry but, more importantly, 
with how to make workers comply with the demands of shareholders. Our 
analysis of the development of twentieth century management supports this 
assertion. As we have seen, the approaches of Taylor, Mayo and proponents 
of job enrichment have been directed at solving the ‘labour problem*. 
Although the methods have differed, the aim has been the same« to 
exercise social control over workers in order to achieve the aims of 
business as defined by shareholders. To those who argue that the 
management function is merely a technical and administrative one we can 
respond with the most effective answer of alii managers demonstrate 
clearly in their approaches to management that they do not see it that 
way.
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II
Once we recognize that contemporary management has attempted, 
systematically, to extend control over all aspects of production, we 
can more readily understand why workers have not had a greater role in 
decision-making. It is not because workers lack the ability, intelligence 
or experience to participate effectively, as is commonly asserted. It is 
because managers have deliberately excluded them. And this, in turn, has 
been because the most effective way for managers to ensure that the aims 
of owners were achieved was to bring all aspects of the productive process 
under their control. As we saw in the development of scientific management, 
employers have attempted to reduce the autonomy of workers to ensure that 
they could not oppose or subvert business objectives. The narrow and 
stifling jobs which resulted from Taylor's methods of reorganizing work 
were not essential to ensure that production was carried outj craftsmen 
had done them in the past without management guidance. Rather, they were 
essential to ensure that the demands of owners were carried out.
Our analysis of the development of contemporary management thus 
calls into question the common assumption that it is the division of labour 
rather than private ownership which is primarily responsible for the 
restricted jobs many workers perform. As we noted in our discussion of 
scientific management, Taylor and his followers saw the division of labour 
not simply as a means for raising efficiency but also as a means by which 
managers could dominate workers. But the analysis of work into its 
simplest components, as Stephen Marglin rightly points out, does not 
automatically mean that the jobs of workers must be organized in a 
corresponding way.'*' The craftsman, for example, performs a large number 
of tasks, each of which, on analysis, is relatively simple. What makes 
him a craftsman is that he organizes these tasks into a complex whole and
1. Stephen Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do?” 0£. cit., pp, 3-11.
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then proceeds to perform them according to a logical progression established 
in his own mind. Similarly, the industrial worker could perform the various 
simple tasks involved in the manufacture of an item in sequence over a 
period of time and thus come to understand - and control - production in 
his own factory. Indeed, some of the more ambitious job enrichment 
experiments such as the General Foods Plant at Topeka, Kansas, provide an 
indication, however inadequate, of the potential for reorganizing production 
to enhance the role of workers.
Yet as we have seen, it is not in management's interest for workers 
to understand the work process or to attain the status and skills of a 
craftsman. If workers control production on the shop floor, management 
cannot be certain that business aims are pursued effectively. Thus Taylor 
and subsequent theorists have maintained that workers must be excluded from 
the planning and organizing of their work.And,the most effective way to do 
this is to restrict their autonomy and discretion by assigning them to 
simple, repetitive tasks.Thus we see that it is not the division of labour 
which is responsible for routine jobs* it is management's use of the 
division of labour for the purpose of controlling workers.
Of course, employers have beai anxious to persuade us that the 
restrictions they impose on the behaviour of workers are a result of the 
division of labour rather than the policies of business. But in light of 
the preceding analysis such claims must be seen for what they a*®» attempts 
to conceal managerial control.
Hov/ever, it is not only the division of labour which has been utilized 
by managers for dominating workers» they have also taken advantage of 
opportunities presented by technology for extending control over workers. 
Carl Barth's slide rule, for example, was valued by Taylor precisely because 
it gave management the information about cutting steel which was required 
to eliminate the role of the skilled machinist. Similarly, conveyor belts 
and assembly lines have been used not simply to carry materials and finished
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products to and from the place of work in an economical way» Rather»
they have been utilized to enforce a particular rate of production on
workers. Because management controls the design of job3 and the lay-out
and speed of the assembly-line, it can use them to pressure workers into
working at the rate it thinks appropriate.
Of course, the conveyor belt and the slide rule are relatively
primitive examples of technology by contemporary standards. As such, they
have been superseded by highly sophisticated production techniques involving
the latest developments in engineering and science. Yet, contemporary
2technology has been used in exactly the same way by management. The newest
automobile plants are fitted with electronic sensors attached to computers
which can locate the source of any delay in production and identify
immediately any individual who is not performing his job properly.
Computers have also been adapted to a wide range of control functions in
factories, offices and shops thus giving management a new and highly
effective method for ensuring that workers comply with business objectives.
Such, use of technology is not dictated by-the demands of industrialization*
it is a result of management's concern to dominate the labour process.
The fact that owners control the use to which modern technology is
put has also meant thatthe opportunities it presented to enhance the • role
of workers in production have been stifled,, as Harry Braverman points out*
In reality, machinery embraces a host of possibilities, many 
of f/hich are systematically thwarted, rather than developed, 
by capital. An automatic system of machinery opens up the 
possibility of the true control over a highly productive 
factory by a relatively small corps of workers, providing 
these workers attain the level of mastery over the machinery 
offered by engineering knowledge, and providing they then share 
out among themselves the routines of the operation, from the most 
technically advanced to the most routine. This tendency to 
socialize labour, and to make of it an engineering enterprise on 
a high level of technical accomplishment is, considered abstractly, 
a far more striking characteristic of machinery in its fully 
developed state than any other. Yet this promise, which has been
Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., Ch. 9. and
pp. 204, 205. ------- :-------  —  ---- —
2
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repeatedly held out with every technical advance since 
the Industrial Revolution, is frustrated by the capitalist 
effort to reconstitute and even deepen the division of 
labour in all of its worst aspects...5
III
As we noted in our introductory.chapter, there has been a tendency
in contemporary literature on industrial organizations to assume that
men can no longer determine the way in which industry will be structured.
Studies such as Robert Blauner's Alienation and Freedom, to take a
typical example, inform us that technology, not human beings, determines
how much control workers have over their jobs and over the policies of the
organizations within which they wbrk.^ Yet in light of our analysis of the
development of contemporary management, such views can be seen for what
they are: justifications for the present pattern of ownership and control.
What Blauner is actually saying is that the demand for profits by owners
necessitates that technology be so arranged as to extract maximum production
from workers. Within this narrow framework, workers may have more or . less
control over their jobs according to how effective management has been in
5finding ways to restrict their autonomy and discretion.
Ironically, Blauner's perspective needs to be turned on its head.
For it is not the limitations imposed by technology on the worker's 
autonomy that i3 demonstrated: it is the limitations on managerial control. 
His thesis, properly understood, means simply that each type oftechnology - 
craft, mechanized or automated - places restrictions on the ability of 
employers to dominate the productive process. It says virtually nothing 
about the feasibility of workers controlling the productive process because 345
3. Ibid., p. 230.
4. Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, op. cit.
5. For a more detailed - and devastating - criticism of Blauner and 
other proponents of technological determinism:see: Harry Braverman, 
Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. 224-229 and passim.
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the factories he examined were organized to minimize their control»
Our analysis of the management function under private ownership 
and control thu3 calls into question the widely held belief that workers* 
control of industry is impractical. As we have seen, managers have not 
been willing to allow workers to participate in decision-making because 
they feared that workers would use their power to pursue objectives other 
than those of business. Even where workers had already demonstrated their 
competence to organize production, as in the case of the skilled craftsmen 
displaced by Taylor, management strove1, to exclude them from the decision­
making process. Because workers have not had the opportunity to control 
organizational decisions under private ownership, it is quite misleading 
to argue that the limited role they now play demonstrates their inability 
to participate successfully in management. Indeed, all that can be deduced 
from an examination of contemporary industry is the tautology that under 
a system designed to exclude workers from control of production, workers 
have not controlled production.
Yet if the enormous effort that has been expanded in deriving methods 
for controlling workers, had been spent on finding ways to enhance their 
control over the productive process, it is clear that their role in industry 
could have been greatly expanded. For example, if industrial engineers 
had been given the task of designing machinery and production methods to 
give workers more control over production, rather than to facilitate 
management's control over them, the tradition of craftsmanship might have 
been preserved in new forms compatible with modern technology. Similarly, 
if it had been thought essential for workers to understand the organization 
of production, the design of jobs and the social organization of work could 
have been modified to enable them to learn how their factories were run.
AI30, payment systems could have been organized to encourage the learning 
of new skills and foster co-operation, rather than competition, among workers.
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This is not to deny that technology and the division of labour 
impose constraints on the design of jobs and the organization of work. 
However, because industry has not used its resources to provide more 
challenging jobs, the limitations of such constraints are simply not 
known. Certainly evidence which has accumulated from the numerous job 
enrichment and participation schemes of the past decade suggests that 
where management seriously wants to re-design jobs, it can do a great 
deal to circumvent what were previously thought of as »immutable1 
constraints. But as we have seen, far-reaching experiments in the 
reorganization of work have been the exception. Instead, management has 
exploited the social organization of work, the division of labour and 
technology as instruments for domination.
But more significantly, if the design of jobs were not subject to 
the constraints imposed by the commercial aims of business, many degrading 
tasks could be abolished. Once the provision of satisfying work was 
accepted as a legitimate objective of industrial policy - an objective of 
equal stature with that of maximizing efficiency - then the limitations 
imposed by the division of labour would be greatly reduced. Engineers 
and designers would be free to sacrifice a certain amount of production 
in order to allow workers to control their work more effectively. Where 
the human costs of methods of work which maximized output were thought 
excessive, other, more intrinsically satisfying methods of production could 
be adopted. Of course, such policies would not lead to the maximum rate 
of economic growth or a continually expanding array of consumer goods.
But this does not mean that they would not increase the sum of human 
happiness. As Jaroslav Vanek wryly points out« "...(T)he building of the 
pyramids did not maximize social welfare, even if it may have maximized 
physical output."^ 6
6. Jaroslav Vanek, The, Participatory Economy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971) P« 35»
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Speculation about the potential for restructuring industry 
according to a different and more humane set of values takes us beyond 
the scope of our analysis of the development of contemporary management. 
However, it does underline the central point of this section: the way 
industry is now organized is neither inevitable nor immutable. It is the 
result of the efforts of a specific group, shareholders, to achieve a 
specific purpose: the maximization of profits. Hence it can be 
reorganized by other human beings to pursue fundamentally different 
purposes. There is no 'logic of industrialization', as Clarke Kerr 
asserts; only a logic of men.
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PART__II
CHAPTER VI
THE IMPACT OP PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OP INDUSTRY
"In more than a hundred interviews with workers, most 
of them group interviews with four, five or more 
workers, I was saddened by this facts no more than a 
handful said they enjoyed their jobs. I interviewed 
four workers at G.M. *s Fisher Two plant in Flint, one 
of the three Flint plants where IT.A.W. members staged 
their 3it-down'in the winter of 1936-7» winning 
recognition for the U.A.W. I asked a workers Do you 
enjoy going to work in the morning?
He said, "Can I ask you a questions Do you enjoy going 
to work?"
"Sure", I answered, "for the most part."
The worker was shocked. He could not conceive of anyone 
who might be happy going to work. He said, "I guess 
that there are jobs that guys like."
Behind me, another G.M. worker, a man who up to that 
point had said nothing, asked, "You never worked in a 
factory?"
"Ho", I said.
"You*re pretty fortunate, aren’t you?" he said. He was 
angry.
"Yes", I said." - William Serrin I
I
Thus far, our approach has foaussed exclusively upon the purpose 
and exercise of the management function within contemporary industrial 
enterprises. We have deliberately refrained from discussing the impact 
of this pattern of industrial organization on those most directly 
affected by it - the workers on the shop floor. Even when we noted the 
responses of workers to management techniques such as Taylorism, we did
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so primarily from the perspective of assessing management*s evolving 
strategies for coping with the various manifestations of employee 
dissatisfaction and not from the point of view of evaluating the effects 
of such dissatisfaction on the v.orkers whose lives were so significantly 
affected by management control. It is now appropriate to shift our 
attention from the functions of management to the impact of capitalist 
control of industry on working people.
It is frequently asserted', in defence of the status quo, that the 
establishment of the priorities of industry by owners is not objectionable 
because their profit maximising activities utilize industry1s resources 
efficiently and thus raise the standard of living of all concerned.
Without sufficient emphasis on efficiency and productivity, workers as 
well as owners, would suffer from that "lack of bread" of which 
Schumpeter warned. Thus while it is true that management exercises social 
control over workers, it is also true that the effect of this control 
is ultimately to their benefit. In an imperfect world, a system which 
assures a good standard of living for working people is not to be 
disparaged, even if it does involve some degree of subordination at the 
workplace.
Although such a view of the beneficial impact of private ownership 
and control has considerable plausibility, we believe that it 
substantially under-estimates the deleterious effects of this framework 
on ordinary workers. First, it ignores the abuses which still exist 
within industry - abuses which are by no means inconsequential in 
undermining the happiness of workers. In the area of occupational 
accidents and illnesses, for example, the subordination of the interests 
of workers to the pursuit of profit results in an alarming toll of 
avoidable suffering and misery. Pressure to maximise output also leads
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to excessive occupational stress and poses a serious threat to the 
mental health of large numbers of workers. And, as our previous 
discussion of management theory points out, opportunities for workers 
to fulfil their creative needs through their jobs remain quite limited.
Second, it assumes that the only values which have a place in the 
organization of industry are those associated with productivity and 
profits. The purpose of industry, according to this view,is to maximise 
output. Accordingly, the success of industry is to be evaluated on the 
basis of how well it attains this end. However, it is not self-evident 
that the sole purpose of industry ought to be to pursue the above 
objectives. There is no reason to assume that the happiness of workers 
on the job is less desirable as an objective than maximising output.
The decision to follow the ideal3 of William Morris rather than 
Joseph Schumpeter can only be made on the basis of the relative importance 
attached to producer rather than consumer satisfactions. Because it 
involves a value judgement about what constitutes a desirable way of 
life, it cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it is "impractical".
For practicability refers to the means used to reach an end, not the 
desirability of the end itself. It may be "impractical" to sacrifice 
ten per cent of production for a happier life at work. But if the 
happiness so gained is thought to outweigh the happiness associated 
with the foregone production, ‘practicality' does not enter the matter.
It is our view that the producer satisfactions sacrificed by the 
single-minded commitment to profit associated with the present system 
of ownership and control are of greater significance than any gains 
in production accompanying it. The importance of self-determination of 
work cannot be dismissed by pointing to an ever growing pile of consumer 
goods - many of which are of questionable value in the first place.
Nor can the benefits associated with a pattern of .work organization
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which places greater emphasis on the need fox1 self-realisation be 
rejected as inferior - to one in which output is maximized by treating 
workers as 'hands' rather than partners in a co-operative undertaking.
Finally, the view that the purpose of industry is to maximise 
output underestimates the central role that work plays in our lives.
It is not merely because we spend such a major portion of our time in 
work and work-related activities that work is important. It is also that 
the kind of work we do and the satisfactions we obtain from it greatly 
influence our sense of self-worth, or social position, or leisure 
activities and, ultimately, our overall happiness. Contrary to the 
fashionable argument that we compartmentalize our lives such that the 
effects of degrading work do not spill over into non-work time, there 
is considerable evidence to show that unhappiness at work reduces 
fulfilment in other areas as well."*"
Consequently, in the following chapter, we shall examine the 
effects - and the implications - of the present pattern of industrial 
organization on the lives of ordinary workers. Our purpose shall be to 
demonstrate just how detrimental the subordination of workers to the 
interests of property is. In the process, v/e shall emphasize that it is 
the question of power, or rather lack of power, which is central to 
understanding why the interests of workers have been igiored as a factor 
influencing how production has been organized. And, we shall suggest that 
the solution to these problems involves a major shift in power relationships 
in order to enable workers to assert their priorities as producers more 
effectively.
II
The deleterious impact of the present system of ownership and control 
on workers is most visible and dramatic in the area of industrial health
1. See, for example: Stanley Parker, The Future of Work and Leisure 
(London, 1971). ■
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and safety» The statistics on accidents» injuries and occupational diseases
are extremely depressing» In the United States, 14,500 workers are killed,
2.2 million temporarily or permanently disabled and more than 25 million
2working days lost every year as a result of industrial accidents. In 
Great Britain, the recent average has been about 1,000 killed and 300,000 
injured. TheSe are the official statistics. They do not include the 
number of workers disabled or killed by occupational diseases which 23
2. John R. Oravac, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety" The American 
Federationist (June, 1974) P* 1» See also: Patricia Cayo Sexton and 
Brendon Sexton, Blue Collars and Hard Hats: The Working Class end
the Future of American Politics (New York, 197l) P» 68; Franklin !7allick, 
The American Worker: An Endangered Species (New York, 1972).
3. According to the Royal Commission on safety and health at work chaired 
by Lord Robens, the total number of fatalities in industrial accidents 
of all types showed a steady decline during the period 1961-1970 from 
1,463 to §85» with significant fluctuations in that period.(a) The 
most notable reductions, however, were in public industries. Railways 
declined from 167 fatalities to 68, while in industries covered by the 
Mines and Quarries Act (i.e. Coal) the reduction was equally dramatic:
284 to 124.(b) However, in industries covered by the Factories Act 
(mainly privately owned) the figures showed only a slight improvement.
In fact, from i960 to 1969 no substantial decrease could be discerned:
669 in the former year, 649 in the latter. However, from 1970 (556) 
to 1975 (549) some improvement can be noted.(c)
However, the statistics on the total number of accidents indicate a 
slight increase, on average, from 19 6 1 (4 5 3, 8 5 1) to 1970 (4 7 2,74 6).
In the mid-1960's there was a sharp rise ±0 a high of 573»948, with 
more than 513»000 every year from I964 to 1969.(d) Again, publio 
enterprises showed a substantial improvement, with the number of 
accidents under the Mines and Quarries Act reduced by half. However, 
in the premises covered by the Factories Act, the number of accidents 
rose substantially from an average of 200,000 in the I96I-I963 period 
to an average of over 300,000 in the 1967-1970 period,(e)
Thus we see that v/hile there has been a decrease in the number of 
fatalities from 1961-1970, the number of accidents has risen and 
this rise is attributable almost entirely to the private sector.
(a) Source: Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Committee,
1970-72, Lord Robens, (London, H.M.S.0. Cmd. 5034) Table 1,
p. 161.
(b) Ibid., Table 1, p. 161,
(c) Ibid., Table 1, p. 161, and Report of the Chief Inspector of 
Factories, London,H.M.S.0. as cited by Labour Research, Vol. 64.
No. 1 (Jan. 1975) p. 6.
(d) Source: Safety and Health at Work, op. cit., p. 162, Table 2.
(e) Ibid., p. 162, Table 2.
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some observers estimate to be considerably larger than the figure for 
accidents.^ Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that 
the official statistics greatly underestimate the extent of the problem.
"One Labour Department study of California's experience", noted 
Dan Cordiiz of Fortune, "indicates that the true toll of industrial
5accidents may be ten times the National Safety Council's estimates."
A report presented to the U.S. Congress in April 1972 by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration pointed out that each year there *.vere 
an estimated 200,000 cases of occupational diseases. It rent on to state 
that: "Basel on a limited analysis of violent/non-violent mortality in 
several industries, there may be a3 many as 100,000 deaths .each year 
from occupationally caused diseases." In fact, the situation may be 
more serious that this figure indicates. In one industry alone - asbestos - 456
4. Figures for the U.K. are available. The Robens Report notes that 
roughly 800 workers die each year from officially certified occupational 
diseases. It also points out that this figure "understates the actual 
number of deaths" because workers are included in the statistics only
if their dependents qualify for a pension. See: Safety and Health at 
Y/ork, op. cit., p. 161, Table 1, There are other reasons why the 
official statistics under-report the number of fatalities from 
occupational diseases. It is frequently difficult for a worker to 
prove that his illness is the result of industrial causes. Some 
occupational diseases only appear 20 or 30 years after initial 
exposure. Thus an individual might not realise that his illness was 
connected with his former employment. Even in the Coal Industry which 
is fairly progressive in this regard, there are arbitrary standards 
which exclude workers from being certified. For example, a miner must 
work in the industry for 10 years before ho can be certified as having 
pneumoconiosis. Yet there are cases of men who entered the pits at 
14 becoming disabled by the time they were 24 and thus not qualifying. 
Dai Coity Davies, "Pneumoconiosis: The New Scheme" Labour Research 
Voi. 6 4» No. 5 (May, 1975)» For a good discussion of how the official 
statistics minimize the extent of the hazards workers face, see:
John Grason and Charlie Goddard, "Industrial Safety and the Trade 
Union Movement" Workers' Educational Association: Studies For Trade 
Unionists, Voi. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 1975) pp. 12-15.
5. Dan Corditz, "Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job for Management" 
Fortune (Nov., 1972) p. 113» See also: Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards 
of Work (London, 1975) P* 12; Jerome B. Gordon, Alan Akmon and 
Michael L. Brooks, Industrial Safety Statistics: A Re-examination,
United States Department of Labour (Washington, 1971)•
6. Report on the Occupational Health and Safety Department (April, 1972) 
as cited by Franklin Wallick, The American Federationist (December,
1974)» See also: John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety", 
op. cit., p. 1.
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the mortality .rate is, quite simply, unbelievable. According to 
Dr. Irying J. Selikoff of Mount Sinai Hospital in New York, for 
every 100,000 employees who work in the U.S. asbestos industry, 20,000 
die of lung cancer, 7,000 of asbestosis and 7,000 of mesothelioma
•7
(another form of cancer). There are over 200,000 currently working 
in the industry while an estimated 1,000,000 other workers handle
Q
absestos products. In the United Kingdom, a recent analysis by
Patrick Kinnersly concluded that the actual number of deaths from
accidents was more than 2,000 while the number of injuries or illnesses
9involving more than 3 days absence from work was 1,000,000.
The fact that industrial accidents and diseases take an alarming 
toll of lives and inflict great hardship on large numbers of workers 
does not, in itself, condemn the existing pattern of ownership and 
control. For the owners of industry may not be responsible for this 
tragedy. Indeed, one of the most frequently voiced arguments about 78*
7. Peter J. Smith, "For those in Peril on the Factory Floor", Nature,
Yol. 251, (Oct., 18, 1974) P« 560. For a more detailed account of 
Dr. Selikoff’s research see the series of articles by Paul Brodeur 
entitled "Industrial Casualties" Parts I-V, The New Yorker (Oct.,
29; Nov., 5» Nov., 12; Nov«, 19; Nov., 27, 1973)« These have been 
reprinted in: Paul Brodeur, Expendable Americans (New York, 1974)«
8. Paul Brodeur "Industrial Casualties" Part II (Nov., 5, 1973)« There 
has also been a notable increase of public concern about the dangers 
of asbestos in Great Britain during the past year. The Acre Mill 
factory of the Cape Asbestos Company at Hebden Bridge, Yorkshire, has 
received considerable publicity because 40 workers have died from 
asbestos since the factory was opened in 1949« Partly as a result
of the publicity given to this factory, a number of similar incidents 
have come to light, emphasizing the extent of tho problem. The 
response of the asbestos industry to the public’s increasing concern 
about the dangers of its products has been to launch a £500,000 
advertising campaign claiming that asbestos is not dangerous! See:
The Guardian, Tuesday, March 30, 1976; The Times , Tuesday, March 30, 
197^5 B.B.C. II special report on Cape.Asbestos, Tuesday, March 30, 
19765 The Guardian, Wednesday, April 1, 1976; The Guardian, Monday, 
April 12, 1976} The Guardian, Tuesday, May 18, 1976.
9« Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work,op. oil;., p, 13« Official 
statistics do not reveal the extent of injuries and deaths because 
employers are anxious to conceal these matters. The more accidents 
they report, the more likely they will be to be visited by the factory 
inspectorate - visits which can result in orders to make costly changes 
in working procedures or equipment. High accident and disease rates 
also give unwanted publicity and thus undermine the image that most 
owners wish to convey as f^cood enroloyerfi*M
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accidents at work is that human error and carelessnesses are the prime
culprits. In testimony before a Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1968, a spokesman for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
J. Sharp, articulated the view of employers when he asserted that
"...80 to 90 percent of the injuries which are occurring in our company
are due to human failure rather than a piece of equipment, a machine or
,,10so on."
A more sophisticated answer to the questioh 'what is the major source
of industrial accidents?* was put forward by the Robens Committee in its
1972 report Safety and Health at Work. The Committee asserted that
"...the most important single reason for accidents at work is apathy.
It went on to argue that "...safety is.mainly a matter of the day-to-day
12attitudes and reactions of individuals..." Workers and managers, it
claimed, were insufficiently aware of the hazards in industry, largely
because "...serious accidents are rare events in the experience of 
13individuals." While the Robens report did not suggest that responsibility 
for accidents lay primarily with careless workers but rather in a more 
general lack of concern about safety, the implications of its view are 
broadly similar to the one articulated by the representative of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce* the source of occupational accidents and diseases 
is primarily in the attitudes of individuals and not in any inherent 102
10. J. Sharp, as cited by Ray Davidson "Peril on the Job" The American 
Fede.vntionist, (November. 1970) p. 16. As we shall see, thi3 figure 
is inaccurate.
11. Safety and Health at Work, op. cit., p. 1.
12. Ibid., p. 1,
13» Ibid.t p. 1. For an alternate view of the causes of accidents see*
G.R.C. Atherley, R.T. Booth and ¡»I.J. Kelly, "Workers Involvement 
in Occupational Health and Safety in Britain" International Labour 
Review, Vol. Ill, Ho. 6 (June, 1975) pp. 478-482.
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conflict between the interests of owners and workers.
The argument that accidents are the result of indifference or
carelessness has been made more plausible by the contention that it is
in the interests of both employers and workers to reduce accidents#
Although most industrial relations theorists acknowledge that conflicts
of interest exist between profits and wages, they reject the notion that
15similar conflicts exist between profits and health. In this area, they
assert, common interests prevail. Governments, too, have accepted this
view. For example, the Robens Committee stated that in their view
"...there is a greater natural identity of interest between the two sides
16in relation to safety and health problems then in most other areas."
They went on to argue that "There is no legitimate scope for 'bargaining' 
on safety and health issues but much scope for constructive discussion,
14
14# Rot surprisingly, the Robens Report has been subjected to considerable 
criticism by trade unionists. The analysis that 'apathy' is the 
primary cause of accidents has been disputed by numerous writers who 
point to the repeated failure on the part of management to spend 
sufficient resources on health and safety. A second major argument 
of the report - that there is too much law associated with health 
and safety - has also been challenged. Although the report notes 
that the Factory Inspectorate found an average of two to three 
serious violations of the law on each of its 300,000 visits to 
factories in 1971» only 3>000 charges were laid against firms. Thus 
critics argue that what is needed is not les3 law but rather effective 
enforcement of existing laws along with increased penalties for 
violations. See, for example; "Robens and Safety" Labour Research 
(Sept. 1972)5 Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, Safety or Profits 
(Bristol, 1973)} Denis Gregory and ¡Toe McCarthy, The Shop Stewards' 
Guide to Workplace Health and Safety (Nottingham, 1975)5 Tony Topharn, 
"Health and Safety: A Question o.f Workers' Control", I.V/.C. Pamphlet, 
No. 39 (Rotti 'ghaiu, 1974); Geoffrey Sheridan, "Work: Health Hazard"
The Guardian (Tues. Jan. 15» 1974) p# 16} Public Interest Research 
Centre, "Memorandum on the Recommendations of the Robens Committee" 
(London, 1972).
15# Indeed, it is remarkable that contemporary industrial relations
theorists have found so little time to examine the issue of health 
and safety. For the most part, they have simply accepted the view 
that employers are as anxious a3 workers to improve standards in this 
area. Perhaps because they have not seen this issue as a source of 
conflict, they have not thought the area worthy of research. It seems 
more likely, however, that they have been too preoccupied with 
problems which employers define as important, such as strikes and 
industrial unrest, to be concerned with problems that affect shop- 
floor workers.
16. Safety and Health at Work, op. cit., p. 21.
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weaknesses. It ignores the fact that health and safety precautions 
cost money. They cut into a company's profits and undermine its 
competitive position. They shift resources from 'productive' to 
'.non-productive' activities.' Thus to protect the health and safety of 
employees, companies must be willing to sacrifice profits which would 
otherwise accrue to shareholders. Although all firms make some 
concessions in this area, the question is how much production they 
are willing to sacrifice-for the benefit of workers. The answer, in our 
view, is very little.
This is not to deny that many companies attempt to reduce some of 
the hazards their employees face. But such attempts are confined within 
a narrowly-defined range of commercial alternatives. Better health and 
safe-ty is provided as long as it does not cost too much. And the 
definition of "too much" is made by shareholders who do not fac6 the 
risks, rather than workers who do. Thus the issue is not primarily one 
of insensitive or callous managers who do not care about the lives of 18
18. Several U.S. studies have attempted to assess the role of worker 
carelessness. According to Dan Corditz "...a 1967 survey of 
industrial injuries in Pennsylvania concluded that only 26 percent 
were the result of employee carelessness." Dan Corditz, Fortune, 
"Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job For Management" (Nov., 1972) 
p. 114. Two studies by the Safety and Fire Protection Committee 
of the U.S. Manufacturing Chemists Association looked into the 
causes of accidents in the chemical industry. Of the 992 accidents 
examined, 402 were the result of poorly maintained or badly designed 
equipment. Unsafe working procedures established by companies 
accounted for another 356 accidents. Only 75 accidents were clearly 
attributable to human errors, while another 1 16 were caused by a 
combination of bad equipment or methods of operation with human 
error. In short, of the 992 accidents, 759 were directly attributable 
to management while another 116 involved a shared responsibility 
between management and workers. Seej Hey Davidson, "Peril on the 
Job" The American Fedcrationist, (Nov., 1970) p. 14* A comprehensive 
review of the accident research literature, prepared for the 
Robens Commission, also questioned the theory that accidents were 
jirimarily a result of individual carelessness or accident prone 
individuals. It argued that accidents could only be understood in 
the context within which they occuired. Some jobs clearly
involved more risk than others, hence explanations which emphasized 
the attitudes or psychological quirks of.individuals neglected vlirt
was probably the most important source cf accidents - the existence 
of hazards on the job. See: A.R. Hale and M. Hale "A Review of the 
Industrial Accident'Research Literature", ITftional Institute of 
Industrial psychology (London, H.M.S.O., 1972).
1 r
thoir employee~' Father it CK.tvf.mz the inctituvicrrl p rc. semes under 
which managers operate. -Those who sit in the boardrooms of industry 
are concerned, above all, with maximizing profits. They are frequently un­
familiar with the specific situations in each shop or factory owned by 
their firm. They do not know about, and frequently have little interest 
in, the hazards faced by their employees on the shop floor. From their 
point of view, the most important indicator of the success of each of 
their firm's divisions is the balance sheet. This means that they exert
constant pressure on lower-level management to maximize the profits of
20the divisions under their control. If a manager allocates too much of 
his firm's resources to safety measures, he reduces the profitability of 
his division. According to the criterion used by his supervisors to 
assess his performance, he is a failure and should be replaced by a man 
more attuned to the financial goals of the enterprise. The fact that 
his humane policies may have saved the lives of some of his employees 
is irrelevant., for his success is gauged not by the number of accidents 
or fatalities his policies have prevented, but by the profitability of 
the division under his authority. Under such circumstances, managers 
anxious to maintain or improve the 'performance' of their enterprises - 
and to keep their jobs - are forced to cut corners on health and safety.
This is exacerbated by the competitive market framework which places 
additional pressures on managers to emphasize efficiency and profits. 
Companies which allocate too much money to such matters lose their 
competitive edge, and as long a3 it is possible for one company to gain 1920
19. However, anyone familiar with reports on accidents and occupational 
diseases - such as the series of articles by Paul Brodeur in the 
Hew Yorker cited earlier - cannot but conclude that there are more 
callous and indifferent managers than would seem possible in a 
'civilized' society.
20. For an excellent discussion of how the pressure to keep up production 
influences the behaviour of lower .-level supervisors seei Theo Nichols 
and Pete Armstrong, 'Safety or Profits' (Bristol, 1973) pp. 13-25.
See alsos Ray Davidson, 'peril on the Job* o£. cit., pp. 16, 17.
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advantage over its rivals by ignoring . health and safety precautions, 
pressure is exerted on all others to do likewise. Each company can 
justify its practices with the argument that its competitors are doing 
the same thing. Moreover, as companies are increasingly multi-national 
in scope, the fact that some countries are lax in their enforcement 
of health and safety standards means that companies wishing to avoid 
large expenditures in this area can, and do, move to more profitable 
locations.
Another factor of considerable importance is that companies
rarely bear the full costs of occupational accidents- or diseases.
Medical expenses are usually paid for byihe state, while workmen^
compensation benefits do not remotely approximate to the_loss in income
to the workers affected. Because the costs of industrial accidents
are largely borne by workers and the community, rather than business,
22managers have li.ttle financial incentive to improve standards. Even 
the more narrowly economic inefficiencies created when workers are 
permanently disabled and therefore no longer able to contribute to the 
economy are avoided by the individual firm. They are categorized, to 
use the language of the economists, as ’externalities'.
When we look more closely at the safety arid health precautions 
taken by companies we find that they usually involve inexpensive ways to 21
21, For an outline of the inadequacies of the U.S. system of workmen's 
compensation sees James O'Brien, "More Injuries Less Compensation"
The American Federationist, (Feb., 1970) pp. 18-24. O'Brien notes 
that in many states the average level of compensation is less than one 
third of the workerte customary wage. In one state - Louisiana - it
is one fifthl The maximum benefit in over half the states is below 
the officially designated poverty level. For a discussion of 
compensation in Britain see: Patrick Kinnersley, The Hazards of Work, 
on. cit., pp. 263-313; Denis Gregory and Joe McCarthy, The Shop 
Steward's Guide to Workplace Health and Safety, op. cit., pp, 50-53»
22. The injured employee can, of course, take civil action against his 
employer. However, according to Professor P.S. Atiyah, only one in ten 
who does so wins his case. As the legal costs involved are usually 
quite high and the chances of success very low, many workers with 
justifiable claims are deterred from taking action. P.S. Atiyah, 
Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London, 1970) as cited in 
Safety and Health at Work. ££. ¿11., p. 144»
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reduce accidents and health hazards without making major changes in 
the production process. Rather than eliminating the safety hazards 
inherent in the design and lay-out of machinery, companies issue' safety 
glasses, safety shoes and similar protective equipment. As one company 
official noteds "Safety, when you get right down to it, is a matter of 
costs. Safety glasses cost $3«00 per employee. On the other hand,
0 7
safety shoes cost $14.00." J He might have mentioned that re-designing 
equipment or adopting new methods of work to avoid hazards often costs
tens of thousands of dollars. It is cheaper to give an employee a
, 24$3»00 pair of safety glasses and keep the unsafe machine in use.
And, if the worker is injured, the company can use the fact that it
issued safety equipment to avoid liability for his injury.
Campaigns designed to persuade workers that accidents are largely
a matter of individual carelessness are thus of considerable economic
benefit to management. By diverting attention from employer responsibility,
expenditures on safer equipment and methods of working can be minimized.
When accidents do occur, the employer can avoid paying compensation and
25reduce the risks of being sued for negligence. And, finally, such 
campaigns can reduce interference by government and trade unions who 
might otherwise demand a greater say in the design and development of 
new technologies and work methods. Thus they safeguard managerial 
prerogatives in this area. 2345
23. Dan Corditz, "Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job for Management", 
op. cit., p. 116.
24. Walter Johnson, "Assembly-Line Merry Go Round" Canadian Forum, July, 
1974» P. 10* This point is supported by a Fortune Survey on the 
reactions of U.S. business to the 1970 lawi "Manufacturers are most 
worried about the cost of eliminating safety hazards on machinery and 
reducing noise to the levels required under the law." Dan Corditz, 
"Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job for Lianagement", 0£. cit., p. 117
25. Walter Johnson, "Assembly Line Merry Go Round" op. cit., p. 10;
John Grayson and Charlie Goddard, "Industrial Safety and the Trade 
Union Movement", 0£. cit., pp. 7-12.
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A s t u d y  b y  N i c h o l s  a n d  A r m s t r o n g ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  
co m p an y r u l e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  w e re  s e t  u p  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  t h a t  t h e y
p r o t e c t e d  m an agem en t r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  w o r k e r s  w h o s e  l i v e s  w e r e  a t  r i s k .
T h i s  w a s  s o  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  s i m p l y  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  w o r k e r s  t o  m e e t
p r o d u c t i o n  q u o t a s  w i t h o u t  b r e a c h i n g  s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  A l t h o u g h
m an agem en t p r e s s u r i z e d  w o r k e r s  t o  m a x im is e  o u t p u t  a n d  t u r n e d  a  b l i n d
e y e  t o  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s  m ade t o  m e e t  s u c h  q u o t a s ,
w hen w o r k e r s  w e r e  i n j u r e d  i t  b la m e d  th em  f o r  t h e i r  i n j u r i e s  o n  t h e
g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  i g n o r e d  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  N i c h o l s  a n d  A r m s t r o n g
a l s o  fo u n d  t h a t  i n j u r e d  w o r k e r s  w e r e  f r e q u e n t l y  d i s c i p l i n e d  -  a  p r a c t i c e
w h ic h  e n c o u r a g e d  w o r k e r s  t o  ¡ a v o id  r e p o r t i n g  a c c i d e n t s ,  a n d  t h i s  m ade
t h e i r  f i r m ' s  S a f e t y  r e c o r d  l o o k  b e t t e r  t h a n  i t  a c t u a l l y  w a s . ^
C o m p a n ie s  h a v e  p e r s i s t e n t l y  o b s t r u c t e d  a t t e m p t s  b y  w o r k e r s  a n d  t r a d e
u n io n s  t o  know  m ore a b o u t  t h e  h a z a r d s  o f  t h e i r  j o b s  a n d  t h e  p r e c a u t i o n s
28
t h a t  o u g h t  t o  b e  t a k e n .  W o r k e r s  h a n d l i n g  c h e m i c a l s ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  a r e  
f r e q u e n t l y  d e n i e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t s  t h e y  
w o r k  w i t h .  T h e r e  a r e  c a s e s  o f  c o m p a n ie s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  r e m o v in g  a l l  
i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  c o n t a i n e r s  a f t e r  t h e y  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  s a f e t y ­
c o n s c i o u s  w o r k e r s  w e r e  l o o k i n g  up t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  s u c h  s u b s t a n c e s  a n d
29
d e m a n d in g  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r e c a u t i o n a r y  m e a s u r e s .  y T h e a rg u m e n t  n o r m a l ly  
u s e d  b y  m an agem en t t o  j u s t i f y  c o n c e a lm e n t  o f  t h e  n a m es an d  f o r m u la e  o f  
c h e m i c a ls  ’i s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  " t r a d e  s e c r e t s . " ^  B u t  t h e  r e a l  a rg u m e n t  i s  
t h a t  s a f e t y  m e a s u r e s  c o s t  t o o  m uch m o n e y . 2678*30
26
26. Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, Safety or Profits, on. oit., pp. 15-25.
27. Ibid., pp. 22-25. See alsoj John Grayson and Charlie Goddard, 
"Industrial Safety and the Trade Union Movement", o£. cit., pp. 8, 9»
28. Ray Davidson, "Peril on the Job" op. cit., p. 15. Patrick Kinnersly,
The Hazards of Work, op. cit.; Peter J. Smith, "For those in Peril on 
the Job", Nature, Vol. 251» (Oct., 18, 1974) PP» 561» 562} Paul Brodeur, 
"Industrial Casualties" Parts I & V, ojo. cit.
29» Ray Davidson, "Peril on the Job", 0£. cit., p. 15»
30. Ibid.. p. 15; Peter J. Smith, "For Those in Peril on the Faotory Floor", 
op. cit., p. 561; Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work, op. cit..
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F o re m e n  a n d  l o w e r  l e v e l  s u p e r v i s o r  e m p lo y e e s  a r e  a l s o  f r e q u e n t l y  
k e p t  i n  i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h e  h a z a r d s  o f  t h e  s u b s t a n c e s  t h e i r  w o r k e r s  h a n d l e .
A t  t h e  sam e t im e  t h e y  a r e  p u t  u n d e r  i n t e n s e  p r e s s u r e  t o  m a x im iz e  t h e  
o u t p u t  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  u n d e r  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y .  B e c a u s e  t h e y  d o  n o t  know  
w h e t h e r  s u b s t a n c e s  a r e  h a z a r d o u s  a n d  b e c a u s e  s a f e t y  p r e c a u t i o n s  r e d u c e  
o u t p u t ,  t h e y  t e n d  t o  dem and t h a t  j o b s  b e  d o n e  i n  t h e  m o s t  p r o d u c t i v e  w a y .
I f  w o r k e r s  a r e  h u r t ,  fo r e m e n  c a n  p l e a d  i g n o r a n c e .  H i g h e r * l e v e l  
m an agem en t c a n  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  u n a w a re  t h a t  p r e c a u t i o n s  w e r e  n o t  
b e i n g  t a k e n  b y  l o w e r  l e v e l  s u p e r v i s o r s .  T h u s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  
e v a d e d  b y  t h e  c o m p a n y .^
S i m i l a r l y ,  m e d ic a l  r e p o r t s  o f  co m p an y d o c t o r s  a r e  n o r m a l ly  w i t h h e l d
fr o m  w o r k e r s .  T h i s  m ean s t h a t  e m p lo y e e s  s u f f e r i n g  fr o m  i n i t i a l  s i g n s  o f
32
o c c u p a t i o n a l  d i s e a s e s  m ay b e  d e n i e d  k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  f a c t .  M o r e o v e r ,
u n io n s  a r e  n o t  g i v e n  a c c e s s  t o  s t a t i s t i c s  c o n c e r n i n g  i l l n e s s e s  am ong
t h e i r  m em b e rs. T h i s  i s  i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  w o u ld  i n d i c a t e
i f  p a r t i c u l a r  a i l m e n t s  a p p e a r e d  w i t h  u n u s u a l  r e g u l a r i t y  am ong c e r t a i n
g r o u p s  o f  w o r k e r s .  I t  w o u ld  a l s o  e n a b l e  u n io n s  t o  c o m p a re  t h e  i n c i d e n c e
o f  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s e a s e s  i n  c o m p a n ie s  u s i n g  s i m i l a r  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  t h u s
i d e n t i f y  i n d u s t r y - w i d e  h a z a r d s  m ore q u i c k l y .  Y e t  a s  P a t r i c k  K i n n e r s l y
p o i n t s  o u t ,  m a n a g e r s  d o  n o t  a l l o w  com p an y p h y s i c i a n s  t o  r e l e a s e  s u c h
i n f o r m a t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  c o u ld  b e  u s e d  t o  s u e  t h e  co m p an y f o r  n e g l i g e n c e
33
o r  t o  f o r c e  i t  t o  i n v e s t  i n  c o s t l y  h e a l t h  p r e c a u t i o n s .  I n d e e d ,  i t  
i s  v i r t u a l l y  u nkn ow n f o r  co m p an y d o c t o r s ,  who a r e  o s t e n s i b l y  h i r e d  t o  
p r o t e c t  t h e  h e a l t h  o f  e m p lo y e e s ,  t o  t e s t i f y  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  e m p lo y e r .
T h e co m p an y p h y s i c i a n  i s  o f t e n  m ore  p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  p r o t e c t i n g  h i s  312
31. T h eo  N i c h o l s  a n d  P e t e  A r m s t r o n g ,  " S a f e t y  o r  P x 'o f i t s " ,  o p .  c i t . ,  
pp. 21-30.
32. P a u l  B r o d e u r ,  " I n d u s t r i a l  C a s u a l t i e s " ,  ojr>. c i t . , P a r t  I I }
R ay  D a v id s o n ,  " P e r i l  o n  t h e  J o b " ,  £ £ . c i t . , p .  17.
33* Patrick Kinnersly, personal interview, October 18th, 1975.
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f i r m  fr o m  l i t i g a t i o n  an d  c o v e r i n g  up  i t s  u n s a f e  p r a c t i c e s  t h a n  h e  i s
34
w i t h  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  d a n g e r  t o  e m p lo y e e s .
A l t h o u g h  c o m p a n ie s  h a v e  p u h l i c a l l y  a s s e r t e d  t h e i r  co m m itm en t t o  t h e
w e l f a r e  o f  t h e i r  e m p lo y e e s ,  t h e y  h a v e  o p p o s e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  w h ic h  w o u ld
g u a r a n t e e  m inim um  s t a n d a r d s  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  W hen i t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  
I
w a s i m p o s s i b l e  t o  f o r e s t a l l  s u c h  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e y  l o b b i e d  v i g o r o u s l y
t o  k e e p  s t a n d a r d s  l o w .  I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e
O c c u p a t i o n a l  H e a l t h  a n d  S a f e t y  A c t  w a s  f o u g h t ,  c l a u s e  b y  c l a u s e ,  b y
b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s  a n x i o u s  t o  m in im iz e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  n ew  s a f e t y  e q u ip m e n t
a n d  p r o c e d u r e s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  F o r t u n e , "T h e  m e a s u r e . . .w a s  v i g o r o u s l y
o p p o s e d  b y  t h e  U .S .  C h am b er o f  C om m erce, t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f
M a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  t h e  I r o n  a n d  S t e e l  I n s t i t u t e ,  t h e  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  C h e m is t s
35
A s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  b u s i n e s s  g r o u p s . "
T h e  A . F . L .  -  C . I . O . ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  h o u s e  j o u r n a l ,  t h e  A m e r ic a n
F e d e r a t i o n a l i s t , " j e a l o u s l y  g u a r d s  e v e r y  comma a n d  s u b s e c t i o n  o f  t h a t
la w "  b e c a u s e  e m p lo y e r s  h a v e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  p r e s s  C o n g r e s s  t o  r e l a x  som e
36
o f  i t s  m ore s t r i n g e n t  p r o v i s i o n s .  T y p i c a l  o f  t h e  t a c t i c s  u s e d  b y  U .S .  
b u s i n e s s  t o  p r e v e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  t h e  r e c e n t  c a m p a ig n  t o  p r e v e n t  m ore 
s t r i n g e n t  n o i s e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  C o m p a n ie s  h a v e  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  
s u c h  l e g i s l a t i o n  w o u ld  b e  p r o h i b i t i v e .  To r e d u c e  t h e  maximum l e v e l  *2
34» John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety", 0£. cit., pp. I,
2. See also; Ray Davidson, "Peril on the Job", oj3. cit., p. 17}
Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work, op. cit., pp. 190-192. When 
Paul Brodeur, a journalist investigating the deaths of large numbers 
of asbestos workers,asked their company physician if he would give 
any details of his examinations, the doctor replied no. His reason 
was that he would infringe on the rights, not of his patients, but 
of his employerl Paul Brodeur, "Industrial Casualties", Part II, 
op. cit.
35» Dan Corditz, "Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job for Management", 
op. cit., p. 115. This is confirmed by the A.F.L. - C.I.O. who fought 
in support of the bill during its passage through Congress! See*
John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety',' 0£. cit., p. 1,
36. Franklin Wallick, The American Federationalist, (Dec., 1974) P* 21.
It is worth noting that Sweden already has passed legislation more 
stringent than anything proposed in the U.S.
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to 90 decibels, they argued, would involve $15 billion in additional
costs while a reduction to 85 decibels would increase this to $30 
37billion. The human cost to the hundreds of thousands of workers 
whose hearing would remain in danger if such laws were not passed was, 
however, of little concern to them.
Similar costing was done prior to the enactment of the 1970 Act 
in order to scare legislators into reducing the stringency of the bill*s 
provisions and thus keep TJ.S. business more competitive on the world
T O
m a r k e t .  S u c h  c l e a r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  h e a l t h  a n d  s a f e t y
r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  t h e  b a l a n c e  s h e e t ,  w hen c o u p le d  w i t h  a c t i v e  l o b b y i n g  t o
prevent government from imposing such standards, belies the claim that
workers and owners have a common interest in this area.
Companies have not limited their opposition to legislation on
industrial health and safety, however. They have also opposed the
expansion of the number of full-time factory inspectors charged with
e n f o r c i n g  t h e  e x i s t i n g  l a w s .  I n  B r i t a i n ,  i n  1971» t h e r e  w e r e  714
inspectors charged with enforcing the Factories Act, 135 inspectors
u n d e r  t h e  M in e s  a n d  Q u a r r i e s  A c t ,  44 i n s p e c t o r s  for a g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  a
39small number of local authority inspectors. Thus the entire working *38
37« Harry Conn, "Quieting Ear Pollution", The American Federationist, 
(Oct., 1975) pp» 21-25» See also an earlier article by the same 
author: "The Ear Pollutions Noise" The American Federationist (Oct., 
1971). For a discussion of the problem of noise in Britain sees 
Tony Fletcher, "Noises Fighting the Most Widespread Industrial 
Disease" The British Society For Social Responsibility . in Science 
(London, 1975)»
38. Dan Corditz, "Safety on the Job Becomes a Major Job for Management" 
op. cit., pp, 115, 117* According to Corditz, the National 
Association of Manufacturers claimed that the 1970 lav/ would cost 
$10 billion. They also estimated that for companies employing more 
than 5000 workers the cost would be $7,146,0001 Although the 
question of how such an exact figure could be calculated is worth 
raising, the important point is that companies have used such 
estimates to plead that they could not afford better safety measures.
39« Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work, op. cit., pp. 240-243. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that large amounts of the inspectorate's 
limited funds are absorbed by costs associated with taking a few 
employers to court. See: O.H. Parsons, "Accidentss A Tougher Line" 
Labour Research. Vol. 62, No. 11, (Nov., 1973) p. 235.
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population of Britain w&s »protected.’ by less than 1,000 inspectors.
As a consequence, the average factory was inspected once every four
years and many small factories were not inspected at all - unless, of
40course, a v.orker was killed or seriously injured.
Although enforcement in the U.S. varies from state to state, the
general picture is the same. In 1963, George Meany, the President of
the A.F.L. - C.I.O., submitted a brief to the congressional committee
deliberating on the bill which subsequently became the Occupational
Health and Safety Act of 1970» Meany pointed out that in the highly
industrialised state of Ohio there were more fish and game wardens than
41factory inspectors - 109 and 79 respectively. Subsequent research
revealed that Ohio was actually progressive in this regard. In Alabama,
the ratio was 105 to 12, in Arizona 55 to 5» in Missouri 145 to 19 and
in Oklahoma 15 to 5» For the entire United States there were only 1,661 
. 42inspectors in 1968.
The problem is exacerbated by the lack of research funds to identify
health and safety hazards and to improve existing practices. In 1971»
for example, only 40p» per worker was spent by the Factory Inspectorate 
43on research. This lack of funds is particularly important in fields 
such as industrial chemicals where an average of 3»000 new products are 40*
40. Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work, op. cit., pp, 240-243» For 
a good account of the problems of under3taffing seei Denis Gregory 
and Joe McCarthy, "The Shop Stewards Guide to Workplace Health and 
Safety", 0£. cit.. pp. 38-41» and Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, 
"Safety or Profits", ££. ci.t.. f pp. 1, 2} John Grayson, "The
Flixborough Disaster" Institute For Worker's Control} Pamphlet No. 41 
(Nottingham, 1975) PP» 12, 13»
41» George Meany, "Job Safety* A National Tragedy" The American 
Federationist, (April, 1968) p. 10.
42» Ibid., p. 10. See also* "O.S.H.A.* Why the Frustration" The American 
Federationist, (May, 1975) pp. 14-19»
43» Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, "Safety or Profits", 0£. cit., p. 2.
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introduced each year and where the expense of testing is so high that
the regulatory agencies often cannot afford to carry out proper research.
Frequently, they simply accept the claims of manufacturers until a
44 r.chemical is shown to have a deleterious effect. By then, of course,
it is too late for the workers concerned.
Although the enforcement and research facilities of regulatory
agencies in the U.S. and U.K. are inadequate, when companies are caught
violating the law, the penalties are so small that they do not act as
effective deterrents. Under the 1961 Factories Act, the maximum fine
was £300. The average fine in 1971 was £40. In that year, 269,000
45accidents were reported, but only 1,350 prosecutions were made. The 
1974 Act does provide stiffer penalties . including unlimited fines and 
up to 2 years in jail for some offences. But it remains to be seen whether 
the courts will impose heavier sentences. Past experience reveals that 
British judges have been extremely lenient towards companies violating 
the law.^
Turning to the United States, the unwillingness of the government to 
view industrial offences seriously i3 even more pronounced. Under the *46
44» In Britain, according to Kinnersly, total Government expenditure on 
research and enforcement is just over £10,000,000. In the U.S. the 
federal government's 1975 appropriation was $102,500,000. See:
Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work, op. cit., p, 243»
John R, Oravec, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety", 0£. cit., p. 2.
45» Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, "Safety or Profits", o£. cit. p.2. 
However, the new Chief Inspector of Factories seems more progressive 
than his predecessor. In 1973 there were just over 1800 prosecutions - 
not by any means enough in this writer*s opinion, although some 
improvement over the figure quoted above. Seet The Annual Report of 
the Chief Inspector of Factories, 1975, H.M.S.O. as cited by Labour 
Research, (January, 1975^ P.
46. There has been some controversy about the implications of the new act, 
especially among trade unionists. Insofar as it adheres to the 
philosophy and recommendations of the Robens Report, it suffers from 
the deficiencies discussed earlier. However, the act inoludes 
5,000,000 workers not previously covered by any legislation on health 
and safety which is certainly an improvement. The ceilings on fines and 
other penalties are also considerably greater. And, the new industry­
wide committees on safety may prove worthwhile innovations. See»
Denis Gregory and Joe McCarthy, The Shop ”L ’ • ~ '' ' - - -
Health, and Safety, op. cit.; John Grayso 
"Industrial Safety and TITS' Trade Union 1»
KJ U i r w c i i .  U . a  U T U A U g  1»U  » v u r K p x a c e ,
n a n d  C h a r l i e  G o d d a rd  
io v e m e n t"  ,0£i. c i t .
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1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, the average fine has been less
than 30 dollars.^ In a recent article in the A.P.L. - C.I.O.*s official
journal, the American Federationist, John R. Oravec gave a typical
example of the attitude of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration towards violators*
(W)hen 14 construction workers were killed and 34 
injured in the collapse of a high-rise apartment 
complex at Baileys Crossroads, Virginia, the total 
penalty amounted to $13,000.
A concrete subcontractor for the project was found 
in wilful violation of three federal standards, 
including the premature removal of concrete forms 
from the 23rd floor after the 24th floor was poured.
O.S.H.A. also charged the company with using damaged 
timber for shoring on two lower floors and failing to 
provide guard railings.
The company contested the case to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review commission. After a series 
of conferences the firm agreed to pay the $13,000 
penalty but made no admission to the charges. At that 
rate, the company paid a fine of about $30 per injured 
worker and less than $800 for each of the workers killed
in the disaster»^
Another difficulty is that factory inspectors frequently inform
management of their intention to visit a workplace in advance. As a
consequence, management has time to put things in order. Moreover,
if managers know that they will be notified ahead of time before an
inspector arrives, this may encourage them to ignore safety practices
49since they know that they are unlikely to be caught out. As 48*
47» John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fight for Job Safety", 0£. cit., p. 6.
"O.S.H.A.: Why The Frustration" The American Federationlst, '('May, 1975) 1 
pp. 14-19» This latter article gives a good summary of the weaknesses 
of the act from the perspective of the A.F.L. - C.I.O. See also:
Paul Brodeur, "Occupational Casualties" Parts I-V, op. cit. Erodeur 
documents the failure of the O.S.H.A. to enforce the regulations 
concerning exposure to asbestos. Other discussions of the reluctance 
of the U.S. federal government to exercise its authority can be found 
in: Ralph Nader, et. al., Bitter Wages (New York, 1971)» Rachel Scott, 
Muscle mid Blood, (New York, 1974)»
48. John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fightfof Job Safety" on* > P* 6.
49» In a conversation with Patrick Kinnersly on Oct. 18, 1975» he told me 
that he had obtained samples of the cards sent out by factory 
inspectors. My father, who worked as a carpenter until his retirement
last year, ji3ed to say that he always knew when the construction safety 
inspector was coming because, the day before his arrival, management
would suddenly décidé to clean up the. site and. repove all safetv hazards The day after, of course, safety woulci again be ignored. ^ naz&ras.
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Ray Davidson of the U.S. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union
caustically noted: "It is, as if a policeman with search warrant in
hand should telephone ahead to a suspect and say: ’We*re coming to
your place the day after tomorrow to see if you have any heroin on 
50the premises..."'
IV
The literature on industrial health and safety abounds with
examples of gross negligence on the part of companies anxious to cut
corners and boost profits at the expense of their workers. For
example, in a recent series of articles in the New Yorker, Paul Brodeur
described the operation of a small asbestos plant located in Tyler,
Texas. The plant, owned by the Pittsburg Corning Company, was inspected
51on a number of occasions between 1955 and 1975» On each occasion the
level of asbestos dust was in excess of official limits. Each time the
company promised the safety inspectors that they would remedy the
52situation but did not do so. At the same time, it told its employees 
that there was absolutely no risk to their health from the asbestos 
dust. The company doctor examined the workers and took X-rays of their 
lungs on several occasions during the period. He, too, claimed that 
asbestos was not a health hazard even though the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration had sent him several circulars on its dangers.^ 50123
50. Ray Davidson, "Perils on the Job" The American Federationist,
(Nov., 1970) p. 17.
51. Paul Brodeur, "Industrial Casualties", 0£. cit., Part I. See also:
John R. Oravec, "The Continuing Fight For Job Safety", op. cit.,
pp* 20, 21.
52. On one occasion it was fined $210.00. The final inspection, before the 
plant was closed, resulted in another fine of $6,999.00. Although the 
company was in serious violation of the law, the inspectors were un­
willing to penalize it heavily. See: Paul Brodeur, "Industrial 
Casualties", o£. cit., Part I, p. 106, Part II, p. 108.
53. Ibid., p. 108. .
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However, in 1971 a combination of events began which led to the closure
of the plant two years later. A new doctor in the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration came across the files of earlier inspections
of the plant and informed the union of the hazard that existed there.
After some research, the union gave a press conference, using it as an
54example of the negligence of companies in the asbestos industry.
Although such publicity normally dies down, and certainly the company hoped
that this would, happen, it did not, primarily because the firm was
endangering local residents by polluting the air with asbestos dust. It
was also selling tens of thousands of asbestos-ridden burlap bags
to a local nursery which, as it turned out, was the largest supplier of
rose bushes in the United States. Hundreds of thousands of rose3 wrapped
in the contaminated bags had been shipped throughout the country.
Ironically, it was because the asbestos plant posed a threat to the local
community and to rose buyers rather than its workers that the campaign
55against Pittsburg Corning continued.
Once it realized that the issue was not going to die down, the 
company responded by claiming that the cost of installing new safety 
equipment demanded by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
was too high. It then proceeded to close the plant, dig a huge pit in the 
ground and bury all the equipment used in processing asbestos. At the 
same time, it maintained that there had been no risk either to the 
community or its employees. This, of course, was toravoid liability for 
the damage done to the health of employees, residents of Tyler and rose 
lovers across the country.. However, the National Cancer Institute thinks 
differently» it estimates that of 895 employees who worked at the plant 
during its 17 year history, 260 will die of cancer. Moreover, many others *5
54» Ibid., Part I
55. Ibid., Part II.
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have experienced so much lung damage that they cannot pass the standard
56medical necessary to obtain another job.
The reason for the callous attitude of the Pittsburg Coming
C,ompany towards its workers is not that its top executives are ignorant
of what is happening on the shop floor or that a few key managers have
failed to recognize their moral obligations towards employees. Rather,
as Paul Brodeur rightly points out, it stems directly from the view
that workers are instruments of production.
Much of industry in the United States has long 
operated on the assumption that it could endanger 
the lives of its employees with relative impunity - 
and without embarrassing publicity and possibly 
damaging repercussions - as long as it did not 
overtly threaten the health and safety of the 
community at large. Underlying this assumption 
is the further assumption that workers are not so 
much a part of the community as part of the equipment 
and machinery of production. As such, upon being 
proved defective, they become expendable. They can 
be replaced or transferred, or, if worst comes to worst, 
given workmen's compensation (which in most states is 
minimal) and retired. At that point, they cease to be 
anyone's responsibility. Like the eight-hundred and 
ninety-five men who worked in the Tyler plant over the 
years, they are out of sight, out of mind. In a sense, 
therefore, like much of the factory itself, they are
buried.57
In the summer of 1975» a small factory in Hopewell, Virginia, which
produced the pesticide Kapone,was shut down. According to David Bell
of the Financial Times: "Twentyj-nine former workers are in hospital
with tremors, loss of memory, slurred speech, loss of weight, erratic
58eye movements, and liver damage." So lax were the company's safety 
precautions that when hehl,th inspectors visited the plant they "...found 
a film of kapone dust, 95 per cent pure,all over the tables in the
56. Ibid.. Part V.
57. Ibid., Part II, pp.128-130.
58. David Bell, "The Unknown Poison" Financial Times, (Jan., 9» 1976)
p. 4» Slion Y/inchester, "The Job that Poisoned a Town Called Hopewell" 
The Guardian (Feb., 18, 1976).
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c a n t e e n . I f  it had not been for the competence of two doctors who 
recognized that one of their patients, an employee of the firm, was 
suffering from kapone poisoning, the plant might still be operating 
today.
Yet the company, ironically named Life Science Products, disclaims
responsibility for the damage done to its employees, arguing that because
the pesticide was not on.the Government's prescribed list it had no
reason to suspect that kapone was dangerous. Disingenuous as this
argument is, the reason underlying the firm's attempt to escape
responsibility is clears a 29 million dollar lawsuit by former employees.
V/hat is more disturbing, however, is the fact that 36 other companies also
produce the chemical. They were not notified of its hazards by the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration until January, 1976. Thus
60thousands of other workers may also be suffering from exposure to it.
In the spring of 1976, seven men working at the Yi/heeler and Pearsall 
factory in Market Drayton, Shropshire, began to feel headaches and 
dizziness as they worked on a batch of zinc dross. After they had been 
admitted to hospital, it was realized that they were suffering from 
poisoning from arsine gas emitted during the production process. Once 
in the bloodstream the arsenic began to destroy their red blood cells and 
each man had to be given more than 16 pints of blood in the effort to 
save their lives. It was not enough to save one of the workers, however, 
a 22 year old man who had ju3t been married. The other six survived, but 
will suffer from major nervous disorders for the rest of their lives.
The company,which was convicted of negligence,was fined £200 although, 
according to Oliver Gillie, the Factory Inspectorate "...estimated that 
arsine gas in the air at the factory was between 22 and 00 times the 
permitted level." ^
59» David Bell, "The Unknown Poison" oj% cit., p. 4.
60. Ibid., p, 4.
61. Oliver Gillie, "The- Low
Sunday Times (May, 23,
62. Ibid., p . 3»
°f ^ iskins Factory -Yorkers' Health" The ■LyioJ p. 3 , - --
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A l t h o u g h  h u n d r e d s  -  p e r h a p s  t h o u s a n d s  -  o f  o t h e r  e x a m p le s  c o u ld  h e  
u n c o v e r e d ,  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  w o u ld  h e  t h e  sa m e: t h e  p r i o r i t y  p l a c e d  o n  
m a x im iz in g  o u t p u t  a n d  p r o f i t s  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a  s i t u a t i o n  w h e r e  t h e  w e l l ­
b e i n g  o f  w o r k e r s  i s  i g n o r e d .  O f  c o u r s e ,  n o t  a l l  a c c i d e n t s  c a n  h e  p r e v e n t e d .  
B u t  m any m ore c o u l d  h e ,  i f  s u f f i c i e n t  t im e  a n d  r e s o u r c e s  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  
t h e  t a s k .  Y e t  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  w o r k e r s  who w o u ld  b e n e f i t  m o s t  b y  s u c h  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  d o  n o t  h a v e  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m ake th e m , a n d  t h e  o w n e r s  who do 
h a v e  t h e  p o w e r  s t a n d  t o  l o s e  b y  m a k in g  th e m , i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  c a n  b e  r e m e d ie d .
I n d e e d ,  we c a n n o t  d o  b e t t e r  t h a n  t o  c i t e  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  R o b e n s
R e p o r t  m ade b y  N i c h o l s  a n d  A r m s t r o n g  -  a  c r i t i c i s m  w h ic h  h a s  a  m uch w i d e r
a p p l i c a t i o n  t h a n  t h e  r e p o r t  i t s e l f :
F l a c c i d  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a b o u t  ’ a p a t h y '  a n d  a  n a i v e  
t r u s t  i n  t h e  g o o d w i l l  o f  men l i k e  t h e m s e l v e s  w e r e ,  
i t  s e e m s , e n o u g h  t o  c o n v i n c e  R o b e n s  t h a t  t h e  m a in  
p r o b le m  w a s  t o  a l l o w  t h i s  sam e g o o d w i l l  f r e e - r e i n .
B u t  t h e n ,  t h e  R o b e n s  R e p o r t  w a s  l a r g e l y  w r i t t e n  b y  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ,  t h e  k i n d  o f  p e o p l e  f o r  whom, m a y b e , 
t h e  t h o u g h t  co m e s h a r d  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  s a f e t y  a n d  
h e a l t h  p r o b le m  i s  t o  p r o t e c t  w o r k e r s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
i n h e r e n t  ’ u n n a t u r a l '  e x c e s s e s  o f  a  s o c i e t y  d o m in a te d  
b y  t h e  m a r k e t ;  a  s o c i e t y  i n  w h ic h  som e men a r e  p a i d  t o  
s q u e e z e  a s  m uch p r o d u c t i o n  a s  p o s s i b l e  o u t  o f  o t h e r s .
B l i n d  t o  t h i s ,  t h e y  n e v e r  sa w  t h a t  w h a t l i e s  b e h in d  
s o  m any a c c i d e n t s  i s  n o t  a n  a p a t h e t i c  s t a t e  o f  m in d  
b u t  a  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c o n c r e t e  r e a l i t y  o f  
g e t t i n g  t h e  j o b  o u t .  M o s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e y  n e v e r  r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  i n  a  s o c i e t y  d e e p l y  d i v i d e d  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  who 
c o n t r o l  a n d  t h o s e  who a r e  c o n t r o l l e d ,  g o o d w i l l ,  
h o w e v e r  m uch o f  i t  e x i s t s , i s  s i m p l y  n o t  e n o u g h ; t h a t  
s i n c e  s a f e t y  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  p u t t i n g  p e o p l e  b e f o r e  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  p e o p l e  who d o  t h e  p r o d u c i n g  m u st h a v e  
p o w e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e i r  s a f e t y  i s  p u t  f i r s t . ^
V
Y e t  i f  t h e  d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t s  o f  p r i v a t e  o w n e r s h ip  a n d  c o n t r o l  a r e  
m o s t  v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  h e a l t h  a n d  s a f e t y ,  t h e y  a r e  b y  n o  m ean s
63» T h e o  N i c h o l s  a n d  P e t e  A r m s t r o n g ,  " S a f e t y  o r  P r o f i t s " ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  30 
( t h e i r  e m p h a s i s ) .
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limited to it. Another area of concern is the impact of narrow, 
circumscribed jobs on mental health. Although writers from Adam Smith 
onwards have speculated that simple, repetitive work had a stifling 
effect on the minds of those performing it,the precise nature of this 
effect has always been difficult to assess. Indeed, there are some 
theorists, such as Clarke Kerr and John T. Dunlop, who contend that 
workers compartmentalize their jobs from the rest of their lives such 
that the effects of routine work do not ’’spill-over” into other areas 
of life.64 *
Others have not been so optimistic. The most extensive study of the 
psychological impact of work is Arthur Kornhauser’s The Mental Health of 
the Industrial Worker. The purpose of Kornhauser’s research was to find 
out which of two opposing views presented a more accurate picture of the 
effect of work on mental health. Was the average manual worker ’’happy
gcand well adjusted” or was he predominantly”bitter and depressed”? J And, 
more specifically, did ’’simple, unchallenging tasks tend to produce poor 
mental health” , or, ’’did Workers adjust to their work in such a way as to 
negate the harmful effects usually attributed to it”?66 67
Komhauser recognized the difficulties involved in defining a concept 
such as mental health and he examined a number of factors which he thought 
ought to be taken into account in arriving at a working definition of the
Sr*
term. For example, he noted that problems such as cultural and class
6 4. Clarke Kerr, John T. Dunlop, et- al.Industrialism and Industrial Man, 
op. oit.
65» Arthur Kornhauser, The Mental Health of the Industrial Worker, (London, 1964)
p. 2.
66. Ibid., p. 2. There are a number of other valuable studies of repetitive, 
assembly-line work which provide support for Kornhauser’s views. See:
C.R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, The Man on the Assembly Line (Cambridge, 
Mass, 1952); Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream (New 
York, 1955)? Harvey SwadoB.' On the Line (Boston,' 1957)» William Serrin,
The Company and the Union (New York, 1973)5 Hew Beynon, Working for Ford 
(London, 1973). ....
6 7. Arthur Komhauser, The Mental Health of the Industrial Worker, op. cit_. f 
pp. 1 1-1 5 .
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b i a s e s  c o n s t i t u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  w h ic h  h a d  t o  b e  g i v e n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n
68
w hen a s s e s s i n g  t h e  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  o f  w o r k in g  p e o p l e .  Y e t  h e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n v o l v e d  o u g h t  n o t  t o  o b s c u r e  a  f a c t  w h ic h  w a s  e q u a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t :  som e p e o p l e  c l e a r l y  d i d  e n j o y  b e t t e r  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  t h a n  o t h e r s .
To s a y  t h a t  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  w a s i n d e f i n a b l e  w a s ,  i m p l i c i t l y ,  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
t h e r e  w a s  n o  s u c h  t h i n g  a s  m e n t a l  i l l n e s s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  h e  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  
t h e  p r o b le m s  i n v o l v e d  i n  a r r i v i n g  a t  a  w o r k in g  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  m e n ta l!  h e a l t h  
w e r e  n o t  i n s u r m o u n t a b le  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  s u c h  a  d e f i n i t i o n  w e r e  
k e p t  i n  m in d .
U n d e r l y i n g  K o m h a u s e r ’ s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  i s  t h e  a s s u m p t io n
t h a t  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  h a v e  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  n e e d s .  T h e s e  n e e d s  a r e  t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o  s p e c i f i c  g o a l s  b y  a  c o m p le x  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  i n h e r i t e d  t r a i t s  a n d  
60
s o c i a l i z a t i o n .  '  I n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  s o c i e t y ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  s t r i v e  t o  s a t i s f y
t h e i r  n e e d s  t h r o u g h  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  a  n u m b er o f  g o a l s  s u c h  a s  e c o n o m ic
s e c u r i t y ,  in d e p e n d e n c e ,  s o c i a l  a p p r o v a l * .  a  s e n s e  o f  a c c o m p lis h m e n t  a n d ,
70
p e r h a p s  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  s e l f - e s t e e m  a n d  p e r s o n a l  w o r t h .  R e j e c t i n g
M a s lo w ’ s  h i e r a r c h y  o f  n e e d s  t h e o i y ,  K o r n h a u s e r  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  " . . . e a c h  p e r s o n
s t r u g g l e s ,  t h r o u g h  a l l  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s *  t o  m a i n t a i n  f a v o u r a b l e  s e l f - f e e l i n g s
a n d  t o  d e f e n d  h i s  s e n s e  o f  p e r s o n a l  i d e n t i t y  a n d  w o r t h  w h en  t h r e a t e n e d  b y
71
f a i l u r e s ,  f r u s t r a t i o n s  a n d  p a i n f u l l y  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  w i s h e s . "  K o r n h a u s e r  
s u m m a r is e d  h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w a y : 68970
6 8. Ibid.. p. 1 7 .
69. Ibid., pp. 12,13. This view has much in common with that of
. psychologists such as Erich Fromm. See: The Sane Society (London.
1956) Ch. 2.
70. I b i d . , p. 13.
71 • Ibid., p. 1 4 .
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...(G)ood mental health, as measured here, means 
that the persons so labelled have high probability 
of feeling well satisfied with their lives, definitely 
positive and favourable in their self-feelings, 
relatively free of nervousness and anxiety (especially 
true of middle aged). With probabilities slightly 
lower, they also tend to have high morale (trust in 
people and society, freedom from "anomie" or social 
alienation) and little manifestation of strong 
hostility. They are likewise somewhat less socially 
withdrawn. Mental health that is "not good" or "low" 
implies the opposite of these characteristics.72
He then postulated that work would facilitate the attainment of good 
mental health to the extent that it allowed individuals to satisfy their 
needs, and impede it to the extent that it frustrated such needs. To 
verify this theory he selected a group of workers in the ’archetypal’ mass 
production industry: automobiles. Korhhauser chose this industry, because 
it employed skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers working within the 
same establishment, on the same product, and in basically the same conditions 
Thus it was possible to eliminate a number of variables which would otherwise 
limit the significance of the findings.
Komhauser’s sample was composed of 655 workers in two age groups 
(20-29 and 40-49) and 402 of their wives. All lived in or near Detroit."^
The sample was divided into two groups; a ’core', composed of 407 manual 
workers employed in thirteen automobile plants; and a comparison group of 
248 workers with similar incomes in other occupations."^ The comparison 
group included manual workers in eight factories located in the small
7 2 . Ibid., p. 4 5 .
73. Ibid., pp. 18, 19* Although many people have the impression that 
automobile plants consist only of an assembly-line, in fact there 
are still a surprisingly large number of skilled workers working in 
them. For a good outline of the various skills used in the industry, 
see: Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream, op. cit., 
or C.R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, The Man on the Assembly Line,
op. cit.
74* Ibid., pp. 18. 19.
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towns surrounding Detroit, manual workers in six non-manufacturing
companies in Detroit and office workers in three non-manufacturing and
75six automobile firms. Thus Komhauser had a representative cross-
secticn of working class people with which to compare his findings on
the 'core* group of auto workers.
Komhauser’s methodology was based upon the in-depth interview
technique, but he supplemented the information so obtained with data from
company records and ot]ber sources. Prom the material gathered in the
interviews, Komhauser placed each worker into one of three categories*
high, medium or low mental health. This categorization was based upon the
use of six indices of mental health: "manifest anxiety and emotional
tension"; "self-esteem"; "hostility versus ttrust"; "sociability and
friendship"; "overall satisfaction with life"; and, finally, "personal 
76morale". To check on the reliability of his assessment, Kornhau3er
gave forty interview transcripts to several noted clinical psychologists
for their diagnosis of the mental health of the interviewees. Their
evaluations coincided to a remarkable degree both with one another and
77with the assessment made by Kornhauser. Comparisons were also made with 
the evaluations made by wives about the mental health of their husbands
»70
using these same indices. Again there was a remarkable degree of 
agreement. Finally, an analysis of the interviews themselves confirmed 
that there was a high correlation among all six indices of mental health. 
Workers who had high anxiety levels were more likely to have low self­
esteem, low satisfaction with life and so on. Conversely, those with low
75« Ibid., p. 18.
76. Ibid., p. 25. Komhauser goes into considerable detail to explain 
and justify the use of these six indices and, subsequently, to 
discuss the mathematical significance of the correlations among them. 
Unfortunately, space does not permit us to give more than a brief 
account of his experimental design.
77. Ibid., pp. 3 1, 33.
78. Ibid., pp. 33» 34.
levels of anxiety were more likely to have high self esteem and high
79satisfaction with life. All correlations were mathematically
•*. . COsignifleant.
Komhauser’s next step was to analyze the findings to see if there
was any relationship between the job a worker performed and his level of
mental health. The data from the interviews showed unequivocally that
the more routine the job, the lower the mental health of workers.
The overall results are clear and striking. When 
workers are classified into job levels by reference 
to skill and variety of work operations, responsibility 
and pay, mental health scores show consistent and 
significant correlation with the occupational hierarchy.
The higher the occupation the better the mental health 
on the average, (his emphasis)'-»!
While 5Cjfa of skilled and high semi-skilled young workers had
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high mental, health scores, only 10$ of young workers performing
82repetitive semi-skilled jobs had high levels of mental health. VJhon
this second category wa3 cub-divided into machine-paced (i.e. assembly
line) and non-machine-paced semi-skilled, the former category had only
7$ with high mental health, indicating workers on the assembly line showed
more signs of psychological damage than workers performing routine semi- 
83skilled jobs. A similar pattern emerged from the analysis of the *802
79* Ibid., pp. 27-2 8 , 40- 5 3.
80. Ibid., p. 46.
ol. Ibid., p. 56.
82. Ibid., p. 57* It may be argued that the results of such surveys in 
automobile plants are of little significance because only a tiny 
proportion of the workforce functions under such conditions. This 
is true. And it is also true that the number of workers whose jobs 
are organized around a conveyor belt is fairly small as well - tho 
usual figure cited is in the vicinity of 5$* l'he implication 
normally drawn from this is that because most workers do not 
experience a situation similar to that in an automobile plant, tho 
findings of psychologists such as Komhauser have little significance 
beyond the immediate group of workers studied. This view is mistaken, 
however. For while most people do not work in similar circumstances, 
the amount of discretion and control that they have over their work 
is not significantly greater than that of auto workers. Indeed, there 
are manjr jobs which are actually worse than that of the auto assembler
S3. Ibid., p. 57.
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interviews of middle aged workers, although the proportion performing
Q4repetitive, machine-paced work having high mental health scores was 16$.
In the comparison groups in other occupations, similar results on the
85relationship of mental health and skill were found. Thus it was 
clear that the job a worker performed provided a good indication of his 
state of mental health.
Yet Komhauser realized that these findings did not confirm the 
theory that repetitive work had a detrimental impact on mental health.
It was possible, for example, that individuals with poor mental health 
might be disproportionately represented in low skilled jobs. Poor mental 
health might prevent them from acquiring skills necessary to move into a more 
satisfying job. Conversely, those with good mental health might be more 
strongly motivated to advance into skilled jobs. Other factors such as 
education, family history and so forth might also be responsible for the 
disparities in mental health among different categories of workers. Thus 
Komhauser felt that it was necessary to find further evidence which 
would demonstrate the connection between repetitive work and low mental 
health. ■
Job satisfaction appeared to provide this connection. As with the 
concept of mental health, Kornhauser acknov/ledged that the notion of job 
satisfaction wa3 extremely complex. It depended upon the individual^ 
psychological make-up, his attitudes towards work, hi3 relations with 
other workers, his income and many other factors aside from the 
characteristics of the job he performed. Because it was a subjective 
response to the experience of work, it could not readily be equated .with 
measurable factors such as the repetitiveness of a job. Despite this, 845
84. Ibid., p. 57.
85. Ibid., p. 60
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K o r n h a u s e r  f e l t  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  j o b  s a t i s f a c t i o n  a n d
86
p o o r  m e n t a l  h e a l t h .
A c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v i e w  d a t a  c o n f ir m e d  t h a t  w o r k e r s  w i t h
h i g h  j o b  s a t i s f a c t i o n  h a d  h i g h  m e n t a l  h e a l t h ,  w h i l e  w o r k e r s  w i t h  lo w  j o b
87
s a t i s f a c t i o n  b a d  p o o r  m e n t a l  h e a l t h .  K o r h h a u s e r  t h e n  a t t e m p t e d  t o
d i s c o v e r  w h a t  s p e c i f i c  a s p e c t s  o f  j o b  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w e r e  m o s t  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d
t o  m e n t a l  h e a l t h .  W as i t  t h e  t a s k  i t s e l f ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  w a g e s ,  s u p e r v i s i o n ,
88
co m p an y p o l i c y ,  p e n s i o n  p l a n s  o r  a n y  o f  a  n u m b er o f  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s ?
A g a i n  h e  w a s  a b l e  t o  c o n f i r m  h i s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  f o r  h e  fo u n d  t h a t  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  u s e  a b i l i t i e s  w a s  t h e  f a c t o r  m o s t  s t r o n g l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h
good mental health.
The statistical analysis as a whole leaves no doubt of 
the relationships workers' feeling regarding the use 
of their abilities is unmistakenly associated with the 
superior mental health of the group in higher factory 
jobs and the poorer mental health at low job levels.°9 *
86.
87.
88. 
89.
I b i d . , pp. 78-82. 
I b i d . , pp. 85-85. 
I b i d . , p .  8 6 .
Ibid., p. 98. It is interesting to compare Kornhauser's findings with
those of E.L. Trist in the British Coal Industry, Trist wanted to find 
out why psychological stress (reflected in absenteeism, sickness and 
accident rates) increased when the Longwall method of mining was 
introduced after the Second World War. After comparing the traditional 
way of working in which a group of 6 men spread over 3 shifts performed 
all work at the coal face and were paid collectively, with the new . / 
method in which 41 men on 5 shifts performed separate tasks and were 
paid individually, Trist concluded that the restricted work roles and 
lack of cohesive social groups were responsible for the greater stress 
experienced by miners under the new method. To test this theory, he 
and several other members of the Tavistock Institute persuaded the 
Coal Board to experiment with a new method of organizing work which 
would utilize the technology of the Longwall system but re-arrange 
the tasks and social organization to restore the "responsible autonomy" 
of the older system. The 41 workers were given collective 
responsibility for all work at the coal face and paid a lump sum for 
their total production. Jobs were again rotated among the workers and 
cohesive work-groups were re-established. Under the new system, workers 
performed an average of 3*6 major tasks as opposed to the single task 
assigned them under the Longwall method. The result was to reduce 
unexplained absenteeism from 4*3$ of the shifts to 0.4$. Sickness 
declined from 8.9$ to 4*8$. And, accidents decreased to 3*2$ from 
6.8$. Interviews with miners confirmed that the new system was 
preferred to the old. See: E.L.Trist, "Social Structure and 
Psychological Stress" Paper presented at the Mental Health Research 
Fund Conference on: Research on Stress in Relation to Mental Health and ■
Mental Illness, Lincoln College, Oxford, July 15-18, 1958. See also: E.L. Trist and H. Murray, "Work Organization at the Coal Face", 
Tavistock Institute (London, 1,953); G.W. Higgins ''Studies in Work Organization at the Coal Face" Human Relations, Vol. XII, Ho. 3,
1 9 5 9 .
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A s e c o n d ,  r e l a t e d  f a c t o r  w a s w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  j o b  w a s  i n t r i n s i c a l l y
i n t e r e s t i n g .  In co m e  l e v e l  ( b u t  n o t  w a g e s  a s  s u c h )  a l s o  h a d  some im p a c t
90
o n  m e n t a l  h e a l t h ,  a s  d i d  r e p e t i t i v e n e s s  a n d  m a c h in e  p a c i n g .  F i n a l l y ,
t h e  p e r c e i v e d  im p o r t a n c e  o r  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  a  j o b  a l s o  a p p e a r e d  t o  i n c r e a s e
91
t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  d e r i v e d  fr o m  i t .  O t h e r  f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  s u p e r v i s i o n ,
s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  j o b  s e c u r i t y ,  p h y s i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  w o r k , an d
92
a d v a n c e m e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  h a d  n o  d i s c e r n i b l e  e f f e c t .  T h u s K o r h h a u s e r 's  
o r i g i n a l  s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  j o b  -  w h e t h e r  s k i l l e d  
o r  u n s k i l l e d ,  i n t e r e s t i n g  o r  m o n o to n o u s  -  a r e  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  w a s  g i v e n  s u p p o r t  b y  h i s  
r e s e a r c h .
K o r n h a u s e r  a l s o  t r i e d  t o  f i n d  o u t  i f  f u l f i l m e n t  a t  w o r k  i n f l u e n c e d
a  w o r k e r 's  o v e r a l l  h a p p i n e s s  a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n s  d e r i v e d
fro m  f a m i l y  a n d  l e i s u r e  a c t i v i t i e s .  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v i e w  d a t a
p r o v i d e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  ' s p i l l o v e r '  h y p o t h e s i s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e
93
c o m p a r t m e n t a l i s t  v i e w .  W orker.a  w i t h  s a t i s f y i n g ,  s k i l l e d  j o b s  t e n d e d  t o  
h a v e  h a p p i e r  f a m i l y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a n d  m ore  e n j o y a b l e  l e i s u r e  a c t i v i t i e s .  
T h e y  a l s o  t e n d e d  t o  b e  m ore s o c i a b l e  a n d  t o  b e  a c t i v e  i n  co m m u n ity
94
a c t i v i t i e s .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  m o s t  w o r k e r s  p e r f o r m i n g  r e p e t i t i v e  s e n i o r  s e m i­
s k i l l e d  j o b s  h a d  n o t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  h o b b i e s  o r  o t h e r  i n t e r e s t s  
t o  c o m p e n s a te  f o r  t h e  d e p r i v a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  w o r k ,  I n  s h o r t ,  j o b  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  -  a t  l e a s t  am ong t h e  655 w o r k e r s  i n c l u d e d  i n  K o r n h a u s e r 's  9012*4
90. Ibid.-, pp, 123-127. The distinction between income and wages is 
that the former assesses the effect of the worker's standard of 
living while the latter gauges the perceived fairness of 
remuneration in relation to what other workers are paid.
91. Ibid., pp. 122, 127.
92. Ibid., pp. 93-97.
95« Ibidj, pp. 192-194. For a good discussion of these two approaches 
to the relationship between work and leisure sees Stanley Parker, 
The Future of Work and Leisure, op. cit.
94. Ibid., pp. 195-198.
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survey - had a significant, and often detrimental, impact on other areas 
of life.95
Komhau3er also explored the impact of work on workers* personal
goals and self images. He found that factory workers in general, and
workers in repetitive, semi-skilled assembly-line jobs in particular,
tended to have a passive orientation towards life. Wbi'le 69?$ of his
white-collar comparison group exhibited a "purposive life style" only
20$ of middle aged and 50$ of young factory workers had a similar 
96orientation. "These figures", Komhauser concluded, "support the view
that factory work tends to stifle ambition and initiative in young men,
not only with respect to work career, but in ways that affect life away
97from work as well." Another measurement of the attitudes of workers
towards themselves assessed traits such as self-reliance, ambition,
initiative and desire for success. Again the findings were disturbing,
because they pointed to "...the very limited self expectations, the
degree of passivity, fatalism and resignation that characterise many of 
98the workers." Factory workers, particularly those in unskilled jobs,
had lost much of their desire for self-expression, personal development,
99and other goals associated with self-realization.
What is impressive in the men*s reports of their 
* life aims is the absence of larger horizons, the
poverty of their aspirations and life expectations; 
the pedestrian, unaroused, unstimulated conception 
of their potentialities, whether for the enrichment 
of their private liveo or for effective action towards 
social ends. uu
95. Ibid., pp. 203-207.
9 6. Ibid., p. 239* As vie noted earlier, the white collar group had the 
same income .as the blue collar Workers.
97. Ibid., p. 239.
98. Ibid., p. 239.
99. Ibid.. p. 242.
100. Ibid., p. 246. See also: C.A. Walker and Charles Guest, The I,Tan On
The Assembly Line, op. cit., .
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Komhauser»s explanation for such low aspirations was that impulses
towards self-expression were so effectively "suppressed" by.the factory
system that they were eventually "abandoned". In this regard, the fact
that older workers tended towards a more passive orientation towards
life suggested that their work experience had driven them to accept a
101limited and restricted view of their human potential.
Turning to what workers thought of themselves, Korhhauser found 
that unskilled factory work led to low levels of self-e3teem and 
individual worth. While 67$ of young white collar workers and 54$ of 
non-factory workers in the comparison group had high levels of self­
esteem, only 27$ of young factory-workers in repetitive unskilled jobs
102had similar levels. These figures do not, however, convey an adequate
101. Ibid., pp. 250, 251.
102. Ibid., p. 253» Komhauser's work has not gone uncriticized, however. 
Charles L. Hulin, for example, argues that Kornhauser»s criteria
for assessing mental health reflects a middle class bias. He also 
asserts that the methodology has major weaknesses arising from the 
fact that the interviewers might well have elicited the responses 
they wanted rather than obtaining an accurate picture of the 
attitudes and feelings of working people. And, Hulin contends that 
the alleged low mental health of as3embly-line workers may be caused 
by other factors unrelated to the jobs they perform.
However, Hulin does not substantiate these criticisms adequately.
On the first point, he simply assumes that cultural differences 
between the middle class interviewers and their working class subjects 
are sufficient to account for the low mental health scores obtained 
by the assembly line workers. But this does not explain why the 
comparison groups of blue collar workers had substantially higher 
levels of mental health. Nor does it indicate why unskilled workers 
in machine paced jobs should have lower mental health scores than 
other, similarly paid, unskilled workers. Moreover, it is difficult 
to see how a person scoring low on Kornhauser»s six indices of mental 
health could be interpreted as having "normal" mental health. The 
fact that large numbers ofrarking people have low self-esteem, low 
aspirations, high levels of anxiety and so forth does not mean that 
such psychological characteristics are desirable or that toe should 
refrain from criticizing an industrial system which leads to such 
responses.
On the second point, Hulin simply ignores Komhauser»s extensive - and 
exhaustive - attempt to ensure that his research was methodologically 
sound. Finally, Hulin fails to note Kornhauser's attempt to separate 
the influence of the job from factors such as education, home background, 
poverty and other influences which could undermine the validity of his 
results. See: Charles L. Hulin, "Industrial Differences and Job 
Enlargement - The Case Against General Treatments" in John M. Shepard 
(ed.) Organizational Issues in Industrial Society (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1972) pp. 399-400.
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image of what this means in human terms. The following are typical 
of the responses of workers to a question concerning their ability 
to "...make your future what you want it to be."^-*“^
"Hot me, I'm too dumb."
"No, I don't think I can; for one thing I don't 
have the ability."
"Gues3 I just haven't got it. My conditions are 
my own fault."
I don't .know but there's something in me makes me 
feel I'm not doing much of what I really feel good 
about."104
However, such negative self-images were a result of the job workers 
performed and not a reflection of the low aspirations of working people.
V
The conclusion that workers with challenging jobs tend to have
better mental health has been corroborated by a number of other studies.
In a review of recent American literature on this question, Claude Bowman
has pointed to the convergence of post-war findings.
Skilled workers have few distinguishing characteristics 
except that they are the least likely to admit to having 
any worries; nor do their wives stand out as distinctive; 
semi-skilled workers, along with other blue collarites, 
are not especially happy either in general or in their 
^ marriages; but their wives frequently report feeling that 
a nervous breakdown is imminent. Unskilled workers 
report more general unhappiness and have a more negative 
self-image than any other group. Their wives are 
unhappy in their marriages find blame their husbands for 
this. They too feel that they are on the verge of a 
nervous breakdown...
It may be concluded from this investigation that the world 
of. semi-skilled and especially unskilled workers is an 
unhealthy environment for them and their families. (His 
emphasis).105
103. Ibid., pp. 352, 354.
104. Ibid., pp. 254» 255« See .also: Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The 
H id d e n  Injuries of Class, op. cit., and Richard Sennett and 
Jonathan Cobb, "Betrayed American Workers" New York R e v ie w  of Books.
(Oct., 5, 1972) pp. 31-55.
105. Charles C. Bowman, "Mental Health in the Workers'-World" in
Arthur B. Sho3tak and William Gomberg (ed,), Blue Collar World,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.) P* 574» The above conclusion draws on a 
survey of 2460 American adults documented in: Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, 
end Shoila Field, Americano View t h e i r  Mental H e a l t h  (New York, i960).
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Kornhauser's findings had also been supported by the United States
Task Force on work mentioned in the previous chapter. In assessing his
research the authors of the report suggested he had underestimated the
deleterious impact of routine work:
Arthur Komhauser’s well documented twenty-year 
old study of blue collar workers, Mental Hbalth 
of the Industrial Worker, is generally regarded 
today as an understatement of the mental health 
problems with respect to the alienation of young 
workers. Yet in his sample of 407 auto workers, 
approximately 40$ had some symptoms of mental 
health problems, and the key correlation was 
between job satisfaction and mental health.
Komhauser's findings have been generally 
corroborated by subsequent studies.106
The Task Force also noted that several recent studies have found a
connection between mental illness and unsatisfying jobs. For example,
a disproportionate number of workers in routine, ■unskilled jobs are admitted
to hospital for psychiatric treatment, and there is a high incidence of
107suicide among such workers. The authors also point to the extensive
research carried out by the Institute for Social Research in Michigan
which has found that unsatisfying jobs lead to "psychosomatic illness,
low self-esteem, anxiety, worry, tension and impaired interpersonal
relations."10^ And, the Task Force corroborates Komhauser's view that
109degrading work leads to unhappiness m  other areas of life.
A study of the impact of lower-level white collar jobs on psychological 
development by Graise and Trent produced findings similar to those of 
K o m h a u s e r . T h e  authors matched two groups of high school graduates with
106. James O'Toole (ed.), Work in America, op. cit., p. 82.
1 0 7. Ibid., p. 82.
108. Ibid., p. 82.
1 0 9 . Ibid., pp. 82, 84, 8 5 .
110. Craise and Trent, "Commitment and Conformity in the American College" 
Journal of Social Issues’. Vol. 23, No. 3» ( July, 1 9 6 7) PP*34-51 
as cited by Charles Hampden-Turner, "The Factory as an Oppressive and 
Non-Emancipatory Environment" in: Gerry Hunnis et al., Yiorkers Control,
■ ■ (New York, 1 9 7 3 ; P., 42. >; ------------;---
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similar I.Q’s on a scale which; measured, creativity, concept mastery, non­
authoritarianism, and social maturity. Pour years later members of the 
group which had attended university were compared with members of the group 
which had taken routine white collar jobs. Graise and Trent found that the 
former scored higher on all indices of psychological maturity. More
disturbingly, those who had spent the four years working had actually 
. Illregressed.
In a study of 200 accountants and engineers, Frederick Herzberg found
that unsatisfying jobs had "...a deleterious effect on the well-being of 
112the worker." The effects of satisfying work were equally apparent:
A more important aspect of our findings is the tone 
of the reports of periods during which job attitudes 
were high. One could almost say by definition that 
a period during which one's attitude towards one’s 
work is strongly positive is a period of good 
adjustment. H 5
Herzberg was particularly surprised at the unambiguous nature of
his findings because his survey was conducted by a group of successful
professionals. "The casualties of the industrial world", he noted, "did
114not appear in our sample." The results of his study led him to 
advocate an industrial policy designed specifically to raise the mental 
health of workers through job enrichment: "(T)he one most significant 
thing to be done to raise the mental health of the majority of our
115citizens is increase the potential for motivation in their work."
In a study of the non-work activities of bank and hospital 
employees, Chris Argyris found that "...the more satisfied workers inside 
the plant are also the ones who are more active in community activities,
111. Charles Hampden-Tumer, "The Factory as an Oppressive and Non- 
Emancipatory Environment" 0£. cit., p. 42.
112. Frederick Herzberg, The Motivation to Work, op. cit., pp. 90, 157» 150} 
Frederick Herzberg, Mental Health in Industry, op. cit.
115» Frederick Herzberg, The Motivation to Work, on. cit., p. 157»
. Ibid., p. 91.114
115 Ibid., p. 157
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church activities and fraternal organizations. This trend is independent 
of age and sex." Argyris also reviewed the findings of a number of other 
American sociologists and found similar conclusions. Independent surveys 
by Clarke, Goldhainer, Komarovsky, Scott and Blum have noted that 
participation in community activities corresponds to participation at
VI
Although ICornhauser's study dealt primarily with the impact of work 
on mental health, he also analysed the interview data to see if other
factors in the lives of.working people contributed to poor mental health.
117Three stood out; deprivation in childhood, poverty and poor education.
Each acted independently of the job and was almost as significant. Thus 
unskilled workers with little education had poorer mental health than 
unskilled workers with substantial education. Workers from broken homes 
were more likely to exhibit symptoms of low mental health than those 
from happy families, while those who had experienced severe poverty 
during childhood were less well-adjusted than those who had not.
The significance of these factors, however, lies in their cumulative
impact, as Charles Hampden-Turner points out:
(T)he chance of "the average worker" in a repetitive job 
having High Mental Health was one in five, but the chance 
of a poorly educated, low income worker having High 
Mental Health was one in ten. Add to this condition a 
history of rejection and a fatherless family and the chance 
of good health was virtually nil. Kornhauser did not 
include discrimination or minority group membership but it 
seems likely that these would just push the hard core 
further through the bottom of the sfiale.HQ
116. dhris Argyris, Personality and Organization, op. cit., p. 116. This
is a summary of previous work published in Chris Argyris, "Organization 
of a Bank", Harvard Business Review, Vol. 34» No. 5» (Sept.-Oct. 1954)5 
Chris Argyris, "Human Relations in a Hospital " op. cit.
117« Arthur Kornhauser, The Mental Health of the Industrial Worker, op. cit. 
pp. 143-146.
118. Charles Hampden-Turner, "The Factory as an Oppressive and ITon-Emancipatory 
Envrionment", 0£. cit., p. 34«
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H a m p d e n -T u rn e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  " t h e  f a c t o r y  s y s te m  w e a r s  dow n t h e  w e a k
b e f o r e  t h e  s t r o n g " ,  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  t h a t  t h o s e  who h a v e  s u f f e r e d
d e p r i v a t i o n s  d u r i n g  c h i l d h o o d  a n d  a d o l e s c e n c e  a r e  m ore v u l n e r a b l e  t o
t h e  s t u l t i f y i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  r o u t i n e  j o b s .  A " d i s a d v a n t a g e d  b a c k g r o u n d  an d
a  r e p e t i t i v e  s e m i - s k i l l e d  j o b  a d d  u p " ,  h e  m a i n t a i n s ,  t o  fo r m  a n  a lm o s t
119
" i n s u p e r a b l e  b a r r i e r "  t o  g o o d  m e n t a l  h e a l t h .
K o r n h a u s e r » s s t u d y  w a s  l i m i t e d  t o  a  s i n g l e  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  w o r k e r s .
T h u s i t  e x c l u d e d  t h e  c u m u la t iv e  e f f e c t s  o f  r o u t i n e  j o b s  o n  s u b s e q u e n t
g e n e r a t i o n s .  H o w e v e r , t h e  im p a c t  o f  s u c h  w o rk  on  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  i s ,  i n
t u r n ,  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  home e n v ir o n m e n t  w o r k e r s  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n .
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  K o r n h a u s e r  fo u n d  t o  a f f e c t  m e n t a l
h e a l t h ,  s u c h  a s  p o o r  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  d e p r i v a t i o n s  i n  c h i l d h o o d ,  w e r e  p r o b a b l y
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c u m u la t i v e  im p a c t  o f  u n s a t i s f y i n g  j o b s  o n  p r e v i o u s
g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  w o r k e r s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  in d e p e n d e n t  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  own 
120
r i g h t .  T h u s t o  t h e  .e x t e n t  t h a t  u n s a t i s f y i n g  j o b s  l e a v e  t h e i r  i m p r i n t  
u p o n  t h e  f a m i l y ,  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  s o c i a l  l i f e  o f  s u b s e q u e n t  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  o r ,  
i n  m ore g e n e r a l  t e r m s ,  o n  w o r k in g  c l a s s  c u l t u r e ,  K o r n h a u s e r  h a s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  t h e  d e l e t e r i o u s  e f f e c t  o f  r e p e t i t i v e  w o r k ,
V I I
*
T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  w o r k  a n d  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  
s u p p o r t e d  b y  r e s e a r c h  on  i n d i v i d u a l s  d ia g n o s e d  a s  m e n t a l l y  i l l .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  i n  
t h i s  a r e a ,  p e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  i t  d o e s  n o t  f i t  c o n v e n i e n t l y  i n t o  t h e  fr a m e w o r k  
o f  t h e  m a jo r  s c h o o l s  o f  p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  p s y c h o t h e r a p y  a n d , p e r h a p s ,  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  p r o b le m s  o f  p r o v i d i n g  s u c h  w o r k  f o r  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e  w i t h i n  t h e
119« Ibid., p. 34 (his emphasis).
1 2 0 . I b i d . , p. 3 4.
t
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existing industrial system. However, according to Georges Friedmann,
psychiatrists in France, Holland and Great Britain have obtained
121encouraging results from work therapy. In one experiment at the
Unit for Research in Occupational Adaptation at Banstead in Surrey, a
team of psychiatrists from Maudsley hospital found that forty percent
of a group of psychotics responded favourably to this form of treatment.
Normally, they have one chance in a hundred of being cured. Success
has also been obtained in the treatment of patients with other
122disturbances, including schizophrenia.
Friedmann's claims are supported by the findings of the United
States Task Force on Work whose authors state that»
Although causal links between alcoholism, drug abuse 
or suicide and working conditions have not been firmly 
established (and, because of inadequate measuring 
devices may never be established), there is considerable 
evidence concerning the therapeutic value of meaningful 
work for these and other mental health problems, (their
emphasis)123
The authors alBo cite evidence from a number of experiments on the 
rehabilitation of drug addicts, delinquents and the mentally ill. One 
study by the American National Institute of Mental Health using an 
experimental group and a control group followed the progress of delinquent 
boys over a period of ten years to see if providing satisfactory work 
would contribute to better social adjustment. It did. The Institute
121. Georges Friedmann, The Anatomy of Work, translated by Wyatt Rawsen 
(Glencoe, N.Y., 1964) (orig. pub. in French, 1961), pp. 133, 134»
122. Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
123. Milton F. Shore and Joseph L. Massimo, "Job Focussed Treatment for 
Anti-Social Youth", Children (July-Aug., 19 6 4) aa quoted int 
James O'Toole, et al., Work in America, op. cit., p. 89. See 
also» Frederick Herzberg, The Motivation to Work, op. cit., p. 92.
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gave the following reasons for its success:
Employment, which is therapeutic in itself, was used 
to provide a focus in reality for the psycho­
therapeutic and re-educative endeavours. For anti­
social adolescents, work can play a crucial role not 
only because it facilitates identity formation, 
provides an avenue for the channelling of aggressive 
and sexual energies, and alleviates material needs, 
but also because it can be used a3 a fulcrum for 
therapeutic intervention.^24
Friedmann and others have been quick to point out, however, that 
the effectiveness of work therapy is dependent upon the kind of job 
provided. Giving a mental patient a routine, boring job is hardly likely 
to improve his mental health. The job must provide opportunities for 
achievement, responsibility and social recognition. The patient's ego 
must be bolstered, not depressed by it. Success in treatment is thus 
dependent on the quality of the work made available. Although the results 
of such experiments are of a limited and tentative nature, they fit in with 
Komhauser's findings that satisfied workers have better mental health 
than those who are unhappy with their jobs.
VIII
However, the full implications of Kornliauser*s work only emerge when 
the connection between low job satisfaction and poor mental health is 
related to po3t-war research on the extent of job dissatisfaction in 
industry. A s  we have seen in our examination of management theory, most 
studies have been concerned with the impact of job satisfaction on 
productivity. But their implications are no less significant in relation 
to mental health. The contrast in job satisfaction between the skilled 
and unskilled workers in Kornhauser's study is paralleled by similar 
discrepancies in other occupations. Indeed, the differences between
I24. James O 'T o o l e ,  et. a l . ,  Work in America, o p . cit., p. 90*
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workers at the top of"1 the occupational ladder and those at the bottom
is often more pronounced, as Daniel Katz points out in the following
summary of post-war literature on job satisfaction:
Comparisons of occupational groups show that the more 
skilled the vocation, the more its members enjoy their 
jobs. R. Hoppock reported that more than 90 percent 
of a group of 500 teachers liked their work. In contrast,
H.M. Bell found that 98 percent of young people working in 
canning factories and textile mills hated their jobs. In 
another study by Hoppock, of 309 people in a small 
Pennsylvania town, the greatest dissatisfaction with work 
occurred among the unskilled labourers. Satisfaction 
increased with occupational level, with the greatest 
satisfaction among professional groups.
R.L. Hull and A. Kolstad analyzed questionnaire responses 
of thousands of workers and report: "The results do 
suggest, however, that there is some relationship between 
skill and morale, that is, that a cross section of workers 
in highly skilled trades would give somewhat higher scores 
than a cross section of unskilled labour." The relationship 
between job satisfaction and occupational status has also 
been confirmed in studies by Thorndike and by Uhrbrock. In 
addition, Super corroborated this finding.. .-*-25
A more recent American study compared job satisfaction in different
occupations using the question "What type of work would you try to get
into if you had the chance to start all over again?" Its authors found
major disparities between those at the top of the occupational ladder and
those at the bottom. While 97$ of urban university professors, 91$ of
mathematicians, 89$ of biologists and 86$ of chemists would be happy to
do the same job, only 23$ of blue collar workers ielt the same way. Among
unskilled steel and auto workers, the percentages giving affirmative replies
126were even lower: 21$ and 16$, respectively.
125« Daniel Katz, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life", in 
Industrial Conflict, ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert ‘Du’oin and 
Arthur Ross (London, 1954)» p. 91* Katz cite3 sources for each of 
the studies mentioned.
126. James O'Toole, at. al., Work in America, op. cit.. pp. 15» 16. The 
figures cited are from a study by Robert Kahn, "The Work Module: A 
proposal for the Humanization of work" 1972. This was a paper prepared 
for the Task Force. It is reprinted in: James O'Toole (ed.), Work and 
the Quality of Life, op. cit., pp. 199-226.
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The study also revealed a level of job satisfaction among white
collar workers considerably lower than we might expects 43$« This
figure contrasts with the optimistic claims of many post-war social
scientists who believe that the elimination of manual jobs will end degrading
'work. Instead, what has happened is that a3 the white collar sector has
expanded, the traditional status and skills of white collar workers have 
127been eroded. As Harry Braverman points out, white collar workers are
increasingly affected by management techniques such as time and motion
study and job evaluation because their labour costs now equal or exceed
120those of production workers. Hence cutting costs in this sector is
now as important to 'efficiency' and 'profitability' as in the blue collar
sector. This process is illustrated well by H.B. Wilson in his dieaussion
of the effects of technology on office work.
Twenty years ago most stenographers took dictation in 
shorthand. This required them to go to the office of 
the person dictating and return to their typewriter to 
transcribe the dictation. En route, they often delivered 
messages, performed incidental tasks and exchanged 
pleasantries with other workers. They were mobile and 
involved.
Ten years ago, dictation machines gained in popularity.
Their appeal was based on eliminating wasted stenographer's 
time while the boss hummed and hawed or was interrupted by 
telephone calls or visitors. The stenographers would spend 
more time at their typewriters - presumably working. Their . 
mobility and involvement decreased and so did their ability 
to make a wider Contribution.
Five years ago, centralized dictation systems gained in 
popularity in large offices. In those brave new offices, 
managers have intercom telephones hooked up to a room 
containing tape recorders and stenographers. The 
stenographers select recorded tapes, put on their headsets 
and type the words recorded by disembodied voices. No time 
is wasted walking or talking. Finished products are 
dispatched to the managers by an office boy. Mobility and 
involvement are almost eliminated.12-'
127« Ibid., p. 16.
128. Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp, 293-358» 
See also» David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., p. 50; C.W. Mills, 
White Collar, op. cit., pp. 192-212 and passim.
129. H.B. Wilson, Democracy and the Workplace (Montreal, 1974) PP« 50» 51«
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Although Wilson's example describes a change which is more dramatic
than in many white collar jobs, it indicates how the traditional
satisfactions associated with such work have been undermined by
management's drive for efficiency. And, it points to the fallacy in the
argument that as more and more workers move into white collar jobs,the
degrading aspects of work will gradually be eliminated.
Returning to our main argument, the fact that large numbers of workers
are far from satisfied with their jobs has been confirmed in numerous
studies both by critics of the status quo and by management theorists
anxious to uncover the • causes of low productivity, high absenteeism,
high labour turnover and poor workmanship. Herzberg, McGregor, Maslow,
Jenkins, Hampden-Turner, Blumberg, Fromm, Bell, Parker and a myriad of
other writers have concluded that the fulfilment in work is unequally
distributed, with those at the top of the occupational hierarchy benefiting •
131more than those at the bottom. As Alan Fox observes:
A category of privilege therefore emerges. Some 
forms of work enable men to grow towards what 
their societies define as full human stature; many 
others do not.132
What this means in terms of our previous discussion of the connection
between work and mental health can be best realized if we substitute
"mental health" for Alan Fox'3 term "full h man stature". Within
*
capitalist societies only a privileged minority take advantage of the
130. Anyone doubting this point need only refer to the detailed and 
comprehensive study of changes in white collar work by Harry Braverman 
in: Labour and Monopoly Capital, op. cit., pp. 293-358»
131. Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man, op.cit.;
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, op. cit.;
Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, op. cit.; David Jenkins, 
Job Pdwer, on. cit.; Charles Hampden-Iurner, "The Factory as an 
Oppressive and Non-Enuncipatory Environment" op. cit.; Paul Blumberg, 
Industrial Democracy: The Sociolo'y of P-.rticirution, on. cit.,
D'niel Bell, "Work and Its Discontents", on. cit.; Stanley Parker,
The Future of Work and Leisure, op. cit.
132. Alan Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry, on. cit.,p. 13.
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psychological benefits of works for the majority, work poses a serious 
threat to psychological well-being and happiness. Yet what is notable 
about business is how little concern it has shown about this issue.
Just as firms have been willing to subordinate the physical health and 
safety of workers to the objective of maximizing output and profits, so, 
too, they hrve been willing to ignore the impact of simplified jobs on 
mental health.
The reason for this lack of concern is clears owners do not bear 
the psychological consequence of routine work, yet benefit from the greater 
production ¿.rising thcrefrum. Consequently, the deleterious impact of 
Taylorism on ’workers is treated in exactly the same way that business 
deals with environmental pollution and other 'externalities1'. As long as 
the costs can be passed on to other „roups while business reaps the benefits, 
production io organized solely according to narrow, commercial criteria.
Yet because it is to the advantage of business to design jobs which 
adversely affect the mental health of workers does not mean that it is in 
the interests of workers or the larger community. With regard to the 
former, it is clear that the benefits of a heavier pay packet are unlikely 
to compensate for the psychological strain associated with stultifying jobs. 
Indeed, how many people would be willing to sacrifice their mental health 
in return for a larger car or a better stereo? Once the question is posed 
in this way, the manifest irrationality of taking a degrading job simply 
to have more money is apparent. Yet thi3 is precisely what business demands 
of workers.
Prom the community's viewpoint, the costs of such jobs are no less 
significant. ’Workers who do not have an opportunity toctevelop skills or 
use their intelligence at work have less to contribute to social and 
political life. Because they have little experience in taking decisions 
or accepting responsibility, they are less vdlling end less able to
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participate in community affairs. This, in turn, means that social life 
is less varied and stimulating for all concerned.
From a more narrow perspective, the community must also bear the 
costs of their poor mental health in terms of greater expenditures on 
hospital care and social services. Similarly, the wives and children 
of such workers must accept a deterioration in the quality of social 
relationships. In short, insofar as repetitive work leads to poorer 
mental health, it imposes burdens on workers, their families and their 
communities which are not taken into ¿account by business enterprises when 
they calculate the costs and benefits of different ways of organizing 
production. Yet once these costs are considered, the argument that it 
does not matter that owners still control the organization of industry 
loses its credibility. For while it is true that private ownership does 
maximize production, it is not true that the production so generated is 
worth the psychological and social costs it incurs.
IX
However, the subordination of workers to the interests of property 
has ramifications beyond the specific issues just outlined. What is 
wrong is not simply that the physical and mental health of workers is 
abused under private ownership and control. More fundamentally, it is 
that workers are treated as means to pursue the objectives of shareholders 
rather than ends in themselves. Consequently, their right as human 
beings to exercise self-determination is suppressed. This point was 
outlined many years ago by the guild socialist, G.H.H. Cole,and it 
applies with equal force today. Cole posed the question of what the major 
abuse of capitalism was. Most people, he suggested, would respond by 
pointing to the poverty which was everywhere apparent at the time. This 
answer, he argued was wrong. Poverty wa3 the symptoms slavery was the
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"disease". Working people were poor because they lacked control over
133their lives, rather than being wage slaves because they were poor.
Similarly, the physical and mental damage done to working people 
today is n result of their inability to control the organization of 
their labour. For, as we have seen, the property rights of owners do 
not simply give them control over objects: they also confer control over 
the lives of other people. And they do so in such a way that they 
encourage the treatment of people simply as objects or, as the economists 
say, factors of production. Yet a person is no less a person because he 
is at work. And a system which views a human being in his role as a 
producer as nothing more than an instrument to be used to carry out 
mechanically the purposes of another cannot claim legitimacy on the 
questionable grounds that it provides heavier pay packets.
The loss of control over work has inestimable cost3 for working 
people beyond the damage done to the physical health and safety.
Initiative and creativity are stifled by management authority. The 
opportunity to develop skills and apply new ideas i3 frustrated, as is
t
the satisfaction arising from planning and executing a task from beginning 
to end. Moreover, the idea of work as a public or community service is 
largely destroyed by the wage-labour relationship. Because the social 
importance of work is obscured, the satisfaction arising from performing 
service for others is denied. And the sense of self-worth that arises 
from performing .a job which is of value to the community is also 
undermined. Thus the role of work as a potential source of happiness 
and fulfilment in the lives of ordinary workers is transformed into one 
of ‘putting in time* in order to collect the pay packet at the end of 
the week.
133* G.D.H. Cole, Guild Socialism Restated (London, 1921)
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The degradation of work, to use an expression of Harry Braverman, 
is thus not a minor loss which is easily compensated for by the advantages 
of a consumer society. Rather, it entails the suppression of man's most 
fundamental, creative instincts. The loss of self-determination at' the 
workplace is a loss of what, in one sense, is man's most important 
distinguishing characteristic: his ability to fashion the world in his 
own image. Insofar as what a man is, is reflected in what he does, the 
fact that the worker is basically an instrument of production means that 
his essential humanity is denied. For men are not means; they are ends. 
And any system that treats them as such is an affront to their human 
dignity and the sanctity of the individual personality.
273 -
FART III
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE LEGITIMIZATION OF I1AITAGERIAL 
POWER THROUOH THE LIMITATION OF ITS ABUSES
CHAPTER VII
SIDNEY AHD BEATRICE liEBD; TIE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
APPROACH OUTLIHEl)
I
The industrial framework outlined by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 
their classic study of trade unionism, Industrial Democracy, is an 
appropriate place to begin our discussion of the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining as a response to managerial power.^ Like many 
other socialists of their day, the Webbs believed that unfettered capitalist 
control of industry gave rise to numerous abuses - abuses which were the 
result of the unequal bargaining position of workers in relation to their 
employers. As a consequence, workers were forced to accept terms and 
conditions of employment that were both morally and physically degrading. 
The Webbs found this unacceptable and believed that trade unionism offered 
a suitable remedy for it.
1. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London, 1919) (orig. 
pub., l897)» In our discussion of the views of the Webbs, we shall 
rostrict our approach to the position expressed in Industrial democracy. 
There are several reasons for doing so. First, the l/ebbs altered their 
views considerably during the period following the First World War, 
particularly on the question of workers’ participation in management, 
to which they became more sympathetic. Second, in Industrial Democracy 
they laid out the theory of collective bargaining as we now know it 
with a degree of foresight that is remarkable. Because they put’ forward 
the basic tenets of collective bargaining more clearly and comprehensively 
than in any other early work, and because so much of what they said in 
defence of the approach is still relevant today. Industrial Democracy 
remains the most logical point to start a discussion of the topic.
As Tawney remarked, their writings ’’stand out amid the trivialities 
of their day and ours, like Roman masonry in a London Suburb."
H.II. Tawney, The Attack and Other Papers (London, 1953) p. 136 as cited 
by Alan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical Analysis" in 
Alan Flanders, Management and Unions, op. cit., p. 213. Flanders»
provides a good overview of the contribution of the Webbs 
to the development of collective bargaining. See: Ibid., pp. 213-276.
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Indeed, it was their opinion that industrial democracy - the only 
system of industrial relations which they thought acceptable within a 
democratic state - was integrally connected with the existence of a strong 
trade union movement. By limiting the autocratic power of employers, trade 
unions provided employees with a degree of security and freedom in their 
work sufficient to transform their position from servility to industrial 
citizenship.
Because the Webbs saw unions as an essential part of the modem, 
democratic state, they were anxious to justify the growth of the trade union 
movement in the face of attacks from its conservative and liberal opponents. 
They argued that proponents of laissez-faiie who criticized unions because they 
posed a threat to the free market exchange of labour were wrong because they 
failed to recognize that freedom for the capitalist to purchase labour on 
the most favourable terms entailed a corresponding limitation on the freedom 
of workers:
What particular individuals, sections or classes usually 
mean by ’freedom of contract’, ’freedom of association’, 
or ’freedom of enterprise’ is freedom of opportunity to 
use the power that they happen to possess: that is to say, g 
to compel other less powerful people to accept their terms.
Trade unions thus performed a vital function in industry by reducing 
the inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees. 
Collective bargaining brought the actual pattern of relationships between 
employers and employees into line with a free market theory which presuppose 
equality of bargaining power in the first place. It was an irony in the
2. Ibid., p. 847*
3» Ibid., pp. 840-842. Alan Flanders challenges the Webbs' assumption that 
bargaining by a group of employees with their employer is the same as 
individual bargaining. He argues that collective bargaining involves two 
distinct processes. The first is a power relationship between the 
employer and the union. Employees use their collective power to negotiate 
an agreement regulating the terms and conditions of employment. The 
second is a market exchange between individual employees and their 
employer. Flanders argues that the one is essentially a political activity 
which establishes rules and regulations, while the other is basically an 
economic activity in the free market sense. Thus "A collective agreement i
position of the liberal economists that they did not fail to note.^
T h e  W ebbs w e r e  e q u a l l y  s c a t h i n g  i n  t h e i r  a t t a c k  o n  t h o s e  who saw
no connection between political democracy and industrial democracy.
Even at the present day, after a century of revolution, 
the great mass of middle and upper class "Liberals"' 
all over the world see no more inconsistency between 
democracy and unrestrained capitalist enterprise, than 
Washington or Jefferson did between democracy and slave­
owning. 4
-  2 7 5  -
T h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  t r a d e  u n i o n s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  i n  a  m o d e m  d e m o c r a c y  
l e d  th e m  t o  a d v o c a t e  t h a t  " . . . t h e  v e r y  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  d e m o c r a c y  w i l l  h a v e  
t o  b e  w id e n e d  s o  a s  t o  i n c l u d e  e c o n o m ic  a s  w e l l  a s  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s . . " ' *  
P o l i t i c a l  d e m o c r a c y  w a s  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  e c o n o m ic  s e r v i t u d e :  h e n c e ,  f o r  
t h e  f o r m e r  t o  o p e r a t e  p r o p e r l y ,  t h e  l a t t e r  h a d  t o  b e  a b o l i s h e d .
II
H o w e v e r , t h e  W ebbs w e r e  n o t  o n l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  j u s t i f y i n g  t h e  p l a c e  
o f  t in io n s  i n  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  s t a t e .  T h e y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
t h e o r y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  m u st a l s o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f .  
o t h e r  g r o u p s  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c o n s u m e r s .  T h u s t h e i r  co m m itm en t t o  t h e  
g r o w t h  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  m ovem en t w a s  q u a l i f i e d  b y  t h e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  u n i o n s  m u st 
n o t  o b s t r u c t  t h e  b a s i c  p u r p o s e  o f  i n d u s t r y :  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  a n  a d e q u a t e  
s u p p l y  o f  g o o d s  a n d  s e r v i c e s  t o  t h e  c o m m u n ity  a t  m inim um  c o s t . ^  A s  a  
c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e y  f e l t  t h a t  i t  w a s im p o r t a n t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  u n i o n s  a n d  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h o s e  f u n c t i o n s .
4« I b i d . , p. 841«
5. I b i d . t p. 840.
6 .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  W ebbs d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  a l l  t h e  a im s  o f  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  
o f  t h e i r  d a y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e y  o p p o s e d  t h e  " r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  n u m b e r s " ,  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  a p p r e n t i c e s h i p  a n d  o t h e r  d e v i c e s  w h ic h  l i m i t e d  t h e  
m e m b e rs h ip  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t r a d e  an d  t h u s  e n a b l e d  i t s  m em bers t o  e x p l o i t  
t h e  p u b l i c .  T h e y  a l s o  o p p o s e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  " v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s "  a  nam e t h e y  
g a v e  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  j o b  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .  When t r a d e  u n io n  o b j e c t i v e s  
o r  p r a c t i c e s  c o n f l i c t e d  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c o m m u n ity , t h e y  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  o u g h t  t o  b e  a b a n d o n e d . T h u s  t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  
r e f o r m  i m p l i e d  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  
t h e  o u t l o o k  o f  t h e i r  c r i t i c s .  S e e :  I b i d . , p p .  559-576, 810-813«
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In answering the question of how industry ought to he organized,
the Webbs put forward a model that can best be described as pluralist*
They believed that consumers should have the right to decide what was
to be produced. Management - whether appointed by government or by
private owners -should have the right to decide how production was to 
0
be organized. And, trade unions should have the right to determine 
the terms and conditions under which their members would carry out
9production. However, overriding the interests of these three groups 
was that of the larger community. Its elected government, the Webbs 
argued, should have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that decisions 
by these groups did not conflict with the public interest.^
The justification for allowing consumers to decide what was to be 
produced followed logically from their analysis of the purpose of 
industry. As they saw it, industry*s primary responsibility was to 
produce the goods and services required by consumers. This meant that 
the consumers who used those goods and services - and they alone - were 
most capable of deciding what should be produced.^ The Webbs 
specifically,excluded the administrators of industry and the trade unions 
from this area of decision-making because they felt that both had 
interests which conflicted with consumers.
Similarly, the Webbs believed that it was necessary to give the 
administrators of industry, whether appointed by government or "...thrown 
up in the competitive struggle..." the exclusive right to decide how the
7 (/
7» Ibid., p. Q28.
8. Ibid., pp. 818, 822, see also» Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History 
of Trade Unionism, revised ed. (London, 1920) pp. 706-711.
9. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 821.
10. Ihiii., pc. 821-82J). See also: Robert Weinberg, Workers* Control: A 
Study in British Socialist Thought (University of London, Ph.D. thesis, 
I960) pp. 16, 17.
11. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., pp. 818, 819» 
See also: The History of Trade Unionism, on. cit.. pp. 710, 711,
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goods and services should be produced. They advanced several
justifications for the primacy of the administrators' role in this
area. First, the complexities of modern industry necessitated that it
be run by highly qualified experts with extensive training and
13experience in the various facets of management. Second, the
administrators of industry - unlike the workers under their authority -
would not be biased towards the use of particular skills or methods of
production and hence would tend to pursue the goal of producing what
consumers wanted as efficiently and cheaply as possible. Because their
success as administrators would be gauged according to how well they
had managed to keep the price of their goods and services at a
competitive level, they would be under considerable pressure to use the
most efficient methods of production. In this respect, then, there was
an identity of interests between the administrators of industry and 
14consumers.
On the other hand, trade unions were "...specially disqualified..." 
from performing this role because their members frequently had a vested 
interest in the use of particular materials, techniques of production 
or craft skills which led them to resist innovations designed to raise 
productivity. Moreover, the Webbs felt that if trade unions were allowed 
to administer industry they would engage in various "restrictive 
practices"designed to increase the eami.ng3 of their members at the 1234
12
12. Sidney and Beatrice VYebb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 819.
13. Ibid., p. 819.
14. Ibid., p. 819. See also» Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of 
Trade Unionism, op. cit., pp, 712-714»
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expense of consumers.^ This de ficiency waB exacerbated by the tendency 
of craft unions to limit entry to their trades and thus maintain an 
artificial scarcity of their services - a scarcity which could be used 
to exploit the community through excessive wage demands. For these 
reasons, the Webbs thought it necessary to exclude workers and their unions 
from management.
However, in their attempt to lower the costs of production the 
administrators of industry would be tempted to reduce the costs of labour, 
not only by utilizing labour saving devices, but also by reducing wages 
and making working conditions less satisfactory. This attempt to limit 
wages, if unchecked, would lead to a reduction in the standard of living 
of the workers under their authority. The Webbs felt that such practices 
were incompatible v/ith the aim of a democratic society to promote the 
happiness of its members.
15. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. eft., p. 819. 
However, in the 1920 edition of The History of Trade Unionism, the 
Webbs, influenced by the arguments of guild socialists, modified 
their opposition to union participation in management. But they 
still maintained that unions ought not to play the dominant role 
for three reasons. First, trade unions still had vested interests 
which conflicted with the interests of consumers. Second, if trade 
unions assumed control there would be a serious problem in 
maintaining managerial authority because it would be subject to 
interference from below. And, finally, producer co-operatives in 
Great Britain had not been particularly successful in their view. 
Hencethey were concerned that workers' control might lead to economic 
inefficiency. See: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade 
Unionism, op. cit., pp, 708, 715*
Similar concern about the difficulties of maintaining managerial 
authority if managers were made accountable to workers was vpiced 
in another book of the same year: "...the relationship set up between 
a manager who was to give orders all day to his staff, and the 
members of that staff who, sitting as a committee of management, 
criticize his action in the evening, with the power of dismissing 
him if he fails to conform to their wishes, has been found to be 
an impossible one." Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Constitution of a 
Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (New York, 1920) p. 161, 
as quoted by Harry W. Laidler, History of Socialism (New York, 1968) 
P.341.
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The permanent bias of the profit-maker, and even 
of the salaried official of the Co-operative Society, 
the Municipality or the Government Department is to 
lower the expense of production. As far as immediate 
results are concerned, it seems equally advantageous 
whether this reduction in cost is secured by a better 
choice of materials, processes or men, or by some 
lowering of wages or worsening of the conditions upon 
which the human agents are employed. But the democratic 
state is, as we have seen, vitally interested in 
upholding the highest possible standard of life of all 
its citizens, and especially of the manual workers who 
form four fifths of the whole. Hence the bias of the 
directors of industry in favour of cheapness has, in 
the interest of the community, to be perpetually 
controlled and guided by a determination to maintain ^  
and progressively to raise the conditions of employment.
It was in determining the terms and conditions of employment that
trade unions thus came to play their special role in the organization of
industry. For if they were disqualified from deciding what was to be
produced and how it was to be produced, the other groups were equally
disqualified from determining the "conditions under which" production
should take place. Consumers wanted goods and services produced as cheaply
as possible and hence were biased in favour of low wages and poor working
conditions. The administrators of industry, in their zeal for efficiency,
wanted to minimize labour costs tni hence reduce the standard of living
of their workers. If these two groups were allowed to determine the
terms and conditions of employment, unchecked by trade unions, they would
17abuse and exploit workers engaged in production.
If the démocratie state is to obtain its fullest and 
finest development, it is essential that the actual 
needs and desires of the human agents concerned should 
be the main considerations in determining the conditions 
of employment. Here, then,we find the special function 
of the trade union in the administration of industry. The 
simplest member of the working class knows at any rate 
where the shoe pinches.^
In pressing, for higher wages and better working conditions, unions 
played a ¡vital role in the organization of industry. By acting as a 16
16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., pp. 819, 020. 
Ibid., p. 820.17.
18. Ibid., p. 821.
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check on the abuse of the power wielded by management, either in its own 
interest or that of consumers, trade unions ensured that their members 
received the most favourable terms for their labour compatible with a
. 19high level of service to the community.
Yet, as we have just noted, overriding these three sectional
interests was that of the public, represented by its elected government.
When any group attempted to exploit the community, it was the governments
obligation to step in and protect it. Thus the Webbs argued for
compulsory arbitration in the case of a prolonged strike or lockout
where the interests of groups other than employers end trade unions were
20adversely affected. In fact, they predicted that collective bargaining
between employers and employees would "...become increasingly subject to
the fundamental conditions that the business of the community must not be 
21interfered with."
Ill
The Webbs' belief that workers ought not to manage industry had 
implications not only for their view of industrial democracy under private 
ownership but, perhaps more importantly, for their approach to industrial 
democracy within socialist or, as they referred to it, collectivist,
19. In this regard, the willingness of consumers to purchase this labour 
through payment for the commodities thrown on the market acted as a 
check on excessive wage demands. For if wages rose too high, demand 
would fall and some union members would become unemployed. This 
interplay of market forces acted as a "friction brake" on the 
exploitation of consumers by workers. Ibid., p, 821.
20. Ibid., p. 8I4. In The History of Trade Unionism, the Webbs reiterated 
the point that the community must retain.ultimate authority in 
industry. "...(W)e expect to see the supreme authority in each 
industry vested, not in the workers a3 such, but in the community as
a 'whole." See: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, 
op. cit., p. 714»
21. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Demo0racy, op. cit.t p. 815»
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economies as well. Insofar as publicly appointed managers would have
the same bias towards maximizing efficiency as their private counterparts,
they would tend to exploit the workers under their authority. Thus removal
22of the profit motive would not, in itself, end the oppression of workers.
To exacerbate this, the differences in outlook, interests and
experience between the administrators of industry and workers might result
in the former taking decisions as harmful to the interests of the latter
as those made by private owners. Moreover, they foresaw that individual
workers would still have difficulties in redressing their grievances
within a collectivist framework. Hence they would still require trade
unions to protect them from abuses of administrative power.
For even under the most complete collectivism, the 
directors of each particular industry would, as agents 
of the community of consumers, remain biased in favour 
of cheapening productivity, and could, as brain workers, 
never be personally conscious of the conditions of the 
manual labourers. And though it may be assumed that the 
community as a whole would not deliberately oppress any 
section of it3 members, experience of all administration 
on a large scale, whether public or private, indicates 
hew difficult it must always be, in any complicated 
organization, for an isolated individual sufferer to 
obtain redress against the malice, caprice, or simple 
heeilessness of his official superior. Even a whole class 
or grade of workers would find it practically impossible, 
without forming some sort of association of its own, to 
bring its special needs to the notice of public opinion, 
and press them effectively upon the Parliament of the 
nation.2-'
Trade unionism would thus be as necessary under socialism as it was 
under capitalism. And, by implication, industrial democracy could exist 
only where trade unions were free to bargain over the terms and conditions 
of employment. Thus socialism or collectivism without trade unionism would
22 Ibid., p. 824. 
. Ibid.,23 p. 824
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not embody the principles of industrial democracy.
Moreover, because the essence of industrial democracy was the
right of trade unions to oppose management, it could exist in either
a private or publicly owned economy:
...Trade Unionism has no logical connection with any 
particular form of ownership of land and capital and 
the members of the British Trade Unions are not drawn, 
as Trade Unionists, unreservedly towards individualism
or collectivism.25
and:
...it follows from this analysis that trade unionism 
is not merely an incident of the present phase of 
capitalist industry but has a permanent function to 
fulfil in the democratic state.
V/ith regard to the place of trade unions within the larger democratic 
framework, the Y/ebbs argued that they had a legitimate role to play as a
24» Ibid., pp. 823» 824. Another reason for their belief that trade unions 
would still be necessary under socialism was that the Consumer 
Co-operatives of their day had not treated their employees significantly 
better than their privately-owned counterparts. As the Webbs saw a 
parallel between the administration of consumer co-operatives and 
industry under socialism, they thought that unions would still be 
needed to ensure that the administrators of industry did not abuse 
their employees. This argument is touched upon briefly in Industrial 
Democracy (pp. 818-820) but developed in greater detail in The 
Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, op. cit.,
pp. 152-154.
25. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. oit., p. 832. See 
also: pp. 271-273»
26. Ibid., p. 823« Their position on this question remained essentially 
unchanged in The Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great 
Britain. See: pp. 185, 18é.
It is also worth noting that the Webb3 saw a place for private ownership 
within their ideal of the socialist state:
"Nor need it be imagined that this progressive 'socialization', which 
has already been going on for some time, will ever become so universally 
complete, even in one country, that there will be no 'unsooialized' 
enterprise. It may even be predicted with confidence that there will 
always be a toleration of unsocialized industries and services...
There may also be a persistent though always varying residuum of 
capitalist profit-making industries...and even, in the most completely 
socialized communities, the carrying on by way of experiment or for 
the sake of comparative costing, of parts or sections or varieties of 
industries or services that are otherwise socialized." Sidney and 
Beatrice Y/ebb, The Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of 
Great Britain, op. cit., pp. 147. 148.
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pressure group attempting to advance the industrial interests of union
members. The/ believed that a democratic society ought to encourage the
formation of numerous groups, each representing the interests of its
members within a certain defined sphere of influence. Thus the trade
unions would represent their members on industrial issues .While other
organizations would represent these same members on issues not related 
27to industry.
We may therefore infer that wage earners will, in a 
democratic state, not content themselves with belonging 
to their trade union, or even to any wider organization 
based upon a distinction of economic class. Besides 
their distinctive interests and opinions as wage earners 
and manual workers, they have others which they share 
with persons of every grade or occupation. The citizen in 
the democratic state, enrolled first in his geographic 
constituency, will take his place also in the professional 
association of his craft; but he will go on to combine in 
voluntary associations for special purposes with those who 
agree with him in religion or politics, or in pursuit of 
particular recreations or hobbies.28
Y/ithin this pluralist, democratic framework, trade unions were not 
a threat to political democracy as their Critics claimed, but, rather,were 
an asset to it,because in defending the interests of their members from 
government encroachments they were acting as a check on the growth of 
arbitrary state power.
Yet the Webbs also pointed out that organizations such as trade 
unions ought not to influence government in areas outside their proper 
spheres of competence. For example, trade unions ought not to have a 
say in foreign affairs, education, financial policy and the like. Nor 
should other groups be allowed to interfere in matters which were the 
rightful concern of unions.
27. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p, 833.
They maintained thi3 pluralist approach in their later publications 
as well. See: The History of Trade Unionism (rev. 1920), op. cit.. 
pp. 106, 707» and, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of 
Great Britain, pp. 147-167« ""
28. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 833«
Within their defined sphere of competence, trade unions could perform
additional services, however. Because of their specialized knowledge in
industrial matters, they could act as a valuable source of information
and counsel to the government. Indeed, no other organizations were so well
equipped to assess the impact of industrial legislation on the lives of
working people. Trade unions were also particularly well endowed to give
advice on technical education and, perhaps, could become involved in its
29administration. Finally, with the universal enrolment of working people
in trade unions and the enactment of legislation protecting the interests
of their meu-bers, the Webbs believed that unions would be free to play a
more positive role in industry. For example, they would be able to provide
assistance in improving methods of production secure inthe knowledge that
30gains in efficiency would not adversely affect their members.
IV
Considering the extensive role assigned by the Webbs to unions,it is 
not surprising that they were concerned that the organizational structure 
of unions was adequate to perform such tasks. In Industrial Democracy, 
they discussed the evolution of trade unions in some detail, paying special 
attention to the methods used by various unions to reconcile administrative 
complexity with internal democracy. They recognized that the development 
of an efficient administrative apparatus was vital if unions were to be 
effective, particularly at the national level. Yet they were worried that 
the price of efficiency might be loss of control by the rank and file over 
their leaders. Consequently, the V/ebbs were concerned to show how the 
theory and practice of British trade union democracy had evolved during
-  2 8 4  "
29. Ibid., p. 8J0.
30 Ibid., pp. 828, 829
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the nineteenth century and to point out avoidable pitfalls that had 
hindered the development of efficient, yet democratic, union 
organizations.
The Webbs used the expressions "primitive democracy" and "infant
democracy" to describe the democratic practices of working men's
societies, associations and clubs - the forerunners of modem trade
unions - during the early nineteenth century. These organizations were
composed of the members of a particular craft or trade and their purpose
was to regulate various matters associated with its practice. Their
members usually espoused a radical, egalitarian view of democracy which
rejected formal leadership and opposed the elevation of any member above
his fellows. They stressed the need for all to participate equally in
both policy-making and administration because such participation was
thought essential for the maintenance of democracy,^
The early trade club was then a democracy of the most 
rudimentary type, free alike from permanently 
differentiated officials, executive council or 
representative assembly. The general meeting strove 
itself to transact all the business and grudgingly 
delegated any of its functions either to officers or 
committees. When this delegation no longer could be 
avoided, the expedients of rotation of short periods 
of service were.", used to "prevent imposition" or any 
undue influence by particular members. In this 
earliest type of trade union democracy we find, in 
fact, the most childlike faith, not only that "all men 
are equal" but also that "what concerns all should be 
decided by all."52
However, as trade unions grew and their functions expanded during 
the nineteenth century, the need to delegate responsibility to elected 
officials became more pressing. Moreover, changes in the political 
conditions during the latter tart of the century, and particularly the 
extension of the franchise, made it possible to pursue union goals by
31. Ibid., pp. 3-7. The Webbs used the expression "primitive democracy" 
¿3 the title of their first chapter.
32. Ibid, p. 8.
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parliamentary means. The campaign for the nine hour day and the 
attempt to implement national standards of apprenticeship, employment 
and remuneration also necessitated larger and more complex 
administrative structures than had been required for bargaining with
34local employers or enforcing union regulations in particular localities.
Yet the tradition of direct democracy was slow to die. Numerous 
techniques, such as rotating the union's offices, limiting the length of 
service, restricting office holders to a single term and using the 
referendum and the initiative, were devised to preserve equality of 
participation.''
However, the difficulties of maintaining direct democracy in the 
face of growing size and administrative complexity led many unions to 
strike what the 7/ebbs saw as an unsatisfactory compromise between 
participation of all on some issues and delegation of authority to 
elected representatives on others. Because they lacked a coherent theory 
of the relationship between those elected to make policy and those 
appointed to administer it, trade unions often combined the two roles.
Thus elected officials were commonly full-time administrators. This led 
to a concentration of power in their hands and tended to undermine the 
ability of members to maintain democratic control.^ Moreover, full­
time administrators often lost touch with fellow workers and became a 
separate group with its own distinct interests and outlook, Yet, because 
they possessed valuable administrative skills, the membership found it
3 7)
33. Ibid., pp. 248-252.
34. Ibid., pp. 8-11, 90-93.
35. Ibid., pp. 14, 24-27, 36, 37, 59-65.
36. Ibid., pp. 15, 58, 59
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37difficult to turn them out of office. Consequently, .the unions were 
presented with an unfortunate choice between oligarchy if they gave their 
elected officials substantial power, and administrative chaas if they 
did not.
37* The resemblance of the Webbs' discussion of the problems of direct 
democracy to that of Robert Michels in Political Parties is 
• remarkable, as the following comparison of quotations makes clear:
"We have already noted that in passing from a local to a national 
organization the Trade Union unwittingly left behind the ideal of 
primitive democracy. The setting apart of one man to do the 
clerical work destroyed the possibility of equal and identical 
service by all members and laid the foundation of a separate 
governing class. The practice of requiring members to act in 
rotation was silently abandoned. Once chosen for his post, the 
general secretary could rely with confidence, xmless he proved 
himself obviously unfit or grossly incompetent, on being annually 
re-elected. Spending all day at office work, he soon acquired a 
professional expertise quite out of reach of his fellow members 
at the bench or the forge. And even if some other member possessed 
natural gifts equal or superior to the acquired skill of the 
existing officer, there was, in a national organization, no 
opportunity of making these qualities known." Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 15.
Michels makes the same point:
"The Party mechanism, which, through the abundance of paid and honorary 
posts at its disposal, offers a career to the workers, and which 
constantly exercises a powerful attractive force, determines the 
transformation of a number of proletarians with considerable 
intellectual gifts into employees whose mode of life becomes that of 
the petty bourgeois. The change of condition at once creates the need 
and provides the opportunity for the acquisition, at the expense of 
the mass, of more elaborate instruction and a clearer view of existing 
social relationships. Whilst their occupation and the needs of daily 
life render it impossible for the masses to attain a profound knowledge 
of the social machinery, and above all of the working of the political 
machine, the leader of working class origin is enabled, thanks to his 
new situation, to make himself intimately familiar with all the 
technical detail of public life, and thus to increase his superiority 
over rank and file. In proportion as the profession of politician 
becomes a more complicated one and, in proportion as the rules of social 
legislation become more numerous, it is necessary for one who lfould 
understand politics to possess wider experience and more extensive 
knowledge. Thus the gulf botween the leaders and the rest of the party 
becomes even wider, until the moment arrives in which the leaders lose 
all true sense of solidarity with the class from which they have 
sprung, and there ensues a new class division between ex-proletarian 
captains and proletarian common soldiers," Robert Michels, Political 
Parties, tr. by: Eden and Cedar Paul, (ed.) Seymour Martin Lipset 
(hew York, 1962) pp. 100, 109» (orig. pub. 1911).
However, unlike Michels, the Webbs had a much clearer understanding of 
the differences between direct democracy and representative democracy. 
Hence they were able to put forward an alternative to the former, while 
Michels was only able to conclude that because direct democracy could
not cope effectively with the problem of size, all other approaches 
to democracy were doomed to failure as well.
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If, therefore, democracy means that 'everything 
which concerns all shall he decided hy all', and 
that each citizen should enjoy an equal and 
identical share in the government, Trade Union 
history indicates clearly the inevitable result.
Government by such contrivances as Rotation of 
Office, the Mass Meeting, the Referendum and 
Initiative, or the Relegate restricted by his 
Imperative Mandate, leads straight either to 
inefficiency and disintegration, or to the 
uncontrolled dominance of a personal dictator or 
an expert bureaucracy. Dimly, and almost 
unconsciously this conclusion had, after a whole 
centuiyof experiment, forced itself upon the more 
advanced trades.38
The Webbs believed that the solution had already been arrived at in 
the political sphere. The separation of legislative from administrative 
functions of government which had evolved in the British Parliamentary 
system, they felt, could be applied with equal success to the problem 
of trade union democracy.^ By separating policy-making from administration 
it became unnecessary for the elected representatives to possess 
administrative skills. Rather, their function became one of formulating 
policies and acting as a watchdog over the administrators to see that they 
carried out these policies properly.^ Thus union members would be free 
to change their elected representatives without fear that administrative 
functions would be undermined.
Several notable examples of trade unions which hid evolved from a 
state of primitive democracy to representative democracy, the Cotton 
Operatives and the Coalminers, were flourishing at the time the Webbs 
wrote Industrial Democracy and they used these unions as illustrations 
of how representative democracy ought to function in the trade union
41
setting:
38. Ibid., p. 36.
39» Ibid., p. 37»
40. Ibid., pp. 54'“56j also p. 844*
41* Ibid., p. 38.
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The Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton- 
spinners is therefore free from all the early 
expedients for securing popular government. The 
general or aggregate meeting finds no place in 
its constitution, and the rules contain no 
provision for the Referendum or the Initiative.
Ho countenance is given to the idea of Rotation 
of Office. Ho officers are elected by the members 
themselves. Finally, we have the complete 
abandonment of the delegate, and the substitution, 
both in fact and in name, of the representatives.
On the other hand, the association is a fully 
equipped democratic state of the modem type. It 
has a cabinet appointed by and responsible only to 
that parliament. And, its chief executive officer, 
appointed once for all on grounds of efficiency,,,;, 
enjoys the civil service permanence of tenure. ^
The difficulty of combining popular control with effective 
administration was seen by the Webbs as the central problem of democracy, 
whether in government, trade unions or voluntary associations. And the 
solution - representative rather than direct democracy — was the same
4 3in each case. What industrial democracy meant in the context of the 
internal government of trade unions, then, was the development of 
representative institutions which facilitated popular control and yet 
still enabled unions to maintain an efficient.*, administration. In this 
way ordinary union members would be able to use their union effectively 
to protect - and promote - their interesta as wage earners.
V
In the preceding discussion, we have seen that the Webbs’ approach 
to redressing the abuses of private ownership entailed an attempt to 
resolve three distinct questions. First, how could the rights and interests 
of workers be protected without undermining ^ economic function of 
industry? Second, what was the place of trade unions within the larger
42. Ibid., p. 40• 
43* Ibid., p. 60.
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democratic framework? And, third, how could unions be organized to 
ensure that ordinary workers were able to control them and thus use 
them to defend their interests? They answered the first by arguing that 
workers ought to be organized into trade unions and that unions should 
be free to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment, subject 
to the limitations of the market and the public interest# Their reply 
to the second was that a democratic society ought to be a pluralist 
society: hence unions had an important role in advancing the interests 
of wage earners just as other groups promoted the interests of their 
members. As to the third question, the Webbs believed that internal union 
democracy could be best served by the adoption of a representative 
system which separated legislative from administrative functions and 
thus allowed elected representatives to control policy. In short, 
industrial democracy, as they defined it, entailed three things: 
collective bargaining between employers and unions; the pressure group 
activities of unions in relation to the state; and, the practice of 
internal union democracy.
Yet if the Webbs' arguments were designed primarily to advance 
the cause of trade unionism in their day, they also had conservative 
implications which have become increasingly clear in recent years. When 
trade unions were fighting for their very existence, the view that they 
ought not to participate in management was largely irrelevant. However, 
once they had attained a position of relative security, encroachments 
on managerial prerogatives became a distinct possibility. Consequently, 
the restrictions imposed by the Webbs’ framework became more obvious.
Like democratic theory which, in the hands of Bentham, was used to 
challenge the status quo, but subsequently had. been utilized to support 
it, the Webbs' industrial framework has been used in recent years not 
to attack the power of employers, but to defend it.
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However, it was left for post-war theorists to draw out the full 
implications of the Webbs’ argument that what was to be produced and 
how it was to be produced were not questions for workers to decide. 
Consequently, i/o shall turn, in the following chapter, to examine the 
views of one of the leading contemporary advocates of the collective 
bargaining approach to industrial democracy, II.A. Clegg. Our purpose 
will be to choir hoi/ the theoiydesigned by the Webbs to further the 
interests of v/orkers has become one of the most effective ideological 
v/eapons in preserving the power of property over them.
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CHAPTER VIII
ACCOIITODATION WITH CAPITALISM: II.A. CLEGG13 THEORY OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
I
A l t h o u g h  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d e m o c r a c y  p u t  f o r w a r d  b y  H .A .  C l e g g
c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a  l o g i c a l  o u t g r o w t h  o f  t h e  W e b b s 1 e a r l i e r  p o s i t i o n ,  r a t h e r
s u r p r i s i n g l y  C l e g g  d i d  n o t  make a n  e x p l i c i t  a t t e m p t  t o  r e l a t e  h i s  v i e w s  t o
t h o s e  o f  h i s  F a b i a n  p r e c u r s o r s . 1  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  C l e g g ' s  a p p r o a c h  i s
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s i m i l a r  t h a t  i t  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a n  u p d a t e d ,  i f  m ore  c o n s e r v a t i v e ,
2
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  7/ebbs* p o s i t i o n .  L i k e  t h e  W e b b s ,  C l e g g  saw  c o l l e c t i v e
b a r g a i n i n g  a s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  r e j e c t e d  w o r k e r s *
c o n t r o l .  A n d ,  l i k e  t h e  W e b b s ,  h e  a d h e r e d  t o  a  p l u r a l i s t  v i e w  o f  p o l i t i c a l
3
d e m o c r a c y  a n d  t h e  r o l e  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  w i t h i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y .
1.
2.
3 .
C l e g g  u s e s  t h e  t e r m  ‘ i n d u s t r i a l  d e m o c r a c y '  t o  e n c o m p a s s  a  w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  
s c h e m e s  w h i c h  a r e  " . . . b a s e d  o n  a  g e n u i n e  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  
w o r k e r s  i n  i n d u s t r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  a  s h a r e  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  d e c i s i o n s . "  T h u s  h e  i n c l u d e s  s c h e m e s  f o r  c o m p l e t e  w o r k e r s *  
c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  o n e  e x t r e m e  a n d  s c h e m e s  f o r  ' s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  c o l l e c t i v e  
b a r g a i n i n g  a t  t h e  o t h e r .  H .A .  C l e g g ,  A New A p p r o a c h  t o  I n d u s t r i a l  
D e m o c r a c y  ( O x f o r d ,  i 960) p .  3 .
R e f e r e n c e s  t o  ‘ c a p i t a l i s t  a u t o c r a c y '  a n d  ' c a p i t a l i s t  d i c t a t o r s h i p '  a r e  
much l e s s  common, f o r  e x a m p l e .
C l e g g ' s  a p p r o a c h  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  d e m o c r a c y  w a s  o u t l i n e d  e x p l i c i t l y  i n  tw o  
m a j o r  b o o k s ,  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  a n d  A New A p p r o a c h  
t o  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y . H o w e v e r ,  h e  a l s o  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t o  a  
l e s s e r  e x t e n t  i n  s. n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  w o r k s  i n c l u d i n g  T h e  F u t u r e  o f  
N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , L a b o u r  R e l a t i o n ^  i n  L o n d o n  T r a n s p o r t  a n d  W age P o l i c y  a n d  
t h e  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e .  T h e s e  l a t t e r  s t u d i e s  a l s o  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m s  
o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  
h e  d r e w  f r o m  h i s  r e s e a r c h  on t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  h a d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i . a p a c t  o n
h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n . E . A .  C l e g g ,  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y  a n d
N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  ( O x f o r d ,  1 9 5 1 ) »  H .A .  C l e g g  a n d  T . E .  C h e s t e r ,  The F u t u r e  
o f  N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  ( O x f o r d ,  1 9 5 3 ) »  H .A .  C l e g g ,  L a b o u r  R e l a t i o n s  i n  
L o n d o n  T r a n s p o r t  ( O x f o r d ,  1 9 5 0 ) »  H .A .  C l e g g  a n d  T . E .  C h e s t e r ,  W age P o l i c y  
a n d  t h e  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e  ( O x f o r d ,  1 9 5 7 ) *  A m o s t  i n t e r e s t i n g  a n d  t h o u g h t f u l  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  H .A .  C l e g g ' s  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
d e m o c r a c y  h a s  b e e n  p u t  f o r w a r d  b y  R o b e r t  W e i n b e r g ,  i n  a  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
L o n d o n  P h . D .  t h e s i s  e n t i t l e d :  W o r k e r s '  C o n t r o l :  A S t u d y  i n  S o c i a l i s t  
T h o u g h t  ( i 960) .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  W e i n b e r g ' s  t h e s i s  w a s  c o m p l e t e d  i n  d r a f t  
b e f o r e  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  C l e g g ' s  b o o k ,  A New A r n r o a c h  t o  I n d u s t r i a l  
D e m o c r a c y  i n  i 960. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  s e c o n d  o f  C l e g g ' s  tw o m a j o r  b o o k s  
o n  i n d u s t r i a l  d e m o c r a c y  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  o n l y  i n  a  b r i e f  p o s t s c r i p t  t o  h i s  
c h a p t e r  on  C l e g g .  A l t h o u g h  Y / e i n b e r g  a r g u e s  t h a t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h i s  
l a t t e r  b o o k  i s  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  some a s  i n  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  
N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , t h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  a l t e r a t i o n s  a n d  r e v i s i o n s  w h i c h
i Cik^e  C l e g g ' s  v i e w s  h a d  d e v e l o p e d  a  s t e p  f u r t h e r .  T h e s e  n o i n t s
w i n  b e  n o t e d  a s  we p r o c e e d  t o  d i s e ñ o s  C l e s s ' s  ? i e w s  i n  t o o  i o l L f r t n *  
s e c t i o n .
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However, Clegg's views can be distinguished from those of his 
Fabian predecessors in one major respect. 7/hereas the Webbs saw the 
major threat to industrial democracy coming from employers and hence 
campaigned to justify the growth of tx’ade unions, Hugh Clegg saw the 
danger arising from workers and thus argued that the power of unions 
ought to be limited. The collective bargaining framework in his hands 
became a justification not for change, as the Webb3 had used it, but 
rather for the preservation of the status quo. Indeed, with the growth 
of trade unions during the half century since the Webbs wrote Industrial 
Democracy, it became possible for writers such as Clegg to argue that 
industrial democracy had been achieved: hence, what was necessary was to 
protect it from zealots, particularly on the left, who wanted to destroy 
it.
II
Considering Clegg's commitment to the existing system of industrial
relations in Grent Britain, it was not surprising that he was anxious
to show why the more radical views of anarchists and syndicalists were
unacceptable. 1-Iis attack on these theories of workers' control concentrated
on two major areas: that they were theoretically inadequate} and, that
4
they were practically unworkable. From a theoretical perspective, Clegg
argued that neither anarchism nor syndicalism could reconcile the conflict
between workers' control of industry and the protection of the interests
5
of consumers and the public. On the practical side, Clegg felt that
4. II.A. Clegg, Labour Relations in London Transport, op. cit., pp. 4-7}
H.A. Clegg and T.E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, op. cit., 
pp. 3-20; H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., 
pp. 1-24; H.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., 
pp. 3-12. Further comments are scattered throughout the preceding 
books.
5» H.A. A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, op, cit,, pp, 8, 2$,
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these theories were based on romantic notions of the capacity of workers
for industrial self-government. Their advocates failed to recognize that
in a highly differentiated industrial society workers' management was
utopian because only those with the requisite technical or managerial
6skills were competent to manage industry.
The grounds for his criticism of syndicalist and anarchist theories
of workers' control were laid out clearly at the beginning of his first
major book on industrial democracy!
Syndicalism must thus meet four distinct challenges! 
that the trade unions cannot take industry over by 
themselves and cannot, therefore, expect to be allowed 
to run it by themselves; that if the state nationalizes 
an industry, it does so primarily in the national 
interest and not in the interest of the workers in the 
industry, which would be the main concern of the unions 
if they had sole control; that trade unions have not 
the technical administrative and commercial experience 
to run a large scale industry; that trade union 
government of industry might be no more democratic than 
capitalist authoritarianism.7
This attack on anarchism and syndicalism was repeated more vigorously 
in A New Approach to Industrial Democracy a deicade later. To reinforce 
his critique, Clegg underlined the popularity of early movements for 
workers' control. The goal of replacing private ownership with a system 
based upon co-operation among equals had been advocated by protest 
movements throughout Europe and America at the turn of the century. 
Syndicalists in France, the I.W.W. in America and the shop-stewards 
movement in Great Britain had all espoused some form of workers' 
management. Yet despite enthusiastic support for these movements, none 
succeeded. The reasons, according to Clegg, were complex but two commonly 
accepted ones were, first; the impact of the Russian revolution which gave 
support to the Communist doctrine of political rather than industrial
6. Ibid., p.- 7.
7« H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., p. 5,
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action, and, second, the economic recession after the First World War 
which greatly weakened the unions. However, the most significant 
reason for their failure lay in the inherent deficiencies of the ideas 
themselves.
The end of the movements for workers’ control, 
however, is to he explained as much by flaws in 
their thinking as by these circumstances which 
provided no more than the occasion of their 
downfall. The central tenet of their doctrine 
was self-government. They believed that working 
men and women could come together to run their own 
lives, not through representatives, not by 
controlling management and governments, but directly 
and by themselves. This notion is now dead. Ho one 
believes that direct industrial self-government would 
provide for the running of modem industrialized 
society.8
Early anarchist and syndicalist theories of workers' control were 
modified in Britain into what Clegg considered to be a more subtle and 
sophisticated, if less apocalyptic approach. Guild socialism had been 
developed by theorists such as G.D.H. Cole who recognized the limitations 
of earlier approaches and, consequently, had attempted to draw up a model 
of socialism which would reconcile workers’ control with public 
accountability and protection of the interests of consumers. Moreover, 
in contrast to earlier theorists, who had stressed the importance of 
direct worker participation in management, guild socialists were willing
9to accept a system of industrial representation.
Yet Clegg believed that the guild socialist solution was inadequate
because the national guilds might well become so centralized that they
stifled workers’ control at the local level. In addition, the guild
socialist framework allocated so much power to producers that there would
10be nothing to prevent them from exploiting consumers and the public.
8. H.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 5»
9. H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., pp. 5t 6.
10. H.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p.ll.
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Given these theoretical shortcomings, and the failure of the tactic of 
encroaching control during the period after the First World War, it was 
hardly surprising, Clegg argued, that the trade union movement had turned 
its back on guild socialism in favour of the more moderate views of men 
such as Herbert Morrison.
I l l
After showing why workers' control was not practical, Clegg proceeded
to outline his own theory of industrial democracy. He began by analyzing
the differences between liberal and Marxist approaches to democracy. The
weakness of the latter, he argued, stemmed from the assumption that in a
classless society, conflicts of interest would not exist. Hence there
would be no need for organized opposition to government. Clegg thought
this view dangerous for two reasons. First, even under socialism,
individuals would, have different interests on particular issues and hence
would need to organize themselves into groups to further their interests.
Second, the Marxist view failed to recognize that the elimination of
opposition would result in massive concentration of power in the hands
of the state. As the practice of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia
demonstrated, such concentrations of power would lead to major abuses.^
This analysis is confirmed by the experience 
of the totalitarian state. There, diversification 
of interests is outlawed. The true interest of 
every citizen is identical. Every organization 
which is not part of the state or the ruling party 
must be destroyed, absorbed, subordinated, or at 
best rendered politically ineffective.^2
The reason Marxists had failed to see the need for opposition was 
that they had assumed that the democratically-run voluntary association
1 1 .  H .A .  C l e g g ,  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , o p .  c i t . t p p .  1 2 - 1 7 *
1 2 .  H .A .  C l e g g ,  A New A p p r o a c h  t o  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y , o p .  c i t . , p ,  2 0 .
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in which all participated on an equal basis could be taken as a model for 
the state under socialism. This was inadequate, Clegg maintained, because 
voluntary associations did not have the same amount of control over their 
members as the state.
The nation itself is not a voluntary organization, 
and it is so large and the temptations of power are 
so great that government inevitably becomes arbitrary 
and oppressive unless some institutions act as a 
constant critic and check, with the strongest possible 
incentive to perform its tasks adequately (for the 
price of successful opposition is power).^3
A second reason that small scale "democracies of common purpose" could
not be used as a model for the state was that they did not confront the
problem of size. The scale of operations in government, according to
Clegg, meant that democratic practices which were workable and appropriate
in small organizations were simply not applicable. Thus while both forms
of democracy were based upon assumptions of political equality and freedom
of speech, in an organization as large as the state these conditions were
not sufficient to guarantee democracy.
...(D)emocracy of the common purpose or general will - 
democracy based on an organic political theory - is 
only acceptable within a ?-elatively small organization; 
if the organization is sufficiently large it becomes a 
sham and a cover for authoritarianism.^
Other techniques of democracy thu3 became essential. The main technique 
devised in the liberal-democracies wa3 that of organized opposition. This 
opposition, normally embodied in an alternative political party had to be 
free to criticize the government, seek support for its platform, and 
replace the government if it could gain the support of the majority.
After establishing that organized opposition was necessary for 
democracy, Clegg applied his theory to industry. Like the state, a large
lq. Ibid., p. 16.
14* Ibid., pp. 121, 122.
p. 121.15. Ibid.,
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enterprise could not be run along the lines of the voluntary, democratic 
organization. Factors such as size, specialization, the need for 
technical expertise and the demands of efficient administration limited 
the ability of ordinary workers to participate directly in management. 
Thus another approach to democracy was required, namely, that used in 
the liberal-democratic state.
In the industrial setting the government was clearly management
while the opposition was the trade union. By opposing management, trade
unions protected the legitimate rights and interests of workers just as
opposition political parties defended the rights of citizens. And by
limiting the power of the government of industry, they transformed
16industrial absolutism into industrial democracy.
The idea that the essential function of trade unions was one of 
opposition separated Clegg*s views from earlier proponents of the 
collective bargaining approach to industrial democracy such as the V/ebbs, 
For this idea fused the pluralist notion of the need for independent 
political parties to oppose government with the existing role of - trade 
unions as an opposition to management. By drawing a precise analogy 
between unions and opposition political parties, Clegg refined tho 
pluralist notion of the need for independent opposition groupsyinto a 
quite specific theory of industrial democracy and thu3 provided a much 
stronger justification for the use of the term 'democracy* to describe 
the collective bargaining approach. 16
16. Ibid., pp. 22, 2% Thus there is a major difference between the 
Webbs' analogy between industry and government and the one made 
by Clegg. The parallel the Webbs drew focussed on the similarity 
between trade union and parliamentary democracy. Their analogy did 
not apply to the government of industry itself and they drew no 
paraBel between the role of opposition political parties and trade 
unions. However, Clegg assumed that the government of industry was 
analogous to a small-scale'-parliamentary democracy in which unions 
performed a role similar to that of the opposition in a parliamentary 
system.
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Clegg* s parliamentary analogy also gave proponents of the status quo
an effective counter to the arguments of guild socialists and syndicalists 
who drew a more literal analogy between industry and government in which 
workers, like citizens, would exercise control on a one-man, one-vote 
basis. For if the essence of democracy was opposition, it was clear that 
these theories of workers' control were not democratic because they made 
no provision for organized opposition. Thus Clegg could argue that it 
was his theory and not that of the guild socialists or syndicalists which 
embodied the essential features of political democracy.
However, if trade unions were to play a role in industry similar
to that of opposition political parties, it was essential that they
resemble the latter in other respects. For example, they must maintain
complete independence from the government of industry: otherwise, they
would compromise their ability to challenge management. Participation
in management would undermine their independence because it would involve
acceptance of responsibility for implementing decisions.
The most important function of a trade union is to 
represent and defend the interests of its members..
Trade unions owe their existence to the need felt by 
the workers for an organization to oppose managers 
and employers on their behalf. The trade union cannot 
then become the organ of industrial management} there 
would then be no one to oppose the management, and no 
hope of democracy. Nor can the union enter into an 
unholy alliance for the joint management of industry, 
for its opposition functions would then become 
subordinate, and finally stifled. They should not 
make any use of joint consultation to take a share in 
the running of industry.17
For the same reason, Clegg believed th t workers should be represented 
only by trade unions. Representation by several organizations would 
lead to a fragmentation of workers' power and thus undermine their 
ability to oppose management. Moreover, conflicts among such 
organizations would be impossible to resolve because each would be the 
legitimate representative of worker interests. Hence workers would
^legg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit.. pp, ljjl,
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be in the absurd position of opposing themselves. Similarly, the
contention that workers could elect management and remain able to
oppose it when necessary through their trade unions was quite inoorrect
because the result would be either that one organization would usurp
the authority of the others and become a de facto management without
effective opposition or, alternatively,that the different bodies v/ould
become dead looted w^ Lth-t heresult that industry could not carry out its
18productive functions properly.
In Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, Clegg drew another
parallel between trade unions and political parties. In a political
party, too much opposition to the leadership compromised the party's
electoral ability because it made the party appear weak, divided and
without clear-cut policies. "...(T)he more conflict there is within a
party", Clegg maintained, "the less it is able to perform its function of
19providing strong government or vigorous opposition." Because the 
political party required a unified front to challenge the common enemy, 
it was perfectly acceptable that its leaders have considerable power - 
power which, on occasion, would have to be used to preserve party unity 
by limiting dissent.18 *20
Similarly, the concentration of decision-making power in the hands
21of union officials did not necessarily undermine the industrial democracy. 
This wa3 so because the purpose of trade unions was to limit the power 
of management and an internally unified movement was more likely to prove
18. H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 21 
and passim.
19» H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., p. 18.
20. Ibid., p. 19.
21. Ibid., p. 21.
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an effective opposition than one weakened by factionalism.
Underlying Clegg's scepticism of the benefits of vigorous opposition 
within the trade unions was his belief that such opposition was frequently 
Communist inspired. Communist opposition, he argued, was irresponsible 
opposition because Communists were not committed to the preservation 
of industrial democracy as he defined it. Their purpose wa3 to use 
trade unions as instruments in the class struggle. Thus to tolerate 
such opposition within unions was to encourage the destruction of industrial 2*
22. Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
In one of his most recent publications, Clegg does examine the 
question of trade union democracy in some detail, but his orientation 
is descriptive rather than normative. He,looks at the rules and 
regulations used by specific unions to facilitate control of the 
leadership by the rank and file and concludes that although 
undemocratic practices do exist in some unions and leaders often 
have a disproportionate influence on union policies, British trade 
unions are not as undemocratic as their critics assume. Specifically,- 
he rejects the claim made by Lipset, Trow and Coleman in Union 
Democracy that a formal opposition group such a3 exists in the 
International Typographical Union in the United States is the only 
effective method of guaranteeing trade union democracy. In 
concluding his discussion of this question. Clegg makes the following 
assertions
"To sum up, it is clear that British trade unions are not autocracies 
and that trade union members have available to them a number of 
channels, varying from union to union, through which they can exert 
influence over their leaders. As in other large organizations there 
is a tendency in trade unions for power to concentrate at the top, 
but there are also a number of checks upon leaders." H.A. Clegg,
The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford, 1970),
Ch. 3 "Trade Union Government" (the quotation is from page 112.)
See also: S.M. Lipset et.al., Union Democracy (Glencoe, 1956).
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democracy itself.^ In stressing the need for internal unity rather 
than democracy, Clegg*3 approach constituted a major retreat from the 
Webbs* earlier position.
Although Clegg felt that his analogy between industrial and political 
democracy was sound, he recognized that it had limitations. One of the 
paradoxes of the role of unions as an organized opposition wa3 that 
collective bargaining had, as its end result, the signing of a collective 25
25. This point is made explicitly in Industrial Democracy and Nationalization:
"...organized opposition in the British trade unions over the last 
twenty or thirty years has been largely Communist. Before 1930, and 
particularly in the period 1910-20, 'unofficial reform movements' 
were common - for instance amongst miners, railwaymen, engineers, and 
building workers - but the experience of the shop stewards' movement 
in the first world war and of the communist-inspired 'Minority 
Movement* in the twenties has inclined union leaders - often rightly - 
to see Communist influence behind any opposition to government, and 
to take disciplinary action. In many unions this ha3 not ousted the 
Communists, but since power cannot be won by a single open contest at 
the polls, they have had to work by steps, marshalling block votes and 
capturing a place on a committee here and an official position there. 
Where this method begins to achieve success, the result i3 that the 
leadership of the unions, normally united in carrying out the agreed 
policies of the union, is split into bitter factions. When it has . 
achieved complete success, le'-‘ derail ip becomes united and effective, 
but even moresolidly entrenched than ever, so that there is even les3 
opportunity for organized opposition, and democracy is more remote 
than before." H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, 
cat., p. 21.
Clegg has launched a similar attack on the left wing of the trade 
union movement in one of his recent publications: How to Run an 
Incomes Policy and Why We Made Such a Mes3 of the Last One (London,
1971). To quote him:
"Others are so conscious of the evils of our present social and 
economic system that they oppose government intervention in the hope 
that crisis can be turned into revolution. They have a better case.
There are grave defects in our present social and. revolutionary
socialist remedies have some attraction. But their oase is 
undermined by two shortcomings. Firstly, for all the noise they make 
the number of British Revolutionaries is pitifully small. They and 
their predecessors have been proselytizing for a century or more, and 
they have made very little impression, at least since the first world 
war. I can see no prospect of their doing much better in the future. 
Secondly, by and large they are, in themselves, a terrifying group of 
people. They are zealots, and few things ere more to be avoided by 
reasonable, tolerant, fair minded men than the rule of zealots,"
I M d . , p. 86 (my emphasis).
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agreement in which unions and eiaployers pledged to fulfil certain 
obligations.*^ Unlike the political party, trade unions had to accept 
some responsibility for the government of industry because if they 
adopted a stance of uncompromising opposition, the signing of a 
collective agreement - an agreement which provided concrete benefits 
for their members - would be impossible. Thus, paradoxically, opposition 
beyond a certain point was irresponsible because it conflicted with the 
best interests of union members.
Conversely, if unions were too co-operative they would fail to
provide adequate opposition. Thus if they opposed too vigorously, or
not enough, they would, in either case, jeopardize their members'
interests. Finding the proper balance between accepting responsibility
and maintaining independence was thus a delicate and complex task which
was not made easier by the fact that, in signing a collective agreement,
the union accepted responsibility for controlling the behaviour of its
members. "From being a champion of the workers, it must change to acting
25as a policeman for a joint agreement with the employer." Thu3 while 
unions must be free to oppose the government of industry, they must also 
accept responsibility for using their power wisely.
IV
Hugh Clegg is best knovni for his oppositional theory of industrial 
democi'Ecy. However, his work on nationalized industries is scarcely less 
significant, particularly, as it represents a coherent and highly 
persuasive statement of the views of the right-wing of the Labour Party 
on nationalization. Although Clegg's enthusiasm for public ownership 245
24. H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., p. 26
25. Ibid,, p. 27*
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gradually waned as the cold war progressed, during the early post-war
period he was a strong supporter of the Labour Government’s nationalization
measures and he made a number of suggestions about how to improve the
administration of the new public enterprises. Yet while Clegg believed
in nationalization at the time, he felt that there was a good deal of
confusion, particularly on the left, about what public ownership could
be expected to achieve. In particular, he was concerned that pressure
from the left wing of the Labour Party might lead to ill-advised attempts
27to bring workers into the actual management of public enterprises.
Clegg opposed worker participation in the management of nationalized
industries for two basic reasons. First, like the Webbs, he felt that the
purpose of nationalization was primarily to protect the interests of the
public by bringing an end to certain abuses associated with private
ownership. Because the purpose of public enterprise was to serve the
community, it was only reasonable that the community's elected
representatives, that is Parliament, ought to maintain control over its 
. . .  28administration. If workers took control there was no way to ensure that 
they would not exploit the public either through excessive charges for 
their services or through management inefficiency.
However, to the arguments developed by the Webbs, Clegg added a new 
reason for excluding workers from management. As we saw erlier, he 
believed that the essence of industrial democracy was opposition. Thus 
if the trade unions controlled the administration of public enterprises 2678
26. H.A. Clegg and T.E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, op. cit.,
Ch. 3 and 4 esp. pp. 206-211.
27. H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., Ch. 4} 
H.A. Clegg and T.E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, op. cit.,
pp. 3-19.
28. II.A.Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. pit., pp. 40-53
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there would be no opposition and, consequently, no democracy. Workers 
could ensure the protection of their interests only by retaining their 
independence from management. Thus it was not simply in the interests 
of consumers and the public that workers ought to be excluded from the 
management of industry, as the Webbs had assumed: it was in their own 
interests as well,
At the same time Clegg put forward a number of suggestions about
how to reorganize the management structure of nationalized enterprises
in order to improve industrial relations and eliminate bureaucratic
procedures which Conservatives continually accused public enterprises of
encouraging. He felt that more autonomy ought to be granted to local
management and that the hierarchical arrangement of the Morrisonian
approach ought to be replaced by a federal one in which local managers
30were accountable directly to the Minister. Clegg also believed that 
there was considerable potential for improving industrial relations in 
public enterprises by providing managers with adequate training in the 
art of fostering better human relations and by placing greater stress, in 
their selection, on attributes of "...human sympathy, of willingness and 
ability to understand.•."^ Yet none of these proposals, as Clegg readily 
admitted, would lead to a major change in the role of workers.
Clegg pointed out, in defence of this position, that the establishment 
of workers' control had been only one cf a number of reasons put forward 
by socialists in support of nationalization. The desire to plan the 2930
29
29. H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p, 25»
30. , H.A. Clegg and T.E. Chester, Tho Future of Nationalization, op. cit.t
pp. 153-160. Of course, such an approach was not new. For example, 
Tvwney argued that a "federal" rather than unitary structure ought to 
be adopted in the nationalized coal industry. See: R.H. Tawney, "The 
nationalization of the Coal Industry" Labour Party Pamphlet (London,
1919) p. 26.
31» Ibid.. p. 205 and passim.
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economy in a rational way, to abolish the chaotic fluctuations of the
trade cycle, to equalize income and wealth and to allocate resources
on the basis of social need rather than profitability, all played a
part in the arguments for ending private ownership. In the formulation
of the Labour Party's policies on nationalization these other
justifications rightfully had taken precedence over the desire to
32establish workers' control.
V/hat was significant, then, about Clegg's early views on nationalized 
industries was that the position of workers was hardly different from 
their counterparts in the private sector. Because Clegg was adamant 
about the need for accountability to Parliament, the organizational 
structures he advocated differed only in points of detail from those of 
conventional business enterprises. Admittedly, he believed that aLabour 
Government in its role as employer would be more sympathetic to the needs 
and aspirations of ..orlcers in the nationalized industries than would 
priva.be owners. And he believed that the elimination of the profit 
motive v;ould curb the excesses engaged in by the more avaricious 
entrepreneurs. However, Clegg did not feel that it was either feasible 
or desirable for workers to participate in the management of nationalized 
industries.
V
Although Clegg had supported nationalization in his early works 
on industrial democracy, by i960 when A Hew Approach to Industrial 
Democracy was published, his enthusiasm for public ownership had notably 
diminished. A long period of Conservative rule separated Industrial 
Democracy and Nationalization from this later work and under this
32. H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, op. cit., p. 44»
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changed political climate the possibilities of capturing the •commanding
heights* of the economy had greatly receded. Moreover, the issue of
nationalization was undergoing a major re-assessment among democratic
socialists in the YJest as the Cold War underlined the totalitarian
possibilities of an economy controlled solely by the state. In this
changed political climate, Clegg felt that justifications for
nationalization carried less weight, while objections appeared considerably 
33more plausible.
To this more sceptical attitude Td. the political consequences of
nationalization was added the weight of Clegg's earlier research on
labour relations in public enterprises. Although he had been anxious
to know if industrial relations had improved in the industries
nationalized by Attlee, he realized that an evaluation in 1950 was
precipitous. However, under the influence of Herbert Morrison, , an
earlier Labour Government had nationalized transport in London in 1930.
Clegg felt that sufficient time had passed in this industry to make a
reasonable assessment of the benefits of nationalization for workers.
Moreover, he believed that London Transport resembled the more recently
nationalized industries closely enough to give his .research a wider
34significance.
What be found, after an exhaustive inquiry into both the pra- 
naticnalizaticn and the post-nationalization labour practices of London 
Transport, was not encouraging for those who believed that nationalization 
would improve labour relations. For, while it was clear that things were
35* H.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit,, pp. 131, 
132 and passim.
34« H.A. Clegg, Labour Relations in London Transport, op. cit. See also: 
Herbert ■ ornson, focialination and Transport ( Lonïïon.“T9?>%).
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no v/orse under nationalization, it was equally clear that they were no
Whatever a differently constituted Board might 
have done, and whatever the omissions of which 
London Transport had been guilty, we may conclude 
that, although London Transport may have served 
the public as well as, or better than, a private 
employer could have done, it has not so far 
achieved relations with its staff markedly better 
than in the old Traffic Combine, or markedly 
better than under good employers in other industries? 
it has not, so far, shown that the public corporation 
provides an adequate and permanent solution to the
problems of relations between,employer and employed, between union and management.33
Clegg used these findings to support his claim a decade later in
A New Approach to Industrial Democracy that ownership was irrelevant to
36good industrial relations. Moreover, since it was clear that labour 
relations under public ownership were no better than under private, then
there was no reason for workers to press for an extension of public
ownership. Of course, public ownership might be advocated for other
reasons. But these were not connected with improving the welfare of
v/orkers in their role as employees.
Yet if workers had no reason to advocate further nationalization,
Clegg argued in this latter book that they had a number of reasons
for opposing it. Historically, industrial democracy had only been able
to.exist in the mixed economies of the West. Wherever the state had
taken full control of economic life, as in the Soviet Bloc, free trade
37unionism had been suppressed. Thus it appeared that substantial 
private ownership was essential to preserve the pluralistic economic 
and political framework upon which free trade unionism depended. In 
light of this analysis, further nationalization wa3 undesirable and *36
35* Ibid., p. 188.
36. II.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., pp. 35-41.
better:
37. Ibid., pp. 131-134.
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perhaps dangerous because it threatened the pluralist economic framework. 
Of course, Clegg did not deny that private ownership occasionally gave 
rise to abuses: but he now maintained that these deficiencies were, 
relatively speaking, for less significant than those which accompanied 
total state control. Ironically, the very private owners against whom 
the trade union movement had campaigned for so many years were actually 
the best guarantee of the preservation of industrial democracy in the 
West.
Clegg1s new found willingness to countenance conservative arguments
was, in part, a consequence of the fear of Communism - both at the
international level and within the British trade union movement. Because
he saw liberal democracy and Soviet Communism as polar systems and was
unwilling to accept that other alternatives wero feasible, he was anxious
to preserve liberal democracy and the industrial relations system that
accompanied it. In order to prevent the development of a monolithic
state, it was necessary to protect exising opposition groups. Thu3
democratic socialists had to revise their earlier position that
nationalization was desirable and replace it with the view that private
enterprise ought to be maintained because it played an important role as
rn opposition group within the pluralist, liberal democratic framework
38and thus supported industrial democracy. In advocating this position, 
Clegg was somewhat circumspect in his defence of private ownership.
He did not discuss the benefits of privately owned enterprises in terms 
of better labour relations for workers. Nor did he attempt to justify 
the profits that accrued to the owners of such enterprises. Rather, he 
focussed attention on the negative features of public ownership and 
stressed that the system of labour relations in the liberal democracies 
of the West was substantially better than in their Communist counterparts.
38. Ibid., pp. 20-23 and passim
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VI
Clegg's conclusion was thus perfectly clear: industrial democracy 
was not only compatible with private ownership, as the Webbs had implied: 
it could be best realized under it. Workers * control was both unnecessary 
and dangerous. It was unnecessary because trade unions were perfectly 
capable of protecting the rights and interests of workers. It was 
dangerous because the elimination of opposition in industry would not 
lead to an expansion of democracy but rather to it3 elimination, as 
workers found themselves no longer able to oppose decisions which they 
felt were contrary to their interests. In short, Clegg's'new approach1 
to industrial democracy involved a complete repudiation of the traditional 
goals of trade unionists and socialists.
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CHAPTER IX
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; REGULATING THE TERMS Ain? 
CONDITIONS OF SUBORDINATION
The function of collective bargaining is to 
relieve or suppress symptoms rather than to 
cure the underlying malady. - Richard Hyman
I
A logical place to begin our discussion of collective bargaining 
is with the values upon which it is based. For much of what the Webbs 
and Hugh Clegg advocated in their outline of how industry ought to be 
organized was based upon quite specific assumptions about the purpose 
and meaning of work. Consequently, we shall attempt to clarify the 
objectives of industry as they defined them and point out how narrow 
and restricted these goals are. Moreover, we shall show how the collective 
bargaining framework fails even to attain the circumscribed goals which 
it is ostensibly designed to fulfil.
What is perhaps most striking about the approach of the Webbs m d  
Hugh Clegg is the extent to which they accepted business priorities 
concerning the need for efficiency, productivity, and the maximization 
of output.'*' These were the criteria by which the success or failure of 1
1. This point has been emphasized by Daniel Bell, who notes that:
"Socialism, particularly in the Y/est, has, in its view of work, been 
markedly utilitarian. Its concerns have been largely with the market. 
The economic guides to the socialist state, such as those by Dickinson, 
Lange and Lerner, sought to prove that market calculi were possible in 
a directed economy, while the social justifications of the Webbs were 
built on the premise that only socialism could promote efficiency and 
order. The humanistic impulses which stemmed from William Morris were 
lost...the YYebbs...saw social change as a means to create order: 
their motive was a passion for efficiency. They had no feeling for 
people."
Daniel Bell, Work and its Discontents, op. cit., pp, 59-40. Although 
Bell is too hard on the Webbs, the point he makes is valid.
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economic activity was to be measured and these were the criteria to which 
other possible goals of an industrial society had to be subordinated. It 
mattered little to them that these yardsticks originated in the desire of 
the private owner to maximize his profit, because they assumed that the 
community benefited from the cheapness and abundanoe of the goods and
2services which were the unintended consequence of his economic activities.
Consequently, they accepted an approach to industry which was
consumer, rather than producer, oriented. Industrial enterprises were
beneficial primarily because they provided goods and services: hence
efficiency and the growth of total production were of paramount importance
3m  determining how industry ought to be organized. Even when they assessed 
the benefits workers were to receive from their contribution to production, 
they stressed the extrinsic rewards derived from work rather than the 
intrinsic satisfactions arising in it. The advantages of efficient 
production were to be realized in higher wages to be spent by workers in 
their capacity as consumers but not in producer gains such as job 
satisfaction or participation in decision-making. In short, they were to 
be derived from, but not in work.
The consumer oriented approach was explicitly outlined by the Webbs 
in their division of industry into three decision making areas: what was
4to be produced, how it was to be produced and under what conditions.
This framework specifically excluded workers from participating in 
management, because the Webbs felt that workers were not sufficiently 
committed to the pursuit of efficiency to be trusted with this responsibility. 234
2. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London, 1927) 9th ed., 
(orig. pub. 1897)» PP« 818, 819. Of course, the Webbs tended to 
favour public ownership, and, in particular, municipal ownership. But 
the purpose of industry wa3 to be the same regardless of ownership.
3. Ibid., pp. 818, 821, 822.
4. Ibid., p. 822.
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As we saw, they viewed producer preferences for the use of particular
skills or techniques of production suspiciously as vested interests,
rather than a3 methods by vjhich producers were able to obtain fulfilment
in their work. Disputes between workers and employers over how production
was to be carried out were not seen as legitimate conflicts between producer
and consumer values. Npr were they seen in terms of who was to control
5production on the shop floor. Rather they were interpreted as conflicts 
between managers attempting to introduce more efficient production methods 
in the public interest and workers attempting to impede such progress by 
striving selfishly to maintain antiquated methods of work.*’
Consequently, while both the Y/ebbs and Hugh Clegg wanted to improve 
the working conditions of the average worker, they still accepted the 
assumption that he was a factor of production to be U3ed like other factors 
in promoting goals of business. They did not challenge the notion that 
labour was a commodity or the view that its value ought to be determined 
by the interplay of supply and demand in the market place. *
Their instrumental view of the worker was accompanied by the adoption 
of another business assumption, namely, that it was the manager's job - *6
5« Ibid., pp. 810, 811. It i3 interesting to note, in this context, that 
Sidney 77ebb gave a conditional endorsement to scientific management.
The First Y/orld 77ar underlined the need for gre- ter efficiency and 
more systematic methods of production in British industry. It was 
thus not surprising that scientific management made its first major 
inroads in Britain during this period and it3 arrival was greeted 
by Sidney V/ebb as a major step forward in industrial management.
See» Sidney Webb and Arnold Freeman, Great Britain After the V/ar 
(London, 1916), Ch. VIII as cited by Samuel Haber, Efficiency and 
Uplift, op. cit., p. 120.
6, As Alan Flanders notes, the attempt to define the activities of trade 
unions within a market framework also led the Webbs to ignore a wide 
range of factors associated with collective bargaining which had 
nothing to do with economic issues. In particular, normative 
questions concerning status, equity, differentials, disciplinary rules 
and other’ matters are often raised at the bargaining table. Similarly, 
the desire to be respected or to be treated with dignity cannot be 
reduced to economic terms, yet is obviousjya legitimate aim of 
collective bargaining. See: Alan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining* A 
Theoretical Analysis" op. cit., pp. 226-230.
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and his alone - to organize production. The 7/orker was to be fitted 
in to perform whatever task management set out for him, just as the 
various machines were fitted in to perform their respective tasks. Hi3 
role in industry was defined not in terms of the development of his 
abilities or the satisfaction of his needs but in terms of his capacity 
to perform tasks that could not as yet be performed by machines, because 
machines that could obey orders and carry out instructions had not
yet been perfected.
The treatment of the worker as an object - at least a3 far as his 
producer interests were concerned - was, rather ironically, combined with 
the assumption that as an employee he was characterized by a pronounced 
disinclination to work. Thus management not only had the responsibility 
of organizing production; it also had the task of policing worker behaviour. 
In this regard, the Webbs took the view that work was not a co-operative 
venture but rather a painful necessity which workers would only perform 
under economic compulsion. Thus a hierarchical pattern of authority was 
essential if production were to be carried out efficiently.
Considering their consumer-oriented approach to the purpose of 
industry and their belief that the rewards of work were extrinsic rather 
than intrinsic, it is not surprising that the Webbs accepted the 
subordination of workers to management. For the costs of such subordination 
to the worker were believed to be relatively small compared with the 
consumer benefits arising from it.
Yet there is no reason to assume that fulfilment in work is 
necessarily less valuable than increased production. Nor is there any 
reason to assume that people with monotonous, routine jobs will be happier 
because they are better paid than those who have more stimulating jobs and 
less money. For the quality of life is not reflected in the quantity of 
good3 and services people consume« it is determined by their ability to 
satisfy their needs. And, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, the need
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for self-expression is fundamental to human happiness. Thus to suppress 
it merely to Gain additional output can he a far Greater limitation on 
the worker’s happiness than to adopt methods of production which axe less 
efficient, hut more intrinsically satisfying»
The Webbs and Hugh Clegg refused to accept that opportunities for
creativity and self-development at work were important. They ignored the
deleterious effects of routine work on mental health and took no account
of the adverse consequences of stultifying jobs on the happiness of workers,
both on .andoff the job. Indeed, they believed that production ought to be
»
organized exclusively according to the narrow, commercial criteria of 
business. Efficiency was to be pursued regardless of the non-economic 
costs it imposed on workers.
However, the issue is not limited to production techniques. To 
work in an atmosphere of co-operation and fellowship rather than hierarchy 
and discipline can contribute greatly to human happiness. Insofar as 
traditional managerial authority limits opportunities for the attainment 
of these goals, it can significantly reduce the social satisfactions 
associated with work. Similarly, management strategies which.are designed 
to breok-up work groups or foster competition among employees can poison 
social life at the workplace. Thus it is essential that the consumer 
benefits of such methods of organizin.; work he weighed a fains t the costs 
to producers in terms of the loss of fellowship at work. Yet like the 
question of worker creativity, the Webbs and Hugh Cle^g were not interested 
in taking account of such producer-oriented considerations. In their zeal 
for efficiency, the Webb3 repudiated the view that industry ought to be 
a co-operative commonwealth based upon equality, fellowship and mutual aid.
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For such a pattern of industrial organization, would impede the maximization 
of production,- .■ .
II
Because they accepted the basic values underlying private ownership 
and control, and because they believed that it was necessary for management 
to exercise control over workers, both the Webbs and Hugh Clegg defined
i
the problem of industrial relations in terms of how to mitigate theabuses 
which tended to accompany such control while still maintaining an industrial 
structure which facilitated its exercise. Their criticism of hierarchical 
authority relationships under private ownership were based upon assumptions 
that they were wrong not because they allowed a minority to exercise control 
over the majority, but rather because they had no built-in safeguard to 
prevent the abuse of that control. Hence the Webbs wanted to establish a 
pattern of industrial organization based upon the use of capitalist techniques 
of social control to maximize output and the use of some mechanism to 
prevent the possible abuse of those techniques.
Trade unionism in its role, as an organized opposition to management 
fulfilled such a function ideally. It limited the arbitrary power of 
managers, yet maintained the basic hierarchical structure of industrial 
enterprises. Thus we see that the role of unions in collective bargaining 
was vital to the approach of the Webbs and Clegg not simply because unions 
offered a method of protecting the rights and interests of workers but also 
because th<=y did so in a way that could be reconciled with the basic 
priorities of business. The fact that trade unions and management negotiated y' 
the terms and conditions of employment enabled the Webbs and Clegg to argue 
that management's exercise of power was so hedged with constitutional 
safeguards that it was no longer objectionable. The function of trade unions
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thus became, rather ironically, one of legitimizing management control 
by limiting its worst abuses.
The Webbs and Hugh Clegg tended to focus attention almost exclusively
7on how collective bargaining protected the rights and interests of workers.
In doing so, they failed to discern how, in a broader context, this 
framework maintained the problems which sprang not from abuses of management 
power, but from its very existence. In emphasizing how much the lot of the 
average worker was improved by trade unions, they failed to notice how much 
more was left unchanged. By stressing the benefits of unionism, they failed 
to see that collective.^ bargaining limited union activities to areas which 
were not only compatible with the priorities of business but quite
0incompatible with the advancement of the producer interests of workers. 
Moreover, in underlining the need to preserve managerial prerogatives over 
the organization of production, they failed to recognize that the preservation 
of these prerogatives undermined the very ability of unions to fulfil their 
more limited function of protecting workers in their capacity as employees.
In short, they did not appreciate how beneficial collective bargaining 
could be for employers. As Alan Flanders notes, the Webbs "...tended to 
assume that collective bargaining was something forced upon employers 78
7. This tendency to over-estimate the accomplishments of trade unions - 
real as they are - has by no means been limited to the Webb3 and 
Hugh Clegg. For example, Anthony Crosland speak3 enthusiastically 
about the extent of trade union encroachment on managerial 
prerogatives, expressing an opinion shared by many other right-wing 
socialists»
«
"The trade unions, .skilfully exploiting the existence of a seller’s 
market for labour, have established a remarkable degree of control over 
those management decisions which directly affect the day-to-day life 
of the worker." See» C.A.R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, (London.
1962) p. 218.
8. On this point see the excellent discussion by George F. Thomason, 
"Workers* Participation in Private Enterprise Organization" in 
Campbell Balfour (ed.) Participation in Industry (London, 1973) 
pp. 169-172.
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against their will by strikes and other union sanctions." Yet from
the employer’s point of view, trade unions offer numerous benefits.
Unions do not simply oppose, they also collaborate. In return for granting
a union formal recognition, management normally extracts important
concessions. For example, unions normally agree to respect management
control of investment, planning, finance and the organization of production
with the result that conflict is restricted to the terms and conditions
of employment.Unions also play an important role in enforcing the
terms of agreements among their own members.Insofar as management can
define the nature of its relationship with trade unions, it can use them
for carrying out its policies and, in some cases, can gain concessions
12which it could not ohtain on its own.
9
As the economist, J.K. Galbraith, points out*
By helping to 'frame the rules and by participating 
in their administration through the grievance 
machinery, the union serves invaluably to mitigate 
the feeling that such systems or their administration 
are arbitrary or unjust. It is a measure of the 
importance of this function that, where the union 
does not exist, good management practice calls for 
the development of some substitute. In helping to 
prevent discontent and, therewith, a sense of 
alienation, the union also removes barriers to 
identification - barriers which once contributed to 
it3 own power.
9. Alan Flanders, "Colledtive Bargaining» A Theoretical Analysis", 
op. cit. t p. 215. Flanders also notes that in the nineteenth 
century, it was employers who frequently wanted collective 
bargaining because they were anxious to share in decisions normally 
made unilaterally by worker organizations.
10. Murray Edelman "The Conservative Political Consequences of Labour 
Conflict" in Gerald G. Somers (ed,) Essays in Industrial Relations 
Theory (Ames, Iowa, 1969) PP« 164» 165.
11. For example, unions can be of great assistance in persuading their 
members to accept redundancies, changes in manning levels, new work 
procedures and the like.
12. Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations» A Marxist Introduction (London, 
1975) pp. 106-113, 190-196; Stanley . Arnowitz, "Trade Unionism and 
Workers' Control" in Gerry Hunnius et al., Workers' Control, op. cit.
pp. 65. 66. -------------------------
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Also, while some unions have resisted technological 
change, others have greatly helped it by aiding the 
accommodation to change. They have helped to 
arrange a trade of higher pay, ashorter week, 
severance pay or other provision for those sacrificed 
for smaller employment. And they have persuaded their 
members to accept the bargain. The industrial system 
attaches great importance to such help. The union 
leader who provides it is accorded its highest 
encomium, that of labour statesman.13
What is remarkable, then, about the collective bargaining approach
as outlined by the Webbs and Hugh Clegg, is not how different the situation
of the worker is in comparison with his unorganized counterpart - although
v/e would not deny that the organized worker is better off in some respects -
but rather how similar it is.^ Management•s legal responsibilities to
shareholders are preserved. The organization of industry remains
hierarchical and workers are still viewed as •hands'. But most importantly,
the basic parpose of business is the same. Trade unions were simply
grafted to an organizational structure designed specifically to promote
the interests of shareholders with little regard for whether that structure
was compatible with the advancement of the interests of workers.^
Neither the Webbs nor Hugh Clegg were particularly interested in
analyzing the managerial function. They did not distinguish between the
technical and administrative role performed by managers and their role as
13» J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, op. cit., pp. 260, 281. See 
also: Murray Edelman, "The Conservative political Consequences of 
Labour Conflict", o£. cit., pp. 166, 167; Lee H. Hill and Charles R.
Hook Jr., Management at the Bargaining Table (New York, 1945) as 
reprinted in E. Wright Blakke et al., Unions, Management and the 
Public (New York, 1948) PP» 323* 324? Stanley Arnowitz, "Trade Unionism 
and Workers' Control" ini Gerry Hunnius, et al., (ed.) Workers' Control, 
on. cit., pp. 63-68 and passim. Arnowitz gives a good account of the 
history of collaboration between union officials in the A.F.L. and 
later A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the companies they ostensibly opposed. One 
of their most important functions wa3 that of suppressing the more 
radical elements within their union.
14» This tendency to overestimate the gains of trade unionism has not, of
course, been limited to collective bargaining theorists. As Richard Hyman 
notes, workers themselves frequently exaggerate the gains they have made - 
a tendency which is encouraged by union leaders who are anxious to maintain 
the commitment of rank and file workers to the union. See: Richard Hyman, 
Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, op. cit., pp. 191-193»
15» George F. Thomason, "Workers' Participation in Private Enterprise 
Organisations" ojo. cit.. p. 169.
- 320 -
agents of social control, guaranteeing that the interests of shareholders 
took precedence over the needs of workers. Nor did they attempt to ascertain 
the extent to which the functions performed by management could be performed 
by workers. Instead, they accepted the existing role of management 
uncritically and assumed that those with technical and administrative 
expertise should be allowed a free hand to organize production.That 
managers might use their power to preserve class privilege was q question 
in which they showed surprisingly little curiosity. The Webbs and Hugh Clegg 
did not believe that the social background and class position of managers 
were important considerations influencing how they administered industry or 
that the status, power, income and other privileges associated with the 
manager's role might constitute major incentives for the preservation of 
managerial prerogatives independently of whether or not such prerogatives 
were necessary for the functioning of industry.
Finally, the Webbs and Hugh Clegg were surprisingly insensitive to
the argument that giving management such power might be unwise when
considerations other than efficiency, such as the desire to promote the
17socialist goal of a more egalitarian society, were taken into account.
Thus we see that collective bargaining does not challenge the 
principles underlying the organization of industry within capitalist societies.
16. On this point, see the critique of the technocratic approach to 
industrial organization by John Child in» "Organization: A Choice for 
Man" John Child (ed.) Man and Organization (London, 1973) esp. pp. 251- 
255. See also» Lorin Baritz, The Servants of Power, op. cit.»
Stephen Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do?" Review of Radical Political 
Economists, Vol. 6 Ho. 2 Summer, 1974 ¿nd Vol. 7i No. i Spring iy75.
17. One unintended consequence of their commitment to traditional management 
prerogatives was that management would continue to view trade unions as 
obstacles to be circumvented in the attempt to fulfil the purposes of the 
enterprises as defined by the owners - whether public or private. Within 
the collective bargaining framework, trade unions would still be seen as 
impediments to management's freedom of action. Ironically, it was even 
freer to pursue the goals of productivity and efficiency within the 
collective bargaining framework because it was now primarily the 
responsibility of the unions, to see that workers were protected from 
abuses of managerial power.
The right of those who own to control is sanctioned, subject to certain 
relatively minor limitations on the exercise of that control. The status 
of the worker remains that of a seller of labour rather than a producer 
v/ho exercises control over his productive activities, and the purpose 
of . ork is still defined exclusively in terms of the production of things 
and not in terms of the satisfaction of the need3 of those who produce.
Ill
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Yet the collective bargaining approach is inadequate not simply because
it fail3 to challenge the values underlying private ownership. Ironically, it
also fails to accomplish its more narrowly defined task of protecting the
interests of workers as employees. This failure is not the result of the
inability of unions to perform the role assigned them within the collective
18bargaining framework, but rather because of the inadequacy of that role.
1C » '* f
Although the Webb3 and Hugh Clegg maintained^'the'• trade unions provided an 
effective counterbalance to management power within the collective bargaining 
framework, this claim is questionable because the equality of bargaining power
19which is the central premise of their pluralist approach simply does not exist.
18. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, op. cit., pp. 819, 820, 
841-846; H.A. Clegg, A Hew Approach to Industrial Democracy, op. cit., 
pp. 20-28. One can say to the credit of the Webbs that their pluralist 
framework did specify the legitimate spheres of different groups. Unlike 
many contemporary pluralists who simply assume that the existence of 
competing groups, regardless of their relative strengths,^ a sufficient 
guarantee of democracy, they saw the competition among groups had to take 
place within a framework conducive to democracy. A simple free-for-all was 
simply'not on'*
19. Of course, the Webbs and Hugh Clegg are by no means the only proponents of a 
pluralist industrial framework. See, for example, Clarke Kerr, John T.Dunlop 
et al., Industrial and Industrial Man, 0%  cit.; Ralf Dahr-ndorf, Class ?nd 
Class Conflict in Industrial Society, op. cit.} C.A.R. Crosland, The Future 
of Socialism, op. cit., Ch. XIV; W.W. Daniel and Neil McIntosh, The Right
to Manage (London, 1972) esp. Ch. 4 and 8; and what is perhaps the most 
persuasive statement of the pluralist position in» Alan Pox, "Industrial 
Sociology and Industrial Relations" (London, H.M.S.O. 1966). Pox has 
subsequently repudiated his pluralist views. See« Alan Pox, "Industrial 
Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology" in John Child (ed.)
Man and Organization (London, 1973)* For statements of the pluralist 
arguments in the field of political theory see: Joseph Schumpeter, Socialism 
Capitalism and Democracy, op. cit.} Arthur Kornhauser, The Politics of 
, Mass Society (London, i960)} Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
op. cit.
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But if managerial power is so overwhelmingly strong, why is this not
obvious to everyone? The answer is that unilateral management control
over major decisions such as investment, pricing, finance and the like is
simply taken for granted. The notion of equality i3 confined to a limited
range of issues associated with wages, hours and other personnel matters.
Thus industrial disputes are not over the main issues of policy which firms
pursue but over marginal labour relations questions. Unions know that to
challenge investment decisions, pricing policies or similar matters would
be futile because management could inflict such heavy costs on their members
that they would be forced to renounce these demands and leave the bargaining
21table with nothing.
Even during strikes the full power of management is rarely brought into 
play. As long as workers limit their demands to areas which are considered 
legitimate by management, the struggle is confined to establishing a mutually 
acceptable compromise within such boundaries. There are exceptions of . 
course: when the union demands a concession which management believes to 
constitute an impingement on its fundamental control of the firm. Or, when 
management wants to weaken or destroy a union and feels secure enough to 
engage in a prolonged struggle to that end. But for the most part, disputes 
are restricted to haggling over the terms on which workers will be willing 
to sell their labour.
The exercise of management power is greatly facilitated by the fact 
that most business decisions are made quietly, behind closed doors, while 21
21. ThiQ point is well illustrated in William Semin* s account of the
relationship between General Motors and the United Auto V/orkers, The 
U.A.W. has traditionally voiced it3 opoosition to specific management 
prerogatives yet failed in every instance to wrest them from management. 
In the 1945-46 strike, Walter Reuther demanded a 30 per cent wage 
increase and a guarantee that G.M. would not raise its prices. He also 
demanded that the company open its books to the union. Not only were 
the last t-0 demands quickly dropped but, in revenge, the company 
fought the strike for 36 days over a difference of one penny per hour 
in wages between it and the union. It won. See: William Serrin, The 
Company and the Union, op. cit., pp. 157-169»
.attempts by trade union to change such decisions normally involve highly 
visible controntation. Thus a firm . can decide to close down a factory, 
or, indeed, an entire industry,without having to face puhlic scrutiny.
But a union which opposes such decisions can only make its case effective 
by techniques such a3 strikes, sit-ins and the like which give the 
appearance that it is engaging in ‘strong-arm* tactics to force acceptance 
of it3 policies.
Thus the collective bargaining framework creates a situation where 
unilateral management decisions which vitally affect the lives of workers, 
and in some cases entire communities, are accepted, in a matter-of-fact 
way, as if it were perfectly normal - and justifiable - for a tiny group 
of business executives to control the lives of thousands of other people. 
Yet, conversely, attempts by the people whose lives are so affected to 
have a say in business decisions are interpreted as evidence of their 
willingness to use force to pursue their own selfish interests.
As Alan Fox ha3 noted, companies have an interest.in concealing thoir ,
power. For in societies which profess to be democratic, the existence of
organizations which have the ability to control the behaviour of the
majority throughout their working lives,without having to be accountable
to that majority, conflicts with the et'no3 of democracy. To expose the
extent of business power is to flaunt the democratic ideal and thus raise
the question of whether such power can be tolerated. Moreover, by creating
the impression that it has relatively little power, especially in relation
to trade unions, business can persuade the public that it is the power
22of the unions which must be curtailed, rather than its own.
A point which has been noted by many critics of pluralism in recent 
years is that power doe3 not have to be overtly exercised to be effective. 2
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22. Alan Fox, "A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology" in John Child
(ed.) Han and Organization (London, 1973) PP* 192-199» 209-212; 
Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, op.cit,, pp, 58, 39» Ralph Miliband, 
The State in Capitalist Society, op. cit., p, 146.
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In fact, the greater the disparity-in power the loss likely it will be
that the subordinate will challenge th: dominant party. This is so
because the subordinate realizes that the possibility of success is
remote, while the likelihood of retribution for such a challenge i3
extremely high. Thus, if.workers were to go on strike over an issue which
posed a fundamental threat to managerial prerogatives, such as a demand to
equalize all wages and salaries - to use an example of Alan Fox - it would
23quickly become apparent which side had more power.
A dispute over a wage demand of an additional ten pence per hour, when
viewed from this larger perspective is of marginal significance to
business. The fact that management may choose to fight rather than
concede the ten pence is not an indication of the importance of the issue,
for as we have seen in our study of management theory, management is
always concerned to keep as much control as possible over the margins of
the interprise as well. If the union is not strong enough to force
management to concede the additional ten pence per hour, then from the
latter*s viewpoint there is no reason to concede the demand. But the
publicity given to such disputes in the press should not obscure the fact
that they are peripheral when compared with the substantive decision-
24making areas where managerial prerogatives remain unopposed.
IV j
J
To underline our argument on this question, it is perhaps fruitful\to 
point out a number of areas where collective bargaining hasufailed to make 
any notable alteration in the exercise of managerial control. First, it 
has not led to any fundamental change in the legal authority of management, 234
23. Alan Fox,Man Hismanagemefat, op. cit., p, 211.
24. George F. Thompson, "Workers' Participation in Private Enterprise 
Organizations" 0£. cit., pp. 170, 171.
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in the source of that authority in property or in the assumption that 
ownership ought to carry with it the right of control. Nor has it 
altered the legal view that the business enterprise is essentially 
a piece of property to be disposed of a3 its owners wish. As we pointed 
out in our discussion of management theory, workers have no right to 
participate in decision-making and the claims they can .make upon the 
enterprise as people who invest their lives in it are still virtually 
non-existent in law.
Second, collective bargaining ha3 not led to any fundamental change in
the exercise of authority within business enterprises. Rather, certain
minor limitations on the exercise of management power have been imposed.
For example, management may have to give reasons before it dismisses
employees, or provide adequate justification for the application of
disciplinary measures. But management still controls the organization
of work and retains the power to determine what and how much will be
produced. The enterprise is not a co-operative endeavour but rather
one in which the relationship between workers and employers is one of
25dominance and subordination. As Richard Hyman points out: "Management
still commands; workers are still obliged to obey. Trade unionism
permits debate around the terms of ..orkers' obedience; it does not
26challenge the fact of their subordination."
In this respect, one of the most fruitful methods of assessing the 
extent*, of managerial control is to examine disciplinary provisions in 
collective agreements to which unions have consented. In many cases 256
25. This fact has been noted by managers as well. For example, Alfred P, 
Sloan Jr. boosted that G.I.I. had been able to accommodate the demands
of the U.A.Vi. "...without surrendering any of the basic responsibilities 
of management." Alfred P. Sloan Jr., My Years with General Motors, 
op. cit., p. 414.
26. Richard Hyman, Strikes (London, 1972) p. 96} See also: George F. Thompson, 
'Workers' Participation in Private Enterprise Organizations", ££. cit.
pp. 170, 171.
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these provisions read more like a prison code than a set of rules to
regulate the behaviour of workers who have, allegedly, gained industrial 
27citizenship. Often, the best that can be said about the impact of unions
on managerial authority in thi3 area is that they have mitigated some of
its more glaring abuses. At,.the same time, they have failed to bring about
any fundamental alteration in management's right to exercise such power.
Third, collective bargaining has not altered’the hierarchical structure
of business enterprise or reduced differentials in status, power and income
between those at the bottom and those at the top. Instead, as enterprise
have grown and the number of levels in their hierarchies of command have
increased, differentials have widened. The gap between the salary of the
managing director of a large multi-national and that of the lowest paid
employee in his firm is normally a good deal greater than in a small 
28enterprise. Over a whole range of organizational decisions concerning
issues such as salaries, expense accounts and other privileges accorded to
29
managers, collective bargaining simply does not apply. Workers can *28
27» These rules and regulations are normally laid out in considerable detail 
in U.S. agreements. Different categories of offences with the relevant 
punishments are stipulated in the contract. Although unions may challenge 
whether an employee is guilty, if he is proved to be so it must not 
interfere in the company's disciplinary actions against him. For a good 
discussion of the importance of discipline in regulating the behaviour 
of workers see« William Serrin, The Company and the Union, op. cit. 
Although Serrin deals only with workers in G.M., such practices are 
typical of most other industries. See also: Walter Johnson, "Assembly 
Line Merry-Go Round" 0£. cit.,pp.10-12 • Hew Beynon, Working for Ford, 
op. oit.; G. David Garson, "Beyond Collective Bargaining" in Gerry Hunnius 
et al. (ed.) Workers1 Control, op. cit., pp. 115, 116.
28. According to Serrin, the salaries of the top 17 officials of G.M. are 
roughly twenty-five times as high as those of the average production 
worker. See: William Serrin, The Company and the Union, op. cit.
29» Of course, it may be argued that there is nothing preventing trade
unions from introducing such issues into negotiations with employers. 
However, while such topics could indeed be introduced, to do so would 
upset the pluralist framework advocated by both the Y/ebbs and Hugh Clegg. 
For trade unions would then be attempting to influence policy making 
areas outside their legitimate spheres of influence because they would 
no longer be engaged in negotiating over the terms and conditions of 
employment of their own members, but over those of a group they did 
not represent.
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negotiate foi* higher wages themselves but not for reductions in 
differentials between themselves and their superiors. Not surprisingly, 
the normal practice in large enterprises is to raise management salaries 
to an amount which corresponds to the percentage increase gained by 
workers. Managers readily admit that the purpose of this practice is to
preserve differentials and thus maintain the division between workers
, 30and managers.
Fourth, trade unions have not been able to alter the distribution
31of income in the larger society either. The share of the surplus from 
industrial enterprises accruing to owners has remained relatively constant 
during the past century, even though union membership has grown dramatically 
during this period. Despite the numerous strikes, sit-ins, work-ins and 
other forms of industrial protest, the basic inequality between those who 301
30. For example, General Motors, according to Alfred P. Sloan, follov/3 a , 
policy of paying foremen "...at least 25 per cent higher than the 
earnings of the highest paid group of employees under their supervision." 
Alfred P. Sloan Jr., Mv Years With General Motors, op. cit., p. 415»
See also: William Serrin, The Company and the Union, op. cit.
Daniel Bell, "The Subversion of Collective Bargaining" in
G. David Garson et al. (ed.) Workers1 Control, op. cit., pp, 130-133«
31. G. David Garson, "Beyond Collective Bargaining" op.cit., p. 113.
Garson arg-ue3 that as long as employers are allowed to pass wage 
increased to consumers in the form of higher prices and a3 long as 
trade unions have no say in corporate prioing policy, it is impossible 
for them to alter this distribution of income. Victor Allen, in an 
earlier work, makes the same point. Soet Victor Allen, "The Paradox
of Militancy" in Robin Blackburn and Alexander Cockbum, The Incompatibles, 
op. cit., pp. 242-248} Daniel Bell, "The Subversion of Collective 
Bargaining" 0£. cit., pp. 121, 122. Bell's article is based partially 
on the findings of the Kefauver Committee. The Committee di"covered 
how large U.S. companies used wage settlements as a justification for 
increasing prices far beyond the amount of money conceded to workers 
under the agreements. Thus unions were actually helping companies 
increase their profitsl Ibid., pp. 125-128.
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own and those v/ho sell their labour remains. Not surprisingly, a
number of conservative economists, such as Milton Friedman, have used
this fact to argue that trade unions are of questionable value, because
a century of collective bargaining has shown that they cannot alter the
33share of income going to labour.
While it may be argued that the purpose of collective bargaining per
se is not to redistribute wealth, acceptance of this proposition leads to
the conclusion that the function of trade unions is reduced to negotiating
34the conditions rather than the terms of employment. While the 
conditions of employment obviously should not be ignored, economic issues 
still play a central role in the appeal of trade unions. If bargaining 32
32
32. See, for examples R.M. Titmuss, Income Distribution and Social Change 
(London, 1962); Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America (New York,
1972) esp. Ch. 1; Frank Parkin, 'Class Inequality and Political Order 
(London, 1972) pp. 114-121; J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
(Harrnondsworth, 1970), orig. pub. 1967* pp» 251-233» 266-285;
J.H. Westergaard, "Sociology: The Myth of Classlessness" in Robin 
Blackburn,(ed.) Ideology and Social Science (Bungary, Suffolk, 1972) 
pp. 122-124} Robin Blackburn, "The Unequal Society" in Robin Blackburn 
and Alexander Cockbum, The Incompatibles (Harmondsworth, 1967) esp. 
pp.16-28; Richard Hyman,‘"strikes ?London, 1972), pp. 77» 85» 86;
Clive Jenkins and J.E. Mortimer, The Kinds of Laws the Unions Ought to 
Want (London, 1968) p. 8.
33» Friedman is not the only conservative economist to question the
effectiveness of trade unions. See, for example, the doyen of conventional 
economists, Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (8th ed.) (London, 1972) 
pp. 565-584 and Clarke Kerr, "Labour's Income Share and the Labour 
Movement" in George W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson (ed.) New Concepts 
of Wage Determination (New York, 1957)« Recognition of the failure of 
trade unionism to redistribute wealth has also been an important faotor 
influencing the proposals of some Labour Party members such a3 
C.A.R. Crosland. Crosland has argued that the best way to improve the 
standard of living of working people is through high economic growth. 
Expanding the sise of the industrial pie is of far greater importance 
for him than redistributing it, because redistribution is so much more 
difficult to achieve. C.A.R. Crosland, Socialism Nov/, op. cit., pp.63» 74-9
34» Indeed, Clegg himself notes- in one of his more recent publications that 
there is considerable doubt as to whether or not trade unions have been 
able to increase the share of corporate earnings allotted to wages as 
opposed to profits. And he is willing to accept the idea thet the 
trade union function may indeed have to be limited to such non-economic 
areas in the future. But he does not relate such observations to the 
theory of collective bargaining as industrial democracy which he 
articulated in his earlier books. See: H.A. Clegg, How to Run an Incomes 
Policy and Why We Made Sucha Mess of the Last One, op. cit., pp. 84-87.
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over the terms of employment does not lead to wage increases which would 
be, in the long run, significantly higher them would be obtained without 
trade unions, then the argument that trade unions bring economic benefits 
to their members falls to the ground and with it the raison d* etre of a 
large prrt of the negotiations between unions and employers.
Fifth, trade unions have not been able to alter managerial prerogatives
over a wide range of issues which directly affect the rights and interests
of workers as employees, but are not considered to be negotiable in the
collective bargaining process. For example, workers are excluded from
policy decisions in areas such as planning, investment, the adoption of new
product lines and the like, even though decisions in these areas have a
35crucial impact on them. Failure to invest may result in future 
redundancies. Adoption of new machinery or processes may make existing 
skills obsolete or introduce new working conditions. And, the construction 
of new plants — often in other countries — may lead to the closure of the 
factories upon which union members depend for their livelihood. Even on 
questions such as redundancy where workers are vitally affected, it is 
often the case that the union can only attempt to reduce the detrimental 
effects of management decisions. Certainly, it cannot force management 
to provide work for all its members.
It may be argued that in cases such as the one just mentioned, economio 
imperatives force management to take unpopular decisions such as reducing 
the Bize of its workforce. But often management has made a series of 
investment decisions, perhaps originating five or ten years earlier, which 
makes the reduction of its workforce virtually inevitable. Under such 
circumstances, the limitations of the trade union power become quite clear. 
For if the union cannot influence investment policy, then the best that
35» G e o r g e  F .  T h o m a s o n ,  " W o r k e r s *  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  P r i v a t e  E n t e r p r i s e
Organizations" op. cit., pp. 170, 171.
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it can hope to achieve is to make the redundancies as painless as possible.
Yet what value is trade union opposition if management has deliberately set 
up a situation where the options open to trade unions are so limited as to 
be hardly considered as options at all?
Finally, collective bargaining has proved unable to provide adequate 
protection for the health and safety of workers . As we saw in our discussion 
of this topic, the human costs of industrial accidents and occupational 
diseases remain enormous, despite the presence of unions in many industries. 
Because unions have not had the power to challenge business priorities in 
this area, they have accepted conditions of work which posed a serious 
threat to the lives of their members. The failure of unions to rectify 
those problems - problems which have such a crucial impact on the lives 
of their members - underlines their weakness in relation to management.
The failure of collective bargaining in the areas just outlined 
substantiates our claim that the theory of industrial democracy as outlined 
by the Webbs, Hugh Clegg and other pluralista fails to protect the interests 
of workers. Unions operate within an organizational framework which gives 
management virtually unchecked prerogatives over the central issues which 
affect industry such as.planning, investment, finance and the like, while 
restricting union activities to marginal questions associated with 
employment policy. And, even in this latter area, the ability of unions 
to protect their members' interests is highly circumscribed.
IV
When we outlined the views of the Webbs and Hugh Clegg in the preceding 
chapters, we noted a number of differences between their respective 
approaches as well as an underlying consensus on the appropriateness of 
the collective bargaining framework. Specifically, we pointed out that 
Hugh Clegg differed from the 7/ebbs in his emphasis on the role of trade
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unions as an organized opposition to management and in his scepticisraubout 
the benefits of nationalization. And we indicated that Clegg's approach 
to collective bargaining had distinctly conservative overtones. Indeed, 
he was more concerned with attacking proponents of workers' control than 
in challenging the powerof private owners. Because Clegg's modifications 
of the collective bargaining framework have been highly influential in 
recent years, particularly in the context of the cold-war debate over the 
dangers of an economy controlled entirely by the state, it is fruitful to 
examine them in greater detail. Our purpose will be to show that Clegg's 
arguments in support of the private sector are highly questionable and 
that his opposition to further nationalization is based on a serious 
misunderstanding of the way public enterprises have functioned within the 
Western democracies.
One of the central themes in Clegg's approach was that the essence of 
democracy at the level of the state was opposition, It was opposition, 
more than any other factor,which distinguished the effective practice of 
democracy within large-scale organizations from the "democracy of common 
purpose" in small, voluntary associations. Clegg argued that the existence 
of an organized opposition had three clear benefits« it facilitated 
government accountability to the electorate, it limited abuses of power} 
and, it enabled individuals to defend their rights by appealing to the 
opposition party.
However, Clegg's argument has been challenged by a number of critics
who feel that he has distorted democratic theory. Paul Blumberg, for
example, argues that it is not opposition but accountability which i3 the
36essence of democracy. By itself, opposition does not guarantee 
accountability, he points out, using as an illustration the fact that 
the parliamentary system in England before the Second Reform Bill, with 
its restriction on the franchise»embodied opposition, but was not 36
3 6 .  P a u l  B l u m b e r g ,  I n d u s t r i a l  D e m o c r a c y :  T he S o c i o l o g y  o f  P a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
o p .  c i t . . p p .  I 44 , 14 5 .
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democratic. Similarly, competition amoh/i the monarchy, the nobles and
the church in medieval Europe could hardly be taken as evidence that the
57interests of the majority were adequately represented.
In this refutation of Clegg's argument, Blumberg implies, but does 
not make explicit, a further criticism which is perhaps even more convincing. 
It is that the opposition, like the government, even in liberal democracy, 
may well reflect the existing power structure of society and thus limit it3 
criticism to areas which do not offend powerful vested interests. Even 
if it does criticize these vested interests, this is no sense guarantees 
that it will challenge them once elected. Opposition, as Blumberg»s two 
examples suggest, takes place within a specific historical, cultural and 
institutional framework which limits .the extent to which opposition parties 
are willing, or able, to challenge the governing party and still maintain 
a legitimate place within the system.
As we have seen, Clegg argued that political democracy was most 
effective within a pluralist framework where various groups were able to 
lobby the government to protect the interests of the members. But such a 
framework would promote democracy only if the interests of all individuals 
were represented on a fairly equal basis. However, most groups lobbying 
government represent specific vested interests, particularly those of 
busine33 and-property, while the majority have no comparable groups to 
advance their interests. Thus to argue that the existence of groups 
guarantees that the interests of ordinary citizens will not be ignored, 
is, in practice, to legitimize the activities of privileged and powerful 
minorities in their attempts to ensure that their interests take precedence
37» Ibid., p. 144
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over the interests of the majority.
Returning to Blumberg's criticism of Clegg's approach, his second
point is that Clegg's analogy between the role of opposition political
39parties and the role of trade unions is incorrect. Opposition political
parties seek to supplant the government, a role that Clegg expressly
forbids trade unions attempting.
...(T)he crucial condition of any true multi-party ,
system, or any system where political opposition 
exists, is that one or more parties is always ready 
and able to replace the party in power. An 'opposition* 
whose role is confined to protesting, making suggestions 
or criticizing, but which cun never itself assume power, 
is not an effective or genuine opposition at all.4U
Moreover, employers are not formally accountable to the workers under
41their authority as the government is in a political democracy. Consequently, 
the argument that trade unions perform a function which parallels that of 
opposition parties is misleading on two counts. First, they cannot supplant 
management a3 opposition parties do. Second, their opposition does not 
make the government of industry accountable to the majority who work in it.
J8. There ha3 been no lack of criticism of pluralism as applied to
government and to industry in recent years. With regard to government, 
Sees Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London, 1969), 
pp. 2-6, 146-149> 171-176} C.A. McCoy and John Playford (ed.)
Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioural!sm (New York, I967) (thi3 
is an excellent collection of articles on the topic)} R.P. Wolff,
''Beyond Tolerance", in R.P. Wolff, B. Moore Hr., and H. Marcuse, A 
Critique of Pure Tolerance (London, 1969)5 Cajole Pa teman, Parti cl nation 
and Democratic Theory, op. cit.; Henry S* Kariel, (ed.) Frontiers of 
Democratic Theory (New York, 1970) especially the articles by Gouldner, 
Bottomore, Kariel, Duncan and Lukes, Davis and Walker; T.B. Hottomore, 
Elites and Society (Harmondsworth, 1971)' (orig. pub. 1969) esp. Ch. VI. 
For a perceptive critique of industrial pluralism sees Alan Fox 
"Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology" in 
John Child (ed.) Man and Organization (London, 1973)? also: Richard Hyman 
Strikes, on. cit., esp. pp. 155*160.
39» Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociolog/ of Participation.
op. oit., p. 145» See also: Coates and Topham, The Now Unionism, op. cit. 
pp. 40-46.
40. Paul Blurnberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation.
00. cit., p. 145 (his words in italics).
41» Ibid., p. 42.
A somewhat different "but equally .effective criticism of Clegg's
analogy has been made by Coates and Taphom in The ITv Uui.wa :w. They
point out that in a political democracy, hoth the government and the
opposition are elected, "whereas the two parties in industry arrive at
42their '.seats' by different methods#.." And, they go on to argue that:
The 'government' in industry is in the hands of 
men who are not subject to any process of election.
Inherited wealth 1h the single most influential 
factor in determining the composition of industrial 
government; education, skills and expertise are also 
influential to a greater or lesser degree, but, in a 
class society, there is no equality of opportunity in 
obtaining these qualifications. The trade union 
"opposition party" on the other hand, represents a 
mas3 voluntary movement, of working, and what is 
sometimes called lower middle class people. The 
representatives of th :.t movement.. .are to a greater 
or lessor degree (depending upon tho level of internal 
union democracy) governed by the views of the members 
of their ofganizations. The contrast between the 
sources of power of the two parties cculd not be more 
complete.43
Hot only is Clegg's argument that trade union opposition to management 
parallels that of opposition political peitiss in relation to government , 
false: his assumption that there is a parallel between the management of 
industry and the government of a democratic state is also inaccurate.
Clegg's theory of industrial democracy has other weaknesses. For
example, he asserts that only trade unions should represent workers because
the existence of other groups would lead to factionalism and thus undermine
the effectiveness of trade union opposition. Clegg's position here is
based upon the assumption that the only interests workers have are their
interests as employees. Hence there i3 only ono possible function for an
44organization representing workers. However, as the guild socialists 
argued more than half a century ago, workers have other interests as well, 42*
42. Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The New Unionism, op. cit.. p. 42.
43* Ibid,, p. 42.
. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, 
op. oit., pp. 159, 160.
44
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the moat important of which is their interest as producers. Once 
this is accepted, it is no longer contradictory to argue that there 
should be a separate organization to represent each interest.
Turning to the question of conflict among different organizations
representing the same workers, this problem is not as serious as Clegg
suggests. In the political sphere, such conflicts occur frequently,
A6as Robert Weinberg has noted. For example, in the United States 
disputes between the President and the Congress - both elected by the 
same voters - are accepted as normal because it is assumed that each 
performs a distinct function for the electorate. Similarly, conflicts 
among local, provincial and national governments are interpreted a3 
perfectly reasonable given that each group is elected to fulfil a specific 
set of functions and that these functions often overlap. Indeed, there is 
nothing inconsistent in saying that individuals themselves have conflicting 
interests. Workers may want shorter hours, higher wages, increased job 
satisfaction, more job security and other benefits, all of which must 
be reconciled when they decide what demands to make on their employers.
Thus to argue that because the various organizations representing employees 
might conflict with each ùther on some issues is not to discredit the idea 
of separate, functional representation, because such organisations would 
merely reflect the conflicting interests of individuals themselves.
Another major theme of Clegg's approach is that private ownership is 
essential for the maintenance of industrial democracy. His argument is 
again based on the notion that pluralism is necessary for democracy, both *46
45
45» G.D.H. Cole, Self-Government in Industry (London, 1920)} G.D.H. Cole, 
Guild Socialism Restated (London, 1921) ; See, as well, the ascount of 
Guild Socialism in: Harry W. Laidler, History of Socialism (New York, 
1968), Ch. 23 and the excellent discussion by Bertrand Russell in Roads 
to Freedom (London, 1918) Gh. III.
46. Robert Weinberg, Workers1 Control» A Study in Contemporary British 
Socialist Thought, op. cit. See also: Paul Blumberg, Industrial 
Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, op. cit., pp. 159-161 and 
passim.
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political and industrial; hence the elimination of opposition* such as 
has occurred in the Soviet bloc, would undermine it» As we saw, Clegg 
supported this theoretical claim with his empirical research which 
indicated that labour relations in public enterprises were no better than 
in their private counterparts.
However, if we examine his arguments, both theoretical, and empirical,
we find that they are seriously deficient. As we pointed out earlier,
the existence of independent groups is no guarantee that the rights of
individuals will be protected. Moreover, the groups Clegg wants to
preserve have one major characteristic m  common» tney represent the
vested interests of property, -To argue that tne most suitable method of
protecting the interests of workers is to preserve a group of owners whose
activities, both as employers and as a political pressure group have been
largely hostile to workers, is curious indeed. For such an assertion
ignores the history of trade unionism - a history of bitter struggle against
these very same owners. And it underestimates the extent to which the
owners of industry remain opposed to the growth of trade unions among
workers who are currently not organized, as well as the expansion of union
47power among those who are.
Another contradiction in Clegg's assertion that we now have
industrial democracy is that by his own criteria, half the workers in
Britain and tnree quarters in North America do not because they are not 
48unionized. Obviously, there are a number of reasons why large numbers 
of workers remain unorganized, but one of the principal ones is employer
47» For a good discussion of the continuing opposition of private employers 
to unionization, particularly among their white collar staff, See»
Clive Jenkins end Richard Mortimer, The Kin-3 of Laws the Unions Ought 
to Want (London, 1968) pp. 57-67 and passim. The editorial position of 
magazines such as the Economist -typifies the anti-trade union bias of many 
British employers. In the U.S., management tneorists have also been 
quite open about their hostility to unionization as we noted in our 
discussion of job enrichment.
48» G. David Garson, "Beyond Collective Bargaining", op. cit., p. 114«
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opposition to trade unions. George Bain, one of the leading experts
in Great Britain on the growth of white collar unions, identifies
employer attitudes as one of the three major factors affecting union
growth. Significantly, of Bain's other two factors, one is the attitude
of government as expressed in labour legislation. (The final factor
50is employment concentration).
Moreover, one of the most salient facts about union growth in
recent years, both in Europe and in North America, has been that
governments, in their capacity a3 employers, have been notably more willing
to accept unionization than private owners. According to George Bain«
The best illustration of the importance of employer 
policies and practices as a factor in trade union 
growth is provided in Great Britain by contrasting the 
public and private sectors of the economy. The density 
of white collar unionism in the civil service, local 
government and the nationalized industries is extremely 
high, even among managerial and executive grades...
By contrast with the public sector, the density of 
unionization among white collar employees in private 
industry is very low.51
Such evidence of the willingness of public enterprises to accept the
very preconditions for industrial democracy contradicts Clegg's assertion
that nationalization has no relationship with industrial democracy. For
52it demonstrably has. *5012
49
49« Clive Jenkins and Richard Mortimer, The Kind of Laws the Unions Ought 
to Want, op. cit.
50. George Sayers Bain, The Growth of White Collar Unionism (Oxford, 1970) 
pp. 183-187.
51. Ibid., p. 126.
52. Ibid., p. 126. Clegg is, of course, aware of Bain's work.- they are 
colleagues at the Industrial Relations Unit, Warwick University - but 
has not, so far as I know, made any attempt to revise his previous 
contention that private enterprises, in their capacity as employers, 
are a3 good as their public counterparts. See: H.A. Clegg, The System 
of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford, 1970) pp. 62,"63» In 
thio same book, he also noted that "...the post war Nationalization Acts 
laid a statutory duty on the boards to make provisions for collective 
bargaining..." and mentions that this provision of the Acts led to 
"...substantial increases..." in the number of white collar trade union 
members. Ibid., p. 368.
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Yet while nationalized industries have shown considerable improvement
over their private counterparts, it is also true that they have failed to
53live up to the expectations socialists originally had of them. However,
the reasons for their failure are not those suggested by Hugh Glegg. It is
because the nationalized industries have been organized along lines similar
to the private sector that they have failed to achieve their socialist
objectives and not because the principle of nationalization is inherently
deficient. Clegg's tacit assumption that nationalized industries embody
the basic principles of socialism - or at least all the principles that
are reasonably practicable - is highly misleading, for no attempt was made
54to implement many of these principles.
The purpose of nationalization for many socialists was to replace the 
narrow, commercial objectives of private ownership with a form of public 
ownership which would take into account broader social considerations.
Such considerations were to extend in two directions. First, they were to 
influence decisions affecting the public with the result that market 
calculations would be subordinated, where necessary, to the overall benefit 
of the community. Second, they v;ere to affect the internal relations 
of nationalized industries such that the happiness and well being of the 
workers employed would become a much more significant consideration in ' 
determining hew they were run. Yet the Third Labour Government and its 
successors rejected the argument that criteria other than profitability 
ought to determine the policies followed by the nationalized industries. 
Although socialists had pointed out for many years that market calculations 
did not reflect the social costs and benefits of economic activity, the *
53» For a good evaluation of the relative success of nationalized industries 
sees Richard Pryke,Public Enterprise in Practice (London, 1971);
Michael Barratt-Brown "Public Enterprise Defended" Institute for 7/orkers 
Control Pamphlet, No. 29 (Nottingham, 1971)«
54» Sees Raymond Williams, "The Meanings of Work" oja. cit., p. 295 Mid passim;. 
CliVa Jenkins, Power at the Top (London, 1959)» Michael Barratt-Brown, 
"Public Enterprise Defended" op, cit., pp. 31-39 and passim.
Labeur Party v<c.3 unwilling to comic it itself to guideline:: which challenged 
traditional financial criteria. Thus the success of nationalized industries 
was assessed not by the quality of service they provided, or the happiness
55of their employees, but by whether the books balanced.
Similarly, the conservative argument that former owners and their 
executives as well as "responsible" members of the financial community were 
needed to provide management expertise was accepted uncritically by the
eg
Labour Party. By assuming that the management function was a neutral,
f'ktechnical one, rather than a class function, they acquiesced to measures 
which facilitated dominance of the private sector over the public. In 
the process, socialist objectives were effectively undermined. Workers 56
55. Robert Weinberg, Workers1 Control: A Study in Contemporary British 
Socialist Thought, op. cit. Clegg himself points this out as we noted 
earlier. And, while he did believe that some accommodation to broader 
social considerations was desirable, he maintained that the discipline 
of cost accounting was essential to protect the public.
56. This policy was also followed when British Steel was re-nationalized, 
According to Anthony Sampson, t:he Labour Government again renounced the 
non-economic goals of nationalization and instead allowed B.S.C. to be 
run by men appointed on the basis of their previous business experience»
"The most exposed position of all, the windy ridge of nationalized 
industries, is occupied by Lord Melchett, the Chairman of the British 
Steel Corporation. For the last forty years steel ha3 been a political 
shuttlecock, nationalized, denationalized, renationalized and now 
threatened with redenationalization at its edges. But in the last 
decade the whole context of the argument has really changed, for both 
parties. Steel is no longer a profitable industry, big units have become 
essential all over Europe; and the Labour Party no longer has dreams 
of a nationalized industry divorced from the profit motive. It was 
symbolic of their new attitude that when the B.S.C. was created in 
1967 the minister concerned, who was Richard Marsh, should choose the 
Tory banker, Lord Meiuhetx, in the belief that it needed a tough money- 
man to dominate the old steel Barons and their companies." Anthony Sampson, 
The New Anatomy of Britain (London, 1971) P» 622. Moreover, most of 
the managers who were active in the private steel companies remained 
after B.S.C. was created. See: The Scunthorpe Group, "The Struggle in 
Steel" in Trade Union Register (ed.) Michael Barratt-Brown and 
Ken Coates (Nottingham, 1975) pp. 151-155» In a recent interview on 
the B.B.C. Dr. Monty Finniston, the present Chairman of B.S.C. and one 
of the two most powerful executives under Melchett, stated that he hoped
B.S.C. might be denationalized in five years if its performance were 
sufficiently profitable. With such attitudes among top executives, 
how could B.S.C. be expected to run on socialist lines?
had their demands for democratic participation stifled. The public was 
cheated out of the service it ought to have received. And the private 
sector which has quietly benefited so much from nationalization was able 
to point to the 'failure* of public ownership as a justification for the 
maintenance of its control over the economy.
7,lien we turn to look at the industries ’which were nationalized, what
is moot notable is that virtually all of them were on the verge of 
57insolvency. Although anyone familiar with the way the coal miners were 
treated under private ownership could not but support the nationalization 
of the mines, this should not obscure the fact that the coal industry was 
in economic chaos. Similarly, the steel industry and railways were hardly 
in better condition. Although there was a good deal of discussion about 
how nationalization would foster greater equality by eliminating the 
profits accruing to owners, onlythe bankrupt industries were taken over
58while the profitable sectors of the economy were left in private hands. 
Thus nationalization has distinctly conservative overtones, as 
Ralph Miliband points out*
t is hardly irrelevant to the issue that 
some of the nationalization Measures oroposed 
and carried through by the (Attlee) government 
had been advocated or at least endorsed by 
Conservative and Liberal politicians as early 
as the First World War and that as Professor Bradley 
has noted, a number of such nationalization measures 
have been recommended by Conservative dominated fact- 
finding and special investigation Committees.59
57» Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, op. cit., p. 1Q8|
Clive Jenkins, Power at the Top, op. cit.; Ken Coates and Tony Topham 
The New Unionism, op. cit. This has also been true of the most recent 
acquisition, British Leyland. And, when Rolls-Royce was taken over 
by the previous Conservative government, the profitable car manufacturing 
section was left in private hands.
58. Similarly, the highly profitable North Sea oil fields were given to
private oil companies at bargain rates. Thus the enormous pi-ofita from 
the oil which should have been used to provide better social services, 
housing and education are instead flowing inlo the pockets of rich 
American shareholders.
59« Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, on. cit., p. 100. See 
also: Michael Barratt-Brown "Public Enterprise DeTehd'ed" o p. cit,.
p p . 7-14. . ■ — : —
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Compensation paid to the former owners was, in most instances, highly 
generous because the Labour Government was anxious to avoid the criticism 
that it had expropriated without fair compensation. But the consequences 
of such liberal policies were quite detrimental to the industries involved. 
"By its ovej>-generous compensation", notes Clive Jenkins, "it saddled the 
new public corporations with enormous liabilities and agreed on a 'bygones 
be bygones'* policy with the financial interests which had milked certain 
industries of large profits and failed to maintain an adequate programme 
of reinvestment and research."^ The former owners were thus able to 
invest their money in more profitable sectors of the economy while the 
government was left with the enormous burden of rebuilding enterprises 
which had been starved of investment for many years.^ The generous 
compensation also meant that nationalization resulted in no transfer of 
wealth or income and thus did nothing to promote the socialist objective 
of a more egalitarian society.
Moreover, as Coates and Tophara note, it was not simply the lack of 
profitability that made nationalization acceptable to private owners- Of 
equal importance was the fact that the bankruptcy of industries such as 
coal, steel and transport would have affected the profitability of a whole 
array of other firms. The industries nationalized by the third Labour
60. Clive Jenkins, Power at the Top, op. cit., p. 13. For a recent analysis 
of the effects of compensation to the former owners of nationalized 
industries see:"nationalization: The Interest Burden" Labour Research 
(June, 1975) pp. 132-134.
61. Ibid., p, 13. This criticism does not apply solely to the industries 
nationalized by the third Labour Government, More recent acquisitions 
such as the steal industry were equally run down. See: First Report 
from the Select Committee on nationalized Industries, Session 1972-73: 
British Steel Corporation, (London, H.M.S.O.) as reviewed by WilliamRobson 
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 45» No. 4» Oct.-Dec. 1974» p. 477* Robson 
notes that the "level of investment by the 14 nationalized companies vias 
"pitifully low" and that the companies were using "obsolete or 
obsolescent plant"". An earlier pamphlet noted the same problems. See: 
Richard Prylce, "Why Steel?" Fabian Research Series, No. 248 (May, 1965)» 
esp. pp. 8-18.
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Government according to them were:
...failing to provide an adequate servioe to
underpin the profit making of all those other
industries which used their products. Since
the major customers of the mine-owners and railway
companies were other industries (rather than
individual consumers), although the directors of
the decrepit sector might put up, as a rearguard
action, a political flight for the principles of f.
'free-enterprise', all the other business men, and 7 ' "
the politicians who represented them,were not
altogether unwilling to concede that nationalization
might be an answer to the structural problems, provided
that the affairs of the widened public sector remained
subordinate to the rest of the private interests which
depended on them.62
When lie turn to look at the administration of the nationalized 
industries in the post-war period, the conservative implications of 
nationalization become even more obvious. The most revealing study of 
how nationalized industries have been used to buttress the private sector 
is by Clive Jenkins, now president o.f A.S.T.M.S. J What is surprising 
about Jenkins' findings is that the connections between the private and 
public sector have been so overt. It is not simply that former owners 
and managers were appointed to run the nationalized enterprises. More 
significantly, these owners and managers retained their connections with 
the private sector and frequently have been associated with companies 
engaged in commercial transactions with the very nationalized industries 
which they were charged with protecting.
62. Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The ITcw Unionism, op. cit., pp. 109, 110}
See also: Michael Barratt-Brown, "Public Enterprise Defended" ojo. cit., 
pp. 9~15* Similarly, Andrd' Gotz, writing in reference to the French 
situation, notes how the nationalization of steel could benefit private 
industry, "nationalization of the Steel Industry, for example, which 
was once a political aim, is today the lest interesting of the 
foreseeable nationalizations, for this ancient industry is losing its 
speed, its profitability is low, and it is. already virtually controlled 
by the State, -nationalization, instead of changing the power relations 
and opening a breach in the capitalist system, can also strengthen this 
system: a neo-capitalist government, in purchasing the steel industry, 
could render a service to its present owners by permitting them to invest 
their capital much more profitably in growing industries." Andr6 lots,
A Strategy for Labour tr. by Martin A. Wicolaus end Victoria Ortiz, 
(Boston, 1967j (orig. pub. 1964) P* 13, footnote 7.
63» Clive Jenkins, Power at the Ton, op. cj.t.
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Jenkins documents a complex web of interconnections between private 
companies and the nationalized industries "...(o)f 131 names listed by 
Mr. Attlee on central nationalized boards'1, he points out, "sixty-one 
also held directorships in private companies, twenty-three were knights, 
nine were lords and three were generals." q During the subsequent period 
of Conservative rule the situation deteriorated further. For example, in 
1956, the Conservative government appointed Mr. Gerard John Regis Leo 
d'Erlanger to head B.O.A.C. Mr. 'd'Erlanger had been dismissed from B.E.A. 
by the former Labour Minister in 1949 because of his bad labour relations 
practices and general incompetence. From 1949 until 195& he was a 
director of Air France Ltd., a private company competing with B.O.A.C. 
Another director of Air France, Lord Rennell, was also on the board of 
B.O.A.C. during this period and remained with the board after d'Erlanger
65was appointed chairman.
Mr. d'Erlanger resigned from Air France when he accepted his new 
position at B.O.A.C. But he remained a vice-chairman of .d'Erlanger Ltd,,- 
a merchant bank. The man who replaced him as a director of Air France was 
Mr. W.R. Merton who, as it happened, was also director of d'Erlanger Ltd, 
Merton was also one of three men who directed a third company, Forestal. 
Land, Timber and Railway Co. Ltd. Who should appear as another director 
of this company? Rone other than Lord Randall who, aside from sitting on 
the board of B.O.A.C., was also director of Morgan, Grenfell, another 
merchant bank and a subsidiary of the U.S. based Morgan Guarantee Trust. 
The third man on the board of Forestal was another merchant banker,
Mr. G.G. Phillips.^ Mr. Phillips, coincidentally, was a director of
64. Ibid., p. 16.
65. Ibid., pp. 45-49 (Jenkins provides extensive documentation to support 
these claims).
66. Ibid.. pp. 46-49*
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The Times Publishing Co., The Equity and Law Life Assurance Society Ltd.,
67and the English Electric Co. ' The major business of Forestal was, not 
surprisingly, the sale of aircraft. The company acted as an overseas 
financier for most of the British aviation industry and its clients 
included Rolls Royce, Vicker3, De Havilland, Lucas, Dunlop, Bristol and 
several other major companies. Mr. d'Erlanger knd Lord Rennell were not 
the only members on the board with private interests. As Jenkins notes»
"Six out of ten of the B.O.A.C. board have thirty-six company directorships
6ibetween them, including seven chairmanships and five deputy chairmanships."
The policies followed by these men were highly detrimental to B.O.A.C.
They encouraged the growing of private air carriers and prevented B.O.A.C.
from competing with them. Profitable B.O.A.C. operations were terminated
to make room for commercial operators and charter companies were allowed
to 'cream off' tho summer tourist traffic, while B.O.A.C. was forced to
maintain unprofitable winter services - services which ought to have been
69paid for by the summer traffic which B.O.A.C. was denied. y Moreover, in
all these activities the tightest secrecy was maintained. The trade unions
were not consulted about such decisions, Jenkins claims, because the Board
was anxious to prevent them from taking action to protect B.O.A.C. Faith
with the unions was broken time after time. Under such circumstances joint
consultation became a farce despite the constitutional obligation of the
70board to seek the views of trade unions. The result of such policies by 
the Board of B.O.A.C. was to demoralize the workers and create a climate of 
industrial relations where suspicion and hostility, rather than co-operation, 
were the norm.
67. Ibid., pp. 54, 55.
68. Ibid., p. 67. These claims are documented with specific lists of each 
board member's financial connections. See» Ibid., pp. 82, 83.
$9* Ibid., pp. 67-70.
70. Ibid., pp. 71, 72.
- 345 -
Yet B.O.A.C. is only one example of the network connections between 
the boards of nationalized industries and the private sector. Jenkins 
outlines the business connections of the directors of B.E.A., the Coal 
Board, the British Railways Commission and each of its regional Boards, 
the Gas Council and its Area Boards, the Central Electricity Authority 
and the Atomic Energy Authority. With the exception of the Central 
Electricity Authority, each public corporation had on its boards a number 
of businessmen with connections with the private sector. As in the case 
of B.O.A.C., these directors were commonly associated with companies dealing 
with the specific nationalized industry they were appointed to oversee.
These men influenced the policies of the other nationalized industries 
in ways that were detrimental to the public sector. For example, the Coal 
Board maintained artificially low prices throughout the 1950's in order to 
give British industry a competitive edge over its European counterparts.
In periods of high demand, when the ÏÏ.C.3. could not deliver adequate 
supplies, it had to purchase coal on the world market at the prevailing 
international price. But the Coal Board sold this coal to British customers 
at the lower British price. The difference was made up from its own funds. 
Between 1950 and 1956, this amounted to a total of £$0 m i l l i o n . G u c h  
practices were perfectly acceptable to the men who dominated the Coal 
Board, despite vocal union criticisms. Given their connections with 
private sector companies which benefited from this cheap coal, the reason 
for their complacency is self-evident. Similar examples of the abuse of 
power by directors with private sector connections are given by Jenkins 
in the various other public enterprises mentioned earlier.
Although Jenkins’ book was published in 1959» there is little indication 
that the manipulation of public enterprise by the private sector has
71. Ibid., pp. 127-134
diminished in recent y e a r s . F o r  example, during the period from 1967
to 1975, British Steel maintained its prices 30fa below the level prevailing
on the world market. This policy constituted a subsidy of £780,000,000
to engineering firms and other private companies purchasing steel from 
7 7
B.S.C. The money could have been used both to reduce the burden of
debt on the company and to invest in new equipment to secure the future
employment of its workers. But it was not. To make things worse, the
Conservative Government of Edward Heath "hived-off" some of the most
74profitable segments of B.S.C. to private owners at bargain prices. Yet
now the management of B.S.C. are campaigning to make 40,000 workers
75redundant because they say they are losing £170,000,000 per year. That 
they are losing money ought not to be a surprise to anyonq given their 
previous policies. But that they should ask the workers in B.S.C. to pay 
for these policies with their jobs is the height of audacity. It is thus 
not surprising that the unions are no longer willing to co-operate with 
management on many key issues, ifor their experience with B.S.C. indicates- 
quite clearly that the management simply cannot be trusted.
72. Thus, according to John 7/estergaard and Henrietta Rehler, in fiscal 
1972-73, there were 30 part-time directors in the nationalized 
enterprises who were also active in the private sector. .They held 
179 directorships in private firms. See*  John Westerga ird and
Henrietta Reisler, Class in a Capitalist Society, op. cit., p. 213.*
73« John Fryer, The Sunday Times, Jan. IQ, 1976. The losses in each fiscal 
year were a3 follows: 1967-68, £24 million} 1968-69, £74 million; 
1969-70, £71 million; 1970-71, £99 million; 1971-72, £20 million; 
1972-73, £76 million; 1973-74, £252 million; and 1974-75, £164 million.
74» Sees "Hiving-off steels The Sordid Story" Labour Research; Oct. 1973,
pp. 210-211.
75» Although there has been a well-orchestuated press campaign supporting 
management in this effort, it is notable that the press has said 
virtually nothing about the massive subsidies granted to the private 
sector. Nor do recent presa reports make any connection between B.S.C* 
present financial difficulties and those earlier policies,
76. ’Then steel was nationalized, the Labour Government, ss we noted, in an 
earlier footnote, appointed Lord Melchett to oversee its operations. 
However, the other appointments to the board were equally favourable to 
the private sector. According to William Meade, they included 
"...four of the big steel company Chairmen and the managing director 
of another - and three directors of large engineering companies.
Another four chairmen of the largest steel companies were made chairmen 
of the new regional groups." William Meade "Nationalized Steel" 
in Ken Coates (ed.)Can the Workers Run Industry? op, cit.. p. 152,
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nationalized industries have also been prevented from expanding 
their activities into areas which would threaten the private sector.
Thus while B.S.C. ought to have been following a policy of investing 
in the manufacture of related steel products to ensure alternative 
employment for workers displaced by new, capital-intensive techniques 
of steel manufacturing, it had its ancillary activities "hived off" 
instead. Moreover, the managers of public corporations have shown 
far too little concern about questions such as redundancy. Instead of 
being anxious to find alternative employment for their workers even 
wha:e this means branching into areas which are the traditional preserve- 
of the private sector, they have been content to run down their work­
forces. Yet given the narrowly commercial criteria upon which their 
performance is evaluated, the composition of the boards of public 
enterprises and the pressures from industry and the media, it is clear 
why such policies have • been followed.
The actions of such men as d’Erlanger of B.O.A.C. remained largely 
unaccountable to the public because the Labour Party accepted 
Herbert Morrison’s position that managers must be free to manage without 
undue ministerial interference. However, the practical implication of 
this doctrine is not to ensure efficient management in the public interest 
Rather it is to allow the private sector to manipulate public enterprises 
to its own advantage. Indeed, the nationalized industries have permitted 
a conflict of interest which is wholly unacceptable. Ho individual who 
has connections with private banking and industrial institutions should 
bo allowed to oversee the operations of public industries. In this
77. See: "Hiving Off: The Sordid Story", Labour Research, Oct. 1973»
pp. 210, 211.
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respect the law on "conflict of interest" provides no effective protection 
78to the public.
Public enterprises have also been used to aid the private sector 
in more subtle ways. This has been demonstrated most recently in the 
attempts by both Labour and Conservative governments to establish wage
79and price controls in order to curb inflation. Despite assertions to 
the contrary, v.age and price controls are far mox-e effective in the public 
sector because it is directly subject to government scrutiny and control. 
In contrast, wage and price guidelines can be circumvented in the private 
sector by numerous methods which conform to the letter but not intent of 
the law. When salaries are frozen, expense accounts can be expanded 
and other fringe benefits arranged. In the case of some industries, 
both unions and management may be willing to circumvent the law - the 
unions because their members want higher wages and management because it 
feels that such wage concessions are cheaper than the cost of strikes or 
slow-downs. Hence mutually agreed methods of indirectly increasing wages
78. Nor does the law provide protection to the public from another serious 
abuse. Far too many public servants take up positions as directors of 
private companies upon retirement. Managers of public enterprises know 
that if they are sympathetic to the private sector during their years 
in the service of the public, they will be well rewarded upon retirement. 
One of the most notable examples of thi3 practice is none other than 
Lord Robens, Chairman 6f the Coal Board from 1961-1971• According to a 
recent entry in the appointments section of the Financial Times, Feb. 2, 
1976, Lord Robens has just been made a director of the St. Regis Paper 
Company, a New York based multi-national. The report note3 that Robens 
is chairman of *' Vickers and of Johnson Matthey, and a director of 
the Bank of England and of the Times Newspapers Ltd. It is legitimate to 
ask whether men 3uch a3 Lord Robens who are so committed to the private 
sector are likely to manage public enterprises according to the intent 
of the architects of nationalization. And, more to the point, it is 
legitimate to ask why writers such as C.A.R. Cropland and Hugh Clegg 
have not been sensitive to the largerconflicts of interest inherent in 
such practices.
79» In 1967» for example, the Labour Government published a White Paper which 
maintained that the policies of nationalized enterprises "must be 
influenced not only by considerations of a rational pricing policy and an 
acceptable rate of return on capital, but also by the purposes of the 
prices and incomes policy, that is the avoidance of inflationary 
pressures." Sees C.C. Allen, The Structure of Industry in Britain,
Third edition (London, 1969) p. 135} Michael Kidron, Western Capitalism 
Since the War (London, 1968) p. 90 and passim. "
- 34* ' : :
on fringe benefits arc negotiated. Meanwhile,■ workers in the public sector
are .rarely offered ouch under-the-table agreements. As a consequence, their
reliitive wages fall - sometimes dramatically - as a result of such government
policies. The use of the public sector as a means of combatting inflation has
become one of the travesties of nationalization, for politicians have been
willing to sacrifice the interests of workers in the public sector in order to
50make short-term political go-ins.
but the most unfortunate effect of the manipulation of nationalized .a 
industries by the private sector has been that the demand by workers.--to 
participate in the running of their enterprises has been stifled. The 
businessmen and merchant bankers who sit on the boards of the nationalized 
industries do not want workers to have a greater say in decision-making because 
workers might well demand ¿in end to the incestuous relationship with' the private 
sector. This is a major reason underlying the relentless opposition by the V 
conservative establishment to workers* control. For perceptive members of-tho 
owning class recognize that as long as they - end people like them - are able . 
to control the policies of nationalized enterprises these enterprises will not 
pose cny throat to the status quo. However, public enterprises embodying 
workers* control would be a different matter. Workers would bo far loss likely 
to accept policies which surreptitiously subsidized private interests, Ilor ': v 
would they be willing to tolerate practices such as "hiving-off" profitable 
segments of public enterprises, .kid, they would bo unlikely to accept that 
narrowly commercial criteria should.take precedence over the notions of public 
service end the provision of fulfilling, work. Yet, as wo have soon,'; tho 
possibility of extending workers* control - within the nationalized industries 
was never seriously contemplated.
Consequently, Clegg's assumptions about tho "socialist" nature of 
nationalized industries are highly questionable. , As with the issue1of the 
management functions, Clegg assumed that a change of ownership without
GO. for ai excellent discussion of how the Labour Party's wage policies in the 
1^66-1970 P&riod increased inequality within Britain, see: Leo Panitch,
Tho Labour Tarty and the Trade Unions, University of London Finn, thesis, 
1S-73» Lee also: kichael Barrett-Brown end ken Coates, "Workers': Control 
in the nationalized Industries", 'Spokesman pamphlet ilo. 26 (liottingham, ■ 
1572) pp. 4-7.
fundamental reorganization,'- or a shift in the purpose of nationalized
enterprises vac all that was necessary to promote socialism. But as long as
those in charge of the nationalized enterprises oncrciso their right in
conformity with the needs of private industry, there is - nothing fundamentally
inoompatib'J e between nationalization of certain sectors of the economy and the
maintenance of the private enterprise system. The failure of nationalization in
attaining the objectives of its socialist proponents can thus be seen not as a .
result of the deficiencies of the principle of nationalization, but rather of thr
compromised approach adopted by the Labour Party. .Indeed, when the priorities .
established within public enterprises mirror those in the private sector end the
nanr.vjement personnel arc recruited from the top echelons of .business, it is
hardly surprising that nationalization has proved so disappointing for socialist
* ■
V .
-.a the preceding analysis demonstrates, the collective bargaining approach 
fails to redress the abuses of private ownership outlined earlier. ■ Because 
tratio unions .accept the values of business, their activities are confined to 
attempting to protect their members '.from, its worst eucosscs. They do not 
challenge the view that the purpose of work is to mamimizo profits rather then 
to provide an avenue for the< self realisation of producers; nor do -they, '.question. 
the assumption that labour is a commodity which can be bought end sold in tlio 
market place. Instead, they confine their role to regulating the terms end 
conditions of subordination cad, as we have seen, they have achieved only 
marginal success in.this latter cuesi.
Contrary to Clegg’s argument t]iat industrial democracy, can be best achieved 
under private ownership, wo havo soon that the public eector hac proveO. far more 
Willing to accept the very precondition of industrial democracy: trade unionism.. 
Yet for reasons which wo noted earlier, public enterprise has never achieved its 
potential in this respect because it has boon subject to numerous constraints, 
both commercial and political, frost the private sector. Thus there is every 
reason to believe that freed from'such constraints, public enterprise might' well'- 
prove a most effective instrument in promoting industrial self-government if
only the Labour 1-arty tad Y.U.C. could be persuaded to adopt a more -radioed. / ; 
approach to its organization.
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PART IV
WORKERS* CONTROL AS A RESPONSE TO MANAGERIAL POWER
CHAPTER X
R.H. TAWNEY: THE NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WORKERS' CONTROL
At present the power of directing industry rests with 
the owners of capital and their agents. The measure of 
their success is personal gain; the method by which they 
attain it is the organization of power, power which is 
mechanical and power which is human. Reformist movements, 
whether on the part of the workers or of the State, have 
acquiesced in that situation and conformed to the strategy 
it imposes. Accepting as unalterable the mastery of Capital 
and the subordination of Labour, they have aimed at limiting 
the former, or at making the latter less intolerable, by 
fixing a minimum of wages, sanitation, and education, and a 
maximum of hours, beyond which the workers should not be 
driven. Such a policy is sound in what it attacks and 
mischievous in what it accepts. For it assumes the 
relationship between capitalist employer and hired wage­
worker, and that relationship itself is a vicious one. It 
is vicious because it classifies human beings as a part, and 
a subordinate part, of the mechanism of production, instead 
of treating that mechanism merely as an auxiliary to the 
labour of human beings . - R.H. Tawney
I
If the approach of the Webbs and Hugh Clegg to the problems of private 
ownership entailed an accommodation with the commercial values underlying 
it, R.H. Tawney*s views constituted an outright rejection of such values.^
1. In our examination of Tawney‘s views we shall concentrate our attention 
primarily on his writings during the period between the First and Second 
World Wars, and particularly the years following his work for the Sahkey 
Commission. Obviously, like many other writers, Tawney did alter his 
position on certain points, but as Ross Tafcrill in his excellent biography 
of Tawney points out, Tawney*s views on socialism remained surprisingly 
consistent during this period with the specific changes in his position due 
more to changes in the political and social climate than to any retraction 
of the principles underlying his approach to socialism. It was only after 
the reforms implemented by the post-war Labour Government that Tawney*s 
views appeared to shift slightly to the right as he came to believe that 
many of the inequalities of British Society had been reduced. However, as 
Richard Titmuss argues in his introduction to the last edition of Tawney*s 
Equality, it is unclear whether Tawney would have praised the achievements 
of the Labour Government to the same extent had the recent research on the 
extent to which inequality has been preserved been known to him at the time. 
Given the ambivalence expressed in these last writings, it is perhaps
b1®!Judgement of the Webbs to himselfj *'...(l)t would
proSilSHf I Foiidaill^lnul4US t efor"8ee» *»*»*“& £  th?,Zebba *° thepersr»ectite" (London. I*?*)?» n«IB. * Tawney, "The Webbs in
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Rather than stressing the narrowly economic question of howto maximize
output, Tawney pointed to the larger social and moral purpose of industry.
Instead of accepting the industrial framework established by private
ownership, and confining his criticisms to the question of how to protect
workers from its worst abuses, Tawney maintained that industry ought to be
founded on a quite different set of principles.
In contrast to the Webbs and Hugh Clegg, who saw nothing, in principle,
wrong with the subordination of workers to capital, Tawney maintained that
this subordination was an affront to human dignity because it assumed that
2men could be treated like machines. Thus the problem of private ownership 
was not that it lacked constitutional safeguards protecting workers from 
abuses of employer power, but rather that the employer had the power to 
treat people as mere instruments of production in the first place. For 
this reason Tawney's approach focussed not on ameliorating the condition 
of the worker, but upon finding a satisfactory set of principles upon 
which to organize industry - a set of principles which would respect men's 
dignity at the place of work.
Tawney's approach to the questioncf how industry ought to be organized
3
was thus a normative one. He believed that moral judgements were as
2. Tawney referred to this difference in emphasis in the Webbs Memorial 
Lecture which he delivered in honour* of their contribution to British 
social and intellectual life. Although he did not directly contrast 
his own views with theirs, the implicit comparison is clear as the 
following comment illustrates*
"It is true, however, that the authors looked at the economic world from 
the planning, directing, and managing end; envisioned their own task in 
intellectual terms, not as a mission of moral conversion but as the 
disoovery of realistic and practicable solutions for specifio problems, 
and saw more hope in the dull fabian war of attrition, with its 
succession of limited aims, than in the speotacular strategy preached by 
more dogmatic or emotional creeds..." R.H. Tawney, The Webbs and Their 
Work. (London, 1952) p. 8.
3. This is also the conclusion of Ross Terrill in his fine book on Tawney* 
R.H. Tawney and His Times* Socialism as Fellowship (London, 1974),
(orig. pub. 1973) PP. 274, 275.
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necessary and as valid in th$ economic sphere as they were in politics 
or religion and he was strongly opposed to attempts to separate the 
technical side of economic theory from the moral purposes underlying it. 
The question of efficiency, to take one example, was not simply one of 
how to maximize productivity. It involved questions about the social 
utility of what was produced and the effects of methods of production on 
the happiness of producers and the community. Such judgements could not 
be made by mathematical calculations, because they were about the relative 
significance of different values and, ultimately, about the effects of 
different patterns of industrial organization on human happiness.
Consequently, Tawney rej^oted the view that economic activity was
guided by objective laws which operated independently of human volition.
The major 'economio' questions were, ultimately, questions of morality and
had to be decided accordingly»
...industrial issues must be understood for what they 
are. They must cease to be sophisticated by being 
treated as exclusively or predominantly an economio 
issue, to be discussed in economic terms, and to be 
solved by economic considerations. Considerations 
are of economic efficiency is one element (sic), and 
only one, and not the most important element, in 
questions which, insofar, as they are concerned with 
the individual are human or spiritual, and, insof.ap. 
as they are concerned with society, are political, in 
the larger sense of word "Politics”. There has been 
no more mischievous habit of thought than the smiling 
illusion which erected into a philosophy the conception 
that industry is a mechanism, moving by quasi-mechanical 
laws and adjusted by the play of non-moral forces, in 
which methods of organization and social relationships 
are to be determined solely by considerations of economic 
convenience and productive efficiency. By erecting an 
artificial barrier between the economio life of society 
and its religion, its art, the moral traditions, and 
kindly feelings of human beings, that doctrine degrades 
th4 former and sterilizes the latter. 4
Tawney equated capitalism with industrialism, a perjorative label he
* I
used to denote a society based upon the principle that the paramount social 4
4. R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction" in» S.J. Chapman (ed.) 
Labour and Capital After the War (London, 1918) pp. 98, 99. See also» 
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement (New York, 1925) pp.l50*154
value was Industrial production and that all other aspects of society
5
ought to be subordinated to the cause of increasing output. "Industrialism
he argued, was like "Prussian militarism", in that it referred not simply
to a particular economic - or in the latter case, military - structure but
to the belief that the sole criterion for establishing the value of a
6society was its economic - or military •*' success*
The essence of industrialism, in short, is not 
any particular method of industry,but a particular 
estimate of the importance of industry» which 
results in it being thought the only thing that is 
important at all, so that it is elevated from the 
subordinate place which it should occupy among 
human interests into being the standard by which 
all other activities are judged.7
Industrialism denigrated the pursuit of purposes not related to
production and thus distorted social priorities. Rather than providing
a material base for the pursuit of knowledge, cultural activities or
spiritual values, it fostered, or discouraged, such activities solely
8on the basis of their commercial value . Thus instead of the economy
being organized to satisfy human needs and to provide the material
foundation for a rich and varied community life, the life of the community
9was subordinated to the needs of the economy.
The detrimental effects of industrialism affefcted not only the larger 
social framework but also the speoifio organization of industry. In this 
latter area, i.t subordinated the happiness of producers to the interests 
of shareholders in maximizing output and thereby increasing their profits. 
And it fostered the idea that the purpose of industry was not to provide 
a service to the community but rather to enrich its owners, often at the 
expense of consumers and workers.
5» R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London, 1921) pp. 35-43
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Capitalism thus denigrated the social value of work and the 
contribution of those who produced. Moreover, it distorted attitudes 
towards work because it divorced it from the fulfilment of any social 
function. It thus destroyed the satisfaction associated with making 
a useful contribution to the community and, in its place, substituted 
the notion that the value of work was proportional to the payment 
received, without regard for the service rendered.
II
The belief that each individual had the right to pursue his self- 
interest without regard for the social consequences of his aotions, 
promoted industrial warfare, Tawney argued, because there was no common 
purpose or social principle by which conflicting desires oould be resolved. 
Consequently, disputes could only be settled on the basis of the relative 
power of the parties concerned. And, the agreements so reaohed were 
respected only until one of the parties felt it was in his interest to 
renew hostilities. Thus conflict between employers and workers was not 
a product of misunderstandings, personal gr$ed or unscrupulous agitators 
but a logical outcome of the competitive principles underlying private 
ownership.^
Because industrial confliot was a direct consequence of the principles 
of capitalism, Tawney argued that it could not be resolved by devices 
such as compulsory arbitration, as many proponents of free enterprise 
believed. For compulsory arbitration was based on the assumption that 
an impartial arbitrator could arrive at a compromise which would be fair 
to both sides of industry. However, the system was not based on the
10. R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction", 0£. cit., p. 115.
11. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., pp. 40-42.
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principles of social justice in the first placej hence there could be
12nothing 'fair' about adjustments within the system.
In reality, compulsory arbitration is the opposite 
of any policy which such an authority could pursue 
either with justice or with hope of success. For it 
takes for granted the stability of existing 
relationships and intervenes to adjust incidental 
disputes upon the assumption that their equity is 
recognized and their permanence desired. In industry, 
however, the equity of existing relationships is 
precisely the point at issue.13
Moreover, in practice, compulsory arbitration merely supported the
position of employers because it denied workers the only effective weapon
they had to protect their interests - the strike. By making it unlawful
for workers to withdraw their labour, it "extinguished” their rights.
Thus far from being an instrument of justice compulsory arbitration was
14little more than a euphemism for compulsory labour.
Tawney was not persuaded, either, that industrial conflict could be 
solved by increasing production. The Taylorist argument that workers - 
ought to renounce their opposition to employers and concentrate their 
energies on expanding ou.tput to their mutual benefit took for granted the 
existing distribution of the fruits of industry. It assumed that the 
basic inequality of private ownership could be papered over by greater 
material prosperity. This was mistaken, Tawney asserted, beoause a 
normative issue oould not be resolved merely by increasing production. No matter 
how much additional output was attained, the question of the justness of the
12. Ibid., pp. 94-96.
13. Ibid., p. 95.
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distribution of industry*s products remained. Consequently, there was
15no reason to assume that prosperity would end industrial disputes.
The solution to industrial conflict, Tawney argued, lay not in state
intervention to support the status quo, or increases in output, but
rather in organizing industry on the basis of publio service. The
view that the purpose of industrial activity was to enrich' private owners
must be replaced by the view . that its purpose was to provide a service
to the community and hence that the organizational principles upon which
industry ougdit to be based were ones of co-operation and fellowship rather
than competition. Tawney believed that once such principles were adopted,
it would be possible to resolve industrial conflict on the basis not of
power but of morality.
If miners demanded higher wages when every 
superfluous charge on coal-getting had been 
eliminated, there would be a principle with 
which to meet their claims - the principle that 
one group of workers ought not to encroach upon 
the livelihood of others. But as long as mineral 
owners extract royalties and exceptionally 
productive mines pay thirty percent to absentee 
shareholders there is no valid answer to a demand 
for higher wages. For if the community pays 
anything at all to those who do not work it can 
afford to pay more to those who do.16
So long as the underlying philosophy of industry was one which accepted 
the right of each individual to use his economio power to extract whatever 
he could obtain from the economy there was no possibility of resolving 
industrial conflict because there were no grounds of fairness or equity to
15* R.H. Tawney, ’'Radical Social Reconstruction", oj>. cit., pp. 94, 95j 
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Sooiet.v. op. cit., p. 42j R.H. Tawney,
The British Labour Movement, op. oit., pp. 152, 153« Tawney also 
repeated the argument that if the property of the wealthy were equally 
divided among all citizens, this would result in no great gain for 
working people as the share going to each would be quite small on the 
grounds that» "sailors in a (life) boat have no room for first class 
passengers, and, the smaller the total national income the more 
important it is that none of it be mis-applied." The Acquisitive 
Society, op. oit., p. 80 (my word in italics).
16. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. oit., p. 42.
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which individuals would be willing to subordinate their personal desires. 
Only if the underlying principles upon which industry rested were based 
upon a commonly accepted set of moral values, could it be brought to an
III
Tawney saw private ownership of the means of production not only as
18a pattern of economic relationships, but also as a system of power.
However, his position on the relationship between economic and political
power was not the same as that of Marx primarily because, like Russell,
he felt that dominance in other areas of life, such as religion, military
19affairs or politics, could occasionally prove overriding. Yet if it was
•'...not the case..." according to Tawney, "...that all forms of power are,
in the last resort, eoonomio..." it was nonetheless true that within
20capitalist societies economic power was of central importance.
Ecomomic power has a special significance in 
industrial societies, owing to the nature of the 
social structure that great industry produoes.
In regions where the pattern of life is drawn" by 
petty agriculture and small soale industry, economio 
interests may be a consuming passion, as with the 
peasant who ruins his own and his family's health in 
order to add a few roods to his holding. But the 
force which they wield is small, since it is broken 
up into fragments. It is dispersed in numerous small 
rivulets, each of which would irrigate a meadow, but 
which cannot, till collected, generate the energy to 
drive an engine. 21
17. This theme was repeated in most of his writings on the topio and 
elaborated in some detail in the followingi R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive 
Society, op. cit., pp. 74-79 and passim, R.H. Tawney, "Railcal Sooial 
Reconstruction" 0 £ . cit., pp. 98-104? R.H, Tawney, Equality (Lontton, I964) 
(1952 ed., first pub. 1931)» PP» 164-169»
18. R.H.Tawney, The Acquisition Sooiety, op. cit., p. 77? alsoi "We Mean 
Freedom" in: R.H. Tawney, The Attack and Other Papers (London, 1953) 
Fabian Sooiety Leoture, 1944» PP» 89, 90.
19. Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, 1934).
20. R.H. Tawney, Equality, op. cit., p. 160. See also: Ross Terrill,
R.H. Tawney and His Times, op. cit., p, 144»
. R.H. Tawney, Equality, op. cit., pp, 160, 161.21
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In contrast, economic affairs in an industrialised society were 
highly concentrated, giving those who owned and directed the means of 
producing considerable power over the majority who were dependent upon 
them for their livelihood. “The influence of the spider is limited by 
the sixe of his web...", Sawney remarked, and as the web of inter­
dependence in industrial societies encompassed so much of life, the 
influence of the capitalist spider was that much greater than that of his 
earlier property-owning counterpart - the small peasant landowner. Moreover, 
Tawney argued that economic power was becoming more concentrated, as the 
scale of industrial enterprises increased dramatically with every passing
Thus Tawney felt that one of the central problems of an industrial 
society was how to reconcile such concentrations of economio power with 
the democratic ideal. It was not adequate to claim, in defence of the power 
of owners, that it was private and hence that its exercise was their
like political authority in a democracy must be evaluated not in terms of 
abstract ownership rights, but according to its concrete social effects. 
Because the decisions made in industry had such a profound effect on the 
community, it was essential that they be subject to some form of publio 
accountability. Thus the principle that those whose lives were affeoted 
by decisions ought to oontrol them, applied to industry as well as government. 
In practical terms, this meant that industrial power must be subject to theN /
22* Ibid., p, 161. See aleoi "Radical Social Reconstruction," op, oit., 
pp. 102, 103} The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., pp, I64-I69.
Significantly, Tawney left his strongly worded attack on monopoly in 
the 1952 edition of Equality - an edition in which he took the trouble 
to write an additional chapter, thus indicating that his opposition was 
as strong in the post World War II period as it had been after World War I.
23. R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. oit., pp. 156-159}
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., pp. 74-78} R.H. Tawney,
"The Western Political Tradition" Burge Memorial Lecture (London, 1949)
pp. 20-24.
24. R.H. Tawney, "Radical Sc^al Reconstruction",0£. cit.. pp. 103, 104}
decade. 22
23exclusive prerogative, for its effects were social. Industrial authority,
control of workers.^ *234
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The economic power that capitalism gave to the owners of industrial
enterprises had wider ramifications» It supported the existence of a
class structure which denied the majority of decent education, housing,
medical care and an adequate standard of living while giving those at the
25top the right to waste the resources of society on frivolous luxuries.
It prevented the majority from developing their various talents and skills
while inculcating in them habits of deference and servility. And, ultimately,
it undermined political democracy itself by giving those with economio power
a disproportionate amount of influence in political matters, while effectively
discouraging working people from exercising their political rights. ThU3
private ownership of industry was not only objeotionable beoause it treated
individuals badly in their capacity as employees; the inequalities it
encouraged were antithetical to the development of an effective system of
26political democracy.
17
Unlike Clegg, Tawney was not impressed with the argument that,
despite its flaws, capitalism provided the only safeguard for individual
liberty. Liberty for the pike, he dryly commented meant death for the 
27minnows. Likewise the liberty of the private owner to pursue his self- 
interest without moral or sooial restraints diminished the liberty of the 
workers 6ver whom he exercised authority. If oriticisms of socialism were 
based on the assumption that it reduced the opportunity for men to behave 
as freely as Attila, the Hun, then, Tawney agreed, socialism did indeed *267
25« R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., pp. 38, 39, 80-012;
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., pp, I5I-I58.
26. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., pp. 129t 130.
27. R.H. Tawney, as cited by Ross Terrill, R.H, Tawney and His Tlmesi
Socialism as Fellowship, op. cit. p, 1 3 4,
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entail a severe restriction on liberty. However, if what was meant was 
that it restricted, the ability of ordinary working people to control as 
much of their lives as was compatible with a similar degree of control 
by their fellowmen, then the charge was false. For socialism was 
concerned with the freedom of the minnows, not the pike} thus it was 
essential, in the interests of the former, to constrain the actions of 
the latter.
Tawney rejected the view that liberty was an abstract concept which 
could be applied irrespective of its specific social and economic context. 
Liberty among human beings was a relational matter, because sooiety was 
not composed of atomistic men, but of people living in communities where 
the actions of each affeoted the rest. In an industrial society with its 
high degree of interdependence, it was facile to pretend that the liberty 
of the capitalist could co-exist with a similar degree of liberty on the 
of the employees over whom'ihe had so much power.
Because industrial societies gave rise, of necessity, to so much
interdependence among people and because many industrial enterprises could
only be conducted on a fairly large scale to take advantage of the benefits
of technology, the only effective way to ensure the liberty of the majority
was to make those in positions of authority accountable to the people their J
decisions affeoted. "Economic freedom must- develop, in short, through
28the applications of representative institutions to industry."
Thus Tawney differed from the Webbs and Hugh Clegg on the key question 
of what constituted the principal threat to the freedom of workers in 
industry, for he believed that this threat lay not in the lack of constitutional 
safeguards protecting the worker from abuses of owners! power but rather from 
the very existence of that power. His assessment of the detrimental impaot
28* R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction", 0£. oit., p.102; 
R.H. Tawney, Equality, op. oit., Ch. 5j See also» Ross Terrill, 
R.H. Tawney and His Times, op. cit., pp. 145-154»
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of authority relationships in industry took into account the broader 
effects of the subordination of workers, rather than focussing attention 
exclusively on the specific abuses of management power and, as a 
consequence, he concluded that the only effective way to guarantee that 
concentrations of power in industry would not be used to oppress workers 
was to use the same device as had been developed in the political sphere* 
democracy.^
Of course, the decisions made inLindustry were not restricted in
their impact to workers, as Tawney readily acknowledged. Consumers had
an interest in the cheapness and quality of the service provided, while the
community was affeoted by the social costs of production. Consequently,
like the Webbs, he believed that it was necessary for all three groups to
exercise some influence on the decisions taken in industry.
However, the specifio way their influence could be brought to bear,
and the nature of the decisions thatthey ought to have a say in varied.
With regard to the organization of production and the pattern of authority
relationships in industry, Tawney felt that this should be left to 
30producers. In contrast, the prices charged for their services ought
31to be agreed upon with representatives of consumers. Similarly, questions 
of wages and differentials, insofar as they affected the prices of the 
service provided, ought to be subject to bargaining with consumers. And 
major deoisions concerning oapital investment, plant closures, redundancies *301
29» Tawney was quite explicit in his critioism of the limitations of 
collective bargaining, as the quotation at the beginning of the 
chapter illustrated. See* R.H. Tawney, ’’Radical Sooial Reconstruction" 
op. cit., pp. Ill, 112.
30. R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction", 0£. cit., pp, 102-105}
See also* R.H, Tawney, The Acquisitive Sooiety, op, cit.. pp, 88-94} 
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., pp. 79-81»
31. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., p. 90.
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and the like ought to be decided by workers and the government.'
Tawney*s division of functions in industry thus differed from that
outlined by the Webbs in several notable ways. The question of how
production was to be organized was not to be allotted to the industrial
administrators, as distinct from the workers under their employ, but rather
33to all those engaged in production - either by hand or by brain. This 32
32
32. Because he believed that the larger community should also have some 
say in determining industrial policy, Tawney could not accept the 
approach to workers* control put forward by either guild socialists 
or syndicalists. Although Tawney had considerable sympathy for the 
views of guild socialists, such as G.D.fl. Cole, he could not agree with 
their rejection of the state as a vehicle for implementing socialism 
or their emphasis on group autonomy - particularly in the industrial 
sphere - to the exclusion of the larger public. Society was, for him, 
more than a collection of groups attempting to pursue the interests 
of their members, with little regard for the effects of their behaviour 
on the community. Moreover, guild socialism placed too little emphasis 
on the underlying moral purpose of industry and thus tended to promote 
corporate selfishness which was antithetical to Tawney*s view of the 
ends of economic activity.
His position on syndicalism was outlined, perhaps most effectively, in 
his discussion of the aims of the Labour Movement in the concluding 
chapter of his book on British Socialism. The Labour Movement, he 
argued “...is sympathetic to the demand those who work in industry ' 
should have an effective voice in questions of industrial organization.
But it is not syndicalist. For though all men are syndicalists as far 
as their own profession is concerned, though the doctor and the lawyer 
and the teacher and the soldier and the sailor dislike the interference 
of ignorant laymen even more than do the miner and the engineer, public 
opinion (in the labour movement) reoognizes that since industry is, 
or ought to be a social function, it must be the community which has the 
final voice in questions of reconciliation of the claims of the State 
and of groups of producers which will secure due representation for the 
latter while reserving the right of ultimate decision to the former*”
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. clt. (words in italics 
are mine).
Tawney*s criticisms of guild socialism were similar to those expressed 
above in relation to the syndicalits. Ross Terrill, in his biography 
of Tawney, summarizes his views in the following way*
“closer to an orthodox Fabian position on the state than to a guild 
socialism (with whioh he is often overidentified) he was not prepared to 
allow the rights of trade unions to out across the basic vertebrae of 
democratic responsibility through territorial parliamentary 
representation.” Ross Terrill, R.H. Tawney and His Times. op. oit., p, 157 
See also* R.H. Tawney, "We Mean Freedom” in The Attack and Other Papers, 
op. cit., pp. 87-90. In this article he defends the role of State 
intervention to reotify social and economic abuses.
33* R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction", op. cit., p. 112.
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op, cit.
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did. not mean that Tawney believed that management would be completely-
abolished or that industry would be based upon an "arithmetical view of
equality" - to borrow an expression used by Ross Terrill - with eaoh
worker being given exactly the same influence as his fellows in all
decisions, regardless of age, skill, experience and other factors, but
rather that the whole body of producers would collectively decide upon
questions such as how much authority to delegate to those in management
positions, which decisions og^it to be determined by majority vote and
which ought to be decided according to expertise. Tawney recognized that
considerations other than a one-man-one-vote principle affected industrial
decision-making and therefore did not commit himself to a rigid position
on this issue. But though he did not advocate an arithmetically equal
approaoh, he wanted industry to be run according to what can be best be
described - despite its vagueness -'as a spirit of equality'and this is
why he found the hierarchical arrangement advocated by the Webbs
34unacceptable. It was necessary for those who were delegated authority 
by Ibheir fellow workers to remember that underlying their differences in 
ability, skill and responsibility lay a common humanity - a humanity which 
transcended these relatively minor distinctions among them.
In short, liberty in industry was integrally connected with control 
by producers of the organization of their work in an atmosphere of 
fellowship and equality. Conversely, private control or centralized state 
control were antithetical to it because they gave power to individuals 
who were not accountable to the workers affected by their decisions.
Insofar as social ownership - whether in the form of nationalized 
enterprises, producer co-operatives, oonsumer associations or professional 
organizations - facilitated control by producers, it increased their 
liberty. Hence the proper course for those who wanted to foster liberty
34» See the very fine, discussion of Tawney*s views on this question by«
Ross Terrill in R.H. Tawney and His Times, op. cit., esp. Ch. 7, 8, 9,
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in industry was to encourage the growth of such organizations» either 
through nationalization or voluntary association«
V
If Tawney was critical of the claim that capitalism provided the 
only safeguard for liberty in industry, he was equally sceptical of 
another justification of private ownership* that it was the only system 
which could run industry efficiently. He rejected the argument that the 
criterion of profitability provided a workable guarantee that industry 
would provide consumers with the cheapest and best quality merchandise 
because he felt that the capitalist was as inclined to exploit consumer • 
as to abuse his workers. Whether his profits were the result of monopoly, 
artificial shortages, or misleading the publio about the quality of his 
goods, was of little concern to him as long as it led to higher earnings. 
Because the goal of maximizing profits was subject to no moral limitations, 
and because the indicator of success was a full bank account, there could 
be no such thing as exoess profits or unscrupulous business practices as 
long as entrepreneurs acted within the confines of an exceedingly tolerant 
legal system.
Thus the lack of an underlying social morality when combined with the 
view that the individual should be free to enrich himself without regard for 
the social impact of his behaviour, did not guarantee that the community 
was supplied with cheap and abundant goods and services) it merely gave 
private owners a lioenoe to exploit the public. Tawney»B case in this regard 
was not merely theoretical, for his work on the Sankey Commission at the end 
of the First World War had given him an opportunity to examine,in considerable 
detail, the way in which the largest British industry of the day had been 
managed by its private owners. He was not impressed. His submissions to 
the Commission were filled with details of incompetence, negligenoe,
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profiteering, gross exploitation of workers and an overall economic
structure that was inherently so irrational that the Commission w«
Nationalization of coal, he argued, was necessary not simply to end 
exploitation of workers and profiteering at the expense of consumers, 
but also to eliminate the gross inefficiencies which were rife in the 
mining industry. Thus, far from aooepting, as the Webbs and Hugh Clegg 
did, that capitalism, despite its ruthlessness, still managed to maximise 
productivity, Tawney argued in support of nationalization that publio 
ownership was necessary to put an end to the inefficiencies of private 
ownership. 56
But capitalism was inefficient in a more fundamental way. Because
the market supplied goods and services according to ability to pay rather
than social need, resources were diverted to the produotion of frivolous
luxuries, while substantial segments of the population lacked adequate
37food, shelter, medical care and the like. The profits accruing to 
private shareholders, Tawney charged,
...enable their recipients to exercise a demand 
which diverts to the supply of luxuries productive 
power which would otherwise be diverted to the 
multiplication of the necessaries of common humanity, 
so that the classes thus endowed wear several men*a 
clothes, eat several men's dinners, oocupy several 
men's houses, and live several men's lives. The 
businessmen and politicians who regard the problem *36
35* R.H. Tawney, "The Nationalization of the Coal Industry” Labour Party 
Pamphlet (London, 1919) PP» 11» 13» 14? R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social 
Reconstruction” 0£. cit., p. 126$ R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society 
op. oit., pp. 69» 84»
36. R.H. Tawney, "The Nationalization of the Coal Industry", o£. cit.,
pp. 13-17? R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit.. p, 78, 
79 and passim. Tawney reiterated his claim that capitalism was rife 
with productive inefficiencies in a lecture over 40 years later, Seet 
The Webbs and Their Work, op. oit.. p. 18j R.H, Tawney,"The 
Nationalization of the Coal Industry", o£, cit., pp. 10, 11,
37» R.H. Tawney, "Radical Social Reconstruction", 0£. oit., p. 118.
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, ojd. oit.. pp. 38, 39 and passim.
35forced to advocate public ownership as the only solution.
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of reconstruction as concerned primarily with, 
intensifying the productivity of industry, may 
be invited to consider the energy which would 
be set free for the production of things 
indispensable if there were no demand to divert 
capital and labour into the manuficture of private 
motor-cars, private yachts, rich men's houses, and 
expensive hotels.59
Tawney was not impressed by a system which prided itself on its
'efficiency' in producing £3,000 motor cars like the one owned by the
Secretary of State for War with its walnut panels and suede-covered seats
39described so bitingly in the Acquisitive Society. The problem of industry, 
as he saw it, was not merely how to produce efficiently but, more importantly, 
what to produce in the first p l a c e . A n d  this question revealed the 
bankruptcy of a system based not upon services to the community but on the 
belief that private gain was the sole end of economio activity.
Moreover, emphasis on private gain undermined the development of an 
attitude of public service among workers and thus led to a reduction of the 
quality of the goods and services provided for consumers. How, Tawney asked 
rhetorically, could workers producing luxury motor cars, like the one just 
mentioned, feel that they were contributing to the (community's welfare?^ 
Clearly, they could not. And, as long as industry was founded upon the 
principle that each man should strive to pursue his own self interest 
regardless of the costs to the community, there was no reason to expect that 
workers would view their role in terms of public service. Indeed, seeing 
that their employers were intent on maximising profits, workers understandably 
came to feel that there was no reason why they should not do the same in'' 
relation to wages.
39. R.H. Tawney, "Radical Sooial Reconstruction", 0£. cit..p. 110.
39» R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., p. 39.
40. Ibid.. pp. 38, 39.
41. Ibid., p. 38.
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Moreover, the subordination of industry to the interests of 
shareholders had the detrimental effect of dividing producers from 
consumers. Even if workers wanted to improve the quality of their 
work they had no guarantee that their efforts would benefit consumers, 
for they could equally well increase the profits of shareholders. As 
long as owners, anxious to maximize the return of their investment, 
separated producers from consumers, and, as long as owners were the only 
party privy to the division of the fruits of industry, it was quite 
unreasonable to berate workers for demanding higher wages on the grounds 
that they were exploiting the public. For even if they did restrain 
their demandsf there was no guarantee that the latter would benefit.
The approach of private enterprise to achieving economio efficiency 
was inadequate for other reasons. Anticipating the arguments of liberal 
management theorists half a century later, Tawney argued that changes in 
attitudes among workers to authority, better education and the rise in 
the standard of living, meant that the traditional basis of industrial
42authority - fear - had been severely and, perhaps, irrevocably damaged.
With the decline in the role of fear as an incentive to work - a deoline 
which was in no large part a result of trade unions - it became increasingly 
important to enlist the co-operation of workers. Indeed, the only way to 
ensure efficient production in the future, according to Tawney, was to 
reorganize industry in such a way as to take into acoount the desire of 
workers for industrial self-determination. "(T)he alternative to the 
discipline which capitalism exercised through its instruments of
42. R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. oit., pp, 91, 92. Tawney 
wrote in this vein during the period directly after the First World War 
when the demands for nationalization and workers* control were 
exceptionally strong. However, the recent upsurge in suoh demands would 
seem to vindicate much of what he said on this question. It is perhaps 
not surprising then that management theorists such as Herzberg and 
McGregor have been arguing that with the rise in standards of living 
since the War, industrial authority has gradually been breaking down and 
as a consequence, managers must find methods for enoouraging their workers 
to produce efficiently - methods which are based not on fear, but rather 
employersWÌ^ Ìnff comm^tment the workers to the goals of their
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unemployment and starvation is the self-discipline of responsibility and 
professional p r i d e . W h e n  seen from this perspective the call for 
workers' control had practical implications which were by no means 
antithetical to the goal of producing goods and services for consumers 
efficiently.
This leads us to Tawney's final reason for rejecting the claim that
private enterprise promoted efficiency» it ignored the psychology of the
worker. Beoause capitalism treated workers aa "hands" it failed to utilize
their mental ability and thus squandered what was undoubtedly the most
important resource of industry»
...(E)fficiency rests ultimately on psychological 
foundations. It depends, not merely on mechanical 
adjustments, but on the intelligent collaboration 
of contentious human beings, whom hunger may make 
work, but mutual confidence alonp can enable to 
co-operate. If such confidence is to be commanded 
by those vested with the direction of economic 
affairs, their authority must rest, not on the 
ownership of property, but on a social title, and .. 
be employed for ends that are not personal but public. ^
Tawney rejected the claims of proponents of 'scientific management'
for the same reason. Their approach to the organization of industry was
based upon the questionable assumption that "...the mental prooesses of the
company promoter, financier or investor..." were identical to those of
45workers in other occupations.While Tawney was quite willing to admit
43» R.H.'Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., p. 145»
44* R.H. Tawney, oja. cit., p. 188. This point was made more forcefully 
in an earlier article»
"...the greatest single obstacle to the efficiency of industry is 
precisely the industrial autocracy which is supposed today to be the 
condition of attaining it,...If men are treated as "hands", if they 
are told that "the best workman is the man who obeys orders and doesn't 
pretend to think," they may give their hands but will withhold their 
brains. The only guarantee of efficient work, whether on the part of 
a company in the trenches or of men in a workshop, is .not the •. 
"discipline" of fear,but goodwill and mutual confidence," R;II, Tawney, 
"Radical Social Reconstruction", op. cit., p. 107»
45» R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., p. 153»
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that pecuniary motivation was one incentive to work, he argued that the
assumption that it was the only source of motivation was quite mistaken for
it was clear that teachers, scientists, physicians and other workers who
provided services to the community or who performed intrinsically
interesting jobs were not motivated exclusively by money. An approach to
industry which failed to take these factors into account was deficient for
46precisely that reason.
Of course, as we saw in our study of contemporary management thought, 
the question of how to establish a social and psychological environment 
conducive to efficient production has been central to recent management 
theory. But such theories of motivation, whether based upon human 
relations, personnel management or job enrichment, have all taken private 
ownership fof granted and thus concentrated on finding the right management 
technique to bring workers' attitudes into line with the goals of business. 
They have assumed that a sense of moral commitment among workers can be 
engendered within an industrial system committed to private gain and failed 
to see the inherent contradictions of such an approach.
Such efforts to influence the attitudes and values of workers, 
however.wrong-headed, vindicate Tawney's argument that the commitment of 
workers to the purpose of industry is a key ingredient in industrial 
efficiency. They demonstrate that questions such as efficiency are not 
simply technical or administrative ones but integrally connected with 
the values underlying the organization of industry. When seen in this 
light, Tawney's stress upon reorganizing industry according to the 
principles of publio service appears not to be naive and idealistic but, 
rather, hard-headed and realistio because it takes into aocount a number 
of vital factors which are excluded from the calculations of business about 
how to foster industrial efficiency.
46. Ibid.. pp. 152-154.
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However, it would be misleading to suggest that Tawney placed the 
question of the economic efficiency of private ownership on the same 
plane as its moral deficiencies. For the heart of his approach to industry 
was ethical rather than economic. Thus even if private ownership were 
successful in eliminating some of its more obvious economic weaknesses, 
this would not exonerate it from the charge that as an economic system it 
was morally bankrupt.
VI
When we consider that Tawney rejected private ownership so
uncompromisingly, the logical question that arises isi what alternative
did he put forward? The answer is complex but, to over-simplify, what he
47proposed was a .combination of publio ownership and workers' control.
However, he had a very specific view of the purpose of nationalisation
and of the way nationalized industries ought to be organized - a view
which contrasted with that of the Webbs and Hugh Clegg and which provided
a more satisfactory answer to conventional criticisms of publio ownership.
Tawney*s position on the question of public ownership was an
instrumental one. Nationalisation was a means of lifting the stifling
influence of private owners from industry so that workers could serve the
48community more effectively. State ownership was thus not the end,
47» Tawney was not dogmatio about extending public ownership into all
areas of industry. But, he was adamant that the power of the private 
owner to control industrial decision making be drastically reduced. 
Nationalization was one method of accomplishing thiB goal. Changes 
in the law which would eliminate the right of control which accompanies 
private ownership, and which would prevent owners from extracting a 
profit from industry, also appealed to him. The important thing was 
to eliminate the parasitical relationship of the capitalist to 
industry, and not how this was done.
48« R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. oit.. p. 98} R.H. Tawney 
The British Labour Movement, op. oit.. pp. 85, 86.
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but rather only one of a number of means for unleashing the co-operative }
49efforts of workers in the service of the community. Other forms of
social ownership such as producer co-operatives, guilds and professional
associations all had a legitimate, and important, part to play in industry
within a socialist society. Similarly, consumer co-operatives and the like
constituted another supplement to state ownership. Thus critics of
nationalization who argued that it wouldrmerely result in the substitution
of monolithic state control for capitalist domination, were wrong on two
counts, according to Tawney. First, socialism could, and should, encompass
50many different forms of social ownership. Second, the goal of
nationalization was not state control for its own sake but rather the
creation of the conditions necessary for the producers themselves to
51control decisions affecting their working lives.
When we consider that Tawney saw nationalization as one of a number j
■1
of tools to be used in the creation of socialism, it is legitimate to ask 
why he was convinced that it was necessary in the first place. His main 
argument on this point was quite simply that no feasible alternative existed.
In industries, such as coal, the presence of almost fifteen hundred 
separate companies and a plethora of mining regulations and property rights 
protecting the interests of private,owners constituted an unsurmountable
52barrier to the voluntary development of other forms of social ownership.
49.
50.
51.
52.
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op. oit., pp, 97, 98f R.H. Tawney, 
"The Webbs in Perspective", 0£. cit.. pp. lS^-168.
R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, 0£. cit., pp. 122-125j alsoi 
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. oit., pp. 167, 168 and 
passim. Like the Webbs, Tawney felt that there was even room for small- 
scale private enterprise within a socialist society. He saw no point in 
nationalizing the comer grocer , for example.
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., pp. 67—69; R.H.Tawney, 
"The Webbs in Perspective", 0£. cit., p. 1^7 Tawney's position on this 
question was expressed perhaps most succinctly in thb latter essay.
"Rationalization, thus conceived is a means, not an end. It is important 
less for what it does than what it enables to be done* Its success depends 
not on the mere change of ownership, which, though a necessary first step, 
is no more, but on the advantage taken of the opportunity offered by it to
carry through measures of reorganization which private enterprise was 
unable or unwilling to undertake..." Ibid.. p. 17.
Of course, Tawney was writing many years before ooal was actually 
brought into public ownership. * ■
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Although organisations,such as the Coal Consumer^ Co-operative, had made
some inroads in reducing the price of coal, the expansion of such
organizations was impeded by the stranglehold that private owners had
on the supply of coal - a strangehold which only the government could break.
And, even if consumer and producer co-operatives were able to make some
inroads in this sector, they would still be operating within the boundaries
of a hostile economic framework designed to accommodate the profit-oriented
activities of the coal companies. Thus nationalization was the only viable
alternative, not only in the coal industry, but in many others as well.
Moreover, by their very nature, some industries were best run as
state monopolies. Duplication of electricity, gas, water, railways and
similar services made little economio sense. .And,.if. monopoly were the only
rational method of 'organization, then it seemed to Tawney that the only way
to protect the community was to bring such industries into public ownership.
Otherwise there would be nothing to prevent their owners profiteering at
53the expense of the public.
Tawney was aware that supporters of the status quo oriticized
nationalization on the grounds that its theoretical benefits would be
effectively undermined by bureaucratio inefficiency. In reply to suoh
critioisms, Tawney pointed out that nationalization did not entail a single
formula which diotated that all state-owned enterprises had to be run like
the post office. Bather, it allowed substantial choice about organizational
structure, size, degree of centralization and various other matters of
influencing how such enterprises would be administered - a degree of ohoice
54that was at least as great as that existing under private ownership.
53. He made this point suooinctly in Equality. "There are oertain great 
services which cannot be safely resigned to exploitation for private 
profit, because the public welfare is so intimately dependent upon 
them, that those who own them become in effect, masters of the nation. 
There are certain others in which the consumer is at the meroy of the 
monopolist. In all the first and some of the seoond regulation is 
inefficient. What is required is publio ownership." R.H, Tawney, 
Equality, op. pit.. p. 182.
54, R.H. Tawney, Equality, op. oit., pp. 184-186} R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive 
Society, op. clt., pp. 113-116.
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Tawney also stressed, that supporters of nationalization were not blind to 
the pitfalls of over-centralisation, bureaucracy and red-tape as their
detractors assumed; hence they were anxious to establish organizational
55forms which would avoid such problems. ^
Iloreover, by involving producers in the policy making and 
administration of nationalized industries local initiative and autonomy 
would be encouraged rather than stifled. The change in status of workers 
from hired "hands" to partners in the co-operative undertaking of providing 
service to the community would unleash the creative efforts of working 
people in a way which had no parallel in the private sector. Because public 
enterprises would utilize their human resources more effectively, Tawney 
believed they would be considerably superior to their private counterparts,
both in terms of satisfying the needs of consumers and in fostering the
56happiness and creativity of producers.
The application of Tawney’s flexible approach to nationalization can 
be understood more clearly by examining his proposals for dealing with the 
reorganization of a specific industry; coal. To avoid the problems of 
centralization, and bureaucratization, he proposed a federal rather than unitary 
form of organization involving considerable decentralization and local 
autonomy. lie argued that because the problems of extracting coal varied 
considerably from one pit to another, it was essential to make use of 
"...local experience and knowledge..." and hence that the structure of the 
industry entailecl.a ".. .decentralized administration within a national 
framework..."^' When this was combined with public accountability, not merely
55. R.II. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op.cit.. pp. 114-115! R«H. Tawney, 
The B r i t i s h  Labour Movement, op. cit., pp. 85-87! R«H. Tawney, "Radical 
Social Reconstruction", op. cit., p. 107.
56. R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., pp. 90|91*
57. R.H. Tawney, "The Rationalization of the Coal Industry” (Labour Party 
Pamphlet, 1919) p. 26; R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, 0£. cit., 
p. 167.
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of the industry as a whole, hut of each local unit, it would ho possible
to avoid the dangers of "...managing the industry from Whitehall,.."
while ensuring that those working in the industry were not allowed to
53exploit the public by charging excessively for what they produced.
But the most important condition for transforming the coal industry
into a public service was that the workers themselves be given the power
to control decision making: otherwise all talk about enlisting their
59co-operation would be a sham.
Wo scheme for reorganizing the coal industry/Can be 
regarded as even approximately satisfactory when it 
does not offer those engaged in it an effective voice 
in the control of its policy and administration. The 
immediate gain to the workers from such a participation 
in the government of the industry upon which their 
livelihood depends is obvious and direct. Through Pit 
Committees, they will deal with questions of discipline, 
of output, of safety, health and comfort in each 
individual mine. On the District Council and national 
Hilling Council they will review not only the special 
policy of the industry, its wages, hours, safety and 
conditions in respect of health and housing, but the 
technical and commercial conditions which govern its 
development, and will do so not as more critics, but as 
men who can translate their ideals and experience into 
practice, and who bear the liability of making them a 
success. The individual workman will know that the 
authority responsible for administering the industry 
consists in part, of men with the same experience as 
himself, and that he, by his own suggestions and 
criticisms, can improve the working conditions and 
efficiency of his own pit. The organization of which 
he is a member will no longer be conoomod solely with 
resisting reductions or securing advances. It will form 
part of the government of industry, and will thus be in a 
position to assumo, as it cannot now, a professional 
responsibility for the quality of the service»®
Thus nationalization, as far as Tawney was concerned, was far more than 
a transfer of ownership from private capitalists to the state. It was a 
means of giving working people control of the industrial decisions which
50. R.Ii. Tawney, "The nationalization of the Coal Industry", 0£. cit., p. 26} 
see also: E.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., Ch. Ill, 
entitled "The Labour Movement and the nationalization of the Coal 
Industry."
59. R.H. Tawney, "The nationalization of the Coal Industry", op.oit., pp. 26. 27
60. Ibid., pp. 29, 30. •
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affected their working lives. To argue, as Clegg did, that they should 
he excluded from management decision-making so as not to compromise their 
ability to oppose would be to repudiate the basic justification of 
nationalization itself. It would constitute little more than the /
replacement of capitalist autocracy with state autocracy. Both were v  
unacceptable to Tawney for precisely the same reason: they denied the 
worker self determination at the place of work and thus transformed his 
role from a man to an instrument of production.
Tawney acknowledged that there was a danger that workers might attempt 
to use their control over industry to exploit the public by charging 
excessive amounts for the goods and services they produced. However, he 
pointed out that under private ownership this danger already existed. 
Shareholders were as intent upon maximising their profits - often at the 
expense of consumers - as it was alleged that workers would be. Thus 
workers’ control would not be any worse in this respect, and would probably 
be considerably better, for workers were also consumers: hence any attempt 
by them in their capacity as producers to exploit their fellows could be 
counteracted by workers in other industries, who could raise their prices 
in retaliation.
Yet, for a number of other reasons,.Tawney believed that nationalization 
would be less likely to result in the exploitation of consumers. First, 
because industry in a socialist society would be conducted with complete 
openness concerning its financial affairs, consumers would be able to 
prove or disprove suspicions that they were being overcharged simply by 
checking the accounts of the firm involved. Such openness would contrast 
sharply with existing business practice where the utmost secrecy was 
maintained to hide excess profits and to prevent workers and consumers from 
influencing the division of the fruits of industry. And, it would provide 
a far more effective method of protecting the public than a so called 
free-market, rife with monopolistic practices. "It is a common place of
democracy*', Tawney argued, "that publicity is the best guarantee against 
political abuses. It should be used as a' safeguard against economic abuses.
A second guarantee that, the consumer would be protected lay in the 
replacement of profit with service as the criterion for evaluating 
industrial success. Under the private ownership the energies of workers 
and managers alike were frequently directed to activities which, although 
profitable for shareholders, provided no useful service to the community.
In contrast, nationalized industries would put service first and hence 
would be far less likely to engage in activities of questionable social 
value. Moreover, public enterprises would be subject to public criticism 
about their affairs which would further limit their abilities to pursue 
anti-social aims.
But the most important guarantee that nationalized industries would 
not exploit the public was to be found in the change in attitudes among 
the producers themselves. The development among workers of a commitment 
to serve • the community — a commitment which would be encouraged by the 
elimination of the profit motive - was of far greater significance than 
the transfer of ownership itself. This new attitude to work could only be 
fostered by treating workers as partners in the pursuit of the common 
objective of serving the community. If nationalized industries were run 
along the lines of their private counterparts they would forfeit both the 
benefits to workers associated with industrial self-determination and 
the benefits to the public from a workforce committed to public service 
rather than personal gain.
Tawney*s faith in the moral integrity of the ordinary worker meant he
62saw little need to preserve a management function based on social control.
61. R.H. Tawney "Radical Social Reconstruction", op.cit., p. 117; See also 
R.H. Tawney, The British Labour Movement, op. cit., p. 169; R«H. Tawney 
The Accniisitive Society, op. cit. t pp, 103, 126, 127#
62. R.H. Tawney, "The Western Political Tradition", op. cit., p. 17 and 
passim.
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For this implied that the majority of workers were not committed to 
the purpose of industry and therefore had to be coerced to do their 
jobs. Of course, such coercion was inevitable under capitalism for 
the purpose of industry was to enrich its private owners. But under 
socialism the purpose of work would be different. Individuals would 
view it not only as a means for satisfying their economic needs but also 
as an avenue for self-expression, creativity and malting a contribution to 
their community. This revolution in attitudes would, in turn, obviate the 
need for social control •
Statedthus, Tawney1s views may seem naive. However, they are naive 
only if it is assumed that socialism is primarily a theory about 
institutional arrangements and not about human values. But as Tawney 
rightly saw institutional arrangements such as nationalization, although 
necessary for socialism, were not its core: its core was fellowship,equality 
and human dignity. Thus what was important was that institutional charges 
promoted socialist values. And this was precisely why workers’ control was 
essential. For it embodied society's commitment to self-determination and 
to socialist and democratic values among citizens.
Tawney recognized that the possibility of such transformation in 
attitudes towards work was seen as naive by critics of socialism. To . 
support his contention that such a change was perfectly feasible he drew 
an analogy between the change in attitudes which would accompany social 
ownership and the transformation which had occurred in the professions 
during the previous century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
law, medicine, teaching and the civil service had been run according to 
principles of self-interest. The members of these professions had neither 
felt, nor been expected to feel, any great obligation to provide a public 
servibe or to uphold professional standards. Like private entrepreneurs, 
they had viewed their occupations as a moans of enriching themselves —
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largely at public expense. Thus their success or failure was assessed
by how much money they were able to squeeze from their client and not
by the quality of the service they provided.
However, during the following century a virtual! revolution occurred
in the behaviour of members of these professions. The principle of private
gain, although not entirely banished, was supplanted by professional
ethics.^ It was no longer assumed that civil servants could b® bribed,
that teachers could be persuaded to give high grades to students in return
for a suitable payment, or that laywers could be corrupted. Tawney
acknowledged that the professions were not perfect and suggested that
there was considerable room for improvement, both in the standards of
professional ethics and in the conduct of many of their more unscrupulous
practitioners. But these deficiencies, he argued, ought not to obscure
the fact that a vast improvement had taken place.
It need not be protended that corporate selfishness 
can be exorcised by professional rules. What can be 
created is a corporate conscience, which may be 
sensitive or indifferent, but to which an appeal on 
public and moral grounds is possible.64
Tawney saw no reason why a similar change could not occur in industry,
for ho believed that there was nothing inherently superior about the middle
class personnel of the existing professions compared with their working
(jrclass counterparts. J When judged by the criterion of service, the 
worker who drove a train or bus, who built houses or produced consumer 
goods, performed a task that was as necessary to society as that of the 
professional. Hence there was no reason why he should not be as proud
63« H.H. Tawney, The Acquitive Society, op. cit., pp. 88-94*
64* R.H. Tawnoyi, "Radical Social Reconstruction", on. cit., p. 115.
69. In fact he sometimos referred to miners as "professionals" or
"professional men" see: R.H. Tawney, The British Labour ’ilovemcht, op. cit., 
p. 72. Bee also: R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op.cit.t p. 91*
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of his contribution to tho community or as equally committed to maintaining
66the standards of his service.
Although Tawney's argument that industry ought to he 'professionalized’
had a distinctly middle class, Oxbridge ring about it, nevertheless,
Sawney was adamant that the present social status of the manual worker be 
revised such that the value of his work received the recognition due it.
As Ross Terrill points out, Tawney's view of socialism stressed equality 
and fellowship among all men - a view which entailed the belief that no 
man ought to be allowed an income or economic position so different from
f f f
that of his fellow man that he lived virtually in another world. Vast 
discrepancies of wealth and income did precisely that by separating the 
world of working people from that of the upper classes. Consequently, 
it was essential that the gap between manual workers and professionals be 
narrowed. To the extent that the hierarchy in industry reflected the 
inequalities of capitalist societies it too had to be reduced, for the 
differentials between those at the top and at the bottom could not be 
justified either in terms 'of social function or in terms of the larger 
goals of socialism. However, as Terrill again points out, Tawney's view 
of equality was not arithmetical - he did not see the value of a complete 
identity of incomes or possessions - but rather one which ensured that the 
class differences that plagued British society viere not allowed to continue.^ 
Tavmey's idea of turning industry into a profession might also be 
interpreted as an attempt to "uplift” the working class by giving it a 
good dose of middle class values. This was not Tawney's intention for he
66. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, op.cit., pp. 89-91*
67. This is one of the main themes of Ross Terrill's discussion of Tawney's 
view of equality. See: Ross Terrill, R.H. Tawncy and IIio Times, op. cit., 
Ch. 5, pp. 121-137 and passim.
63. Ross Terrill, R.II. Tawney and His Times: Socialism and Fellowship, op. cit..
pp. 130-134*
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Vías anything but a middle class reformer. The reason working people 
had. not been able to develop a service-oriented attitude towards work 
v;as related to the structure of the capitalist economy - a structure 
which precluded the development of self-governing bodies composed of 
working people, and not to their inherent intellectual or moral 
deficiencies.
Because the importance of work in capitalist societies Vías evaluated 
not according to the service rendered but rather according to the income 
received, those who contributed much and received little were despised 
while those who contributed little yet consumed extravagantly from the 
income of their shares, viere esteemed. Such a set of values destroyed 
the self-respect, pride and social recognition that Tauney felt ought to 
accompany manual labour and thus resulted in the workers themselves 
underestimating their contribution to society and, ultimately, their ovni 
worth as human beings. It precluded the development of a professional 
esprit de corps . w.ithin the ranks of the manual workers for it wrongly 
denigrated their contribution to society. However, because capitalist 
society undervalued the contribution of ordinary workers, this in no way 
meant that a socialist society would do the same. And, once the honourable 
place that such work had in the community vías recognized, it would be 
possible for ordinary workers to develop the came degree of professional 
commitment to the community's v/elfare that was the acknowledged goal of 
medicine, lav;, teaching and other professions.
r a
While the preceding discussion of Tawney's views on how industry ought 
to bo reorganized may be of historical interest, the sceptic might ask, 
"What relevance do they have to contemporary industrial society, after all, 
Tawney's main works on the topic were published half a century ago?"
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In part, the answer to this question ought to be self-evident, as many 
of the problems he discussed remain with us today. Admittedly, the 
coal industry about which he wrote so much and so passionately, has been taken 
into public ownership along with a number of other major industries. But, 
as v;e noted in the first section of this thesis, the economy has remained 
under private control and the organization of business enterprises still 
embodies the subordination of labour to the "dead hand" of capital.
While there has, indeed, been a considerable rise in the standard of 
living since Tawney*s most important writings on industrial democracy, 
were published, the basic framework of industry has not changed, ,and the 
question of the subordination of those who work to those who own remains 
largely unresolved. To argue that Tawney's normative approach to industrial 
organization has become obsolete because we have managed to double or even 
triple industrial output since his day would be to miss the point of his 
argument entirely. For the question that he tried to answer concerned the 
nature of relationships among men associated in the task of production.
It is a question that cannot be resolved either by pointing to the ever- 
growing mounds of material goods whose continued growth is not so 
confidently assorted as it was only a few years ago, or to the ever- 
increasing technological sophistication which has accompanied industrial 
development. It is a question that demands an answer which is essentially 
normative, for it concerns not what exists or what might exist but what 
ought to exist in industry. And Tawncy’s answer is no less rolcvant today 
than that developed in the political sphere over two hundred years ago.
The question of how to organize industry can no more be solved by 
increasing efficiency or expanding output in our day as it could have been 
in his. lior can the fundamental conflicts of interests between workers 
and owners be papered over, either with admonitions to the former group to
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subordinate their difference to the common aim of increasing output, 
or with attempts by the latter to promote industrial harmony by 
techniques, such as human relations or job enrichment, designed to 
foster normative integration. They can only be resolved by restructuring 
industry on the basis of extending the principles of political democracy 
into industry, that is, by giving workers industrial citizenship.
CHAPTER XI
WORKERS' CONTROL: THE YUGOSLAV ILLUSTRATION
It is inconceivable that the system should be 
replaced; weaknesses or not, alienation or not, 
in general it has become accepted among 
Yugoslav workers. One young worker in a 
Sarajevo factory asked me quite seriously, after 
an interview, "Is it true that in England the 
workers don't manage the factories?" - David Riddell.
I
In the preceding chapter we maintained that Tawney's approach to 
the organization of industry was still relevant today, despite the 
numerous technical and economic changes which have occurred since he 
published his most important works on the topic. When Tawney argued 
that producers ought to have self-determination at the workplace', there 
was no economic system which he could use as a practical illustration 
of the feasibility of his idea3. Thus he was confined to outlining why 
he thought it ought to work» without being able to show conclusively 
that it aid. Fortunately, we are in a better position today in that we 
can point to the Yugoslav experiment in workers' management as an example 
however imperfect, of the feasibility of workers' control.
As we noted in the first chapter, critics of workers' control have 
argued that it would quickly lead to economic collapse. However, when we 
turn to examine Yugoslavia's economic performance during the twenty-five 
years in which self-management has operated, we find little evidence of
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the "lack of bread" Schumpeter confidently forecast.^ On balance, 
Yugoslavia’s economic record has been reasonable, excelling in economic 
growth and efficiency of investment, while falling down on inflation and 
unemployment.
Looking at the first aspect of economic performance, Yugoslavia has 
maintained a consistently high rate of growth over the past twenty-five 
years. According to the 1975 United Hâtions Economic Survey of Europe. 
from i960 to 1974 the growth rate averaged 6.6 per cent annually and it
1. In the following discussion of ;forkers* management in Yugoslavia, ;j
we shall eschew a detailed examination of the organizational!. structure |
of enterprises or the history of the Yugoslav system. These topics f
have been adequately dealt with in a number of excellent publications |
such as the 1962 I.L.O. report and Frederick Singleton’s more recent f
book Twentieth Century Yugoslavia. Hence there is no reason to 
duplicate this research. On the question of whether workers really 
do control Yugoslav enterprises, there is considerable.literature, 
much of it dealing with the relative influence of workers and managers f
in decision making. However, from a legal point of view, the answer |
to this question is clear: workers have the final say in all decisions.
For further evidence on this matter see: International Labour Office,
VJorkers’ Management in Yugoslavia (Geneva, 1962); Frederick Singleton, <:
Twentieth Century Yugoslavia (London, 1976); Arnold S. Tannenbaum,
Bogdan Kavcic et a l . ,  Hierarchy in Organizations (London, 1 9 7 4 )»
Branko Iiorvat, An Essay 'on Yugoslav Society (trains, by Henry F. Mins)
(White Plains, New York, 19697 (orig. pub. 1967)» Ichak Adizes, Industrial 
Democracy; Yugoslav Style (London, 1971)* First International Conference | 
on Participation and Self-Management. Dubrovnik, Dec. 13-17; Volumes fj
I-V; Jiri Kolaja, Workers’ Councils: The Yugoslav Experience (London, 1965); 
Adam Sturmthal, Workers* Councils (Cambridge, Mass. . 19M)V Paul Blumberg, ij 
Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (London, 1968); u
M.J. Broekmeyer (ed. )* Yugoslav Workers*' Self-;¡an'age'ment (Doetrecht, Holland,?" 
1970); David Riddell "Social Self-government: Theory and Practice in |
Yugoslavia" British Journal of Sociology; Vol. XIV, I968, as reprinted in b 
Anarchy 95, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1969, pp. 4*32} Jaroslav Vanek, The . |
Participatory Economy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971); Milan Rukavina, "Yugoslavia”- in |j 
Charles Levinson (ed.) Industry’s Democratic Revolution (London, 1947)» *
Roy Moore, "Self-Management in Yugoslavia" Fabian Research Series 231 
(London, 1970)» Frederick Singleton and Anthony Topham, "Workers' Control 
in Yugoslavia" Fabian Research Series 233 (London, 1963); G. David Garson,
On Democratic Administration and Socialist Self-management: A Comparative 
Survey Emphasizing the Yugoslav Experience (Beverly Hills," 1974)» '
Pusan Bilandzic, Social Self-Government (Belgrade, 1965); Bogdan Denitch, 
"Self-menagement in Yugoslavia" International Studies in Industrial 
Democracy No, 7 (Nottingham, 1973); Gerry Hunnius, "V/ork'ers'*’ Self- ' 
management in Yugoslavia" in Gerry Hunnius, G. David Garson and John Case 
(ed.) 'Workers’ Control: A Reader on Labour and Social Change (New York,
1973) pp. 268-321; Jaroslav Vanek, (ed.) Self-management: Economic 
Liberation of I-Ian (London, 1975) 5 Jan Vanek, The Economics of Workers’ 
Management; A Yugoslav Case Study (London, 1972).
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pshows no indication of slowing down despite the recent world recession.
Of course, this does not mean that ups and downs.have not occurred. But
despite such fluctuations, the underlying trend has been good. Indeed,
only Japan, (and until the 1973 war, Israel) has performed as well in this 
3area.
Turning to the question of efficiency of investment, the picture
is equally favourable. According to Jaroslav Vanek, for every 10 per cent
of income diverted to investment, a 2.8 per cent rate of growth was achieved.^
In contrast, most countries in the West, including .the United States, were
only half as efficient, obtaining roughly 1.4 per cent growth for the same
5input of investment. And, when we compare Yugoslavia with Great Britain,
2. S o u r c e :  United notions Economic Survey of Europe in 1974. Part I ( G e n e v a ,  
1 9 7 5 )  P -"  59» T h i s  f i g u r e  i n c l u d e s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  w h ic h  g r e w  m uch 
l e s s  r a p i d l y  t h a n  i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t .  I f  we l o o k  o n l y  a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t ,  Y u g o s l a v i a  d o e s  e v e n  b e t t e r ,  w i t h  a n  a v e r a g e  i n c r e a s e  o f  
8 . 4  p e r  c e n t  p e r  y e a r  fr o m  i 960 t o  19 7 4 «  A g a i n  t h e r e  i s  n o  i n d i c a t i o n ' o f
a decline in this rate of growth in the industrial sector. For mpre 
information on Yugoslavia’s current economic position, see the Financial 
Times special report on Yugoslavia dated Friday, June 11, 1976, pp. 19-lG 
and, International lionet ary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
Vol. XXIX Ho. 1, Jan. 1976» pp. 4K4-419. ’ ' ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ' ’ ' " ' ' ’ ' '
3. Earlier claims about the success of self-management were dismissed by 
Western Economists either on the grounds that the country was extremely 
lucky or that its growth could be attributed to factors other than self- 
management. In response to a 1963 article in the American Economic Pcview 
by Je.roslav Vanek noting Yugoslavia’s exceptional growth from I95Q
to i960, Iiicliolas Spolber maintained that American economic aid was' 
responsible for much of this growth. During the period from.1850 'to 1959» 
ho noted, Yugoslavia received ^1,066 billion in ’’general economic assistance 
million in aid for ’’special projects” and 7^24 million in military eu; 
plies from the United States. Without such massivo aid, ho thought it 
unlikely that Yugoslavia could have achieved such a high rate of growth. 
However, the argument that foreign aid has been responsible for Yugoslavia’;., 
high growth rate in the post-1960 period is less persuasive. Although the 
amount of foreign aid in relation to the size of the economy is far less 
them in the past, the Yugoslav growth rate has remained constant. See: 
Jaroslav Vonck, ’’Yugoslav Economic Growth end Its Conditions” American 
Economic Review, 1963» PP* 555-961; Nicholas Gpolber in the same edition,
PP* 5 7 5 - 5 7 7 *  F o r  o t h e r  a s s e s s m e n t s  o f  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  
eco n o m y  w h ic h  s u p p o r t  t h e  a rg u m e n t c i t e d  a b o v e ,  s e e :  C a r o l e  P a te m a n , 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  D e m o c r a t ic  T h e o r y  ( C a m b r id g e ,  1 9 7 0 )  PP*
David Jenkins, Job Power (New York, 1973) pp. 95-104» Branlco Horvat,
Business Cycles in Yugoslavia (Shite Plains, Hew York, 1971) (Translated 
b y  Helen M. Kramer) (origY pub. Belgrade, 1 9 6 9 ).
4* Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy, (Ithaca, W.Y., 1971) PP* 43» 49* 
5* £bid*» PP* 49» 50.
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■the picture is even more favourable. Moreover, no developing country
has achieved comparable results with the possible exception of Cuba of
, 6which v;e still know too little.
However, in the areas of unemployment and inflation, the economy has
performed less well. Looking at the former, the 1975 United nations
Economic Survey of Europe noted that 4 per cent of the nort^  agricultural
work force had been officially registered as unemployed the previous year.
This figure under-estimates the number out of work, however, because many
unemployed workers are not registered. If the number of workers looking
for employment is used as an indicator, the true unemployment figure may
7be as high as 10 per cent. When we consider that in the same year, there 
were almost one million Yugoslavs working abroad out of a population of 
21 million, the dimensions of the unemployment problem,are quite considerable. 
Although the level of unemployment can be attributed, in part, to demographic 
factors as Yugoslavia moved from a backward agricultural country to a 
moderately developed industrial nation in the period of a single generation, 
tho country’s failure to provide enough jobs must be seen a3 a serious 67
6. It is ironic, yet true, that these facts have not beon assimilated by 
many Western economists who continue to argue that workers’ control 
must be inefficient. For example, in a recent Hew Society article,
Tim Congdon explained, in some detail, why a system based upon private 
ownership was inherently more efficient than Yugoslav market socialism. 
And ho suggested that if tho Yugoslavs wanted to increase economic 
efficiency they would be wise to allow tho development of private 
ownership of the means cf production. However, he failed even to mention 
the statistics in Yugoslav economic development! See: Tim Congdon,
"The Economics of Industrial Democracy" ITew Society, Oct. 30, 1975»
pp. 255-257* See also: Peter Wiles, "A Descent Towards Particulars" 
in M.J. Broekmeyer (ed.) Yugoslav Workers’ Self-Management (Dordrecht, 
Holland, 1970) pp. 154-160. For a good outline of the theoretical 
arguments supporting self-management see: Branko Ilorvat, Towards a Theory 
of Planned Economy (Belgrade, 1964)j Branko Ilorvat, Business Cycles in 
Yugoslavia, op. cit.; Jaroslav Yanek, The Participatory Economy, on. cit. 
Jaroslav Van ok, The Economics of Workers'*' Management (London,' 1972Ti 
Jaroslav Vanelc, The General Theory of Labour-Managed Market Economies 
(Ithaca, 1T.Y., 1970jl
7. Source: United nations Economic Survey of Europe in 1974. Part I, p. 60.
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economic veakness.8
Similarly, the rate of inflation in Yugoslavia has been higher, on 
average, than in the West. Rising prices have plagued the economy since 
the mid-1960’s, creating a good deal of stress on the balance of payments 
and forcing the government to take fairly drastic steps to keep Yugoslavia’s 
trading position from deteriorating. During its worst year, 1975» the rate 
v;as 30 per cent and although recent reports indicate that it has fallen back 
to 11 per cent, this is still above that of many of its Western competitors.^ 
While such figures are comparable with those of Great Britain, they still 
indicato that the economy has problems to overcome in this area.
Weighing Yugoslavia’s high rate of growth and efficiency of investment, 
v/ith its less successful record on unemployment and inflation, it is fair to 
say that the economy has performed neither much worse nor much better than 
its 'Western counterparts. Thus in narrowly economic terms, Yugoslavia 
demonstrates that workers’ management is perfectly compatible with,-a modem 
economy.
Indeed, when we consider that no previous experience in managing a 
worker-controlled economy vías available to guide the Yugoslav planners and 
that there vías no body of economic theory to which they could turn in order 
to understand the complex problems arising in the new system, the fact that
8 .  A n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  h i g h  u n e m p lo y m e n t i n  Y u g o s l a v i a  i s  t h a t  w o r k e r  
m an a ged  f i r m s  t e n d  t o  b e  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e .  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b er o f  
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s ,  b u t  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o st im p o r t a n t  i s  t h a t  w o r k e r s  a r e  
n o t  c h a r g e d  a n  ’ e c o n o m ic  r e n t ’  o n  t h e  s o c i a l  c a p i t a l  t h e y  u s e .  H e n c e , 
t h e y  h a v e  t e n d e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  b e c a u s e  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  o a p i t a l  
e m p lo y e d  p e r  w o r k e r , - t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  in c o m e  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e .  
I n  a  r e c e n t  P h .D .  t h e s i s  a t  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  A .  V a h c io  h a s  e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  t e n d e n c y  f o r  Y u g o s l a v  f i r m s  t o  b e  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e ,  h a s  c o s t  
b e t w e e n  .6  a n d  2 m i l l i o n  j o b s .  S e e :  A . V a h c i c ,  A n E c o n o m e t r ic  A n a l y s i s
o f  P o s t - W a r  P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  E c o n o m y , C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y  
D o c t o r a l  D i s s e r t a t i o n ,  19 7 6 »  a s  c i t e d  i n :  A .  V a h c i c  a n d  J a r o s l a v  V a n e k , 
" S e l f - M a n a g e m e n t ,  W o r k e r s ’  M an agem en t a n d  L a b o u r  M an agem en t i n  T h e o r y  
a n d  P r a c t i c e :  A  C o m p a r a t iv e  S t u d y " ,  U n p u b l i s h e d  p a p e r ,  197*3» P* 8 »
9 .  S o u r c e :  T h e  F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s , S p e c i a l  R e p o r t  o n  Y u g o s l a v i a  ( F r i d a y ,  J u n e  1 1 )  
p p .  15- ^ 8 .' F o r  e a r l i e r  f i g u r e s  s e e :  U n i t e d  n a t i o n s  E c o n o m ic  S u r v e y  o f  
E u r o p e  i n  1 9 7 4 » P a r t  I ,  p .  59* A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  l a t t e r  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  
r e t a i l  p r i c e s  i n c r e a s e d  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  1 0 . 5  p e r  c e n t  fr o m  
I 960 t o  1970 » w h i l e  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  fr o m  19 71  t o  1974  w a s  1 5 , 1 6 ,
1 9  an d  2 6  p e r  c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I b i d . . p .  59*
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it has performed, as well as its Western counterparts is a notable
achievement. Hot surprisingly, a number of leading economists, both
Yugoslav and foreign, have argued that the economic potential of
workers’ management has not yet been realized. A. Vahcic, in an analysis
of the effects of imperfections in the capital market has calculated that
between ,6 and 2 million jobs wore lost because government economic policy
inadvertently encouraged worker-managed firms to become too capital
intensive.Another economist, Branko Horvat, contends that the growth
rate could have been in excess of 10 per cent per year if the economics
ministry had understood how to control the business cycle to prevent
unnecessary cut-backs in investment and production."^ Jaroslav Van ok
feels that the failure of the government in adopting correct fiscal and
12monetary policies has greatly impeded economic development. And
David Liddell notes that "...the system has been bedevilled by planning 
13mistakes.” Thus while sceptics might argue that Yugoslavia’s recent 
economic performance has resulted from a fortunate coincidence of economic 
factors, proponents of self-managemont can argue no less cogflntly that the 
economy has performed well in spite of numerous disadvantages and probably 
could have done considerably/better had the proper policies boon
10. A. Vahcic, An Econometric Analysis of Po8t-Uar Performance of the 
Yugoslav Economy, op. cit., as cited in: A. Vahcic and Jaroslav Vanek, 
’’Self-Management, Workers' Management and Labour Management in Theory 
and practice: A Comparative Study” , oj% cit., p. 8.
11. Branko Horvat, Business Cycles in Yu/faslavia, op. cit., pp. 3 - 7  and 
passim.
12. Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy, op. cit., p. 47«
13» David Riddell, ’’Social Self-Government: Theory and Practice in 
Yugoslavia” , op. cit., p. 16.
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followed.1'*
Yet what is important about Yugoslavia from our point of view is 
not that it has a higher rate of growth than the west or that its rate 
of inflation is slightly worse, but rather that as on economic system 
it works in a reasonably successful way. Ue have not argued that the 
purpose of workers*, control is to facilitate higher output and profits, 
whether those accrue to owners or workers, but rather that other 
objectives pught to have a higher priority within industry. Thus evidence 
that economic collapse will not occur with the introduction of workers* 
control is all that is necessary to prove our case in this regard. And 
Yugoslavia provides such evidence.
II
If the economic success of the Yugoslavs challenges prevalent assumptions 
about the impracticality of workers* control, their innovations in management 
practice constitute a no less profound attack on orthodox views concerning 
the role of managers. As we noted in the first chapter, writers, such as 
¡Schumpeter, Kerr, Dahrendorf and Galbraith, believo that the authority 
of managers is derivod from their acknowledge! expertise rather than their 
position as agents of shareholders. The complexity of■the management 
function, they argue, precludes workers from playing on active role in 
management decision-making. ITor can managers be made accovmtable to their
14. As Carole patoman points out, tho impressive economic performance of 
Yugoslavia has led to a notable shift in the type of criticisms raised 
by opponents of workers’ management. In the early 1960's, they 
confidently predicted that the "inherent economic weaknesses" of the 
system could lead to a sharp decline in the rate of development. However, 
by tho end of tho decade, when it vías clear that such a decline had not , 
occurred, they had come to feel that economio criticisms viere not that 
important anyhow. Instead, self-management vías attacked on the grounds 
that workers did not really manage; that the freedom of managers vías being 
suppressed by the egalitarian tendencies of the regime; or any one of a 
number of issues associated with alleged infringements of. tho liberty of 
professionals and managers. See: Carole Pateman, Participation and 
Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970) PP» See, also: David Jenkins,
J'Olf 1'b'w'er, op.' cit., pp. 107, 108.
subordinates, for the latter are incapable of judging executive performance.
Yet, in Yugoslavia, managers do account for their actions to their
workforce and must obtain the approval of democratically elected workers'
councils for the decisions they make. Although the practice of self-
management varies considerably from one enterprise to another, the
observations of Supec, Tanic, Adizes, Tannenbaum, Riddell, Blumbcrg and
other scholars confirm that in many undertakings workers and their
representatives do take an active part in decisions about investments,
15pricing, marketing and the like. ^ Thus far from being the exclusive 
preserve of senior executives, these policy decisions can be controlled by 
workers.
The Yugoslav experience also casts doubt on the claim that management 
is necessary as an agent of social control. As we saw earlier, one of the 
reasons the Viebbs and Hugh Clegg were anxious to preserve managerial 
prerogatives was the fear that workers would behave irresponsibly if they 
were not subject to the authority of their employers. Managerial 
prerogatives - and discipline - were thus essential to ensure that 
production was carried out efficiently.
But managers do not exercise the function of policing the behaviour 
of employees in Yugoslav factories.^ Indeed, quite the opposite occurs: 
workers take it upon themselves to see that everyone fulfils his obligations,
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15 Rudi Supec, "Two Types of Self-managing Organizations and Technological 
Progress" First International Conference on Participation and Sclf- 
Management", Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, Dec. 13-17» 1972»Vol. I, pp. 150-173; 
Zivan Tanic, "Dimensions and Factors of the Apperception of Self- 
Management" First International Conference on Participation and Self- 
Management , Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, Dec. 13-17» 1972, ïol. I, pp. 139-149» 
Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Stylo, op. cit.t pp. 81-90, 
110-132; A.S. Tannonbaum, Bogdan Kavcic, et al., hierarchy in Organization!-, 
op. cit.; David Riddell, "Social Self-Management, Theory and Practice in 
Yugoslavia", 0£. * Pau-1 Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology
of Participation, op. cit., pp. 196-232; David Jenlcins, Job Power, op. cit. 
p. IOC,
16. Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Stylo, op. cit., p, 192.
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as the following observation by Ichak Adizos illustrates:
The resea-rcher noted, while visiting some shops, 
that many foremen wore not in their units, but 
were at various meetings. Asked if the workers 
would work without supervision, the foreman replied, 
"they control each other, they don’t need me for 
that." The supervisor's function was not that of a 
policeman, but simply that of a co-ordinator of 
activities.
In some units, if there vías no need for co-ordination 
• there was no supervision. 1'«
Although it might be argued that, on occasion, .peer group pressure 
can be as stifling to tho individual as traditional managerial sanctions, 
outside observers believe that this is generally not the case.^ Because 
there is no structural conflict of interest and because workers live in 
similar social and economic circumstances, it is far less likely that the 
individual v/ill be oppressed. Democratic practices can certainly bo abused. 
But they are preferable to a situation in which discipline is imposed by a 
separate management group which has both a duty and a vested interest in 
keeping workers in a position of subordination.
The Yugoslav experiment thus shows that it is quite possible to separate 
management's technical functions from its rolé as an agent of social control. 
Industry does not collapse where managers have no stick to wield. Indeed, 
industrial relations appear substantially improved v/hore workers themselves 
carry out disciplinary functions. This point needs to be underlined, for 
much of the discussion of the ' impracticality' of workers' control focuses
17. Ibid., p. 192. It is worth noting that workers elect their foremen, 
thus ensuring that the individuals who perform these jobs have the 
support of those they oversee.
18. The fact that workers actually do control discipline within factories 
has been verified by many Western observers. Perhaps tho best outline 
of how the Yugoslav system functions in this, .area is to be found in the 
1962 I.L.O. Report cited earlier. In addition, accounts by
David Tomquist, Ichak Adizes, Roy Iloore, Frederick Singleton and 
Anthony Tophcun all confirm that discipline has been transferred out of 
management’s hands. See: I.L.O., Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, op. 
cit., pp. 179-203; David Tomquist, Look Fast. Look Vlest: The Socialist 
Adventure in Yugoslavia {Hew York, 19^6) pp.' 174“ldQ} Ichak Adizes, 
Industrial Democracy: Yugoslavia Style, op. cit., pp. 165-194; Jan Vanelc, The' i'j'c'oh'dhu'cfe' or Workers' I-kmiy;chientr~A Yugoslav Case Study, op. cit.
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on the alleged inability of managers to carry out their functions properly 
without the threat of sanctions to back up their demands. It is frequently 
asserted in the British press, for example, that a major reason for the 
industrial 'troubles* besetting British industry is that managers do not 
have sufficient 'authority', by which ... is meant disciplinary prerogatives, 
and hence that workers are allowed to 'get-away with* any number of 
irresponsible acts. Not unexpectedly, the solution proposed in response 
to this problem is to strengthen management's hand. Yet in Yugoslavia, 
where managers do not have such powers, the number of strikes is minimal 
when compared with Britain. Although critics have suggested that this 
is because the Communist party suppresses dissent, most observers feel that 
it is a result of the absence of a structural conflict of interest between 
owners and workers.^
Evidence that workers can perform disciplinary functions competently 
reinforces our critique of the role of management in the West. The enormous 
quantities of time and money that have been spent on devising strategies 
for controlling the behaviour of workers cannot be justified on the grounds 
that such control is essential for the smooth functioning of modem industry» 
the Yugoslav experience shows that it is not. Rather, such strategies have 
been devised to ensure that the interests of shareholders take precedence 
over the needs of workers. The reason management must have disciplinary 
powers under private ownership is precisely because it must be able to 
suppress attempts by workers to assert their own priorities. Similarly, 
the reason management must continually search for new methods of reduoing 
the autonomy and discretion of workers is that only by so doing can it 
guarantee that the interests of shareholders are fulfilled.
19. For a good analysis of the causes of strikes in Yugoslavia see»
Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy» Yugoslav Style, op. cit.» Other 
accounts are to be found in the following books and articles*
Frederick Singleton, "Yugoslavia's First Official Strike", The Spokesman 
No. 0, (Bee. 1970)| David Carson, On Democratic Administration and 
Socialist Self-Management, op. cit., pp, J8-44} Ken Coates and Tony
Topham, The New Unionism, op. oit. 
Participation M d  Sfifilfil POTerUl 
Job Power,'op. cit.. p. 112.
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Ironically, the function of technicians and administrators under 
Workers1 management comes much closer to the 'neutral*, purely technical 
role which the managerialists wrongly argue they now perform in the West. 
Because managers no longer have to concern themselves with exercising 
social control over their subordinates, they can concentrate their energies 
on technical and administrative functions. And they are in a better position 
to provide help to workers because such assistance cannot be interpreted as 
a subtle way of forcing workers to produce more, or a method of scrutinising 
their working habits. In freeing them to do that for which they were 
trained, self-management opens up new possibilities for such workers, and 
enables them to avoid the difficult - and delicate - personnel matters 
associated with enforcing the demands of shareholders.
Thus we see that the abolition of management's traditional role as an 
agent of social control can facilitate the development of a new and more 
co-operative pattern of relationships between managers and workers. 
Management's technical and administrative skills can be utilised as 
effectively in the pursuit of objectives agreed upon by the majority of 
workers as they have, in the past, been used to further the aims of owners. 
Under workers' control the task of managers becomes not one of dominating 
workers but rather of assisting them in attaining the objectives which they 
have democratically established. Discipline, as Tawney rightly argued, 
could be replaced by co-operation and fellowship, once the structural 
impediments of private ownership and control were removed.
Of no less importance is the support that Yugoslav self-management gives 
to Tawney's argument that the worker could be treated as a responsible moral 
agent willing to fulfil his obligations to the working community without 
having to be coerced. This does not mean that social pressure, particularly 
from fellow workers, is entirely absent in Yugoslav enterprises. Nor have 
they dispensed with all disciplinary measures. But they have shown the 
practicality of the assumption that in a free society, people do not need
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to be forced to do their jobs. Work can be treated as a co-operative
venture in which the benefits - and responsibilities - are shared among
all members of the working community. Thus the assumption of the Webbs
and Hugh Clegg that the worker had to be controlled by management in order ,
to prevent him from behaving irresponsibly is discredited.
The fact that Yugoslav enterprises have been able to foster reasonably
harmonious relationships between workers and managers also lends support
to Tawney’s claim that removal of the ’dead hand’ of private ownership
would reduce industrial conflict. The Yugoslav experiment demonstrates
that it is not ’industrialization’ or ’technology’ which is the source of
most disputes within industry, but rather the conflict of interest between
owners and workers. Moreover, co-operation in Yugoslav industry has not
been established on the basis of sophisticated manipulation by highly paid
psychologists and sociologists anxious to help management ’solve’ its
20labour problems. Nor has it been achieved by suppressing workers. Rather 
it has been attained by doing precisely what Tawney suggested; giving 
ordinary workers industrial citizenship. Harmony has been established on 
the basis of voluntary co-operation among equals, not on the subordination 
of one group to another.
According to economists, such as Vanek, the abolition of structural
sources of conflict in Yugoslav industry has had significant economic benefits 
21as well. Aside from the fact that losses due to strikes are minimal, 
observers have noted the absence of practices such as output restriction, 
deception, sabotage and other devices used by workers in the West to protect
20. Of course, there are instances of the suppression of workers’ rights.
No system is perfect. Yet the abuses in Yugoslav industry are certainly 
no greater than those in the West, particularly when we consider that 
in countries such as the U.S. less than one third of the labour foroe is 
unionized,
21, Jaroslav Vanek. The Participatory Economy, op. cit., Ch. 3« ■
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themselves from exploitation by management. Moreover, because workers 
control how their work is organized, they are able to deal directly with 
impediments to production, without having to obtain permission from higher 
authorities. And, because they have no reason to obstruct production, their 
talents and energies are more effectively utilized than is the case with 
their counterparts in the West.
Indeed, as a number of Yugoslav economists have noted, the ability of
Yugoslav firms to enlist the full co-operation of their workforce in the
pursuit of democratically-chosen objectives is probably the major reason
23for their economic success. Because Yugoslav workers take an aotive role
in the affairs of their undertakings, suggestions and proposals for improving
production emanate regularly from the shop-floor. Production of better and
cheaper products improves the economic position of the firm and, therefore,
the income of those who work within it. Consequently, they have an important
incentive to minimize production costs and improve the quality of their goods
or services. Similarly, because antiquated work methods reduce the income
of the working community, workers have a major incentive to modernize
24production techniques. This contrasts with the situation under private 
ownership where innovations frequently lead to the obsolescence of 
traditional craft skills and the substitution of lower paid labour. Beoause 
workers1 councils in Yugoslavia are reluctant to lay off members of their 
working community, improvements in production methods are not seen as
22
22. See, for example, the account by Ichak Adizes ini Industrial Democracy! 
Yugoslav Style, op. cit. See alsoi Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory 
Economy, op. oit.. pp. 15-20, 43-46.
23. Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy, op. oit.. pp. 30-32}
Mitja Kamusic, "Economic Efficiency and Workers' Self-Management" in 
M.J. Broekmeyer (ed.) Yugoslav Workers' Self-Management, op. cit., 
pp. 111-113.
24. As we noted in footnote No. Q, self-managed enterprises have a tendency 
to become capital intensive, a factor which has contributed to the high 
level of unemployment in Yugoslavia. However, this tendency also shows 
that workers are not reluotant to utilize the most modem and efficient 
equipment.
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a threat by their members. Moreover, because workers rather than outside 
owners receive the benefits of such innovations, both financially and in the 
form of better working conditions, they have every reason to encourage 
modernization. And this, according to many observers, is precisely what 
happehs.^
The Yugoslav experience thus undermines another common criticism of 
workers' management, namely, that workers will preserve traditional methods 
of work at the expense of consumers. As we noted earlier, the Webbs felt 
that the tendency of workers to oppose modernization was a major reason for 
denying them oontrol over production. However, in light of the Yugoslav 
experience it is clear that such opposition under private ownership does 
not spring from the inherent conservatism or self-interest of. .workers but 
rather from the rational fear that employers will use these innovations to 
destroy their livelihood. Once workers are assured that they will share in 
the benefits of technological innovations, they behave differently, as the 
Yugoslavs have shown.
The Yugoslav experiment also provides an answer to a number of other 
objections which are frequently raised concerning the ability of workers 
to take part in management. For example, it is commonly argued that if 
workers are given the power to hire and fire their managers they will prove 
incapable of selecting persons who are qualified for the job. Indeed, in 
a country suoh as Britain with its notable class differences, the idea 
that working people should be able to determine who will be appointed to
25
25. Western economists, noting; this fact, have argued that it obstructs the 
operation of the labour market and thus leads to inefficiencies in the 
allocation of skilled workers in the economy. However, asBcanko Horvat 
notes, such policies also have an important effect in modifying 
fluctuations in the business cyole, thus compensating for their adverse 
impact on the labour market, Seet Branko Horvat, Business Cycles in 
Yugoslavia, op. oit.
26. See, for example» Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy, op. cit., 
pp. 31, 52{ Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy» Yugoslav Style, op. oit., 
pp. 79-152; David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit., pp.
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deal with the administration and technical affairs of industry is looked
upon with abhorrence. Yet this is precisely what does occur in Yugoslavia.
The director of each firm is seleoted by the workers' council after a public
competition for the position. Similarly, all other senior executives must
27
be appointed by the workers' elected representatives. Such practices
do not appear to have jeopardized the eoonomio performance of Yugoslav
enterprises as the statistics, cited earlier, confirm.
The feasibility of workers' control has also been challenged on the
grounds that workers are not capable of the self-restraint necessary to
23ensure sufficient investment. Instead, it is argued that they will follow
the short-sighted polioy of paying themselves high personal incomes and
thus jeopardise the future economic development of their enterprises. A
more sophisticated version of this oriticism is that workers will not feel
sufficient commitment to their undertakings to sacrifice present earnings
for future investment when the only way they can reap the benefits of such
29investment is to remain with their firm. .
However, the problem of under-investment has not plagued Yugoslav firms.
As David Jenkins notes "...there is no evidence in the statistics that wage 
increases have been, on the whole, excessive, or that investment has suffered. " ^ 0
27» I.L.O.,Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, op. cit., pp. 100-116, 276-292.
Of course, all workers are seleoted by a similar prooess. =
28. See, for example» Tim Congdon, "The Economics of Industrial Democracy",
0£. cit., pp. 255, 257.
29. Ibid., pp. 255, 256.
30. David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit.. p. 103. Jaroslav Vanek provides a 
good economic analysis of why this is not the case. See* Jaroslav Vanek,
The Participatory Economy, op. cit.. pp. 145-148. See also* Jaroslav Vanek, 
The General Theory of Labour-manager* Market Economics (ithaoa, N.Y., 1970) 
Ch. l6 and A. Vahcio. An Econometrio Analysis of Post-war Performance of 
The Yugoslav Economy, op. cit.
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One reason is that workers do not have the kind of capitalist mentality 
which is assumed by those who make this criticism. Another is that 
workers readily see the value of modernizing production, because they 
benefit both financially and in terms of more comfortable, less 
laborious work. Moreover, because Yugoslav workers see themselves as 
self-managers and not merely sellers of labour, they tend to develop a 
strong commitment to the success of their enterprises. On the basis of 
this evidence, there is no reason to assume that the introduction of 
workers' control in Britain will lead to short-sighted economio policies 
or a lack of investment.
Another objection which is frequently raised is that if workers are 
given control of industry, they will reduce wage differentials to the 
point where managers will no longer be willing to make the effort 
required to perform their jobs properly. To use Sir Keith Joseph's term, 
managers will no longer have an adequate 'incentive' to accept the heavy 
responsibilities of their job.
Although it is perfectly true that Yugoslav workers have used their
power to reduce wage differentials, there is little evidenoe that this has
31undermined economio performance. Nor is there any indication that 
Yugoslav managers are willing to go back to manual labour because they 
feel the responsibilities associated with executive office are too great 
for the salary offered. Obviously, what constitutes an adequate 'incentive' 
varies from one country to another. Thus it could be argued that Yugoslav 
managers might be satisfied with much less than their British counterparts. 
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has moved from a pre-war situation where 
differentials were extremely great, to the present one in which they are 
relatively narrow, while substantially increasing economic performance,
31. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy» The Sociology of Participation.
op. cit., p. 2 14«
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thus demonstrating that a reduction in differentials is compatible with
32a high rate of economic development. Indeed, if efficiency were 
dependent on the »width1 of differentials, one would expect neighbouring 
Italy, with its extreme differences in pay between managers and workers, 
to be more efficient than Yugoslavia.^ Yet this is not the case. Nor, 
one might add, is Britain, with its wide differentials, more efficient 
than Sweden or Denmark where, according to the logic of Sir Keith Joseph's 
argument, one would expect industry to be on the verge of collapse.
As Jaroslav Vanek notes, workers' management has a built-in mechanism 
for ensuring that differentials are adequate to provide sufficient incentive, 
yet not so gre&t as to offend the sense of fairness held by the majority.
If workers do not pay their executives and technicians adequately, 
competent people will leave, economic performance will suffer and workers 
will see their own incomes diminish. Henoe they will be willing to pay 
what is necessary to hold qualified personnel within the enterprise.
However, they will be unlikely to offer more than this beoause increased 
income distributed to executives means less for themselves and because 
their sense of justice will normally incline them to reduce differentials 
as much as possible. Thus the democratic prooess provides a perfectly 
adequate method of arriving at differentials which are acceptable from 
both a normative and an economic point of view.^
Critios of workers' control have also olaimed that workers do not 
want to be" burdened with the responsibilities associated with management.
32. A.S> Tannenbaum, Bogdan Kavcic et al. Hierarchy in Organizations, op. clt.
33» According to the study by Tannenbaum, Kavcic et al., cited earlier, 
each step in the organizational hierarchy in large Italian firms is 
accompanied by a 210$ rise in salary. In Yugoslavia, it is accompanied 
by a 535$ rise in salary. That is, differentials are roughly four times 
as great in the former country than in the latter. Seet A.S. Tannenbaum, 
Bogdan Kavcio et al., Hierarchy in Organizations. ££. cit., p. 107.
34. Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy. 0£. cit.. pp. 30, 31.
Instead, they have other interests which they see as more important than
participating in industrial decision-making. The fact that trade unions
in the West have renounced any desire to supplant management is often
cited in support of this argument.’ Similarly, the findings of opinion
polls that workers do not aspire to take over the management function are
pointed to as further evidence that workers have no interest in participating
in decision-making. In the words of Clarke Kerr*
...(S)erious interest in industrial participation 
appears to be limited to a minority of the work 
force and oitizenry, albeit this proportion may 
show some secular rise with industrialization. The 
careful studies of worker participation that have 
been made both in eastern and western countries do 
not suggest that any sustained interest in 
participation at the work place has compelled 
drastic changes in worker organizations.55
Yet what is clear from the Yugoslav experiment is that once exposed to
workers* management, workers would not tolerate any other system. A strong
commitment to self-management has been revealed in every survey which has
posed the question of whether Yugoslav workers would prefer a system where
36management were given more power. As Tawney predicted, workers prefer 
industrial citizenship with its accompanying burdens, to a system where 
they are treated as 'hands'.
Moreover, the Yugoslav experiment demonstrates that the values 
associated with workers' management can be fostered in an environment in 
which self-management was not part of the previous social tradition. Thus 
it provides an answer to the vital question of whether workers oan be
35» Clarke Kerr, John T. Dunlop et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man. 
op. cit., p. 3 0 1»
36. See, for example* David Riddell, "Social Self-Government* Theory and 
Practice in Yugoslavia", 0£. cit.. pp. 22, 23} G. David Garson, On 
Democratic Administration and Socialist Self-Management* A Comparative 
Survey Emphasizing the Yugoslav Model, op. oit., pp. 40, 41$ Bogdan Denitch 
"Self-Management in Yugoslavia", 0£. cit., p. 7$ Rudi Supec, "Two Types of 
Self-Managing Organizations and Technological Progress", 0£. cit., 
pp. 168-171$ Zivan Tanio, "Dimensions and Factors of the Appreciation of 
Self-Management", 0£. oit.', pp. 143-148$ David Jenkins, Job Power, op. cit. 
pp. Ill, 113, 114.
402 -
persuaded to accept the responsibilities required to make the system 
work. Indeed, the progress that has been made in this regard in 
Yugoslavia is quite remarkable. Before the war, Yugoslav industry was 
characterized by rigidly authoritarian relationships between employers, 
many of whom were foreign, and poorly paid, insecure Yugoslav workers. 
Trade unionism was unknown in many areas of the ®conomy, and the power 
that employers had over their employees could fairly, be described as 
autocratic. ^  Yet in twenty-five years of self-management, a virtual 
revolution in attitudes towards industry has taken place. Workers' 
control is now viewed as the only acceptable basis for the management of 
• the Yugoslav economy.
This suggests that the reason workers in the West have not shown more 
interest in controlling management is not that they are incapable of 
exercising power responsibly ortiiat they cannot be bothered, but rather 
that the system of private ownership has systematically excluded them from 
decision-making and encouraged them to seek fulfilment outside the work 
place. However, given the opportunity to participate, as the Yugoslav 
.experiment shows, there is no reason to suppose that they would be any 
less anxious to take part in management than their Yugoslav counterparts. 
If poor, uneducated Yugoslav peasants can be persuaded to accept the 
responsibilities associated with workers' management, the prospect for 
workers in more developed countries is highly promising. Indeed, in the 
context of a developed economy, such as that of Great Britain, with its 
strong tradition of democratic trade unionism, this aspect of the 
transition to workers* control would probably be considerably less 
difficult than in Yugoslavia.
Thus we see that the successful attempt at workers' management in 
Yugoslavia has resolved a number of key issues relating to the management
37* For an excellent discussion of the pre-war industrial situation seet
A.S. Tannenbaum, Bogdan Kavoio et al*. Hierarchy in Organizations.
•£. oit., pp. 221, 225. --------------------- ---
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function. It has shown that workers can participate in decisions 
traditionally thought to be the exclusive preserve of senior executives. 
It has also revealed that management•s traditional role as an agent of 
social control is quite unnecessary. Workers are perfectly capable of 
acting responsibly without being subject to the disciplinary sanctions 
of management. Similarly, the autocratic pattern of authority 
relationships characteristic of industry under private ownership can be 
replaced by a democratic one without undermining economic efficiency. 
Finally, it has shown that, once exposed to self-management, workers 
rapidly come to accept it as the only satisfactory basis for the 
organization of modem industry and are perfectly willing to accept the 
responsibilities, as well as the benefits, that follow from it.
Ill
One of the most persuasive arguments of Hugh Clegg and other proponents
of the existing pattern of oollective bargaining in the West has been that
workers' rights and interests could not be protected if their
representatives took part in management. Trade unions must be free to
oppose management unencumbered with any managerial responsibilities, in
the same way that the parliamentary opposition is free to oppose the
government. If workers also formed the government of industry there would
be no opposition} henoe the rights of individuals would no longer be
protected. Yet there is little evidence that workers' management in
Yugoslavia has led to the abuses forecast by its detractors. It is true
that Yuguslav trade unions play a somewhat different role from their
Western counterparts. In particular, they do not adopt.the "oppositional"
«
stance which is the hallmark of Clegg's theory of industrial democracy.
Yet their functinn in encouraging lower paid, semi-skilled and unskilled
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workers to make better use of their self-management rights is hardly 
less valuable. And, in recent years, they have been willing to make 
use of the strike weapon in cases where the rights of ordinary workers 
were being ignored by a domineering director or unresponsive workers* 
council.^ 8
Yugoslav firms also embody the principle that the worker ought to be
judged by his peers, rather than higher authorities. When a worker is
accused of breaking one of his firm's regulations, he is tried by an
elected committee in his own department or shop. In serious cases, legal
advice and representation is available to him. Moreover, he can appeal
to the workers' oouncil and, finally, to the economic courts if he feels
that he has been unfairly treated. This appeal procedure also acts as a
check on discriminatory behaviour by his workmates. As Tomquist and
Adizes have noted, workers do not treat disciplinary matters lightly
39because offences are seen as challenges to the working community.Hence 
to be convicted is a very serious matter. Consequently, disciplinary 
committees tend to be lenient unless the offence is so serious that it 
cannot be tolerated by the community.
Moreover, the interests of Yugoslav workers are safeguarded by a 
number of other bodies which have no parallel in the West. The aggrieved
38» A good survey of official thinking on the question of strikes is to 
be found in the April-May 1972 issue of Socialist Thought and Practioe 
which devoted ten articles to the function of trade unions under self 
management. See also* David Carson, On Democratic Administration and 
Socialist Self-management, op. cit., pp, 38-40; Ken Coates and Tony Topham, 
The New Unionism, op. cit., pp. 229-231? David Riddell, "Social Self- 
Government* Theory and Practice in Yugoslavia" o£. cit., p. 22 and passim? 
Josip Zupanov, "Employees' Participation and Social Power in Industry" 
op. cit. % Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy* Yugoslav Style, op. cit.. 
pp. 177-180; Frederick Singleton, "Yugoslavia's First Offioial Strike",
The Spokesman. No. 8 (Dec,, 1970); David Jenkins, Job Power, op. pit., 
pp. Ill, 1 1 2 .
39» Ichak Adizes, Industrial Democracy* Yugoslav Style, op. cit., pp. 168- 
192; DavidTornquist, Look East, Look West* The Socialist Adventure in 
Yugoslavia, op. oit. , p p.175-186. '' "
worker can turn to his elected representatives, the workers' council, 
the League of Communists, the director, the economic courts, or, in 
some cases, the local commune in his attempt to obtain justice. Accounts 
of how the Yugoslav system functions in practice, confirm that workers do 
make use of these channels.^ 0 Indeed, some observers have suggested 
that the Yugoslav worker is more likely to obtain redress for M s  
grievances than his counterpart in the West because he can choose to 
pursue his case through the organization which he feels will be most 
sympathetic to him.^ 1 The Yugoslav system illustrates what should be an 
obvious pointi in a democratically run enterprise it is perfectly 
feasible to build in a number of safeguards to protect the rights of 
individuals. There is no inherent reason why workers cannot control the 
organizations within which they work and yet still make provisions to 
ensure that that control is not used to oppress individual workers.
Turning to the larger issue of the protection of the oolleotive 
interests of workers, the fact that control of enterprises rests in the 
hands of elected representatives provides an effective guarantee that 
management will not ignore their interests. Workers not only have the 
power to elect whomever they wish to their workers' councils and other 
decision-making bodies} they also have the right to rep,all these 
representatives at any time. Individuals or groups of workers can also 
make proposals to the decision-making bodies directly or initiate referanda 
on certain issues.^ 2 Because decision-making is public, workerscan make
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40. International Labour Office, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, op. cit., 
pp. 179» 180} Adolf Sturmthal, Workers' Councils, op. cit., pp. 117, 118} 
Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracyt The Sociology- of Participation, op.
oit.. pp. 206, 207.
41« Adolf Sturmthal, Workers' Councils, op. oit.. p. 118.
42. On this question, see the excellent discussion in the I.L.O. report, 
Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, op. cit. Accounts of how these 
grievance precedures work in praotice can be found in Ichak Adizes, 
Industrial Democracy» Yugoslav Style, o£. cit., pp. 168-177}
David Tonnquist, Look East. Look West» The Socialist Adventure in 
Yugoslavia, op. cit.. I76-I8O.
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their opinions and interests felt at any stage of the process. Although 
the practice of workers' management varies from firm to firm, in the 
more successful ones there is no doubt that workers are able to pursue 
their interests more effectively than in the West.
For example, the ability of Yugoslav workers to take part in the 
planning process gives them the opportunity to shape the policies which 
affect their future. Because decision-making is public, proposals which 
may adversely affect individuals or groups of workers are subject to 
intensive scrutiny long before any decisions are made. It is inconceivable 
that managers in a , Yqgoslav firm could secretly decide to shift investments 
to another factory - or country - where labour was cheaper or more 
compliant. Similarly, it is impossible to imagine them adopting new 
technologies or methods of production with the sole purpose of cutting 
labour costs by making large seotions of their work-force redundant.
As we noted earlier, Yugoslav enterprises tend to maintain a stable 
level of employment regardless of fluctuations in the business feycle.
This is because workers are collectively willing to absorb the costs of 
adverse economic conditions rather than allow some of their fellows to be 
made redundant. Such protection against redundancy is unavailable to 
workers in the West because the policy which minimizes the losses of 
shareholders is normally one of shedding 'surplus' labour. True, trade 
unions can demand redundancy pay and perhaps threaten retaliatory strikes 
to defer owners from wholesale redundancies. But trade unions cannot 
force owners to take losses on their investments! hence they must succumb 
to the 'logic of the market' and accept the owners' right to disoard 
labour when this is the most 'economically sound* course to follow.
Thus we see that workers' management provides better protectinn for the 
interests of workers on this question.
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Finally, in areas such as health and safety, the fact that workers 
control decision-making ensures that their interests are not subordinated 
to the demands of shareholders for greater profits. Workers can decide 
whether the benefits associated with the use of certain types of machinery 
or the production of particular substances are worth the risks entailed.
As it is their lives that are endangered they are more likely to give such 
considerations full weight when making their decisions. Of course, this 
does not mean that Yugoslav workers always make the most sensible choice. 
Ignorance of the dangers of chemicals and other products, particularly 
those of recent origin, cannot be discounted. Similarly, economic 
pressures may make them willing to take risks which others would find 
unreasonable. But the basic advantage of workers' management remains» 
the workers who bear the risks are the ones who have the power to control 
the decisions that are made. The conflict of interest between owners, 
anxious to maximize their returns by pressuring workers to take unnecessary 
chances, and workers interested in preserving life and limb, does not 
exist under workers' management.
Thus we see that Clegg's argument that workers' interests could only 
be protected under a system where workers-.did not participate in 
management is refuted by the Yugoslav example. Indeed, what it reveals 
is that the best way to safeguard the interests of workers is to give 
them control over managerial decision-making. Without such control, it 
is difficult to see how they can avoid being subjected to arbitrary 
decisions by individuals who have vested interest in exploiting them.
17
The Yugoslav approach to self-management has also dispelled another 
common notion about the role of the state in a socialist society. Clegg 
argued that too much nationalization was dangerous for it destroyed the
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pluralist economic framework which was the major guarantee of individual / 
freedom, both at work and in the wider political sphere. Public ownerdiip, 
if carried too far, would lead to monolithic state control similar to that 
in the Soviet Union. Yet what is notable about the Yugoslav approach to 
socialism is that state intervention in the economy has been minimized. 
Indeed, the Yugoslav system is more decentralized than that of Great 
Britain and, ironically, the central government is proportionately much 
smaller as well.
When self-management was introduced in the early 1950's the federal 
government in Yugoslavia was, literally, decimated. Whereas in 1948 there 
were 4 7 ,5 0 0 civil servants, by 1956 this number had been reduced to 1 0 ,326. ^  
Official commitment to the "withering away of the state" has resulted in 
further reductions in the ensuing years. For example, in 19 6 4, according 
to O.E.C.D. figures, the federal government accounted for 13 per cent of the 
G.N.P. By 1969, the figure was 8 per cent.^ No country in the West has 
managed a comparable reduction. Indeed, no country in the West has a 
central government remotely as small. This evidence clearly refutes Clegg's 
argument that nationalization inevitably leads to massive concentration of 
state power.
The Yugoslav example of industrial democracy also challenges the 
Morrisonian approach to nationalization followed by the Labour Party 
in the post-war period. Arguments which were accepted by Labour
43* Bogdan Denitch, "Self-management in Yugoslavia", o£. cit., p. 6.
44. Economic and Development Review Committee, O.E.C.D., Yugoslavia 
(Paris, O.E.C.D., 1970) pp. 19-21. As cited by David Jenkins,
Job Power, ojo. cit., p. 97. More recently, a report in the Financial 
Times noted that "...decentralization has reached the stage where the 
government has no everyday means of fine-tuning the eoonomy." By this 
it was meant that the role of the central government had diminished to 
the point where it lacked the fiscal and monetary tools used by 
governments in the West to regulate their economies. See» Financial 
Times Special report on Yugoslavia, Friday, June 11, 1 9 7 6, p. 1 5 .
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Governments concerning the necessity of maintaining a hierarchical pattern 
of control in the industries taken into public ownership appear much less 
persuasive now that the Yugoslavs have shown that public enterprises can 
be organized according to radically different principles# In particular, 
they have demonstrated that workers can manage public property in a 
socially responsible way# It should be noted in this respect that the 
Yugoslavs have not restricted workers* management to the market sector. 
Schools, hospitals, research laboratories and many other public services 
function along lines similar to self-management in industry. Thus it is 
not possible for critics to argue that workers* democracy is only feasible 
in areas of the economy where the market aots as a cheok on financial 
mismanagement# This is an important finding because it suggests that 
workers' control can be introduced into public enterprises in Britain 
without fear of wholesale cost over-runs or a decline in service to the 
public.
The policy of making the reoords and aocounts of Yugoslav enterprises 
available to the public provides an important safeguard, ensuring that 
workers and their representatives cannot easily abuse their powers.^ 
Traditionally, of course, it was argued that such a polioy oould not be 
followed in public enterprises, both for commercial reasons and because open 
decision-making would result in unwanted interference by workers and 
outside groups anxious to exploit any information made available. Yet open
45* Tawney argued that publicity would perform precisely this function.
See: The Acquisitive Society, op. cit., p. 126. For verification 
of the 'openness* of Yugoslav deoision-making, see* Gerry Hunnius, 
"Workers* Self-Management in Yugoslavia", 0£. cit., p. 2Q5j 
International Labour Office, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, op. 
cit., pp. 67-731 Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy* The Sociology of 
Participation, op. cit., pp. 196-209. The Yugoslavs also have 
established a number of mechanisms for ensuring that accounts cannot 
be 'doctored'. For example, the accountant in each enterprise has a 
special, independent status and cannot be fired by the workers* counoil. 
And the tax authorities act as an additional check.
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decision-making in Yugoslav has not harmed economic performance* Indeed, 
it has been suggested that it fosters better management because mistakes 
are quickly exposed. In light of such evidence, the •commercial1 
justification for excluding workers from the decision-making prooess seems 
rather flimsy, particularly when we consider the vested interests of 
various groups anxious to keep workers out of the boardroom.
The importance of eliminating seorecy cannot be too strongly
emphasized, however, for it has the dual effect of exposing mismanagement
and limiting opportunities for exploiting the public. In Yugoslavia
local newspapers frequently discuss and criticize the policies adopted
46by firms in their area. When decisions contrary to the community's 
welfare are taken, the ensuing publicity often forces enterprises to 
reoonsider their actions. There is every reason to assume that in the 
British context, similar benefits would ensue.from ‘opening the books1. 
Indeed, such a policy would go a long way towards eliminating the 
incestuous relationship with the private seotor which profits so much 
from its dealings with publio enterprises. And, more importantly, it 
would provide ordinary citizens with the information necessary to make 
demooratic decision-making on industrial issues possible.
Thus we see that it is perfectly feasible to establish forms of 
public ownership which give workers control over the deoisions affecting 
their working lives while ensuring that this oontrol is not used to exploit 
the public. Clegg's argument conoeming the need to maintain a 
hierarchical authority structure, with its accompanying subordination 
of workers, is refuted. Indeed, the Yugoslavs have demonstrated the truth
46. Ichak Adizes describes a wildcat strike in one of the factories he
studied while gathering material for his doctorate. He mentions that 
one of the first steps of the dissident workers was to tell their 
grievances to the local paper. It published a story featuring the 
strike in the following day's edition. Seet Ichak Adizes. Industrial 
Demooraoyt Yugoslav Style, op. oit.. pp.174^186.
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in Tawney's assertion that»
...public ownership, like private enterprise may­
be accompanied by any one of a dozen systems of 
organization, and that its effect, good or bad, 
will depend not upon the name used to describe it, 
but upon which particular system of organization 
is adopted in any given case.47
V
As we have seen, the Yugoslav experiment refutes a number of common 
assumptions about the impossibility of workers* control. In the economio 
sphere, it demonstrates that an eoonomy can be run in a reasonably 
successful manner on the basis of workers* management. With regard to 
the management function, it shows that workers oan participate effectively 
in the planning and organization of a modern enterprise. Moreover, such 
participation in management is fully compatible with the protection of 
their rights and interests. Finally, the Yugoslavs have demonstrated 
that nationalization does not lead invariably to monolithio state control 
as has taken plaoe in the Soviet Union. Rather, it can be a useful tool
A Q
in creating a more democratic - and pluralist - industrial framework.
The Yugoslav experiment reminds us that industrial organizations are 
created by human beings to fulfil human purposes. The 'demands' of 
industry upon individuals are not determined by Robert Blauner's
47» R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Sooiety, op. cit., p. 120.
48, The positive effects of self-management in terms of liberalizing 
Yugoslav society have been noted by a number of writers such as 
Branko Horvat and Frederick Singleton. The fact that Yugoslav 
industry is now highly decentralized acts as a check on the growth 
of state power, while the democratic practices established within 
enterprises tend to generate pressure for a corresponding 
democratization of political life.
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•technological imperatives* or Clarke Kerr's 'logio of industrialization’! 
but by the social values underlying its organization. If it is seen as 
morally acceptable to subordinate the aspirations of working people for 
self-determination at work to the interests of shareholders, anxious to 
maximize output and profits, then the organization of industry will 
reflect this priority. However, if it is seen as desirable that 
producers should exercise control over their work, then, as the Yugoslavs 
have shown, authority relationships and technology itself can be 
re-arranged to foster this purpose. There is no 'logio of industrialization' 
only a logio of men.
Tawney's argument that the question of how industry is to be 
organized is primarily a moral, not a technical, one is thus given ample 
support by the Yugoslav example. To be sure, technical and organizational 
considerations do act as constraints. But these constraints are neither 
as important as is commonly assumed, nor as difficult to surmount. The 
real constraints, as he rightly argued, are rooted in social and political 
institutions which legitimize control of the working lives of the majority 
by a tiny class of property owners. It is these constraints - constraints 
imposed by other men - which are still the basio source of the workers 
subordination at work. However, the Yugoslavs have shown that these 
limitations can be overcome. And once the social organization of 
industry is founded upon a different set of priorities, the technical 
aspects of production will fall into their rightful place as means for 
the pursuit of human ends.
Thus what is significant about the Yugoslav experiment is not that it 
provides a blueprint for workers' management in other countries - although 
certainly many of its innovations could be borrowed to good advantage.
Rather, it is that Yugoslavia demonstrates the feasibility of vdsting 
decision-making authority in the hands of producers. It is an example
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of what can be achieved, but not necessarily a model for others to copy.
It illustrates how one country with a unique historical, cultural and 
economic background has gone about the democratization of its industry.
For this reason, the implementation of workers* management in 
other countries could well follow a somewhat different pattern. In 
Great Britain, for example, the process of transferring power from private 
owners is unlikely to be aided by a national liberation struggle comparable 
to the one which facilitated Tito's rise to power. Instead, it must 
rely on the ability - and willingness - of the labour movement and the 
trade unions to challenge the existing framework of ownership and 
control. At the same time, British socialists have a long and valuable 
history upon which to draw in their efforts to lift the 'dead hand* of 
the capitalist from industry.
The extension and reorganization of publio ownership, combined with 
a concerted effort to open the boardrooms of major private companies, as 
suggested by Wedgwood-Benn, is one fruitful approach to this question. 
Another strategy would involve a major expansion of the issues raised in 
negotiations between trade unions and employers. Unions would demand a 
greater say in decisions concerning investment, pricing, finance and 
manning, as well as increased information about boardroom decisions. 
Election of union representatives to the board of directors constitutes 
yet another possible way of enhancing the role of workers in decision­
making. Of oourse, the purpose of such representation would not be to 
promote better »human relations', or to foster integration into the 
existing framework, but rather to gain an additional lever in the 
struggle to ease out the existing representatives of property.
Regardless of the specific strategies adopted, the ultimate goal 
must be clear» to establish self-determination at the workplace. It
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must be to give ordinary working people control over the decisions which 
so greatly affect their happiness and well-being. For as we have seen, 
control of the lives of workers by owners of property and their 
representatives is neither morally justifiable in a society committed 
to the ideals of democracy, nor economically necessary. It can, and 
should bo supplanted: anything less is an affront to human dignity.
VI
In the preceding chapters, we have examined a number of questions 
associated with the basis and purpose of authority within contemporary 
industry. It is now appropriate to tie together the various strands of 
our argument. We began by questioning the common assumption that the 
management function in Western societies is a neutral, technocratic one 
in which ownership no longer plays a significant role. The arguments 
of Berle and Lleans, Burnham, Galbraith and other supporters of the 
'separation of ownership from control' thesis were challenged on two 
counts. First, from a conceptual point of view, proponents of 'managerialism' 
confused the day-to-day administration of industry with the function of 
establishing general policy. Shareholders, we argued, were perfectly capable 
of seeing that the policies followed by business enterprises wore made in 
their interests without becoming embroiled in the day-to-day administration. 
Second, from an empirical point of view, evidence that ownership was 
dispersed among a large number of owners did not prove that no shareholders 
were capable of exercising control. Rather, it indicated only that small 
shareholders were effectively disenfranchised. The very large shareholders, 
both individual and institutional, we maintained, were still capable of 
monitoring and checking the activities of the executives who managed their 
property. Moreover, when we turned to examine the actual behaviour- of
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business enterprises, we saw that the goal of maximizing profits was as 
dominant in contemporary business enterprises as it had been in their 
owner managed counterparts a century ago. On the basis of this evidence, 
we concluded that ownership, not professional expertise, remained the 
basis of the organization of contemporary industry and that the management 
function lías still one of pursuing, albeit in a more sophisticated way, 
the interests of property.
The implications of management’s role as an agent of shareholders were 
examined in the following three chapters. Scientific management, we 
argued, was developed not primarily to rationalize production, but rather to 
extend management control over the shop-floor in order to prevent 
soldiering and limit the ability of workers to pursue their own, rather 
than their employer's objectives. Taylor used engineering principles to 
carry out a social reorganization of work which he hoped would place 
management in complete control of the shop floor and reduce the role of 
workers to 'hands', confined to executing the orders of managers'. Once 
this was accomplished, management would have a free hand in pursuing the 
goals of efficiency and productivity and thus be able to maximize the 
return on shareholders' capital.
Yet workers were not easily reconciled to their role as instruments 
of production, subservient to the will of management, scientific or 
otherwise. They reacted hostilely to their limited work roles and 
position of subordination. Thus other, more sophisticated methods of 
control were called for. A b hostile workers responses were the source of 
management's difficulties, it seemed logical to find out more about them. 
Social science was thus enlisted in the quest to understand, and, ultimately, 
to control the attitudes and values of workers.
The human relations theorists concluded that the source of worker 
opposition lay either in psychological mal-adjustment or in non-logical
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v/ork group norms and mores which had come into existence as a response 
to the social needs of workers. In either case, they thought it would 
be possible to modify worker attitudes to the advantage of employers. 
Counselling could be used to persuade individual workers that opposition 
to management was an indication of psychological immaturity, v;hile 
supportive supervisory techniques could be exploited to bring the norms 
and mores of v/ork groups into line with the objectives of business. Like 
Taylor, proponents of human relations had no interest in the question of 
whether management had the right to manipulate workers: they simply took 
it for granted.
However, human relations also had notable weaknesses v/hich soon 
became apparent. The v/orker v/as both more complex and more difficult to 
control than had been anticipated in the heady days when sociology and 
psychology promised a quick end to the labour problem. Hence managers 
renewed their search for strategies to overcome worker resistance. Post­
war development in the behavioural sciences has ‘ been a most fruitful 
source of ideas in this quest. Particular attention has been paid to 
analyzing the employee's needs in the hope that these can be harnessed 
to corporate objectives. The findings of psychologists such as Maslov/, 
Herzberg, McGregor and Argyris that workers want opportunities for self- 
expression, responsibility and initiative has led to the development of 
job enrichment and participation schemes designed to provide the worker 
with opportunities to satisfy such needs on condition that he pursue 
management goals.
Job enrichment and participation schemes have achieved only limited 
success, however, for their application has been restricted by th.e narrov/ly 
commercial constraints of efficiency and productivity. Jobs are enriched 
only where it is likely to 'pay'; otherv/ise, the techniques of scientific 
management are retained because '.these techniques still constitute the most
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effective way of providing shareholders with the profits they demand 
from the enterprises they own.
Our discussion of contemporary management theory thus provided 
additional support for the contention that managers are agents of I
shareholders rather than independent socially conscious professionals.
They have attempted to extend their control over all aspects of the 
productive process, including the minds of workers, not "because this vías 
necessitated by technical or administrative requirements,but rather because 
this was the only way they could guarantee that the interests of 
shareholders took precedence over the needs of workers. Industry has 
been organized to maximize efficiency and profitability not because such 
goals were dictated by industrialization, but because they were dictated 
by shareholders. And, the worker’s autonomy and discretion have been 
reduced not because of organizational or technical imperatives, but because 
it was only by transforming him into a ’hand' that employers could be 
certain of his compliance with their objectives.
After demonstrating that contemporary management is still carried 
out in the interests of owners, we turned, in the following chapter, to 
examine the impact of private ownership and control on workers. 
Specifically, wc 'challenged the fashionable view that management’s control 
over tho worker is not objectionable because the additional production so 
generated more than compensates for his loss of freedom on the job. To 
support our case, wo pointed to the deleterious effects of management 
control in a number of areas of the worker’s life. Pressure for 
production has resulted in the exposure of workers to unnecessary risks 
and occupational diseases. Because the employers who make the decisions 
benefit from the extra production resulting from hazardous methods of 
work, and because the workers who talco the risks are excluded from the 
decision-making process, the latter are frequently exposed to risks
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which could be eliminated if their welfare were thought of as highly 
as the balance sheet.
Yet physical health and safety, we argued, are only the tip of the 
iceberg. Routine, repetitive jobs performed under stressful conditions 
frequently lead to serious strains on the psychological well being of 
workers. Again, because such methods of work ensure maximum returns on 
shareholders' capital, they are utilized without regard for their 
deleterious effects. However, the most important drawback of the present 
system of ownership and control is that it denies the worker opportunities 
for self-expression, craftsmanship and personal development on the job. 
Instead of being an avenue for creativity and fulfilment, work is reduoed 
to a means - and frequently an unpleasant means - for earning a living.
By treating workers simply as instruments for the pursuit of shareholders' 
objectives, industry fails to respect their right to be treated with the 
dignity that is due human beings. Indeed, to regiment a human being 
to a task which fails to provide him with an opportunity to express 
himself is no less an attack on his personality than to expose him 
needlessly to physical danger. Thus we concluded that the present pattern 
of ownership and oontrol had a profoundly deleterious impact on the lives 
of the workers subjected to it - an impaot which far outweighed the 
consumer benefits resulting from this method of production.
In the next section of the thesis, we turned to examine the 
effectiveness of trade unions in redressing these abuses. While not 
denying the real accomplishments of unions, we maintained that their 
willingness to accept the subordination of workers to owners resulted 
in a failure to challenge the source of the problems confronted by their 
members. By focussing their energies on improving the terms and 
conditions of employment, they unwittingly legitimized the treatment 
of workers as hands. And, by accepting managerial prerogatives over a
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wide range of decisions, unions collaborated in the maintenance of the 
status quo even though this meant that many of the needs and aspirations 
of workers were effectively stifled»
After demonstrating why private ownership and control of industry 
was unacceptable and why trade unions in their present form were inadequate 
in redressing its abuses, it was logical that we turn to examine an 
alternative view of how industry should be organized. We maintained that 
Tawney's vision of industry, organized on the basis of co-operation, 
fellowship and equality among producers still constituted a viable 
alternative to the status quo. Tawney's argument that the solution to the 
problems of industry lay in transferring control to the producers themselveB, 
we argued, was no less relevant in our day than in his, despite the numerous 
changes which have occurred in the period since he put forth his views. 
Indeed, the need to provide self-determination at work has become even more 
pressing in the intervening years.
To substantiate our assertion, we turned, in the final chapter, to 
examine the Yugoslav experiment in workers' management. Despite its 
problems and shortcomings, the Yugoslav system: .demonstrates unequivocally 
that workers can participate in management. As we noted earlier,
Yugoslavia's economio performance has been perfectly acceptable, while in 
terms of involving workers in the decisions which affect their lives, the 
Yugoslavs have advanced considerably beyond the collective bargaining 
approach found in the West. Moreover, the success of the system has 
refuted a number of common assumptions about the need for unilateral 
management power in industry.
Industry, we concluded, can be reorganized on the basis of a 
fundamentally different set of values, just as Tawney argued. The 
Yugoslavs have shown that the impediments to self-determination at work 
are not rooted in the impersonal demands of technology or industrialization, 
but rather in the power that property still exercises over industrial
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enterprises. Once this power is removed, workers can reorganize industry- 
according to a different and more human set of priorities.
VII
Yet the liberation of industry must be soon not simply as a 
liberation from private ownership and control, but also a liberation from 
the narrow, commercial values associated with that control. For as long 
as the purpose of work is viewed exclusively in terms of maximizing the 
production of material things, rather than as an avenue for the self- 
realization of producers, many of the abuses described earlier will 
continue. To break the hold of the cult of efficiency and productivity, 
we will have to develop a new vision of how industry ought to be organized - 
a vision which focuses not on the quantity of material objects produced 
but on the quality of men’s lives, it must include an understanding that 
happiness is not the same as affluence and that pursuit of the latter may 
prejudice attainment of the former.
This means, first, that the role of work in fostering happiness must 
be given its rightful place in our priorities. Vie must recognize that human 
beings have needs for creativity, self-development, fellowship, and, perhaps 
most importantly, for a sense of purpose in their lives. And we must Bee 
that it is in their work that they are most likely to be able to fulfil 
such needs. Thus to treat them a3 objects, as mere ’hands', is to stifle 
their most fundamental human aspirations. Moreover, because individuals 
require opportunities for self-development, consumer goods cannot offer 
compensation for what they have lost at the workplace. A new automobile 
or a larger stereo is no compensation for a job which chains a human being 
to a monotonous, stultifying task throughout his working life. Indeed, the 
fulfilment arising from exercising a skill or performing a socially worthwhile
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task has a value for the individual which cannot be measured in narrow, 
commercial terms.
Thus we must be willing to sacrifice increased output in favour 
of giving people an opportunity for self-development at the workplaoe. 
Production must be reorganized to enhance the worker*s responsibility and 
control over his work. The stifling constraints of Taylorism and other 
management techniques designed to reduce his autonomy must be removed so 
that he can develop his potential through his work. The enrichment of 
work, not as a management technique designed to extract more output, but 
rather as an end in itself, must become a central aim of social polioy.
For the damage that is done to human beings by methods of production in 
which they are treated merely as 'hands' is simply too high a price to pay 
in a society where demand for the goods so produced must be created by an 
industry - advertising - devoted entirely to cultivating artificial needs.
Secondly, we must replaoe the consumer-oriented values which have 
become such an important part of contemporary society with ones which do 
not equate happiness with the production of greater quantities of material 
goods. We must recognize that eoonomio growth is not necessarily a 
desirable objective even if we have the resources to achieve it. Of course, 
this is a proposition which is difficult to accept in a society where more 
is equated with better and where economic growth is seen as the Cure for 
all our ills.
Indeed, it is conceivable that under the influence of competitive 
market forces and the pressures of a consumer society, even where workers 
did control production they might be persuaded to maximize output at the 
expense of their other needs. Critios of the Yugoslav system have suggested 
that this has happened in some factories there as pressure far success in 
the market place has resulted in the subordination of other objectives, 
including, in some instances, the very participation of workers in decision­
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making which the system is designed to promote. ' Yet the twin fetishes 
of efficiency, as measured in the ratio of inputs to outputs, and growth, 
as measured by the increase in G.N.P., must be seen for what they are* 
substitutes for the much more difficult task of deciding what kind of an 
industrial framework will satisfy our human needs. Under the influence of 
the cult of efficiency and growth, all other conflicting values are 
conveniently swept aside. We do not need to ask whether more oars, 
aeroplanes, motorways and consumer goods are likely to improve our lives* 
the answer is assumed to be self-evident. Moreover, the belief that all our 
problems will be solved if we can only achieve a 3 or 5 per cent rate of 
growth has the unfortunate effeot of stifling arguments about the relative 
merits of different social priorities. It is mistakenly assumed that 
growth will provide everything for everyone. But this belief is refuted 
by innumerable examples of the wasteful and destructive impact of what is 
mistakenly referred to as progress.
The fallaoy of elevating production above all other values is 
demonstrated clearly in the manufacture of automobiles. The assembly line, 
widely heralded by proponents of technological progress as a miracle of 
modern industry, has effectively destroyed all vestiges of craftsmanship 
in the workers whose lives are chained to its unrelenting rhythm. The 
human costs of such methods of production are enormous, as we noted in 
our discussion of the research of Arthur Komhauser and other industrial 
psychologists.
Yet what has this sacrifice of human potential at the workplace
49» Of course, in a country where the per capita income is still much lower 
than in Great Britain, preoccupation with eoonomio development is 
understandable beoause so many of the basio economio needs of people 
remain unfulfilled. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that, once 
Yugoslavia reaches a level of economio performance comparable to her 
Western neighbours, workers will turn their attention to other, non- 
economio matters associated with the quality of their working lives.
49
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accomplished? Production of ever greater numbers of motor cars threatens 
the very lives of our cities. Parks, historio buildings, recreational 
facilities and innumerable other features of the urban landscape, 
including, in some cases, entire communities are bulldozed under to 
provide more and wider roads for the rising number of motor vehicles. In 
London, to give a simple illustration, the high streets of many town 
centres have been turned into virtual motorways, unsafe for pedestrians, 
stinking with .the fumes of lorries and automobiles and utterly laoking 
in peace and quiet. And to what purpose? Simply to enable suburban 
commuters, unwilling to use the public transport system, to drive their 
own cars to work, because it is assumed that if we can afford mare oars 
we must have them.
Until recently, the Department of the Environment was predicting a
doubling of the number of cars by the year 2000 and scheduling a road
building programme accordingly. Yet as the economist, E.J. Mishan, argues,
it is by no means clear that the fulfilment of such a prediction would
50enhance social welfare. If London were able to achieve the same level 
of 'development* as Los Angeles, where almost half the surfaoe area of the 
city is devoted to roads and other facilities for cars, would this be a 
desirable objective to pursue? Obviously not. However, there is little 
indication that the Government is willing to limit the number of automobiles 
produoed and sold, despite their questionable sooial value, for to do so 
would reduce the G.N.P. and challenge the basic assumption of post-war 
economic policy that growth, in whatever form, is benefioial.
The automobile is by no means the only example of production which 
is either positively harmful or of marginal social utility* The manufacture 
of consumer goods for which a market must be created by the advertising 
industry illustrates clearly the foolishness of the quest to maximize
50. E.J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth (Harmondsworth, I969) 
(orig. pub. 19^7).
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output. Ironically, however, the fact that such goods fulfil artificial 
needs does not mean that there is any less pressure to maximize their 
production or that industry is contemplating revising its priorities.
Quite the contrary, increasing expenditures are allocated to developing 
the raw markets which are necessary to absorb these goods. And this, in 
turn, calls for new methods of production designed to extraot even more 
work from employees.
Thus the obsession with production is doubly pernicious. On the one 
hand, it leads us to pursue economic growth even when such growth is likely 
to reduce social welfare. And on the other, it imposes constraints on 
the organization of industry which preclude the satisfactionof worker needs 
on the job. Yet it need not be so. We do have choice in the matter. We 
can decide to eschew further eoonomic development and focus our energies 
on how to transform industry into the kind of place Tawney argued it could 
be. Indeed, if a society can afford coloured televisions,automobiles fitted 
with stereo and the innumerable other gadgets we are told are essential to 
our lives, then it can afford to provide work that is fit for human beings 
to perform.
For example, there is considerable scope for the technical 
reorganization of production if we are willing to forego additional output . 
in order to satisfy the needs of workers. Experiments initiated by 
proponents of job enrichment, such as the General Foods plant at Topeka, 
Kansas, illustrate, however inadequately, some of the possibilities for 
reorganizing production. Yet these experiments have always been subject 
to the constraints of efficiency and profitability, as well as the de­
termination of top management to maintain control over the behaviour of 
workers. Removal of these constraints would facilitate a much more radical 
reorganization of the lay-out of plant and equipment than anything so far 
attempted by those advocating job enrichment. Indeed, once the objective
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of providing fulfilling jobs was firmly established, research and
development could be re—directed to finding technologies and methods
of work which enhanced the role of ordinary workers in production.
Consideration of the workers' needs would be taken into account in the
design of equipment and not considered as an afterthought.
Similarly, the social side of work could be made far more satisfying
once it was accepted that fellowship and co-operation at the workplace
were legitimate objectives. Amajor factor in improving the sooial
satisfactions derived from work is removal of the traditional hierarchical
chain of command designed to facilitate control by those at the top.
Election of foremen and supervisors, as takes place in Yugoslavia, oan
reduce many of the tensions which plague industry in the West. Moreover,
by reorganizing industry on the basis of co-operation among equals, it
becomes possible to develop a sense of common purpose uniting workers in
the pursuit of mutually agreed objectives.
Obviously, the specific changes required will vary from industry to
industry according to the particular problems of each. It is not our
purpose to provide a detailed outline of what should be done in each instance
Rather, it is to stress the need to alter our objectives suoh that the needs
of those who work are given the attention they deserve. It is to challenge
the cult of efficiency growth because our obsession with the pursuit of
these objectives has resulted in a distorted pattern of industrial
organization which wrongly places production of material goods above the
satisfaction of human needs. Indeed, we oan do no better than to re-affirm
Tawney's simple, yet eloquent statement that economic activity in a
democratio society should be founded upon
•..(t)he belief that the machinery of existence - property 
and material wealth and industrial organization and the 
whole fabric and mechanism of social institutions - is to 
be regarded as a means to an end, and that end is the growth 
towards perfection of individual human beings.51
51. R.H. Tawney, Equality, 0£. cit., p. 85. As cited by J.E.T. Eldridge, 
Sociology and Industrial Life (London, 1971) p. 208,
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